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ABSTRACT
COORDINATION AND CONFLICT IN THE GLOBAL APPAREL VALUE CHAIN
Alexander D. Hoppe
Randall Collins
David Grazian

The interdisciplinary paradigm of global value chains gives us a baseline understanding
of how the $1.3 trillion apparel market is organized. Brands are believed to be largely
responsible for industry organization. While there are many case studies of industries like
apparel or electronics, they are rarely carried out with an ethnographic sensibility that
digs into the interactions of conflict, coordination, and execution. My dissertation takes
us inside apparel factories, buying agencies, and textile mills in India. I use
organizational theory, economic sociology, and social psychology to gain an intimate
understanding of how fashionable objects are anticipated, designed, sourced, planned,
constructed, and tested. The chief substantive contribution of the work is the integration
of multiple levels of analysis, from the transnational coordination of forecasting down to
the micro analysis of assembly lines. Additional findings, like the existence of brokerage
networks that mediate design from the global semi-periphery, counter 125 years of
academic and political skepticism. At the brand level, again in contrast to existing
evidence, I find that differences between luxury and discount brands extend throughout
dozens of decisions and quality parameters. Different assessments are partially explained
by occupational positioning. Our self-presentations are cut from global cloth.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Textile and apparel production has a long global history and broad disciplinary
reach. Immigrants have fueled textile industry labor and innovations since the protoindustrial age in Western Europe. “Growing space” for wool and cotton was a major
rationale of one of the largest forced migrations of all time—American Indian removal—
as well as slave transfers from Africa and the American northern colonies to the South
(Wolf 1982:278-85). Enclosure for wool production, famously deplored by Marx, created
the basis for modern Anglo-American property law. The putting-out system, as well as
factory production, brought women into larger public relations with capitalist employers
and national governments. Indeed, the earliest industrial strikes in America were led by
young female textile workers (Zinn 2003:228-31 et passim). Environmental concerns
were awake in 18th century Manchester, while today’s throwaway consumption has
added another knot to a large tangled web of issues. Classical economic arguments on the
European import restriction of Indian and Chinese calicoes were fiercely debated, as are
today’s global trade deals and customs duties.
Where cotton and textiles have been a global industry for over 200 years, “it was
only in the 1950s that a similarly vigorous world trade began in clothing” (Rivoli
2005:84). In 1956, the U.S. imported just one percent of its apparel. This increased to 50
percent in the 1990s. Today imports account for a stunning 97 percent of sales, with
seventy eight percent of these imports from Asia (AAFA 2016:4-5, OTEXA 2022,
Pashigian 1988:944). My dissertation seeks to understand the process of apparel
production within these new conditions. Specifically, I ask how buyers and suppliers
anticipate, source, and manufacture apparel across the global value chain. The
overarching motivation comes from Durkheim’s Division of Labor: “How does it come
about that the individual, while becoming more autonomous, depends ever more closely
upon society? How can he become at the same time more of an individual and yet more
linked to society?” (1893/1997:xxx).
Multi-Level Analysis Across the Value Chain
My dissertation is designed to bridge levels of analysis and social science
disciplines, as well as to correct conventional but misleading artifacts of prior research
designs. In the most abstract view, I seek a pseudo-Leibnizian synopsis that accrues
hundreds of empirical perspectives on work and organizational routines. This allows for
robust ethnographic discoveries and the identification of pressure points in existing
frameworks. Simmel’s work has also been philosophically influential in toggling between
form and content. I will introduce the macro, meso, and micro levels of analysis that
principally inform my perspective shortly, but a brief word on the sociology of fashion is
necessary first. Although for 100 years scholars have noted the distance between
commodity-based textile and apparel production and identity-based fashion
1

consumption, analysis connecting the two sides remains rare (Aspers and Godart 2013b,
Sombart 1913/1967).
I define fashion as dynamic conformity to a modal representation of taste.1 On the
one hand, studies of consumption argue that it is theoretically interesting because it is a
product of collective behavior with deep links to meaning and identity (Crane 2000,
Lieberson 2000, Simmel 1904, Veblen [1899] 2007). Distance from use-value and the
commodity form are marked by a tremendous amount of ambiguity, ambivalence, and
uncertainty (Blumer 1969a, Davis 1992a). Still, among intellectuals it remains widely
undervalued and misunderstood as a process of simple or mindless conformity.
On the other hand, until recently, studies of production subsume aesthetics to
focus on the economic and labor structure of the industry, including trade, development,
and sweatshop conditions (e.g., Aspers 2010b, Collins 2003).2 The paradigm of global
value chains (GVCs), in my view, provides the most shade under its academic and policy
umbrella (Gereffi 2014).3 The most important findings concern governance structures and
processes in political economy—the relationships of power among world regions,
industries, and especially firms (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005). Apparel is a
“buyer-led” or “demand-responsive” value chain, denoting the power of brands to
leverage customer relationships and monopolize high-value services among themselves—
e.g., branding and design—while leaving low-value tasks like assembly to their suppliers
(Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1980, Gereffi 1999). Export-oriented industrialization is
arguably the most important policy on the supplier side (Hamilton and Shin 2015).
Between production and consumption the “chain” metaphor is an accessible and
powerful starting point. Whether we are speaking of commodity chains, value chains, or
interaction rituals chains, the metaphor directs our attention to distributions of power that
are both durable and flexible (Collins 2004, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986, Porter 1985).
It allows consideration of structural linkages, long-term governance relations (including
geographies of exploitation), and integration along chains in a way that is sensitive to the
total strategic trajectory of production and consumption (Appadurai 1986, Mintz 1986,
Molotch 2003). Finally, unlike frozen networks or rushing processes, chains remind us of
the programmatic organizational divisions of labor and of time—of sequences of action.
These are important across every level, and indeed we will see how the time horizon for
action constantly diminishes in the movement from design toward assembly lines.
The three major levels of analysis that I consider are GVCs, business
administration, and ethnographic organizational routines. My study is concentrated
within a single industry and is not, of course, empirically comprehensive; this is never
1

This definition was the product of my BA thesis and could be the subject of an
independent chapter. For now, suffice to say that is a component-part definition built on
precepts from Durkheim, Simmel, Bourdieu, and Moscovici.
2
Benzecry’s (2022) work on shoes has a strong aesthetic sensibility but was published
too recently to incorporate here.
3
Global production networks are a popular alternative in geography (Coe and Yeung
2019), but I think the distinction is inflated and primarily represents anti-capitalist
boundary work (see Gieryn 1983).
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possible.4 Still, I hope it goes some way toward satisfying the repeated requests for
integration among leading scholars of interaction, occupations, and globalization (Abbott
1993, Collins 1988, Guillén 2001, Layder 2006).
First, GVCs represent at least a window into the macro-historical territory of
comparative political economy. My research critiques the lack of dynamism in current
models and analyses, specifically identifying a decades-long ideological bias toward
unique capabilities, or the presumption of geographically and jurisdictionally restricted
functional expertise. We will get to this later, but unlike other macro paradigms, GVC
theory can be more easily revised to account for the empirical changes that I document in
the rest of the dissertation. Discussion is abbreviated here but is available in Chapter 2
and in a separate article manuscript focusing on financialization and outsourcing.
Certainly GVC strategies need to be implemented and balanced in practice.
Second, my dissertation offers a new path toward micro/macro integration by
focusing on intra-organizational structures and process. I disregard managerial versus
social scientific territories in my analysis, drawing as freely from strategy and
organization studies as from industrial or cultural sociology. In sociology, apart from a
one-sided labor process theory and some spare change from the economic sub-field
(Baron and Bielby 1980, Biggart and Beamish 2003), intra-organizational structures and
process have not been taken seriously since the excision of functionalism.5 While the
hesitation to study cultural elites has ended, managerial decision-making remains
anathema (Jackall 1988, Prechel 1994 are exceptions). We need to recognize the full
complexity of a managerial labor process as well. Eschewing its study for ethical or
epistemological (standpoint) reasons denies us both an understanding of internal
workplace authority and an external recognition of agency—leadership, skill, corruption,
and exploitation included—in emerging economies.
Business scholars, meanwhile, build their theoretical foundations for
organizations where sociology leaves off—with minimal rebounds to sociology (Oswick,
Fleming and Hanlon 2011). Like economics, mainstream organizational theory evinces a
strong preference for abstraction and positivism (Akerlof 2020, Barley and Kunda 2001).
The two places where practices occasionally escape instant objectification include a
recent movement toward strategy as practice6 and a long history of business
administration. I draw on the Carnegie School of administrative theory when attending to
the political and social-psychological realities of occupational niches (Barnard
1938/1960, March and Simon 1958). I argue that the compartmentalization of routine
4

But see for instance Ramamurthy (2004) or Quark (2013) on cotton farming and
standardization further back in the GVC.
5
Thanks to Willie Ocasio for discussion on this point with, of course, any blame accruing
only to myself. Perrow and Stinchcombe are possible exceptions.
6
This is traceable to Heidegger (Chia and Holt 2006) and the sociological practice
theories of Giddens, Bourdieu, and others who are vaguely cited and quickly left behind.
Sociologists may eschew philosophy, but we do work with an understanding of schools,
identities, and traditions. To me the recency bias in management journals appears rather
extreme.
3

activities solves problems of uncertainty at the macro level by reintroducing coordination
problems at meso and micro levels of occupational niches and organizational routines.
Third, I attend to the ethical and creative dilemmas of social interaction by
studying organizational routines as a unit of analysis (Feldman and Pentland 2003,
Leidner 1993). Like the GVC paradigm, otherwise valuable Carnegie studies of
administrative behavior typically lack an ethnographic appreciation of context, dynamic
interaction, and descriptive color (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Cyert and March
1992). Everett Hughes and the Chicago School, on the other hand, leverage Simmel and
pragmatist philosophy in the established genre of workplace ethnography (e.g., Hughes
1959, Roy 1959).7 Their emphasis on activity, interaction, and habit provide sociological
micro-foundations for the study of work (Camic 1986, Joas 1996).
The next section introduces what I call the ideology of unique capabilities. It
serves as an immanent critique. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the apparel GVC, the
Indian context, and the suppliers, brands, and buying agencies I studied. Chapter 3
tackles design and product development, headlining the empirical critique against unique
capabilities. This is extended in Chapter 4 on marketing. Chapter 5 moves into product
management; it introduces decreasing time horizons and increasing time pressures that
accelerate in the next chapter. Chapter 6 covers factory planning and industrial
engineering, showing how “rational” expectations for labor time are buffered across half
a dozen layers of organizational routines.8
The Problem of Unique Capabilities
I define unique capabilities as a presumption of geographically and
jurisdictionally restricted functional expertise. Critiques can be applied to other areas of
study, but I focus only on apparel here, where it peaked roughly between 1990 and 2010.
In these years it served as a necessary rebuke to techno-utopian globalists, but the
argument that “place matters” has gone too far. Strong versions cross a line from
comparative advantage (which merely appreciates location-based assets) into the
metrocentric claim that some places are so special that only they can generate meaningful
and mobile symbolic production. “Affluent people across the globe may wear Armani
suits to their meetings,” proponents say, “but only one world region could generate those
specific garments” (Molotch 2002:665). The historical and interdisciplinary consistency
of skepticism merits serious critique.
There are three phases of unique capability arguments. I will introduce the first
two briefly. The first phase primarily represents political and intellectual foundations. It
includes Adam Smith’s discussion of home bias through an “invisible hand,” which is a
“natural inclination” to favor domestic rather than foreign investment ([1776] 1976:4777

Robin Leidner (through Howard Becker) is a second-generation student of Hughes.
I have also gathered extensive data on efficiency monitoring and risk management,
including human resources, corporate social responsibility, sustainability, and anti-union
organizing.
4
8

8).9 This continues through Weber and in modernization theory, both soundly critiqued
by Collins (1997) and Guillén (2001). The second phase begins around 1900, at least in
the U.S., with the beginning of dedicated economic and policy analysis of the apparel
industry. Claims like the following, from the Committee on the Regional Plan of New
York and Its Environs, are typical: “On the whole, it seems likely that the women’s
garment industry will be one of the last industries in which fabrication will be forced to
abandon Manhattan” (Selekman 1925:21).
The third phase of unique capabilities, beginning around 1960, is directly or
indirectly articulated against a background of import competition. Arguments share two
features. First, fashion design is consistently positioned as a high-value, highly skilled,
and culturally expressive task. Second, there is a consistent refusal to recognize the
possibility of emerging economy suppliers “upgrading into design” or providing
competitive value-added services. The word “possibility” is important. It goes beyond
strict empirical changes—including slow-moving world-systems development and sector
changes like those recognized by Wallerstein (2004:1-41)—to penetrate the logic of
resistance. Before lining up these arguments, however, some theoretical setup is required.
Grounds of the Critique
The methodological strategy of immanent critique is derived from Kant, Hegel,
and Marx; its philosophical parameters are discussed elsewhere (cf. Antonio 1981,
Munch 1981). Presumably because of the impact of positivism, this strategy is not widely
deployed or well-understood in U.S. sociology. Fortunately, in this chapter I have a very
simple goal: I seek to explain “why other theories reach limits they cannot transcend”
(slightly modified from Calhoun and Karaganis 2001:180-81). I argue that the ideology
of unique capabilities constitutes an epistemological blockage in the realm of supplier
upgrading and emerging economy development. Identifying or uncovering it should
require recalibrations in many of the middle-range theories below. Perhaps more
importantly, I am interested in the quest for a social science which is less burdened by the
stultification of model-building and the inertia of general linear reality (Abbott 1997). I
still certainly want analysis to depend on materiality, practice, and valuation, but there are
other sources of fuel that build reality, including interaction, expectations, and
inspiration. I rarely cite Simmel in this dissertation, but I am convinced that many
generative aspects of his theorizing have been overlooked.
Most of the theories, methods, and case studies that I critique below are in a
middle range which has dominated work since Parsons. In many ways they represent
improvements over prior “grand” theories like modernization. I think, however, that like
the engineers I analyze in Chapter 6, we have felt too safe in believing the middle range
9

I have read the entire two volumes of Wealth of Nations and this is the only place the
phrase appears in the book. Context includes the related benefits of trust, understanding
of local laws, and the visibility and authority of local control ([1776] 1976:386-405).
Similar theorizing is available in Babbage ([1835] 1963:219-24) and Collins and Quark
(2007); see the section on embeddedness below.
5

to be free of bias—something both Merton and critical theorists cautioned against.
Instead, Parsons himself offers some lessons I think we have forgotten: “Methodological
considerations enter in when we go behind [research techniques] to inquire whether the
procedures by which this observation and verification have been carried out—including
the formulation of propositions and the concepts involved in them, and the modes of
drawing conclusions from them—are legitimate” (1968:24, italics added). This is a
diplomatic way of talking about ideology.
Ideology is “naturally” difficult to avoid, but combining varied examples to build
concepts is the technique that brought us “ethnocentrism” in the first place (Hughes 1961,
Sumner 1904/1940:27-28). With Sumner, I want to be clear that the label of “unique
capabilities” is my own analytical construction. It crosses a sizeable number of
disciplines and authors who sometimes do and sometimes do not rely on each other for
their claims. It encompasses different kinds of mechanisms. All of the arguments,
however, possess at least a hint of ethnocentrism—directly, logically, or by omission.
Most of the authors make specific claims about the apparel industry, and I have been very
aggressive in tracing these exact passages, distinguishing them from abstract theoretical
sweeps with signals like “see generally.” I think this is because fashion and apparel are
easy targets. Too often there are no consequences in making assumptions about both
feminized consumers who are engaged with fashion and invisible producers who are
assumed to be undertaking simple tasks in traditional industries in faraway places.
I grant that Asian firms have historically played a subordinate role in buyer-led
GVCs. My argument is rather that theories which presume unique capabilities
overemphasize this history at the expense of contemporary transformations. There are at
least three potential weapons which may be deployed in combat. One option is
postcolonial theory and its variants, which certainly helps to uncover the broad biases of
Orientalism and metro-centrism (Connell 1997, Hung 2003, Said 1978/1994). Go
(2013:36), for example, argues that Weber, Durkheim, and Marx all viewed the Orient as
“lacking and static.”10 This level of analysis, however, is too expansive for the analysis of
a specific industry. An alternative is the strategic management thesis on dynamic
capabilities and the broader resource-based view (e.g., Barney 1991, Teece, Pisano and
Shuen 1997, Teece 2014). This literature centers firm resources and managerial
cognition, but is impaired by its emphasis on inimitability of tacit knowledge.11 There are
exceptions (Arndt, Katic, Mistry et al. 2021), but in most global applications it has been
crowded out by a problematic international business agenda which centers (Western)
technological innovations and the control, command, and search activities of multinational enterprises (see below).
I thus take GVC work on upgrading as my point of departure. I will analyze its
shortcomings below, but it has two major benefits: a political economy perspective that
centers governance, industries and firms, and the specific mechanism of industrial
10

Orientalist commentary on the textile industries of India and Great Britain is available
in Baines (1835:55-74 et passim), along with an analysis of protectionism (1835:77-82,
323-25) in conversation with Smith.
11
The intellectual upstream comes from Ricardo, Coase, Williamson, and Vernon (see
below).
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upgrading. First, GVC theory originated at the intersection of international economics,
international business, strategy, and the sociology of development.12 At the broadest level
of global political economy, despite internal disagreements, there is widespread
acknowledgement that changes within the last 30-70 years are driven by semi-peripheral
and peripheral integration. This includes a pattern of decentralizing global cities and
multi-national enterprises (Alcácer, Cantwell and Piscitello 2016, Castells 2010, ChaseDunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000:88, Giddens 2000:24-37, Guillén 2001, Sassen 2016).
GVC theory incorporates these shifts in its signature concept of functional integration
(Gereffi 1996:132-37, Krugman, Cooper and Srinivasan 1995).
The second GVC benefit is the mechanism of upgrading, or the “process of
improving the ability of a firm or an economy to move into more profitable and/or
technologically sophisticated capital- and skill-intensive niches” (Gereffi 1999:51-52).13
At the macro-economic level recent years have witnessed the what we might call an
ecosystem-wide upgrading of trade in goods to trade in tasks (WTO and IDE-JETRO
2011). With transnational brands we see trends of financialization and supply chain
consolidation (Gereffi 2014, Milberg 2008, Soener 2015). Most importantly for my
analysis, we see significant upgrading among suppliers. Full package component
sourcing has been a standard feature for some time (Gereffi 1999). Large suppliers have
moved into inventory management and wide-ranging subcontracting arrangements as
well (Appelbaum 2008, Azmeh and Nadvi 2014, Shin 2017). With Sako and Zylberberg
(2017), I argue that a proper understanding of supplier strategy is necessary for
theoretical advancement. The need is especially clear for what is arguably a new class of
large and powerful first-tier suppliers identified by Appelbaum (2008) and Dallas (2015).
Design is the Achilles heel in the evaluation of semi-peripheral upgrading. In
addition to my work on India, it has been reported in case studies from Korea (Shin
2017), Turkey (Tokatli, Wrigley and Kızılgün 2008b, Tokatli and Kızılgün 2009), and
Bangladesh (Sinkovics, Hoque and Sinkovics 2018). However, examples are few, details
are sparse, evidence is thin, and skepticism and ambivalence are prevalent. My
assessment, based on fieldwork and interviews, is that supply-side design is now expected
of large and medium-sized first-tier suppliers in India and China, to say the least. This is
a clear minority of total suppliers, but it is a mistake to assume that upgrading into design
is impossible or unlikely, as so many have done. Without the ethnographic study of work
12

Bair (2009) takes a more sociological view of its origins, for better and for worse. The
advantage is coverage of perhaps a wider set of founders, including Hopkins and
Wallerstein on commodity chains. The disadvantage is that it downplays Vernon’s
influence on Gereffi, who is to me clearly the leading GVC theorist; Gereffi himself
regularly identifies firms as the lynchpins and drivers of GVCs. Another casualty is the
massive impact of Michael Porter on the field of strategy. A newer edited volume on
GVCs (Part 4 of Ponte, Gereffi and Raj-Reichert 2019) and the launch of the Global
Strategy Journal pick up these possibilities.
13
As far as I can tell, this concept comes from industrial economics, modern strategy
(including SWOT analysis at Harvard Business School), and a long-term economic
interest in imperfect markets. Porter (1991:111) offers a similar definition.
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and organizational routines, we run the risk of theorizing with petrified images and
concepts (Barley and Kunda 2001:82).
The Modern Argument for Unique Capabilities
The modern phase of unique capabilities begins with the rise of GVCs and policy
anxieties about offshoring. An underlying motivation was to explain and predict strategic
jurisdictions in the new international division of labor (Fröbel et al. 1980, Vernon 1979).
Theories of post-industrial society, flexible specialization, the new international division
of labor, and creative cities all argue that high-value, culturally expressive, or temporally
exigent work like fashion design is decidedly not susceptible to offshoring. Competing
paradigms including world-systems analysis or GVCs at least create a theoretical space
for offshoring, though here too, proponents invent new analytical defenses to render
skilled offshoring unlikely at best. Either patternmaking, cutting, tailoring, quality
control, and design do not constitute high-value, skilled, or culturally expressive
services—in which case we must ask why we have spent the last half century classifying
them exclusively in this way14 and what has changed—or we need to face the legacy of
unique capabilities as an ideology.
Weak versions endorse a slow, developmental view of foreign investment and
knowledge transfer, suggesting an invisible hand that restrains offshore upgrading. Strong
versions are metrocentric and distinguished by references to exclusive cultural
capabilities. Positions are illustrated in Table 1; examples are distributed throughout the
paper on topical grounds. The bottom line of what I am arguing is that we have a
situation in which the offshoring of design works in practice, but not in theory.
Table 1: Range of Unique Capability Arguments ............................................................ 8
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Table 3: Design Samples................................................................................................ 92
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Table 1: Range of Unique Capability Arguments

Unique Capabilities
Endorsement
Strong

Scholar(s)

Disciplinary Focus

Aspers
Currid-Halkett

Economic Sociology
Cultural Geography,
Urban Planning
Management, Urban
Planning

Florida

14

I focus on design, which is presumably less susceptible to deskilling via automation,
but justifications for the impossibility of offshoring other tasks relied on the same unique
capability justifications (cf. Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond et al. 1999:132-44, Sassen
1988:163, Tokatli 2008:25-26, Waldinger 1986:69, Zeitlin and Totterdill 1989:167).
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Jacobs
Molotch
Moderate

Weak

Abernathy et al.
Buckley
Duranton and Puga
Fröbel et al.
Piore and Sabel
Sassen
Schrank
J. Collins
Gereffi
Porter
Scott
Uzzi

Urban Studies, Journalism
Community and Urban
Sociology
Mechanical Engineering
International Business
Regional and Urban
Economics
Labor Economics
Labor Economics
Political Sociology
Industrial Sociology
Community and Rural
Sociology
Economic Sociology,
Political Science
Strategy, Industrial
Economics
Cultural Geography
Management

The dominant sector model of long-term economic change, which analyzes the
changing distribution of tasks, reserves high-value, high-skill, and culturally intensive
work for advanced economies (Bell 1973, Clark 1940, Giddens 2007:61-67, Vernon
1979, Wallerstein 2004).15 I will show that this model has diffused but continues to
dominate sociological, geographic, urban/regional, political, economic, and strategic
analysis of the apparel industry. I will argue that research theorizing barriers to entry has
given so much attention to either fashion capitals or sweatshop labor that it has crowded
out targeted investigation of the first-tier suppliers most likely to engage in design. In
short, we need to recognize the operation of a methodological attention space (Barley and
Kunda 1992, Collins 1998, Merton 1936, Simon 1997:92-139).
Unique capability arguments are inherently comparative and might be applied to
any sector, but a review of the literature on apparel shows that design has consistently
received special treatment as a time-sensitive, high-value, or culturally intensive skill that
is geographically restricted. The critique here has four sections that move from generally
economic toward generally cultural rationales. It includes skepticism motivated by
theories of uneven international development, GVCs, agglomeration and embeddedness,
and creative cities.
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Specific discussions of intangible work characteristics are available in Castells (2010),
Liu and Grusky (2013), and Florida (2012). Cultural “skill” is sometimes awkward for
sociologists, but it remains a major part of neo-Weberian scholarship (Attewell 1990,
Bourdieu 1984a, Collins 1997).
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Uneven International Development
One of the most notable features of mainstream economic commentary on the
fashion industry is the failure to recognize the institutional dimensions of markets. As
with Smith, protectionism, status, and social capital in core countries typically appears as
imperfect, irrational, and fundamentally accidental (Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan
2004, Gregory 1948, Pesendorfer 1995, Rivoli 2005, but see Robinson 1961). In core
countries, the economic rationale for outsourcing is defined by the search for scarce
factor inputs (especially cheap labor). This creates a comparative advantage which can be
leveraged into research and development, higher capital stocks, higher productivity, or
increased value capture (see generally Bhagwati et al. 2004, Krugman 1991, Porter
1990). By the other side of the same neoliberal coin, sweatshops offer an appropriate
development strategy for emerging economies (Krugman 1997, Myerson 1997, Powell
2014, Rivoli 2005:86-107). Krugman (2019) has since admitted that mainstream
economists did not anticipate the accelerating functional integration of GVCs in the
1990s, but the orthodoxy of sweatshop development holds. The expectation is one of
Asian imitation, not innovation (Abrami, Kirby and McFarlan 2014).
World-systems analysis is highly sensitive to protectionism and critical of uneven
development, but here too the global semi-periphery is functionally conceived as
providing an industrial reserve army and effectively staving off revolts from the
periphery. Measured by the percentage of production workers, apparel is clearly one of
the most labor-intensive major industries. The contribution of production activities to
value is low, with the U.S. value-added per employee at 78 times that of an Indian
employee in the clothing industry (Balchen and Becker 1983:5-7, OECD 2004:77, Shils
1966:18). Relying on a case study of textiles and apparel in Germany, Wallerstein (1974)
acknowledges increasing decomposition of the labor process, yet argues that exportoriented industrialization will reserve complex work for developed economies.16 The
Marxist new international division of labor thesis also relies on textile and apparel data in
Germany versus export-processing zones in semi-peripheral countries; there are similar
difficulties of semi-peripheral upgrading (Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1978, Fröbel et al.
1980). Marxist scholarship, like neoliberal economics and the prior study of Orientalism,
bifurcates complex versus routine labor. For now, I want the reader to further note the
large substantive residuals of macro-economic theory and its general inability to account
for politics, place, and social interaction.
Global Value Chains
The unique capability claims in GVC research are logically based in macro
economics, strategy, international business, and a cultural interpretation of transaction
cost economics (Alcácer and Oxley 2014, Buckley and Strange 2015, Porter 1990).
16

Sklair (1993) develops a similar arugment for automobile assembly in Mexico by
putting transnational corporations in the place of core states.
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Downstream from the home bias of Smith, arguments focus on the monopolization of
value by firms in advanced economies.17 GVC scholars make some of the strongest
claims about categorizing design as highly-skilled work; they also offer some of the most
principled and specific arguments about why offshoring is strategically unlikely. A few
GVC scholars18 challenged an earlier segment of unique capability arguments under the
guise of flexible specialization (Collins 2001, Tokatli 2008), but these criticisms are
relatively narrow, rest on light evidence, and retain opposition to or ambivalence about
the offshoring of design.
GVC research on the apparel industry has largely failed to discover supply-side
design not because it empirically absent, but because (a) lead firms are analytically and
methodologically privileged (Gereffi 1994, Milberg 2013), while (b) suppliers, even with
sympathetic treatment, are often lumped into the anonymity of a sweatshop-laden “global
assembly line” (Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983, Sassen 1991:10). Apparel is the
prototypical example of a “buyer-driven” chain, where “profits come from combinations
of high-value research, design, sales, marketing, and financial services that allow the
retailers, designers and marketers to act as strategic brokers” (Gereffi 1994, Gereffi and
Frederick 2010:11, Vernon 1979). Theoretical motivations for the bifurcation of value
hinge on comparative advantage, strategic positioning, and a cultural interpretation of
transaction cost economics.
As lead firms with direct customer relationships, the competitive advantage of
buyers is built on brand equity (Heintz 2006). By traditional GVC theories of
governance, power is based on core competence and barriers to entry, including control
over design and marketing (Buckley and Strange 2015, Gereffi 1996:434, Prahalad and
Hamel 1990). This includes rents based on asset specificity and symbolic geography—
e.g., brand names and the prestige associated with Western fashion capitals like Paris
(Porter 1980:280, Tokatli 2012). Authors specifically and repeatedly argue that branded
firms have “tenaciously held on to product conception, design, and marketing—the
highest value-added activities—while subcontracting production” (Bonacich, Cheng,
Chinchilla et al. 1994a, Collins 2001:177, Collins 2003:119, Gereffi and Frederick
2010:7). If there is any design input from suppliers, it ostensibly amounts to no more than
changes in technical specifications originally provided by brands (Aspers 2010a:191-95,
Bair and Mahutga 2012:281, Collins 2003:119, Fernandez-Stark, Frederick and Gereffi
2011:11, Schmitz and Knorringa 2000:196-200). The pathbreaking research of Tokatli
identifies some suppliers who have gone further, though she qualifies her sites as
exceptional cases with low design percentages and remains skeptical of broader upgrades
Key papers on industrial organization and value capture include the “smile curve” and
a case study of personal electronics (Dedrick, Kraemer and Linden 2010, Mudambi
2008). Dedrick and his colleagues argue that Apple has higher value capture and gross
margins relative to its suppliers because of brand equity and greater control (or at least
bargaining power) over supply chain management. Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994:18)
offer a Marxist reading of the same general phenomenon which, as usual, shortchanges
consumption.
18
As a reminder, I am using GVCs as an umbrella label, in this case covering commodity
chain and GPN identities.
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(Tokatli and Kizilgün 2004, Tokatli et al. 2008b:273, Tokatli and Kızılgün 2009:154-56,
60).
One strategic response is for buyers to deliberately block suppliers from
upgrading into design, either by restricting information-sharing or threatening to diminish
contracts (Alcácer and Oxley 2014 on personal electronics, Aspers and Skov 2006:809,
Humphrey and Schmitz 2002 on footwear). The logic is that limited information-sharing
is a defensive move which prevents suppliers from striking out on their own (see also
Tokatli 2007). The GVC position on design can be summarized with the following
statement: because Western buyers “are intolerant of competition in the highly profitable
design, marketing, and distribution sectors, relegation to lower return manufacturing
activity may therefore constitute the inherent price of [supplier] participation in the
apparel commodity chain” (Schrank 2004:138).
Suppliers, for their part, appear limited by market uncertainty, grinding
competition, and a lack of cultural skill. First, fashion is notoriously difficult to predict,
so firms who want to upgrade must face the vagaries of uncertain consumer demand,
including the temporal pressures of fast fashion (Cachon and Swinney 2011). While
Western brands diminish uncertainty by using trend forecasting and collective selection
processes at fashion weeks in Paris, New York, London, and Milan, suppliers in
emerging economies have smaller travel budgets and are sometimes deliberately
marginalized from participation. Chinese manufacturers, in particular, are seen as
intellectual property pariahs at trade fairs and forecasting presentations (Lantz 2016:103,
67-70, Skov 2006:779). Second, brands reportedly see suppliers as interchangeable, so
even if suppliers invest in upgrading, advantages will be short-lived and difficult to
sustain (Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond et al. 2004:41-2, Buckley 2009, Schrank 2004,
Tokatli and Kızılgün 2009:160). Fragmented supplier markets mean that brands can play
suppliers off of each other (noted by Marshall 1920/1961:297, Porter 1980:191-214).
Third, suppliers are said to be without access to the geographic, cultural, and tacit
foundations of unique capabilities. I address these claims below.
Agglomeration and Embeddedness
It is possible that the arguments of macro economics, international business, and
GVCs fail to recognize the offshoring of high-value work because they are undersocialized. Granovetter (1985) offers this general critique of Williamson; Lee (2005)
offers this critique of Collins’ research on apparel assembly in Mexico. Research on
agglomeration and embeddedness may offer a corrective. Industry examples are available
in Marshall (1920/1961:268-71), who gives the example of Plantagenet and Tudor kings
inviting Flemish artisans to create a local base of production, leading to improvements in
weaving, lace-making, and silk production.19 Later research applied Marshall’s regional
19

At this stage fabric dyeing was too complex to outsource, however, and remained in
Flanders (Marshall 1920/1961:268-71). Migrants went on to develop the Manchester
cotton textile industry, which Hodos (2011:24-25) identifies as the first Marshallian
industrial district.
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insights to industrial districts in Italy, the one-time world leader of textile and apparel
exports. It was championed as a hub of flexible specialization enriched by community
trust (Piore and Sabel 1984:213-16, 65-67, Porter 1990).20 The concept of flexible
specialization was immediately recognized for its applicability to the Garment District of
New York and had an enormous impact on policy arguments in the U.S. and Western
Europe (Florida 2012:189, Hirsch 1986a:1260, Waldinger 1986, Zeitlin and Totterdill
1989). Unfortunately, the focus on agglomeration, embeddedness, and “special” regions
created another path toward unique capabilities. New York moved to center stage in the
media and in scholarly research. Since then, as I will show, “there is something about
New York that seems to produce not infrequent myopia” (Demerath 1962:863).21
The macro context privileging New York and other fashion capitals is one of
polarization, command, and control. Marshall long ago extended his argument about
agglomeration to the international level with an early iteration of the transitional sector
model (1920/1961:273-77). Scholarship on the knowledge economy emerged in the
1950s, followed by the more specific thesis of a Western post-industrial society. New
York comes to center stage as a “headquarters city”; it is simultaneously acknowledged
that “more and more manufacturing of the standardized sort will move to the poorer
sections of the world” (Bell 1973:484-85, Bluestone 1984:45, Sassen 1991). New York is
specially marked by all the classic assets of professionalism (1973:374), including the
skills of abstract rationality that are necessary for command and control.22 Invoking the
product cycle thesis (see below), Bell argues that “control of the product, in many
industries, will remain with the multi-national corporation” (1973:484). Similar and more
specific claims about unique capabilities and control—now attached directly to either the
U.S., New York, or Los Angeles—show up repeatedly in dedicated analyses of apparel
production (Abernathy et al. 1999:15n33, 129-44, 239, Doeringer and Crean 2006:361).23
Access to knowledge transfers and the agglomeration dynamics of New York is
also viewed as important for coping with “demand uncertainty” and rising consumer
preferences for product differentiation in fashion.24 Brands in a post-industrial society
20

On the independent parameters of trust and social capital in Italy, see Putnam,
Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993). Whitford’s critical review of the Italian language literature
on industrial districts (2001) reveals substantial underlying heterogeneity and
consolidation through business groups.
21
Demerath’s critique takes aim at Vernon, a progenitor of both GVC research and
product life cycle analysis (see below). Vernon began his career by studying the industry
and occupations of New York (Hoover and Vernon 1962) before transitioning to the
study of multi-national corporations.
22
A postcolonial critique might identify these skills as those necessary for the
maintenance of empire (Go 2013, Radhakrishnan 2007). A statement of classic
professional criteria is available in Parsons (1939); Abbott’s synthesis (1988b) focuses on
jurisdiction.
23
Doeringer and Piore were graduate students together under Dunlop.
24
Differentiation since the 1970s is well-established (Abernathy et al. 1999, Pashigian
1988). Possible explanations include informalization and the loss of purchasing power in
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need to be especially innovative. One way they achieve this is by embedding their
headquarters in fashion capitals. Early advocates of urban design resources include
Jacobs (1969:12, 51, 85-121, 237-39), who used textile and apparel examples from
England and New York City, and Vernon (1966, 1979) with his generic product cycle
approach. Duranton and Puga (2000, 2001, 2004) bring these approaches together in their
work on the micro-foundations of agglomeration. At the level of the city or industrial
district, they argue that “nursery cities” like New York spawn innovations through
interactive exposure within and across economic sectors (see also Florida, Adler and
Mellander 2017, Godart 2015, Scott 2000:171-202). Industrial diversity boosts
innovation by improving organizational learning and decreasing transaction costs. More
specifically, firms can learn about ideal production processes through rapid, interactive
prototype development. Although firms in other industries commonly relocate after the
initial phase of prototyping, relocation is less common in traditional industries like
apparel (Duranton and Puga 2001:1457-58). Small batches, quick turnarounds, and
responses to consumer demand apparently cannot be replicated in faraway industrial
clusters like those in Bangladesh (Abernathy, Volpe and Weil 2006:2229-30).
Embeddedness is the relational counterpart to agglomeration. Mechanisms are
similar but more socialized. We see from Uzzi—a student of Granovetter—how the colocation of retail, marketing, design, and sourcing in a nursery city creates both efficiency
and trust. In his high-profile studies of New York apparel manufacturers (1996, 1997),
Uzzi shows how structurally embedded ties generate thick information transfer, feedback,
and joint problem-solving. These studies clearly show how localization replaces market
transactions with embedded ties. They show how advance information seems to depend
on local interactions. (We will see more radical emphases on interaction below).
However, they consider only how embeddedness can optimize local market relationships
to the ethnocentric detriment of a GVC vision. As a result, the view of industry structure
that we receive is myopic. It replicates the local functionalism of Piore and Sabel,
privileging the quest for temporary optimization and failing to attend to external
linkages.25 By misrepresenting ethnographic involvement and emphasizing just the right
amount of embedded autonomy within a sample of suppliers in New York amidst
massive changes in the apparel GVC, we miss the forest for the trees.
There were signs of secular city and domestic declines long before the end of the
import-restricting Multi-Fiber Agreement in 2005.26 U.S. textile and apparel employment
peaked in 1977 (Department of Commerce 1994, p. 32-1). During that decade journalists
reported on “apparel’s last stand” and the American Apparel Manufacturers Association
warned that “imports are taking over one product [category] after another… No one is
immune to import competition” (Business Week 1979, Council on Wage and Price
Stability 1978:iii, Priestland 1971:65). Uzzi himself notes a shift among large buyers
a shrinking middle class, leading to an expansion of the discount retail segment (Rosen
2002:179).
25
See Gereffi (1996:428) and Collins (2001) for earlier GVC critiques of flexible
specialization. See also Hamilton and Shin (2015:397) on embedded autonomy.
26
See Figure 1. According to Waldinger (1986:68), whom Uzzi cites, New York City’s
manufacturing decline began already in the 1930s.
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from “relationship buying” to “numbers buying” amidst a wave of acquisitions in the
1980s (1997:58); Bluestone (1982:156) gives the example of Mobil Oil buying
Montgomery Ward. The American Apparel and Footwear Association later reported that
“the apparel industry has stood on the front lines of the massive globalization trends that
have swept the country, and indeed, the world during the 1990’s” (AAFA 2000:3). More
than 100,000 apparel manufacturing jobs were lost in New York state alone between
1978 and 1999 (AAFA 2000:12). Today fewer than 1,500 apparel manufacturing
establishments remain in New York state (BLS 2012). Los Angeles has attracted a
fraction of these lost jobs, though analysis there continues to rely on the same restrictive
explanations of unique capabilities (Williams and Currid-Halkett 2011).
Uzzi is not alone. Indeed other authors have been more optimistic about the power
of agglomeration and embedded relationships to maintain U.S. production (Doeringer and
Crean 2006, Kanter 1995, Rantisi 2002). The deep challenge here is one of
methodology—the kind of methodology that never forgets theory and context. I certainly
acknowledge that it is impossible to be simultaneously attuned to history, industry
structure, multi-level analysis, triangulation through different types of data, and an
unending list of considerations. The real problem is that none of these scholars are alone
in their stances befitting unique capabilities. The ideology crosses many disciplines and
multiple levels of analysis.
Creative Cities as Special Places
The strongest claims of unique capabilities are culturally based. They emerge
from urban studies, economic geography, and the sociology of consumption. Again New
York is featured as a temple of unique capabilities. Now, having lived and done
fieldwork there myself, I know that the city is an excellent place to conduct research. I
also know that “New Yorkers don’t take the downgrading of their town lightly” (Becker
1998:17). Still, New York is not the only place to study fashion (Hoppe 2020a). We miss
so much without proper comparative investigation.
Proponents in the most recent phase of unique capability arguments recognize that
a global shift in apparel manufacturing has occurred, but they remain skeptical of the idea
that creative designs can be executed without the atmosphere or human resources of
Western fashion capitals (Godart, Maddux, Shipilov et al. 2015). Creative cities pull in
the best talent—a point already argued by Marshall—but more importantly, they provide
opportunities for cultural encounters which cannot be generated elsewhere or accessed
from afar. Tacit knowledge and the place-based externalities of interaction are framed as
valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable.
While I do not dispute that co-presence creates emotional energy and focused
attention, there are three micro-foundational arguments that differentiate unique
capability propositions from general microsociological claims: (1) proximity generates a
special kind of organic innovation; (2) places have a non-fungible “character” that
materializes in cultural production; and (3) symbolic production requires immediately
accessible cultural skill. While each of these claims has some merit as middle-range
theory, they go too far in arguing that spatial and institutional arrangements could not be
15

organized differently.27 Divisions between skillful design in fashion capitals and simple
manufacturing in emerging economies must be broken up to account for the empirical
transitions detailed in the rest of the dissertation.
Street-level serendipity
Taste and innovation are constructed through interaction and inter-subjective
perception. Claims shade into the territory of unique capabilities when they unduly stress
the inimitability of unplanned or informal interactions in fashion capitals. Weak versions
merely assign methodological convenience to fashion capitals, assuming that the
processes of collective selection happen similarly elsewhere (Blumer 1969a). In strong
versions, informal encounters supersede GVCs or alternative institutional arrangements.
“Creative industry innovation is not a product of hierarchical supplier-core industry or
collaborative and competitive relationships within one industry,” Currid-Halkett argues.
“Rather, it results from a heterarchical peer review process across the cultural economy”
(2007:127n20). The most radical arguments go so far as to claim that “Asia’s great cities
are the biggest and densest in the world, but their innovative and creative impetus pales in
comparison to places like New York” because they lack the “pedestrian-friendly scale”
which allows for “street-level serendipity” (Florida 2012:328-9).28 Because New York
possesses the ultimate unique capabilities, the city and its Garment District are often
explicitly identified as places that should be both thriving and irreplaceable. In fact, the
rationale of creative city interactions justifies financial and policy support for their
maintenance (Joint Economic Committee 2015). Softer arguments examine the emotional
and cognitive residuals of place in product.
Place in product
Place in product is the idea that unique products are the reflections of special
places. Beyond the tight mechanisms identified in other theories, here associations and
examples provide the key to understanding. There are both tangible and intangible
dimensions. The climate and casual lifestyle of California, for example, is accredited with
promoting colorful, sporty, and democratic looks (Goodman 1948:77-80, Molotch
1996:171-87, Scott 2000). There is a Meadian sensibility of mutual adjustment. “Even if
not consciously inventorying ‘the trends,’” Molotch says, “designers are alert to such
messages from the streets and shop windows” (1996:258). “The consequentiality of small
variations in product,” he continues, “implies that minor variations in place can be a real
force in shaping commodities” (2002:666).

27

This touches on a larger argument against Weber (Collins 1997, Hoppe 2022, Martin
2016).
28
Currid-Halkett was a student of Molotch, Clark, and Florida. Florida cites Jacobs and
Bell as the primary inspirations for his work.
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In addition to the opportunities of absorbing and reflecting material culture,
fashion capitals offer a valuable rhetorical geography for brands.29 This may be why, for
example, French associations are more common among fragrance names than any others
(Corrigan 2008:97, Porter 1980:280). There is debate about whether heritage fashion
firms like Burberry or Woolrich should outsource their production (cf. Kapferer 2012,
Pike 2015, Tokatli 2014). Many have done so, however, while retaining historic
associations to place through advertising and public relations. Yet again, in the view of
unique capabilities, “the localness of entertainment [and] its dependence on a particular
confluence of cultural skills and expressivity… make it a business that cannot go
offshore, cannot be imitated abroad, and cannot be branch planted” (Molotch 1996:239).
Further resistance to offshoring comes from time pressures and the inertia of human
resources.
Immediate cultural skill
“Lead time” is the number of days between a product order and delivery. Across
the last 50 years, it has been the most consistent strategic arguments about “why
garments are still made in New York” and why design will not be offshored (Abernathy
et al. 2006, Collins 2001, Sassen 1991:291-93, Waldinger 1986:97-103). Arguments on
lead times can be analytically divided into two parts. One concern is demand uncertainty,
which is linked to the product cycle hypothesis and strategic concerns for quick response.
In this view, traditional modes of production need to be updated to keep up with
consumer demands for fast fashion (Abernathy et al. 1999, Cachon and Swinney 2011,
Joint Economic Committee 2015:5).30 Demand uncertainty is thought to be especially
important for the luxury and womenswear sectors: “These are the [production] markets
for which New York City has a competitive advantage that is difficult for offshore supply
chains to imitate” (Doeringer and Crean 2006:369, Rantisi 2002). Focusing on high-risk
“fashion” goods has been proposed as a solution to the “invasion” of import competition
since the 1970s (Priestland 1971:65). Empirically, it is worth noting that Asian suppliers
actually account for 80 percent of products at H&M and 30 percent at Zara (Weinswig
2017:4).31
Short lead times also complement agglomeration and thick information transfers
for higher-status brands, linking competitive strategy to cultural capital. Since the 1980s,
scholars have generally acknowledged outsourcing by lower-tier brands producing work
29

An article manuscript, co-authored with Nataliya Nedzhvetskaya, defines rhetorical
geography as a “strategy that leverages associations of place to create value for
shareholders and stakeholders.” Our case study examines the brand legacy of Woolrich.
30
The marketing strategy perspective of Cachon and Swinney black-boxes demand into
shelf life. Time is inversely related to risk, meaning that recency is valued simply as an
index of price. The underlying mechanism in strategic and economic theories of fashion
is either bandwagon effects or a crude trickle-down hypothesis about signaling value
(e.g., distinction or [evolutionary] attractiveness).
31
Tokatli (2015) offers further critique of company narratives and reporting on Zara.
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uniforms or “fashion basics” (Collins 2001, Salzinger 2003:109-10). Styles can be
pushed abroad, it seems, as long as they have simple patterns. “One requisite for
internationalization,” Sassen argues (1988:163-66), “is the possibility of breaking down
production tasks to isolate low-skill operations for export to cheap labor areas.” Still,
“sensitivity to lead times because of short fashion cycles… tends to work against global
competition… [creating] delays in responding to market needs that can be unacceptable
in businesses like fashion clothing and distribution” (Porter 1980:283-84). “Lead times
are too long, minimum production runs too large, quality control too difficult, and the
capital costs of stocks too high to make sourcing in the Far East worthwhile for many of
the more fashion-sensitive types of garment,” authors say (Zeitlin and Totterdill
1989:167). Higher-tier brands are not known for fashion basics; they operate on different
principles of competitive strategy. According to Williams and Currid-Halkett, “fashion
relies on just-in-time materials for preliminary designs, product samples and limited
batches of high-end apparel that are not produced offshore” (2011:3024). Downstream
from Piore and Sabel, other authors similarly concentrate on lead times for the valueadded or “better dress” segments of production, especially in New York (Doeringer and
Crean 2006, Uzzi 1997:48-50).
The arguments I have labeled as those of “immediate cultural skill” are linked not
only to time, but to distance. The work of design is too culturally and temporally
sensitive, authors say, to allow for geographic distance (Molotch 1996:257). Stylish
consumer products depend on local interaction, context, recognition, and tacit
knowledge.32 In this view, design, pattern-making, and quality control—“those aspects of
the business that [are] difficult to routinize and [require] face-to-face interactions”—
cannot be reliably outsourced (Abernathy et al. 1999:132-44, 239, Aspers 2006b:757,
Rantisi 2004:101, Waldinger 1986:69, Zeitlin and Totterdill 1989:164-65). One of the
most detailed studies of supply-side design to date (based on 27 interviews and three
months of fieldwork across India, Turkey, and Western Europe) argues that upgrading is
exceptionally difficult without “contextual knowledge,” a phenomenological concept
based on the lifeworld and province of meaning (Aspers 2006b, 2010a). Here “even if
production of clothes, for example, is outsourced to cut costs, design is still something
that is done close to the final consumers” (2006b:575, 2010a:197). Perhaps the best
suppliers can do, given this distance, is to learn by hiring Western consultants and relying
on diasporic networks (Tokatli and Kizilgün 2004 offer similar advice).
Again, Aspers is far from the only one to claim a necessary overlap between local
consumption and innovative production. Bourdieu does this too (1993b:132-48 and see
below on fields). A huge range of international business research relies on suppositions of
tacit knowledge, transaction cost theories of firm-specific knowledge and skill
(Williamson 1981:562-67), and the quantifiable notion of cultural or psychic distance
(derived from Hofstede 1980, or Johanson and Vahlne 1977). Porter (1985:89-92, 567)
also argues that cultural similarity promotes clearer perception and faster innovation. I
am not trying to suggest that these arguments are completely wrongheaded. It is just that
when we begin to discuss culture, mechanisms, and perhaps “traditional” industries that
Paul Adler is quite right when he says that “there is something terribly one-sided about
the current fascination with tacit knowledge” (2007:1336).
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the possibilities of upgrading into design are discounted. The claims of unique
capabilities are reproduced again and again, from multiple perspectives and through
multiple mechanisms. They build a picture of the impossibility or unlikelihood of
outsourcing culturally expressive work.
Chapter Summary
Unique capabilities are a presumption of geographically and jurisdictionally
restricted functional expertise. I have focused on the apparel industry here, but the core
critique is one of metrocentric ideology. Research in other industries can search for cues
about the ostensibly inimitable cultural and economic resources of Western cities which
enable the geographic control of high-value labor. Because of methodological bias, local
encounters may be systematically inflated in accounts of an exclusive or spontaneous
generation of new trends. Contextual and sensuous knowledge may be assumed to be
essential, yet place-specific. Broadly speaking, the ideology of unique capabilities fails to
recognize the actual international division of labor. It sees singular Western cities as
creative machines and minimizes contributions from the global South.
The broad “searchlight” feature of epistemology is widely acknowledged (e.g.,
Coser 1989, Parsons 1968:16, Simon 1997:92-139). Because we cannot study everything,
we always draw attention to some areas while leaving others in the dark. This can mean
that ethnocentrism reflects omission as often as commission (Garner 2018, Hughes
1961). In a concluding comment I want to again acknowledge that in addition to
inequalities in the geography of labor, there are inequalities in the geography of
recognition.33 Today’s four fashion capitals of Paris, New York, London, and Milan are
defined by an index of media attention and superstar modeling contracts (Godart 2014b).
Dozens of studies in these cities are justified by the centrality of field position (e.g.,
Crane 1997, Entwistle and Rocamora 2006, Godart and Mears 2009b, McRobbie 1998,
Mears 2011a). These are examples of good scholarship, but it sometimes seems difficult
to believe that fashion exists outside these cities, or that studying it elsewhere might help
us to learn something different about either collective behavior or the wider industry.
An immanent critique, like any other strategy, has its limitations. Readers may
certainly be wondering, amidst the wall of skepticism, how it is possible that design and
other complex work can be offshored. Fortunately, we do not need to wipe out past
programs and restart from first principles. It is only when the theories and mechanisms
analyzed above are restricted to New York and other fashion capitals—as they so often
are—that they become problematic. Chapter 2 offers more analysis of the structural
context, but if I offer one basic answer as to how complex work can be offshored, it is the
post-WWII introduction of GVCs and supplier upgrading (broadly considered). Macro33

Incidentally, this formulation brings together The Division of Labor in Society with The
Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Although many scholars follow Parsons
(1968:382ff) with a “two Durkheims” rupture between early positivism and late
normativism, my “one Durkheim” interpretation is instead aligned with Giddens
(1972:38-44, see also Parsons 1968:308).
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historical discussions are available in many studies by Gereffi and Hamilton (e.g.,
Hamilton and Shin 2015). Castells (1989, 2010) was also an early opponent of the new
international division of labor thesis, instead arguing that we should attend to semiperipheral upgrading and the degree of integration into the world economy. Wide patterns
of economic liberalization, export-oriented industrialization, digitalization, and the rise of
service firms have enabled the creation of brokerage networks in the global semiperiphery.
My contribution is to argue that although decision-making is fragmented on the
global scale, administration is increasingly re-centralized in semi-peripheral industrial
clusters and especially in supplier firms. A strong subset of GVC authors have pointed us
in the right direction by identifying the places where we should look if we want to see
how governance and the distribution of tasks and services is changing. In the years to
come, we must be attentive to realignments in capital and culture and the intimate
implications they have for the organization of work. Davis-Blake and Broschak focus on
domestic outsourcing in their review of changing work arrangements, but I heartily agree
with their summary outlook:
Because outsourcing changes what workers do, how they do it, with whom they
do it, and what they are paid for it, outsourcing is as significant a change to the
nature of work and organizations as the industrial revolution, scientific
management, or the emergence of the mature bureaucratic form… At this point in
history, outsourcing is no less pervasive or important than these fundamental
changes and deserves a similar level of careful research attention (2009:322).
Adapting Burt (2004:387-88), let us consider that proposition that “this is not creativity
born of genius; it is creativity as an import-export business.”
Figure 1: U.S. Apparel Imports Versus Domestic Production, 1956-2019
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Source: Compiled from AAFA, AAMA, and U.S. Department of Commerce
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CHAPTER 2: BRANDS, BUYING AGENCIES, AND ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT

Moving Production from the United States to India
Textiles and apparel were arguably the leading products of the industrial
revolution and certainly the first factory industry. Developed in England between 18001830, the U.S. imported designs and technology at the end of that period (Stinchcombe
[1965] 1986:199, Weber 1905/2002:28-9, Wolf 1982).34 Production took off shortly after
the Civil War in what would become “the largest of all manufacturing branches in the
South,” especially for white women35 (Myrdal 1944:1110-11). By the 1910s and 1920s,
faced with “possibly the least money per week of any industrial class in the United
States,” unionization drives in the North had begun to improve conditions against
sweatshop labor and scientific management (Mitchell 1921:44). Unionization rates in the
North increased to nearly 100% by the 1960s; production in Philadelphia peaked in 1948
(Shils 1966:4, 15).36 By the end of WWII, 80% of production had shifted to the South,
where only 20% of workers were unionized (Knox, Agnew and Mccarthy 2014:167,
Lescaze 2004a).
A combination of Southern unionization drives (Lescaze 2004b), increasingly
global markets with free trade agreements like NAFTA in 1994, and the end of MFA
quota restrictions in 2005 decimated American production (Collins 2003, Crane 1997,
Lardner 1988c, Rivoli 2005). The United States shut down hundreds of factories and lost
637,000 jobs between 1973 and 1986 (Lardner 1988c:66). It further lost more than
900,000 textile and apparel jobs from 1994 to 2005 as a result of trade liberalization;
these recent losses largely occurred in the South (USDA 2012). As we have seen in the
introduction, domestic production accounts for around three percent of sales in 2022.
Apparel production is a highly labor-intensive industry, but there is no single
explanation for global shifts in production. Since the 1960s sourcing has followed a
winding path that chases lower labor costs while factoring in infrastructure, trade
policies, and currency valuations (e.g., Bonacich, Cheng, Chinchilla et al. 1994b, Harvey
2010, Rivoli 2005, Shils 1966, Smith 1996). Temporary leaders of shifts in global apparel
production have included Japan in the 1930s, 1950s, and 1960s, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, and Italy and Mexico in the 1990s (Bonacich et al.
1994b, Collins 2003). Most broadly, however, supported by a labor supply shock
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, state policies of liberalization and export34

The first Indian mill was founded in 1856, using English technology, administration,
and technical staff (Wolf 1982:288-89).
35
African Americans were systematically excluded in the South until the 1960s. Around
that time lawsuits and pressure from the federal government appear to have been the main
drivers of integration (Minchin 1999), although fear of unionization among African
Americans was also a factor (Lescaze 2004a). See Edelman (1992) on the organizational
mediation of Civil Rights laws.
36
Unionization rates in New York remained at 90% in the 1990s (Uzzi 1996).
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oriented industrialization, and the fact that total world consumption doubled in real terms
from 1973 to 1998 (Dauvergne 2005:384), Asia has seen the greatest gains in apparel
production since the 1990s. China specifically has seen the lion’s share of growth,
jumping from 16% of apparel sold in the U.S. in 2004 to 39% in 2015 before diminishing
to 24% in 2022 (Barboza and Becker 2005, OTEXA 2015, 2022).37 Rapid percentage
changes like this are not unusual: Bangladesh rose from 76th in 1980 to become the
world’s fourth-largest garment exporter in 2013 (Cadman, Bernard and Lucas 2013).
India, China, Turkey are the only countries with strong domestically integrated
textile and apparel chains.38 India is the world’s third-largest exporter of textiles and
apparel, behind China and the European Union (WTO 2014:58). In the 2010s it was the
world’s largest producer of cotton, second-largest producer of silk, and fifth-largest
producer of man-made fibers (Anand and Khetarpai 2014:65, USDA 2015:6-7).
Contributing about five percent to U.S. imports for the past 10 years, its contribution
ranks fourth behind China (24%), Vietnam (18%), and Bangladesh (9%). India’s top
market is the U.S. (18% of exports), where export trade of textiles and apparel is valued
at $7.1 billion (Ministry of Textiles 2012, OTEXA 2015). Apparel manufacturing
contributes 30% of export earnings and is the largest source of industrial employment in
the country, employing between 38 and 45 million people, mostly young women (Kar
2012:86, Ministry of Textiles 2012). Supported by a demographic boom, it has the
highest export growth for textiles and apparel in the world (WTO 2014:58).
The rest of this chapter provides an introduction to the major organizational actors
of my study. First, I introduce the suppliers I studied.39 I then introduce their client
composition, supplemented by a presentation of the brand system that organizes Western
consumption in the Appendix. I analyze some of the regional differences among
European, U.S., and Indian buyers, as well as how different suppliers strategically
respond to such differences. The second half of the chapter sets up the organizational
parameters of buying agencies. I consider a few organization-level conflicts with buying
agencies, again showing the active and strategic responses of supplier management and
executives.
Research Sites and Methods
I spent most of my time at two export-oriented supplier firms, which I call
Apparel Craft Exports (ACE) and Mass Exports India (MEI).40 ACE is a medium-sized
supplier with headquarters in the Delhi-NCR region; MEI is a large supplier whose
location details that I do not disclose for confidentiality. For between one and two weeks
37

Rivoli (2005:63) notes that when Chinese Communist Party was founded in Shanghai
in 1921, nearly half of the factory workers were employed in cotton mills.
38
The U.S. formerly qualified, but the collapse of the industry is the subject of a separate
project.
39
These will eventually be supplemented with a methodological appendix.
40
All firm and participant names, except where otherwise noted, are pseudonyms. Firm
names are intended, however, to carry connotations of market niches.
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each, I also conducted fieldwork at two fabric mills, two footwear suppliers, and two
other small suppliers. I call these suppliers Standard Factory India (SFI) and India
Standard Factory (IFS). Firms varied in size from 600 to 5,000+ employees, 400-2500+
machines, and U.S. $8 million to U.S. $60+ million in annual revenue. Most are
bureaucratic and rationalized family-owned, common to both Indian manufacturing firms
and the broader context of newly industrialized countries (cf. Cappelli, Singh, Singh et al.
2010, Guillén 2001:216). There is no question that a separate chapter can and should be
written about the comparative and regional context of the firms that I studied. I have the
data but not the time to complete it.
My research access at ACE and MEI was exceptional: it included specific
permission to attend all buyer meetings, read communications with both local and
international representatives, conduct interviews, and conduct ethnographic interviews
and observations of nearly all organizational routines.41 In each case I produced a short
consultant-style report identifying bottlenecks, communication problems, or simple
observations in exchange for access. I was given the formal status of an intern at ACE
and the informal status of a management trainee at MEI, though only executive
permissions and sequential introductions mattered in practice (see below). At three firms
I was given a company lanyard and fingerprint access. As I learned from visits to new
departments and new factory units, the lanyard was the single most effective tool in
demonstrating insider status and securing access to information. I read company
documents, employee manuals, and trade publications when available, but did not pursue
their systematic analysis.42
To analyze the actual practices of organizational routines, I conducted
ethnographic interviews with 144 participants in India.43 Each ethnographic interview
lasted for a minimum of three hours (not including trust-enhancing meals and tea breaks).
I followed organizational routines sequentially across the product cycle in rotations,
beginning in design and carrying through to the assembly lines. I also studied end-to-end
processes of human resources and risk management, though these are excluded from the
dissertation. Participants typically brokered introductions to the department head of the
next unit. Major shifts among pre-production (design, marketing, product management),
production (planning, industrial engineering, factory management), and end-to-end
processes were sometimes brokered by executive order (e.g., a one-minute phone call).
My own revisits to previous departments were extremely common; I revisited ACE after
visiting other small suppliers and again after visiting MEI. I also conducted formal,
41

Access to one site came through weak ties; another took more than a year of
introductions and intercessions from multiple brokers. Because I did not have a
fundamental understanding of practices, I did not pursue executive observations. All
executives agreed to long interviews, however, at the conclusion of my research at each
site. Ethnographic interviews of accountants were somewhat limited by my own
competence.
42
See Khaire and Hall (2016) for an analysis of India’s leading fashion magazine.
43
Multi-sited or transnational ethnographies have become standard practice in sociology
(Marcus 1995). For more on the research techniques I used see Spradley ([1979] 2016),
Leidner (1993), Pentland and Feldman (2005), and Hoppe (2022).
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audio-recorded interviews with 31 participants from India and 29 participants from the
U.S. and Europe, typically lasting about an hour each. Participant tallies are recorded in
Table 2. Together they cross 31 occupational niches. Partly for background and partly as
a base for new projects, I conducted around 50 hours of additional fieldwork in the U.S.
This was mostly at presentations and industry events around sourcing, trend forecasting,
and related topics.
Table 2: Participants

Occupational niche
Design
Marketing
Sample tailoring
Fabric production
Product management
Sourcing
Factory planning
Industrial engineering
Factory management
Executives
Accounting
Human resources
CSR/NGO/industry groups

Ethnographic interviews
19
18
8
10
24
4
5
11
17
1
6
15
6
144

Formal interviews
13
4
3
14
10

6
5
1
4
60

Client Composition of Indian Suppliers
Although I cannot discuss direct observations of individual brands because of
confidentiality requirements, my methodological strategy involves naming buyer retail
segments under the “fashion pyramid” (See the Appendix). I had exposure to 129 unique
brands through the four suppliers I studied in India. Buyers and agencies have different
sourcing strategies and conflicts with suppliers, so there is variable yearly turnover (see
below). If brands were within working memory (within the last five years) I include them
in this total. MEI has recent relationships with 78 clients, ACE with 39, and IFS and SFI
with fewer than 10 each. The 129 brands observed in India are controlled through 87
different parent companies. Thirteen of these parent companies simultaneously sourced
from multiple factories under observation. It is appropriate to spotlight brands rather than
parent companies because brands are consumer-facing; they represent marketplace
diversity (see for example Lopes 1992 on ownership and product variety in the music
industry). While for the investor it matters that Zara, Oysho, Massimo Dutti, and Pull &
Bear are all part of Inditex, most consumers are unconcerned or unaware of a brand’s
corporate parent. Marketing executives at fashion corporations purposefully segment
25

their brands to avoid “cannibalization” or intra-corporate competition. The same is true in
consumer industries ranging from automobiles (Toyota, for instance, owns Lexus) to
cosmetics (Estee Lauder has over 100 brands in its portfolio). Sixteen of the brands I
observed are under private labels, owned either by department stores or suppliers
themselves.
Using the segmentation model in the Appendix, a bar chart (Figure 2) displays
retail brand segments in my fieldwork. The scope of the current study does not contribute
to the study of haute couture production and offers only limited data on the production of
high-end luxury apparel. Most of what I learned about high-end luxury production was
through literature and interviews with a small number of buyers in the segment (n=4). Of
other relationships, 16% (n=21) include accessible luxury brands, 20% (n=26) include
bridge brands, 37% (n=48) include mid-tier brands, 19% (n=25) include value brands,
and 6% (n=8) include discount brands.
Figure 2: Retail Brand Segments Observed in Fieldwork
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The above chart provides only data on brand segment, not order size or account values.
Only discount, value, and mid-tier buyers routinely place large orders (see the analysis of
costing below). At various times before, during, and after my fieldwork, discount, value,
mid-tier, or bridge brands all had the status of being the top buyer in sales terms at ACE
or MEI. One particular buyer in the value segment provides the mainstay of SFI’s
business; a mid-tier buyer is the most valuable for IFS. Buyer portfolios must be
periodically rebalanced by marketing executives, as I document later in this chapter. For
now it is enough to note that of the 129 brands observed, 56% are North American
(n=72), 40% are European (n=41 continental + 10 UK, total 38%), and 5% are Asian
(n==6).
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As we move forward through the GVC, the model of fashion retail segmentation
promoted in the Appendix will re-appear regularly, from costing to order size to quality
control to packing, showing the consistent correlation of status with quality. First-tier
suppliers do not treat brands or orders equally, as industry commentators so often suggest
(Chapter 1). Still, brand status is far from the only parameter which matters in the
industry, or even to suppliers. The next sections introduce regional buyer differences and
supplier account management. They begin to show how suppliers engage in strategic
behavior (Sako and Zylberberg 2017). They respond to both heterogeneous buyer
preferences and act to satisfy their own strategic goals.
Regional Buyer Differences
Buyers engage in strategies that reflect and respond to “home base” conditions
(Porter 1990). Europe (OECD) and the U.S. are the two major export markets of the
suppliers I studied and of Indian exporters in general. Although participants at the
suppliers I studied have different preferences in working with American or European
clients, the social representations of American and European clients are stable. European
buyers are reported to be more fashion-conscious and open-minded. Americans, on the
other hand, are focused on standardization and efficiency. Preferences among supplier
participants are mixed. Operations staff strongly prefer working with Americans, who are
less likely to change purchase orders. Designers and product managers, on the other hand,
appreciate the European tolerance for variation in a natural product (e.g., fabric dyes).
The suppliers I studied also have a handful of domestic Indian clients. They are given
little thought or attention among staff, but they do fulfill a function of surplus absorption.
We will look first at European versus American clients.
Europeans: Fashion-Conscious and Open-Minded
“Basically all of the hardcore designers are in Europe,” MEI senior design Rituraj
explains to me on the first day when I introduce myself and sit with him at lunch. “They
set the trends and everybody copies them… Even me, I work for [an American accessible
luxury brand]. Still you can see how they are looking to all the fashion capitals in
Europe…” Rahul notes that there is a European “chic” which is more “upscale” and
“formal.” Although at the beginning of his career (around 2005), he thought Europe was
the trend leader, today he holds the exceptional view that Americans are more “trendy”
(which he associates with “casual”). Throughout my fieldwork I find that Europeans,
compared to Americans, are seen as more experimental, aesthetically sensitive, and
“hands-on.” A shoe factory owner tells me that “in Europe I make a lot of sales from
trade shows; they are willing to take a chance. The U.S., they won’t buy.” Back in India
during buyer presentations, European designers make selections more slowly and
carefully. They are more likely to ask questions and more likely to work together with
ACE for desired modifications. Although they have stricter garment testing requirements
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they are more understanding of fabric variations. Abhishek, the general manager of the
MEI washing unit, lays out a comparison from his perspective:
Europe, everyone wants to have something a little special, they want to look
different from everyone else. American businesses, they want 100k pieces, with
exactly the same consistency each and every one. Americans… they all want to
look the same.
According to Arun, fabric for European customers is generally of much higher quality
than fabric for American customers. He prefers working with European customers for
both of these reasons.
The preference for European customers cools into tolerance in later linkages in
the value chain. Sanjana, the assistant general product manager at MEI, complains that
European “fashion-forward” buyers “sometimes make changes at the pre-production
stage, when they are not supposed to make changes anymore. But they really want things
to keep up with what is the newest fashion…” Changing an embroidery color from coral
to black or adding a lining makes achieving on-time delivery “hectic.” In the planning
department (Chapter 6), shorter timelines sometimes mean that other orders must be
bumped or rearranged. Garment testing is stricter. More embellishment means more
subcontracted work that must be arranged and audited. Finally, Abhishek points out that
Europe is very far ahead of the U.S. on environmental responsibility. While most top
executives embrace environmental responsibility as the future of their business, others
feel that requirements are unnecessarily burdensome when non-compliance at competing
suppliers is overlooked.
Americans: Organized and Standardized
McDonaldization is a thesis about homogeneity and the Western domination of
cultural globalization (Ritzer 2003, Ritzer and Stillman 2003, see also Simon 2009 on
Starbucks). Its four principles include efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control;
it is a useful way to think about American clients. Americans, according to Indian
participants, are less committed to fashion than their European counterparts. There are
three apparent (interwoven) reasons for this: culture, administration, and order sizes.
Following a hint from Amrita, the design director at ACE, I ask, “Do you think European
designers are more creative?” She frowns, “oh yes. Oh yes.” She believes that there are
overlapping cultural and administrative reasons for the difference. One of them is cultural
or strategic:
American companies do not let their designers see enough when they travel, they
do not let them go for sightseeing, they do not give them opportunities for
inspiration. They think designers are crazy… I hear this from the merchants, I
hear this from [an accessible luxury buyer] even, the merchants will say, ‘Oh, she
must be a designer, she has red hair or blue hair or whatever.’ But who cares?! Let
them have blue hair if they want. This doesn’t mean that they can’t be commercial
people.
From her perspective American brands err when they restrict travel schedules, stigmatize
eccentricity, or conclude that eccentricity is incompatible with economic sensibility.
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An administrative hierarchy redoubles these errors, simultaneously inhibiting the
commercial sensibilities of designers and the artistic taste of buyers. Amrita continues her
assault on American designers and buyers by arguing that “the U.S. is very backward.
[An American value brand] does not even come here, we have to go there to make a
presentation. I don’t know if it’s budget [or what].” She puts on a disgusted look and
gives a dismissive wave of her hand:
Americans always leave their buyers in the U.S., but this is such a mistake… It’s
not only that European designers are more creative… but they have a better
commercial sense as well because they take part in the process. You’ve seen this,
how the designer and the buyer from [a European mid-tier brand] were going
back and forth at the meeting, trading ideas. The Americans don’t do this.
While American designers do not receive enough opportunities to learn from buyers, in
Amrita’s opinion, buyers are restricted in their vocabularies of style. “American buyers
do not develop any sense of taste, they are trained only in how to make money and they
always want to make things cheaper.” This is a powerful administrative reason why “they
have no creativity.”
Order sizes, related to market power, are one more major reason for differences
between American and European accounts. A senior designer at MEI is in an excellent
position to judge the difference, as she designs for both the U.S. and European divisions
of the same accessible luxury brand. Higher order sizes for the U.S., she says, lead to
“production-friendly” designs (Chapter 3) compared to the “more particular” preferences
of European counterparts. Where the European division might ask for two prints for each
pocket, the U.S. division will ask for a basic pocket without any print. Unlike designers,
most product managers prefer to work with McDonaldized American buyers because
they give better lead times and delivery times. Sanjana frame it as follows:
Americans are more organized. They have their whole [time and action plan],
deadlines, their own ‘plan by’ date—they even know when they want their
designs to be finished by, sometimes even started by. Their whole calendar is
fixed. And they respect the due dates also. If the [purchase order] release date is
today, they will release the PO today… You get an assurance, you know? You
find some safety in that.
This sense of safety extends deeper into planning and assembly, Sanjana continues: “If I
can’t plan ahead, I don’t want to have empty lines in production. That’s scary for me…”
Such rigid organization can also create delays; a division product manager at MEI feel
that Americans are too slow in the approval process and need to make greater use of local
buying agencies. Probably most participants, however, appreciate the superior supplieroriented planning of American companies.
Indians: Thrifty and Reliable
In the words of an Indian executive, the Hindi word jugaad means the ability “to
manage somehow, in spite of lack of resources” (Cappelli et al. 2010:95). Jugaad
characterizes the business practices of Indian brands working with ACE. They earn the
least respect from first-tier export suppliers. Sanjana is someone who tightly regulates her
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emotions, but she almost scowls when I ask her about Indian clients: “You can’t even
compare them. They are not even in the same league.” This perspective is common: an
ACE senior product manager advises me against learning anything about Indian retailers
behind they are “so far behind.” According to ACE’s owner Vaasu, “it’ll be another five
to seven years before Indian retailers start to catch up.” There are strategic and cultural
reasons which currently prevent executive attention toward production for Indian brands.
Infrastructure, including business infrastructure, is less well-developed in India
than in the U.S. or Europe. One division product manager handles many European
accounts and has traveled many times to Germany: “When we are in India, we feel so
outdated, seeing the advanced technology there!” she exclaims. Unlike executives at
MEI, Vaasu is not entirely opposed to domestic production. He shifts a bit in his chair as
I ask him about it, then says, “We are manufacturers. We produce garments. And we can
make them for Indian styles too.” From his perspective, however, infrastructure and
business practices need to improve before he would consider it:
The important thing is that they are doing a good business on their end… The
payments should be secure and they should come on time. The company also
needs to be organized. That is the big reason why we are not doing the business; it
is very disorganized.
The disorganization critique extends to government, suppliers, and consumers. During
lunch Amrita jokes that while Americans are “honest” and “direct,” Indians “are like
jalebi,” a domestic sweet with pretzel-like shape. Export subsidies are financially
important. For now, adds Niharika, the general product manager at SFI, “India is a
different market” because “we are very price-sensitive. Our customer is not educated on
quality.” One final reason to avoid domestic production, according to Niharika, is that
“most ladies are wearing Indian [ethnic] attire” and “there is so much internal
competition for that,” including regional competition from China and Thailand.
Disposal and surplus absorption
What remains of India’s potential, according to most participants, is the
absorptive potential of its consumer market. For suppliers, this reduces losses for both
fabric and garments. As a former British colony, India has a long history of absorbing
excess foreign manufacturing capacity (Bazley 1854:439). Now the absorption is
domestic (Kar 2012:87), a function which suppliers take for granted. While purchase
orders are one form of consummation in design, disposal is another. Design samples,
fabric, and apparel units are cleared by different pathways.
“Dropped” prototypes—now returned to design sample status—may remain in the
showroom for other buyers to pick up or they may go to the archives. The life of a design
sample may be extended to six months, according to Vani, if committed to the archive (or
up to three years at SFI). Sections may be cut out to inspire new developments, but
because the garment has only been “fitted to a hanger,” it is not wearable. At MEI,
unselected sample garments are “mutilated” with a V-shaped cut in the fabric; they also
earn a sticker that says “sample for presentation only—no commercial value.” These
garments are sent to a warehouse and disposed of.
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Nikita, a senior product manager at ACE, vows to tell me “the story behind the
stock,” or the disposal pathways of fabric leftovers. We venture to the fabric store (or
“fabric library”) where she introduces me to the sample fabric product manager, Gian,
one of only two participants I meet who is fond of domestic clients. He estimates that 9099% of extra fabric is sold to domestic clients (rather than incinerated). Although bulk
purchases of stock fabric can be useful for clearing inventory, Nikita tells me that it is
“much better to sell garments instead of fabric. You’ll only get ₹20 for the fabric,” but a
finished garment can be sold value-added. When Nikita is working with a domestic buyer
she goes to Gian to see what stock fabrics are available to offer. Choice, however, is a
distant priority for domestic buyers. Sanjana had warned me to expect this, claiming,
“they are just buying stocks. They don’t do any approvals, they have no testing
requirements, they aren’t finicky about fittings or anything.” Nikita verifies this analysis,
telling me that “a buyer may ask for a 1-inch trim, but maybe we only have 2-inch.
They’ll say ‘ok.’” Domestic buyers earn 60-70% discounts in exchange for accepting
limited choices.
Big buyers never buy from stock fabrics, instead usually sourcing their own
through nominated mills (including mills owned by ACE or MEI). This happens for three
reasons. First, buyers are concerned about compliance certifications and copyright issues.
Only if a fabric is developed by ACE or MEI (Chapter 3) can it be used without a
problem. Second, big buyers need quantities that outstrip stock leftovers. Third,
especially with Americans, they are “choosy” about color variation. If a stock fabric has
color variation, a product manager will send a call-out to the buyer with this information,
noting that if purchased the variation must be accepted “as is.” Although small European
buyers sometimes ask to see stock fabrics, they must put in a special request. Stock
fabrics are only offered upfront to domestic clients.
Surplus garments may accumulate because of overproduction or unfulfilled
orders. Overproduction was more common in the early days of ACE; Amrita says that for
an order of 500 pieces, 200 extras would be produced. Surplus production was an early
iteration of lean retailing, as they could be shipped immediately with high demand. They
also served as insurance against high defect rates. Researchers of Dominican and Turkish
apparel production report chargebacks to suppliers for supposed errors or customer
returns, especially in retailer slack times (Schrank 2004:138n14, Tokatli et al.
2008b:274). Supplier liabilities or unfulfilled orders today are rare at ACE and SFI
because of better forecasting, improved quality control, lean manufacturing, and the risks
of buyer-incurred liabilities.
There are six pathways to clear surplus garments: (1) They can be sold directly to
the buyer, sometimes at a reduced rate. Sanjana brightens up at this potential for
recovery: “Our loss percentage gets reduced by at least 50% in case of a dropped order or
error or something.” Riya, of MEI, reports that “I will order a discount to the customer, or
customer will have their own showroom; they call it ‘outlet…’ where we will be selling it
at 50% FOB or 35% FOB.” (2) If the contract allows (e.g., with in-house fabric
development), they can be sold to a competing foreign or domestic buyer at a reduced
rate. (3) Surplus can be sold to a foreign wholesaler. As Vaasu and I continue our
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discussion of surplus production, he dips into his memory and his eyes light up in
mischievous excitement:
We had one issue some years back when we used to sell more of it to an
American stock buyer… He did the shipping by air, so one time it arrived before
our shipment [to the original retailer by boat]! That was definitely a problem. In
that case actually the [original] buyer sent me an image, and he said, ‘Look, my
garment, it’s being sold by someone else!’ That was really something.
This episode changed the terms of contracts rather than ending the practice altogether,
mostly because, according to Nikita, foreign buyers pay about five times the ₹10 per
pound offered by Indian buyers. On top of this, suppliers can take advantage of export
subsidies. (4) Garments may be cut into fabric and trims. (5) The fabric product manager
at MEI tells me that garments are sometimes incinerated if the contract requires it. H&M,
facing such allegations, claims “it’s only done when they do not fulfill our safety
regulations” (2017). (6) Finally, suppliers can sell to local markets like Nehru Place in
Delhi.
Local markets are Vaasu’s preferred option today. “If we have a dropped order
that we have already produced,” he says, “then we are stuck. We can’t sell it. What we
will do if this happens is to store the garments for six months, then remove the labels and
sell for scrap [by weight] or charity.” Six to twelve months is the typical required time for
warehousing (set by contract),44 preventing competitive market impact. Before selling to
“some local market,” suppliers must “de-brand,” “de-identify,” or “cut-tag” garments by
removing labels and logos. Kunal, a division product manager at a buying agency,
discloses that it is easy to find buyers: “Let’s say you have 1k garments. You can have
the right connections to some street vendors, they will keep it quiet, you can easily sell. If
they are selling it for one-fifth the cost [of retail price], they know that people will
definitely buy.” Brands are likely to condone this behavior; they should not be associated
with a design if de-branding has proceeded according to plan. Supporting this is the fact
that “street markets” in India are also called “parallel markets” because they reach
mutually exclusive customer segments.45 Paaus finds street market prices ridiculous and
uninformed: “Can you imagine, Levi’s will be sold at the same price as Lee. People don’t
even know they are in totally different segments!”
If garments are sold as unaltered originals (even if they are factory rejections) and
traceable to suppliers, suppliers can be fined. However, I heard of only one such case—
rendering enforcement accidental rather than systematic. Instead, when I ask Paaus for an
estimate of street market composition, he is willing to guess 20% factory rejects and 80%
“fakes.” Fakes outnumber rejections, he believes, because they can make use of much
cheaper fabric and poor execution. Kunal makes the same point in a separate interview,
adding, “The thing is, anyone can visit the Calvin Klein website. You can easily find a
good master [tailor], show him the image… anyone can reproduce it.” This is a more a
case of economic substitution than the secondhand exchange which occupies the attention
of anthropologists (e.g., Palmer and Clark 2005).
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Paaus reports one or two seasons, significantly less than a year.
See also Yükseker (2007) on the Turkish-Soviet shuttle trade.
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India is an emerging market rather than an advanced one like the U.S. or Europe.
Consumer demand in each market is filtered through the institutions of brands and the
roles of designers and buyers. Supply side designers and marketing staff view Europeans
as more fashion-conscious and open-minded, even if late changes to purchase orders
create downstream challenges for product management and operations staff. American
buyers tend to be larger and McDonaldized—organized, predictable, standardized, and
efficient. Suppliers accordingly adjust and compare their regional social representations
of clients. Cultural differences, including legacies of flexible specialization and Fordism,
continue to influence buyer administration and negotiation tactics. Marketing executives
at ACE and MEI are not, however, willing to commit overwhelming production capacity
to any single market or any single buyer. We shall explore the reasons for this as we
begin to close our examination of the marketing department and its commitment to
responsiveness.
Account Management
The general picture presented in Chapter 1 is that because apparel supply is a
fragmented industry, buyers can easily look to other captive suppliers. If we look only at
economic surveys, GVC governance studies, or organizational routines, this might be a
rational assessment. However, we know that internal supplier considerations of firm
strategy and account management are underdeveloped (Sako and Zylberberg 2017).
Indeed, only by talking to senior managers and executives did I come to understand that
the suppliers I studied have different philosophies about expansion (see generally
Selznick 1957). They include aggressive expansion at MEI, a systems-level focus on
quality and capacity at ACE, improved investigations of buyer quality at IFS, and
original brand manufacturing at SFI. In accounting terms, business at ACE and MEI is
good. Fifteen to twenty-five percent compound annual growth rates over 10-year periods
are normal in the sector, similar to other top firms in India (Cappelli et al. 2010:7).
Both macroeconomic factors and brand performance matters for supplier
planning. Kunal, a division product manager at a buying agency, believes that
macroeconomic conditions need to be specifically linked to account management and
product development.46 Consider the level of account management:
Each year, you need to do planning and updating: are rich people still there?... A
poor customer will not buy a $599 jacket from [accessible luxury brand] Perry
Ellis… Perry Ellis is basically for business people who already have four or five
coats, but the poor person will have only one.
Under such macroeconomic conditions Kunal directs his staff to concentrate their
attention on brands targeted at the “middleman” rather than the wealthy.
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At the product level, Lantz (2016:151) reports that buyers ask for more statement
pieces during recessions: consumers reportedly avoid basics and seek special items if
they are going to buy anything at all. Women also spend more money on beauty products
during recessions (Hill, Rodeheffer, Griskevicius et al. 2012).
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Astute suppliers are wary of the shifting fortunes of a brand like Liz Claiborne or
a deeply struggling brand like Sears (cf. Siggelkow 2001, Uzzi 1997). There are three
options to pursue. First, they can end the relationship. MEI stopped working with a firm
in the discount segment, for example, when it declared bankruptcy, declining to restart
business after re-emergence. Second, suppliers can plan and negotiate. In one case Ankur
is expecting a “major drop” of 30-40% in orders from a value buyer. To meet his own
sales target he communicates with the buyer: “Have styles been placed somewhere else?
Is there some design issue? Are the prices not good?” If these approaches do not add up
or if “that business is not meant for us,” he pushes other buyers or other brands under the
same parent company to fill the missing capacity. Third, suppliers with weak bargaining
power can become trapped in failing relationships. At ISF, the owner tells of an episode
in which “one of my major customers died (i.e., went out of business). I lost almost two
years being dragged down with them. There was too much in the pipeline, you couldn’t
exit, you couldn’t say no.”
Aggressive Growth at MEI
My first hint of growth differences is through senior product manager Ankur at
ACE. After a long discussion of account management at his desk one afternoon,
impressed with his knowledge and ability, I venture to ask about his professional future.
Could he take his job skills to another manufacturer or buying agency, earning higher
pay? For every $1 million he manages at ACE, he responds, he could manage $1.5
million at MEI. But he doesn’t respect MEI’s apparent expansion policy: “MEI’s goal is
just to increase volume” and take on any client, he says with concern, whereas “we work
scientifically… We only take orders where we can make a profit.” My independent
experience at MEI shows grains of truth in Ankur’s claims. On the one hand, MEI
marketing and accounting managers furrow their eyebrows when I (confidentially) take
Ankur’s claims to them. Radhika, the general manager of accounting, seems particularly
violated by the accusation and denies that an order would be accepted without at least a
small profit margin. Ramya, a division product manager, also points to the importance of
productive relationships. She says that “brands are taken on efficiency basis… it doesn’t
make sense to have a great car, but then not a good driver. You need a great driver.”
MEI’s expansion is significantly more aggressive than that of the other companies
I studied.47 The shorthand is growth for growth’s sake. They seek to aggresively capture
business and expand their operating capacity by responding to large order sizes from big
buyers. Riya admits that “earlier, it used to be like, after shipping we used to analyze
whether we are making money or not.” Today, however, not even mature relationships
are not taken for granted, as division product manager Ramya explains:
The management is very focused on performance. No customer is being treated
like, ‘Ok, we have reached this stage’ [of acceptance], that has never been the
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It has both domestic and inter-regional competitors in terms of CAGR and reputation
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attitude here. We still put the same effort, we still see how we can grow bigger,
we still see what potential is there, where we are lagging.
MEI generally adds two to three new buyers per year, according to the assistant manager
of accounting, but indeed “growing the same buyers” is responsible for the majority of
increased revenue. General product manager Riya adds that “each year we have been
adding… to become a one-stop solution, or a one-stop shop, if any customer would like
to add more business with us, more product.” She also feels that MEI, unlike the average
supplier, is actually in a position of power. Over the past 20 years, “very few customers
have left us… most of the cases, it will be our decision to leave them. So the customers
who have left us, I think, would be less than five percent.”48 “And when would you make
the decision to leave?” I ask. Riya responds, “If the business is not growing. If the
prospect of annual turnover is minimum 50-60 crore [$8m], then it is a potential
customer. If it is less, there is no point in working with them. Anyone.”
An interview and observations with still a higher layer of management, this time
the vice president of marketing, Mahesh, clarifies further the “potential” of a customer.
Mahesh’s overtures during a buyer presentation substantiate the logic of responsiveness
with an emphasis on very large potential quantities. When Cathy asks about the viability
of SMS (consumer testing) samples, Mahesh assures her, “with some clients we are doing
a lot of testing” and proceeding to name brands in a similar market segment. He
continues, “it gives you a proven track record to plan for the sales of next season… But
the question is, ‘Where do you see us? What kind of a place do you want us to have for
your company?” During a later interview I confirm that this exact overture dominates
Mahesh’s philosophy of expansion:
It’s not the question of me trading for five cents or ten cents up and down… it
depends on what is their vision with us... Fine, I may lose money this year, this
season, it doesn’t bother me. As long as they have a vision to grow along with me
and they have the commitment to me, I don’t mind losing a few cents today…
Long-term plan in your mind, first when we decide on your customer.
“And the management is comfortable with that?” I ask, thinking of Ramya’s earlier
comments about sustaining growth. Mahesh appears less intimidated by his superiors,
perhaps because there are fewer of them: “Yeah yeah, there is no pressure. If we explain
them, they’ll understand, why you do it.” The position of MEI marketing leadership,
then, is focused on growth potential when accepting a new buyer, relegating immediate
profits to secondary importance. Deferral, however, cannot last forever.
In one of the offices at MEI I see, quite surprisingly, lingerie posters on the walls.
They are an extreme contrast to the Hindu devotional posters and statuettes that decorate
many desks. I discover that they were part of an intimates division that was shut down; I
ask Mahesh about the reasons for this. This is his account:
It didn’t work out because we… what happens is that we try to explore new
divisions when we grow. When we started we were only with, uh, basically the
shirt-making. From the shirt we migrated to trims. From trims we migrated to, uh,
knits. From knits we migrate to denim. And then from there, the next hope of
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expansion, we felt was, huge opportunity, because there were very few players in
the lingerie business... But what we realized is that the amount of time, and the
turnover, and the return that we are getting, doesn’t substantiate our time. When
we become focused on the existing category, that can grow at a much faster
pace… it was not taking shape to get the required returns.
Essentially, MEI hit a limit on its expansion of product assortment. Other large suppliers,
buying agencies, and buyers face similar choices about producing intimates or home
textiles. Strategic vision was realigned to focus on growth through stronger existing
product categories. “Unless you do it you don’t know,” Mahesh concludes, but if “it
doesn’t work out we need to [let it go].” Indeed, other opportunities may be right around
the corner.
Catering to big buyers
“Big buyers” like Dillard’s and May Department Stores (now part of Macy’s) led
the sourcing and lean retailing revolutions of the 1970s and 1980s (Abernathy et al. 1999,
Gereffi, Korzeniewicz and Korzeniewicz 1994). Today they are either joined or displaced
as “chain drivers” by fast fashion behemoths like H&M and Zara as well as first-tier
suppliers themselves. Nodes of innovations in GVCs can change segments over time, as
Gereffi and colleagues have long argued. Today supplier consolidation is one of the most
important changes in the GVC paradigm (Gereffi 2014). Within India the trend has
impacted both MEI and ACE significantly. As Mahesh tells Cathy, “our customers are
looking for consolidation… With [a value brand], we have just dedicated two plants for
them” with special equipment or unit compliance requirements (see Chapter 6 on factory
allocation). Vaasu validates the consolidation trend negatively, telling me that one of its
largest buyers in the value segment recently left ACE to go “long and deep,” “shrinking
their production matrix” to just a handful of Indian suppliers including MEI.
Big buyers often forge business relationships with “strategic vendors” or “core
partners,” though definitions vary. According to Paaus. a buying agency executive (see
below), there are “internal classifications” that can be either “subjective or measurable.”
Additionally, the place of a vendor “can shift over time in its strategic growth potential.”
It may, for example, start out by manufacturing small orders and grow into a strategic
partnership through the concerted support of a buying agency. MEI’s internal criteria
means that it is responsible for fulfilling about 75% of a client’s total orders; with some
brands they are seeking to fulfill up to 90% of orders (see generally Appelbaum 2008).
According to Ramya MEI has five or six buyers that fall under this metric. From the
buyer side individual brands or their parent companies can designate a supplier as a
strategic vendor if it fulfills a high percentage of orders in terms of quantity or quality.
Supply-side risk management initiatives facilitate these designations as well. During a
corporate social responsibility meeting the president of marketing, noting that a
conglomerate is one of MEI’s largest clients, offers them “100% exclusive” use of
innovative technologies or processes that are environmental or machine-based. With new
knitting machines, the president relates, “we have some clients who are using it already,
but they are small small orders... We would be willing to offer it fully after some time,
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for possibly up to a year.” An additional pitch is that exclusivity will add value for the
brand: “We can also put this on a [garment] tag, develop a good name for it, and you can
market it.” Similar innovations—think Dri-FIT or Flyknit at Nike—enhance brand
cachet. As with design, supply-side marketing innovations are part of extended fullpackage manufacturing. They represent important value-added services hidden in buyerside branding. Big buyers, impressed by supplier efforts, thus continue to give large
contracts to consolidated first-tier suppliers.
Quality and Capacity at ACE
Increasing market share is a goal, not a strategy, and Porter (1996:75-78) warns
firms to avoid this “growth trap” in favor of strategic discipline. Both because it is
smaller and because of differences in leadership, ACE is a more risk-averse supplier than
MEI. I had difficulty understanding this at first; I did not understand that Vaasu thinks of
his factories as a closed system. If I had studied operations before design I would have
understood these principles and parameters sooner—Vaasu is an engineer by training (see
Chapter 6). At any rate, quality and capacity are the two central principles which guide
growth at ACE. Following these principles had led to the occupation of a successful
productive niche. Overall, ACE is focused on maintaining its reputation for quality
service within a productive niche for mid-tier, bridge, and accessible luxury buyers.
Vaasu is targeting 10% year-over-year growth at ACE, primarily through existing clients
but with an additional one or two buyers per year.
Vaasu’s emphasis on quality is captured in his claim that “we either do it well or
we don’t do it.” It doesn’t do menswear, for example, and it doesn’t typically do couture
work (see below). It also doesn’t accept multiple new clients that offer business. Senior
product manager Rina has worked with ACE for almost 20 years. As she explains, “It’s
not worth if you get a new relationship and then you don’t serve them. We keep our list
of customers limited to focus on service… You can only survive one or two seasons if the
quality and service is not good.” Where MEI poached a value buyer from ACE because
of larger production capacities, in fact the same buyer later returned to ACE for
compliance reasons (see below). Another mid-tier buyer left a medium-size supplier for
ACE, a story which Vaasu recounts with pride. Where the competing supplier failed to
adjust to high expectations in management practices (e.g., lean management and Six
Sigma), sourcing agents told Vaasu that ACE was already employing best practices. In
summary, ACE’s reputation for quality is a point of competitive advantage.
ACE also takes a more curated approach to clients because of capital restrictions
and smaller production capacities. It cannot simply invest $50 million to build a new
plant or install special machinery for a big buyer, as some require. Even if business is
guaranteed in the short term, Vaasu is uncomfortable with being highly leveraged in the
medium and long-term (i.e., exposed to debt and risk of bankruptcy). Given the limits of
factories as a closed system, then, efficiency—in the form of capacity utilization (Chapter
6)—is more important than growth potential. As Amrita puts it, “We only have capacity
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to produce about [70k]49 pieces in a day, so we don’t stress too much to get orders for
which we need to produce [100k] pieces. There’s no point.” If “every export house is full
during the peak season,” as Ankur claims, “we get more requests than we can produce.
So we choose the most profitable and production-friendly designs.” Recognizing that
competitive “price is the biggest shortfall” of ACE, Vaasu and Amrita accept gradually
ceding basic production to countries like Bangladesh and Vietnam. Instead, Amrita says,
“we are looking for customers who want value-added design” and that “our goal is to
work with customers who can pay.”
The knowledge of which “customers who can pay” has been learned through trial
and error. On the one hand, Amrita says that in ACE’s niche, luxury clients “won’t
promise you business” that is competitive in its regularity. Vaasu, particularly attentive to
consistent overhead expenses, doesn’t want to embrace these uncertainties or lay off
workers in slow seasons (Chapter 6). Amirta sums up her position as follows:
You don’t want to do [luxury production] for the sake of it. We are better off
doing what we do best… Actually, when I called [a mid-tier brand] a few months
ago they were wondering why we hadn’t approached them and what was taking
us so long!
On the other hand, large and steady orders from discount, value, or mid-tier brands may
not be perfect either. Like MEI, ACE sometimes assigns a “fully dedicated factory”
where “all floors are committed” to a buyer. One arrangement has evolved over the past
15 years with a mid-tier brand. By Chandana’s account, the buyer was consistently
satisfied with quality and on-time delivery, so it slowly increased the number of styles to
be placed with ACE. At one time the buyer accounted for more than half of ACE’s total
revenue. When the brand asked ACE to invest in intimates production, initially
guaranteeing orders, Vaasu and Chandana complied, starry-eyed at the promise of so
much money. Chandana smiles with a mix of pride and disappointment as she explains
how prices were gradually squeezed to the point of account closure:
You know? We were the only company in the whole of India (she draws a circle
with index fingers of both hands) doing this account. And we have maintained the
on-time delivery, everything. The only issue was the cost.
The experience led ACE to divest from intimates altogether, restricting production to a
previous core competence in womenswear. Such closures do not necessarily burn
business relations forever, but they do expose suppliers to risk that can be mitigated by
improved portfolio management.
Indeed, after the mid-tier brand dropped intimates production and another
“elephant” of a large value brand shifted production to Vietnam, Vaasu and Chandana
began to think more seriously about balancing their buyer portfolio. With tougher
negotiation and improved outreach to other buyers, ACE worked to reduce the percentage
of orders from the mid-tier brand; from 50% it is “now not more than 30-35%” of
revenue. ACE continues to reserve 300k capacity for the buyer during each peak season
(Chapter 6), but risk is now less severe. Again at a shoe factory I visit, the owner reports
an industry guideline that one client should be no more than 20% of the business. In
practice his largest client accounts for 30% of revenue, but he is “comfortable” with the
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percentage because of a long-standing relationship.50 Quality and capacity represent both
possibilities and restrictions for growth. Of course, as supplier size decreases, the burden
of captive or unstable supply becomes increasingly problematic.
Assessing Potential Clients at IFS
Financial solvency, reputation, and competence in product management seem to
be the three primary signals that suppliers use when investigating new buyer
relationships. ACE, MEI, and SFI do not report major difficulties when following these
criteria. Radhika, for example, tells me that “we would certainly check into the financials,
and they would need to be very strong; we would need a D&B report.” (Dun and
Bradstreet does business credit checks.) As the owner of SFI, Gokul’s answer is standard:
References are very important, I will definitely call the other manufacturers that
they are working with. Their financial rating, volume: if they’re too small I won’t
take them (waves his hand off); if they’re too large I won’t be able to meet their
expectations.
Because procedures for assessing new clients are handled by strong accounting
departments, most executives do not expand their answers as they do when discussing
issues of capacity utilization or compliance.
At IFS, on the other hand, cautionary tales are a major takeaway from my
interviews with its owner Sanchit. His statements, presented here in depth, clarify the
advantages of slower, more selective growth. Let us begin with finance:
Over the last few years, we’ve been very focused on ensuring that our clients have
financial stability... What we did also learn is that although there’s a façade of a
large private equity group, [it] doesn’t mean anything… I think we all learned that
the hard way. They structured the companies in such a way that they can walk
away from any commitments they’ve made. And still try to protect [their
reputation of being] large and honorable and all that good stuff… When we get
too much of these private equity players we try and exit those businesses. Because
the outlook is so limited, so short-term. It’s not worth building that long-term
relationship.
Financialization, Sanchit suggests, represents merely a veneer of security. Buying
agencies (see below) appear much the same to him. In consequence Sanchit has exited
most of these partnerships. So “now, although we’ve shrunk the size of the company,
we’ve moved up the, in terms of level of the customer and financial stability… I think the
business is stronger because we’ve been more selective about who we work with.”
Growth at IFS is not for the sake of filling capacity. Instead it is measured and principled.
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The general manager of accounting at MEI is even stricter, desiring that no customer
should be responsible for more than 15% of sales in the long term. The “long term” is an
important caveat which allows major contracts to go through, but “we would again seek
to pull that… down to 15% by increasing the targets for other brands. We would want it
to even out.”
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A second signal to assess is reputation. Organizational reputation, contrasted with
organizational image and organizational identity, is constructed externally (see Lange,
Lee and Dai 2010 for a review). Sanchit has had to learn the importance of reputation the
hard way:
We’ve had lots of companies approach us who are known to be fraudsters, where
they’ll book a lot of product… later on closer to the season they’ll cancel styles or
they won’t give approval on time. Some customers have that reputation.
Struggling buyers present challenges with more frequent order cancellations. Suppliers,
for their part, have recourse to industry groups for information sharing. Groups of owners
may meet once per month. On multiple occasions I overhear Vaasu discussing buyer-side
negotiating tactics with other owners over the phone, advising them to resist and assuring
them of collective resistance at the same time. Owners with access to these informationsharing channels gain some advantages in negotiations (Chapter 4).
Product management competence from the buyer side is an occasional issue for
ACE and MEI, but these firms also attract employees with higher levels of human capital.
Sanchit slows down his speech as he lays out the IFS scenario from an administrative
point of view:
The average education level of people in our industry is not very high. They’re
not very organized… it’s really a problem for us. Because as a factory we have
money on the line, we have money sitting on the cutting tables, on the sewing
machines. And if I have a customer who has somebody there who’s giving us
approvals or giving us comments which don’t make sense, which they keep
changing their mind on, it can cost us a lot.
Exactly how and why communication matters is covered extensively in the following
chapter. So long as IFS is able to attract buyers with a high “caliber of people,” however,
it makes life easier for everyone at the supplier. When relations grow excessively
strained, suppliers may choose to go their own way.
Cutting from a Different Cloth: Original Brand Manufacturing at SFI
Tokatli and her colleagues have argued, in a series of case studies (2004, 2004,
2007, 2008b), that strained brand relationships have prompted some Turkish first-tier
suppliers to engage in original brand manufacturing (OBM) beyond original equipment
manufacturing (OEM). Mavi Jeans, sold at accessible luxury retailers like
Bloomingdale’s and Nordstrom, is a star example. A shoe supplier that I visited in India
is undergoing a similar transition. After two big clients “pulled out,” the company
“created a new market” by opening its own brand. It focuses on design “as a hedge
against the bigger players in manufacturing.” MEI also actually began as a “tailoring
shop” with an independent brand sold to Western retailers—now expanded to three
brands—but these brands are a small percentage of the overall business. The most
dramatic and dynamic case, and that which I explore here, is that of SFI. We shall call its
internally developed childrenswear brand “Indiababy.” Indiababy is designed by the
owner’s wife with the assistance of four independent designers trained at the National
Institute of Fashion Technology.
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Where SFI was once a captive supplier to a value brand with 60% of dedicated
production “for years,” the percentage has dropped to 50 and is steadily being replaced
by other buyers (15% and 10% from two competing buyers). While for export clients,
according to Niharika, “we just make and finish, [with Indiababy] we are building value
for the brand, so we put more effort into production and design.” Indiababy now accounts
for 20% of SFI’s revenue. The brand is seeing the fastest growth of any account, rising
from $50k to $2 million within two years. Gokul has big plans: “If someone is doing
well, I want to increase their capacity… It will require restructuring a whole division of
the company, new planning, and a totally different scheme, but it is possible.”
With the force of a whip, Gokul originally grants me a half-hour interview.
Luckily it is extended, time and time again, into two hours of mutual absorption into the
future of Indian suppliers and the future of his firm. He later offers further comments in
the form of a “briefing” during a ride between factories (in a black BMW SUV). As our
trust grows his language becomes increasingly forceful and colorful.51 There are three
main analytical components driving the shift toward original brand manufacturing at SFI:
(1) anger toward Western buyers, (2) strategic capitalist moves up the value chain, and
(3) awareness of demographic and macro-economic shifts.
The first thing to understand from Gokul is his hatred of a semi-colonial market
relationship with his biggest value-segment buyer:
I am not going to work with [the buyer] forever. You know, two to three years
back, they sat down with us and had a meeting. They said, ‘Gokul, where do you
want to take your business? We want you to expand your production, open up a
new factory. We will give you the orders.’ I said, ‘You really want to know what I
want to do? I want to be YOU—I want to be [the buyer]. My whole life, I’ve been
working for you. I’ve been making garments and putting your label on them. So at
any moment, you can throw me out. We both know that it’s only a matter of time
before that happens.’
“They have all the power,” he concludes. Indeed, much neo-Marxist GVC scholarship
echoes this perspective (e.g., Anner, Bair and Blasi 2012, Collins 2003). Resistance
through solidarity and cooperative production is a prominent alternative, at least in the
intellectual attention space. Without reference to capitalist upgrading, however, such
perspectives fail to anticipate institutional entrepreneurship and Gokul’s desire to become
a bigger capitalist on his own.
Secondly, Gokul is familiar with the concept of value chains and the power that
accompanies higher positions. As labor costs rise and local development policies push
manufacturers out of Delhi, Gokul sees two alternatives to move his business forward.
One is movement to the interior:
I have been approached by state officials who have offered me incentives to set up
my production in Orissa [state]. They told me that, ‘You will have to do this,
otherwise you will go out of business with labor costs.’ But I told them the same
thing that I told [the value brand], which is that I want to get out of
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manufacturing… No one should want to be a garment manufacturer, actually. It is
not an aspirational job.
The other choice is Indiababy and other new brands fit to demographic changes (see
below). “There’s more risk involved,” he concedes, “but for me it’s a very clear choice…
I don’t want to leave 30k employees to my kids. I want to leave a brand.”
Gokul’s self-presentation is not as a resentful, empty complainer, but that of an
entrepreneur moving up the value chain:
At the same time, it’s not like I am not making a lot of money… I have seven
chauffeurs, two gardeners, four house helpers, and I live in a palace. I mean, you
should see it… I live like a king. I am just without any power... I want to have the
power in India, in China. I don’t want to deal with all this placating the Western
retailers and putting up with their crap… You are going to see that Indian and
Chinese retail companies are going to compete with the American ones. We are
much hungrier. Even though there is a big domestic market, we are going to push
into international markets too. Why can’t we compete?
Gokul has a hunger not only for money, but for national power. Like many of India’s
business leaders, Gokul’s plans are motivated by both personal and national ambition.
These identity claims are closely linked to a sense of India as an emerging economy (see
also Cappelli et al. 2010, Radhakrishnan 2007).
Third, Gokul believes that India, demographically speaking, is “at an inflection
point” (again see Guillén and Ontiveros 2012 for evidence): “India is 1.2, 1.25 billion.
America is nothing compared to this... Once the [Indian] middle class comes up, once
India and China start spending… the Americans can kiss their manufacturers goodbye.”
There certainly are “teething problems,” as Niharika points out, because “we are not like
MBA professional business and all that.52 We had to build [the brand] from the start.”
Gokul further claims that “Indians are still very price sensitive.” Nevertheless, his vision
is oriented toward macro-level potential:
As the middle class grows… we already see that spending is shifting from
necessary spending to discretionary spending, especially among youth. We are
going to be ready for that market. And you will see, in five to six years other
manufacturers will get into retail too, and then they will be coming to us.
Niharika also looks forward to the eventual transition to retail because “all the buyers are
local” and easier to coordinate with. Or again in Gokul’s more expansive words:
I feel much more comfortable, personally, doing business with an Indian than
with an American. American companies are abusive, Western companies—I don’t
mean to offend you, I know you’re an American—but it is really bad and you will
see, it is going to end.
Rising middle-class spending and the demographic dividend suggest a bright future for
fashion retail in India. Strategic expansion entails its own challenges, of course, and
opportunity is mixed with uncertainty (Cappelli et al. 2010, Guillén and Ontiveros 2012).
Still, Gokul believes he can successfully steer his firm toward success, allowing SFI to
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exit its position at the bottom of exploitative relationships and enter a new hierarchy at a
higher level.
Gokul’s longitudinal vision is supported, to the same radical extent, by Vijay
Mathur, the Additional Secretary General of the Apparel Export Promotion Council
(AEPC). The Apparel Export Promotion Council is the largest industry group of suppliers
in India (with about 7k members), publishes a monthly magazine (Apparel), and
collaborates on reports with international institutions like the World Bank (e.g., LopezAcevedo and Robertson 2016). Mr. Mathur sees huge potential for Indian domestic
consumption, so much so that they will be a net importer of garments in 20 years. He has
some advice for the U.S. on this point: “If Americans want to rebuild apparel
manufacturing,” he says, “they should start learning how to make [Indian-style garments
like] salwar suits, saris, maybe dhotis. That could create a future for them.” Likewise,
“designers at Parsons and FIT [top American design schools], they should be working on
how to adapt the sari for Americans, how to popularize it.” Such pronouncements are
based on a shift in the global prominence of Indian culture. While they will likely
surprise the American consumer, the history of demand creation—sugar (Mintz 1986),
tea (Sen 2004:26), cricket (Appadurai 1996:89-113), recurrent Orientalist fashions in
clothing and interior design (Skov 1996)—these example offer lessons in the surprising
twists and turns of culture and globalization. Mr. Mathur concludes that “in, what was it,
[1961], JFK said, ‘We’re going to put a man on the moon...’ People did not think such a
thing was possible, but it was done within [eight] years.”
The four firms I studied have different methods for managing growth. As
expected, there is overlap in some areas. All firms engage in portfolio management,
reducing risk by reducing exposure to extraordinarily large accounts. Both SFI and MEI
engage in some original brand manufacturing. Apart from SFI, we might hypothesize that
original equipment (contract) manufacturing is resilient because of core competency and
established networks (Gereffi 1999:55-57, Shin 2017:13-15). Still, a different principal
problem and method define the situation (from the executive marketing perspective) at
each supplier. MEI has a long-term strategy which seeks to meet the capacity (and to a
lesser extent capability) needs of buyers. Big buyers are especially favored for their
steady orders and potential to place extremely large orders. ACE is settling into a
productive niche. Rather than further engaging luxury retail segments, they are avoiding
overexposure to big buyers and maintaining rigorous quality expectations for existing
clients. IFS, meanwhile, is working at a more basic level of assuring financial solvency
and trustworthy clients. Avoiding private equity or contracts with failing retailers have
been hard-learned lessons. Finally, SFI is taking on original brand manufacturing. Driven
by anger, pride, and a search for profits and power, they are moving up the value chain
and counting on success in the domestic retail market. Until their production contracts are
short-circuited, however, they continue to hedge by taking production orders from
Western buyers. Account management, as we have seen, is a complex enterprise. Even
this introduction shows that we cannot think of suppliers simply as sweatshops that carry
out contract manufacturing. We will see more details as we carry on, but first we must
introduce another major set of actors on the scene: buying agencies.
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Agencies and Vendor Sourcing
In our chapter thus far we have gained an understanding of the brand environment
and supplier account management. We can now introduce buying as an additional
stakeholder. Buying agencies are a major set of intermediaries between buyers and
suppliers. In addition to sourcing, supplier training workshops, quality analysis,
compliance, and logistics, agencies claim to offer design and product development.53 This
introduces some possibilities for collaboration. However, the greater control that these
intermediaries seek to exert, the greater amount of conflict we can expect. Conflicts are
both formal (e.g., contracts and commissions) and informal (e.g., corruption). Before
examining these conflicts, we need some sense of scope and some idea of the different
organizational forms that intermediaries can take.
As mentioned, recent years have witnessed consolidation in the apparel GVC
(Gereffi 2014). The internal strategic assessment of a mid-tier brand, summarized by a
liaison agency director (see below), is that while “we should have a healthy capacity for
India” to place orders of at least a million pieces with multiple firms, sourcing from too
many suppliers is “unwieldy.” A sourcing intern for an American conglomerate,
Charlotte, explains large-scale shifts in the following terms:
From what I’ve seen, because I’m working in the strategy department, a lot of
brands are trying to reduce their supplier base… [they want] economies of scale
[and] better control and a set of relationships with the suppliers. Because they’re
asking [suppliers] to do a lot more than I think they were asking them to do
previously. Maybe that’s having a merchandising team or an in-house design
team.
My dissertation will make it abundantly clear that first-tier suppliers like ACE and MEI
are indeed evolving, upgrading, and assuming these extra functions.
Buying agencies are also seeking to fill the voids of receding buyer
responsibilities. Paaus tells me in self-aggrandizing style54 that the work of his firm
“reaches deep back into development. We have our own [version of] WGSN [trend
forecasting]. We create fabrics that people don’t understand… we create things that
people have never seen.” This includes a trend-based team oriented toward “conceptual
development” with “no limitations” and other teams focused on “brand-specific
development.” Like most Western buyers and designers (Chapter 4), he contrasts the
honorary “design” work of his own employees versus the mere “product development” of
competing Indian suppliers. He later admits, however, that “manufacturer design cells we
love. It makes our job easy!” In fact, his agency has now begun to demand that some
suppliers “build design teams” before placing orders. For example, “we will tell them,
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‘you need three people in place, then we will give you the business only [after that].’”
The threat of competitive services is not an issue for Paaus, who relies instead on
boundary work and the belief that a deeper talent pool will ultimately provide greater
client satisfaction. As we will see, different kinds of agencies hold different positions on
collaboration versus competition.
Major Organizational Forms
The major division among agencies is not large versus small, but direct versus
indirect. Liaison agencies are direct brand representatives: they represent a basic sourcing
strategy of hierarchy and cooperative internalization. Usually they act as the sourcing
arm of large brands. I tracked nine liaison offices in my fieldwork but they probably
number in the dozens. Vijay Mathur estimates that $5-6 billion of export value flows
through liaison offices. Buying agencies work for a variety of brands: they represent a
basic sourcing strategy of market governance and competitive fragmentation. Over 300
buying agencies are registered with the Apparel Export Promotion Council, representing
around $12 billion in export value. As in manufacturing, most buying agencies are small.
Each form of organization, of course, comes with its own set of advantages and
disadvantages.
At both ACE and MEI, 75-85% of orders are handled through liaison agencies;
the remainder are routed through buying agencies. This is notable for two reasons. First,
it does not reflect the greater power of buying agencies in India at large ($12 billion
versus $5 billion). ACE and MEI are medium and large first-tier suppliers: they are
playing a different game than the majority of small and medium enterprises in the
country. Second, there is a very strong preference for liaison agencies across executives,
management, and workers in at least three out of the four suppliers I studied. As I analyze
conflicts below, it should be remarkable how many complaints are directed at buying
agencies despite their control of only 15-25% of orders.
Corporate Liaison Agencies
Corporate liaison agents offer the advantages of control and information-sharing
that arise from internalization (Coase 1937).55 They minimize disputes and other
transaction costs. In direct and long-term relationships, “sequential adaptations become
an occasion for cooperative adjustment rather than opportunistic bargaining; risks may be
attenuated; differences between successive stages can be resolved more easily by the
internal control machinery” (Williamson 1971:116). Long-term liaison and supplier
relationships can develop goodwill (Sako and Helper 1998)—a higher form of trust that
may be more reliable than contracts in some areas of the apparel industry (e.g.,
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intellectual property). Liaison agencies are generally understood as cooperative rather
than intrusive.
Liaison agencies take orders from either a Western headquarters or an Asian hub
like Hong Kong. In large cities like Delhi, they may staff hundreds of employees. There
are also branch, “satellite,” or “production” offices in regions or cities with sparser
factory units. Outposts may employ only a few people. An executive tells me that some
regions in Pakistan, for example, “are very hard to travel to. But they have a few
products, like indigo denim—they are the best in the world.” In such a situation the
liaison office will work with only one or two high-quality, “reputable” factories in the
region. According to a senior product manager at ACE, most branch offices within India
“will work on Delhi information.”
From the supplier perspective, there is a near-universal preference for working
with liaison agents who are locally empowered with decision-making authority. Reasons
for this preference include familiarity (learned preferences, indexed by casual
conversation and Indian staff) and efficiency (including time spent sending status
updates). Some buyers offer a direct line for certain approvals (e.g., costing) but
designate other decisions to liaison agents. Agents without authority are especially
frustrating to work with: details must be transmitted from supplier to agent to buyer and
back again (and through different time zones). This can remove an entire day from a
precious time-and-action plan (Chapter 5).56 Some liaison offices and small brands go
further by not employing any independent agents for quality control. They devolve
quality control to their trusted or long-term suppliers, perhaps certifying a particular
employee at a supplier instead.
One of the largest buyers and best relationships for ACE is a mid-tier brand whom
a senior product manager calls “the big shot of ACE.” I begin my first meeting with
Chandana by asking about this relationship. She started her career with them and feels
that she, along with ACE, “has grown up with” the brand. In technical terms, “they are
“defined,” which creates “less confusion… Everything runs very smoothly.” At the same
time, the buyer “is open to our technical suggestions, they are not rigid. They are
subjective… That way they are a very understanding buyer.” Though their timelines are
not forgiving, a senior product manager tells me he does not mind accelerated order
timelines, claiming the buyer “will always help us… to expedite fabric and trims”
(Chapter 5).
The relationship seems to be built on good faith from both sides, with more
interest in trust and collaboration than in control. “We try to move away from
transactions as much as possible,” a liaison agency director says. “We are more into
relationships with manufacturers, good quality manufacturers who we can trust.” She lays
out her philosophy this way:
Every season we have a path with [our suppliers], what we are looking for in
terms of numbers, in terms of design content… When it comes to capacity
planning [Chapter 6], I know, for example, for each of my [suppliers], how much
56

Co-presence is deemed necessary for many approvals. Agents with minimal authority
are still a more efficient option for both sides than a previous method of air-mailing
samples back and forth.
46

capacity they will offer each season. We make a goal to fill that capacity. We give
them projections. It won’t be 100% accurate, but plus or minus ten to 15%.
Chandana agrees that the liaison agency “is very committed with their vendors. They
work like a partnership. They are not like this, ‘[give us] five cents cheaper or we will go
somewhere else.’” They are also “conscious” to provide orders for capacity utilization.
Buying agencies make the same claims of providing supportive capacity blocking (see
below), but managers at the suppliers I studied are noticeably more skeptical of buying
agency claims. From the supplier perspective, liaison agencies are not only more reliable,
but more loyal. From the buying agency perspective, meanwhile, this loyalty to suppliers
carries an opportunity cost. Buying agencies have a certain license of market
opportunism; they advertise loyalty to buyers themselves.
Large Buying Agencies
Buying agencies, by strategic intent, are more competitive than liaison agents. In
other words, because these agencies work for multiple buyers, this generally means
favoring market transactions rather than internationalization. “[Our] clients demand
results,” the William E. Connor agency argues (2017). “If they don’t get them, they go
elsewhere. What better way to sharpen the mind than to know that we had better deliver
or else?” Buying agencies offer three things that liaison agencies do not: accessibility,
dispersion, and specialization. First, small brands who cannot afford to support their own
liaison agencies gain access to discounts and capacity blocking through the combinations
of orders by buying agencies (Davis 1992a:153n22).
Second, buyers gain access to specialized or “core” competencies (Prahalad and
Hamel 1990). As Anurag tells me, “most of the buyers have an apparel focus, but [every
brand] offers shoes now. You might not think about it, but [a bridge brand] is a huge
producer for shoes… A liaison office will not have the expertise. They can look at the
factory very generally, but they will not know anything about the product.” “If you’re
making leather bags,” Charlotte further explains, “you need a separate supplier. Wallets,
that’s a separate supplier. Or like if you’re making sunglasses. If you’re not making just
clothing, you need specific suppliers—like someone that makes clothes can’t make
plastic, you know what I mean?” A variety of interview and online sources report that 6090% of buying agency sales are focused “soft goods” like apparel and footwear.57
Third, dispersion amplifies competition among suppliers while providing new
ideas and geographic flexibility for supply chains and institutional agreements. In terms
of information-sharing or creative exploitation, “you want your supplier to keep working
with other people so they will be exposed to new ideas they can bring back into the
Carlsson’s survey-based study (2017) verifies that large buyers use supplier networks
to access product variety and to navigate weak institutional environments (indexed by
factors like contract enforcement and the prevalence of violence). In my view (see
below), his most important finding is that buyers transition toward local suppliers with
country experience.
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network” (Fung 2011).58 Li and Fung (just cited) is today’s giant buying agency. With a
network of 15,000 suppliers, by a journalist’s estimate they supply 40% of all apparel
sold in the U.S. (Sherman 2014b).59 In the days of trade quotas (a major U.S. agreement
lapsed in 2005), buying agencies could allocate orders across countries to navigate
loopholes (Lardner 1988b). The same is now true for optimizing tariffs.
Charlotte adds that with a large network of suppliers, “they might be producing
the same pants in multiple factories because they can get a shorter lead time to Europe by
making it in a European factory. And then they make it in an Asian factory for Asia and
the U.S.” In addition, peripheral or emerging sourcing locations (e.g., Ethiopia) facilitate
lower costs. By relying on a buying agency, buyers meanwhile gain access to institutional
navigation: a senior general manager of operations at MEI gives me the analogy of
showing up to court without a lawyer. By offering “field presence” with touch and feel,
large buying agencies can (a) procure unique materials (already noted in Babbage [1835]
1963:221-22) and (b) smooth over different supplier standards of quality control when
sourcing from multiple suppliers.
Small Buying Agencies
ACE works with more small buying agencies than the other suppliers I studied.
Most buying agencies in India—like most suppliers—are small. After a week of learning
the basics in product management, senior product manager Vivek brings me to a small
buying agency meeting for a mid-tier buyer. As we walk over, he tamps down my
excitement by saying that they are “not as big as [other agencies].” The outside of the
building has dark windows and an unmarked entrance through a black door. A buying
agent inside tells me that most small agencies like his will work with between five and 10
buyers, some small and some large, handling 100% of each buyer’s sourcing in India.
The buying agency, in turn, maintains relations with about five suppliers. There is a
garment sample from one of ACE’s rivals on the table, a subtle but ever-present reminder
of competition.
There are a number of plausible explanations for the continued survival or vitality
of small agencies against large ones. One classic general explanation is flexibility (Piore
and Sabel 1984), including bureaucratic avoidance. A U.S. sourcing director fields the
following critique: “I love giant conglomerates [as competitors]. Because they’re
dinosaurs. Like their old way of corporate structure drives them. So by the time that they
made a decision, I’ve already bought it and sold it.” Another possible explanation is
fewer compliance burdens, so according to Vijay, “they can source from anywhere where
they can find the lowest margin.” A division manager at a large buying agency further
suggests that some small agencies can survive with low overheads by hiring only a
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handful of staff (see also Commons 1901:323) or by working with suppliers that only
produce a specific product or product category. And, an MEI executive cautions me,
“remember that there are a lot of domestic businesses also. There is a whole range…” he
says as he moves his hand up and down in a tall sweep.
These suggestions are of course analytical and come together in practice. ACE
senior product manager Nikita relates a story (verified by other product managers) of a
small agency that is stocked with former agents and product managers from a liaison
agency. At the liaison agency, she says, employees were working until 10 or 11 at night.
The liaison agency “had so many levels of hierarchy” that increasing responsibilities
were continually pushed down to subordinates. Eventually, a low-level product manager
might be responsible for 250-300 styles (compared to around 25 for an ACE product
manager, and even then with the help of an assistant). Requirements were “crazy,” so a
number of employees left to start their own agency. As employees left the brand
headquarters, the new buying agency was able to build a client portfolio from existing
personal connections. Initially accepting a lower profit margin also helped to induce
switches.
One final possible advantage of small buying agencies is that they may act more
tenaciously on behalf of a smaller number of buyers. Paaus admits that small buyers are
sometimes afraid they “may get lost” within a large agency.60 Nikita provides another
example of a bridge brand who contacts ACE for an order requiring special machinery.
Nikita declines the order, telling the brand “it is outside of our capability.” “Please do this
style,” the buyer responds, offering a target price of $11—far below ACE’s initial costing
of $20-25. Nikita again declines, encouraging the buyer to place the order elsewhere.
Finally, the buying agency intervenes on behalf of the buyer, with an agency manager
calling the managing director of ACE personally to ask for a favor. “The buyer comes
begging,” Nikita says, “and you cannot say no to someone who is begging,” so she is
instructed to proceed with the order. It turns out that the buying agency has contacts with
only two suppliers in India. Although the order is outside of ACE’s capability, because of
regional competencies, ACE still has a better chance of fulfilling the order than a
competing supplier in another country. Given differences in cost and capability, it is
extremely unlikely that this order would have proceeded without buying agency
intervention.
Buying Agency Conflicts
Inter-organizational issues of trust and responsibility are regular features of
GVCs. They are not just between buyers and suppliers, but among agencies and
monitoring organizations as well. Buying agencies appear to create substantially more
friction than liaison agencies. While a liaison agent visits SFI regularly, for example, it is
mostly to meet with a brand-certified quality analysis manager who works for the
supplier. She adopts a sharp, even bitter tone in her separate assessment of buying
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agencies, saying that they “want to control everything, but they don’t understand [the
internal processes of manufacturing]. We are unable to fulfill their whims and fancies…
they are very egoistic people.” Liaison agencies also judge buying agencies harshly; a
director who favors “facilitation” accuses buying agencies of being “into control, control,
control.”
We will begin by covering relatively formal battles before looking at conflicts that
are proximally based in social interaction. Both analytical categories involve failures of
goodwill (Dore 1983). The former set includes contracts, buying agency commissions
and corruption, and the agency practice of competitive “counter-costing.” Some conflicts
are avoided by fiat: Sanchit, for example, largely avoids contracts with buying agencies.
Because direct buyer-supplier relationships take time to develop, however, managers
process the brunt of buying agency coordination and conflict (Cramton and Hinds 2014).
Supplier executives make the ultimate decisions (Knight [1921] 1964), but managers do
have some influence with brands about working with particular agencies. Vivek tells me,
for instance, that business for one client was formerly run through a small agency in a
different city. After convincing the buyer of inconvenience, the buyer accommodated
with an agency that is a five-minute walk from one of the ACE factory units. For now, let
us turn directly to the executives and managers at suppliers, buying agencies, and liaison
agencies. With dozens of years of experience, they have honed perspectives that are
continually ready for battle on topics including contracts, commissions, corruption, and
social interaction.
Contracts
Senior executives are tight-lipped about contractual issues. Early in my fieldwork
I sometimes get vague answers that cannot be opened up, like “the most important thing
in business… is not to do the wrong business. You might get really screwed on a
contract...” I realize in hindsight that there is a clear methodological trade-off between
scope (studying organizational routines through ethnographic interviews) and focus in
this area. Dedicated studies are simply more revealing, especially where researchers can
establish informal relations that emerge with maturity and experience (Jackall 1988,
Thomas 1993). At any rate, after building case details from the rest of the organizational
hierarchy, I was at least able to gather detailed responses from vice presidents or general
managers who seem strategically forged in part through notable episodes of brand and
buying agency conflict.
One of the most elementary forms of contract is a non-competition agreement;
they prohibit a supplier from working with competing brands. Elizabeth, a financial
analyst for an accessible luxury brand in the U.S. apparel industry, says that they are
useful where there is a “monopoly on product” through a distinctive material, fit, or
patent. She suggests Lululemon as a “signature product,” proposing that the brand “will
make factories sign a non-compete” so as not to be tweaked by a competitor like Under
Armor. In her view it is extremely important “to preserve brand loyalty. You have to
keep the customer coming to you... You don’t want to share your secret sauce.” Reverse
engineering is possible, she acknowledges, but an inefficient counter to novelty—
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tweaked versions will appear “too late to market.” In my fieldwork, non-competition
agreements are extremely rare: a senior product manager at ISF, like most participants I
ask, says she has “never heard about it.” Only two brands may require them, but these
two are suggested only through hearsay. There would be price premiums required to hold
off competitor capacity, for one thing. Weak intellectual property laws (Chapter 3) are
not helpful either.
The next level to consider is minor contractual conflicts. These are dispatched by
general managers without ever reaching the attention of senior executives. As an
example, Nikita pulls up a set of orders from a bridge brand asking for sample
developments for six styles. They were dropped late in the product management timeline
(Chapter 5) without explanation. “If it’s something small like a color or something, we
don’t charge them for anything,” Nikita says. “But since I have put so much work into
this, we had to charge them.” She shows me the liability document, which charges $300
per “artwork” multiplied by six styles for a liability of $1800.
Some infractions are brought to the attention of senior executives but still handled
by general managers. An export logistics manager tells me the following story on the
terrain of intellectual property:
There was one very famous case, that was with [a bridge brand]. They are placing
their orders through [an agency] with some apparel house [supplier] who has sent
some outwork for finishing, but someone has stolen 100 pieces… [The brand],
they had some spies in India and they found these pieces in the [consumer]
market. As per the contract, [the supplier] has to pay a heavy penalty, some $100200 per piece.
The concern here is for brand equity and control of distribution. Paaus’ agency has
worked with this brand in the past, but when I ask him if he knows about this episode, he
avoids details and pushes me back into general conversation. Where “pop and mom
brands don’t care” about such infractions, an established brand “is holier than the pope
when they come in!” He gives a hearty laugh; my interview skills simply lose out against
his rhetorical defenses and emotional diffusion.
The biggest conflicts can involve millions of dollars and are highly charged.
Quality or compliance issues can escalate over time before reaching a breaking point.
Elizabeth tells me that her accessible luxury brand and a mid-tier brand prefer captive
strategies (near 100% of supplier capacity) to establish strong parameters of quality
control. After a $2 million order from a supplier was completely rejected, her brand
terminated relations. They now pay order premiums to another supplier but feel assured
of dedicated attention, minimal defects, and on-time delivery.
Soham also relates a major public conflict between Target and textile
manufacturer Welspun India. “There was an allegation that low-quality cotton was used
for some bedding or towels… [Target] has sued for a major claim. Now the relationship
is over.” An export logistics manager at MEI relates his perception of the case:
Target has paid lots of money for good quality cotton, it should be Egyptian brand
cotton, but they have given some Indian brand cotton. This will be a
misdeclaration with U.S. government… that [textile] company has been turned
upside down, kicked so many times, blacklisted… You have to be honest toward
the buyer. You do not bluff, you do not play with their requirements.
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Target ended orders with Welspun in 2016 and did not restart contracts until 2021. With
10% of Welspun’s business coming from this buyer alone, they suffered serious financial
and reputational losses in the intervening years.
Mahesh gives another example of a $400,000 claim filed by a buyer against a late
shipment from MEI. “It was [due to] an external factor, which was not in our control,” he
says. “You had issues in Bangladesh, you had Rana Plaza [collapse], you had a building
falling down, you had factories shut for 20-25 days.” After sourcing delays, “the goods
[are] getting into air [shipment] situation, so you’re getting to incur huge losses. So
probably some customers charge you back for loss of sales [opportunities] and other
issues, and you have a lot of issues which crop up because of non-deliveries.” He
continues, saying that a “$20 million customer with a $400,000 claim is huge. So there at
one point of time we need to take a call whether we want to pursue the customer
[relationship] or do you want to withdraw from the customer, based on the issues that we
had.” Mahesh and other executives made the following call:
[We decided to] bite the bullet, and then we called into settlement, and then we
settled it amicably… Today the same customer is $100 million. If you would have
said, ‘thank you [i.e., goodbye],’ if you would have shaken hands at $20 million,
you would never have been at a $100 million business. The point is that the vision
of the [corporate] board is what matters. If they’re aligned to the strategy, then it
can be solved.
These high-level executive decisions can involve serious risk and thoughtful strategic
assessments. They are one of the fundamental tasks of executives, above and beyond the
routines of designers, planners, or assembly line operators. Executives must also decide
how much to pay in commission fees and how much corruption to tolerate.
Commissions and Corruption
Most agencies claim to accept commissions only from retailers, not suppliers. My
fieldwork suggests that bribery toward suppliers is not uncommon, however, and may
extend back up the value chain as well. Commissions are based either on prices or on a
formula that includes prices, volume, design, etc. Paaus does not think I should be
interested in the details: “It’s all contractual,” he assures me, implicitly emphasizing that
each firm has the power and resources to make rational and ethical decisions.61 Divisions
between policy and practice, however, are common in many bureaucratic organizational
forms (e.g., Edelman 1992, Meyer and Rowan 1977), and here I know better.
An introductory example is from informal bids or competitive costing, always
called “counter-costing” in India. This is the practice of seeking between two to four cost
estimates for a style. Requests are targeted toward suppliers with the capabilities and
price ranges to follow through to production if selected. I hear from multiple sources that
two brands gradually deserted ACE through this process. In keeping with the trust-based
relationships of liaison agencies, competitive costing is sometimes formally prohibited.
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“prevention of bribery,” which to me actually suggests its prevalence in the industry.
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On the desk of a senior product manager at ACE, however, we look through a large
manila envelope which contains four sample kids garments. These samples have already
been produced by competitors. “That’s basically always how it works,” the manager says,
but is this case he is confident that ACE can produce the same garments more cheaply.
Chandana reports that ACE wins 60-70% of these competitions. She believes—and game
theorists should agree—that collecting competing estimates from other suppliers first
indicates ACE’s favored status with the liaison agency. Early access to information
expands bargaining power.
At a general level, there are three main barbs against buying agency commissions:
(1) expense, (2) lack of utility, and (3) moral outrage over corruption. (1) Alfie, a
European brand operations manager, reports that a 10% commission is the same level of
“effective tax” as import or export taxes. Senior product manager Sanjay reports regular
commissions of seven to eight percent (taken from the buyer). Vijay estimates the
standard “middleman margin” at 4-10%, though he says it can reach up to 15% in some
cases. Suppliers, liaison agents, and industry trade officials all agree that liaison agencies
“offer a better price” in the end. (2) While buying agencies argue that commissions
represent value added, historical and contemporary critiques are easy to find (e.g.,
Commons 1901:321-22). Amrita feels that buying agencies “are paper-pushers. They are
not technical. They just call you (puts imaginary phone to ear): ‘you are asking for $5,
but we want to give you $3.’” Alfie calls them “the devil,” telling me that “all they do is
connect a buyer to a factory.” Sanchit also says of buying agents that “most of them don’t
have specialized knowledge of anything except how to, you know, manage the
communication [between the buyer and the manufacturer]. And that’s not something that
we feel that we lack in.”62 Finally, a liaison agency director accuses buying agencies of
acting as mere “business partners” with a “transactional” or “one-off” approach as a
“profit center counting the money.” This brings us to a third major concern: corruption.
(3) At a minimum, a former buying agency intern reports, the main objective for
low-level staff is to increase their orders in order to obtain higher commissions for
themselves. Paaus endorses this. After a couple of interviews, I mention to him that I
have heard the word “profit” a good number of times. His response is loud and upfront:
“Why shouldn’t I? We have to think about profit! Why are we here if it is not about
profit? It is your own maintenance in this competitive world.” Commissions seem,
however, to offer the temptations of bribery. Sanchit believes that when buying agents
work on sourcing from suppliers, they also consider “if they are going to make money on
the side. They don’t say that upfront, always. Sometimes they do and sometimes they
don’t.” When I ask about bribes, Mahesh is similarly soft, pinning it only on small
agencies:
Uh… see, for large established buying houses doesn’t happen, but for small
buying houses yes they do. The problem is that, you know, it becomes an
individual [relationship] thing. So they try to become corrupt. So, as much as
possible, you withdraw yourself and work with retailers [i.e., liaison agencies]. If
you ask me for a [business] model, first is direct [liaison agencies], second is large
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At other times Sanchit acknowledges this as an internal shortcoming.
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buying houses who have established customer; so, these small buying houses will
be our last choice.
Mahesh’s explanation tends toward the logic of bad apples. Small agencies may collect
supplier commissions on the side, but this is not standard practice.
At the other end of the spectrum, some of the most antagonistic comments that I
hear throughout my fieldwork emerge on the topic of buying agency corruption. Sanchit
and I go back and forth in an interview:
“In many cases there’s all sorts of unscrupulous practices that happen.”
“I’ve heard about that. So basically they take a cut of it or they offer you…”
Sanchit interrupts: “[A cut] on both sides” (i.e., buyer and supplier).
“Does that also include some of the big agencies like [x] and [y]?”
“Oh yeah. Absolutely.”
“So it’s just a part of the industry that some are willing to accept, and others are
not.”
“Very few are not.”
Sanchit’s view is that commission-based corruption is endemic. Gokul’s view is even
stronger. He issues a broad-scale condemnation as follows:
I will say that Western retailers and their buying agencies are so corrupt. It is
really sickening. If a buying agent will come to me and tell me, ‘I can bring you
business if you give me one percent [commission],’ I will tell them no, get out of
here.”
Based on my knowledge of brand sourcing patterns and buying agency clients, it seems
quite likely that both Sanchit and Gokul are avoiding relationships with buying agencies
both in rhetoric and in practice. These executives are not representative of smaller
suppliers, but (a) their opposition does seem to be principled, and (b) they may be
specially enabled to avoid this kind of corruption because they have access to the
alternatives of liaison agencies and direct buyer relationships.
Social Interactions and Bad Apples
Mahesh, like most participants, has a clear preference for direct or liaison
relationships. Business is business, however, and he understands why brands may choose
to work with buying agencies:
You see, many time working with direct makes more sense. Because you’re
offering a better price to the end consumer, to the end retailer. But [many times
buyers] cannot come direct because there are a lot of commitments to the buying
houses… The [agencies] give services other than buying, like sourcing in the first
place. So the retailers are forced to get into a buying cycle.
He acknowledges that “there are some excellent buying houses who actually understand
and help us to convert business.” He intentionally brackets organizational arrangements,
however, in favor of individual relationships: “So I would say it is again [about] people.
If you have great people, then you really love the buying house… And if you have stupid
people, even in an ultimate buyer, you don’t feel what you’re getting [is worth it].” The
big-picture executive outlook is something like the following:
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As a company we value relationship on a much higher scale than, uh, you know,
people who just stop [orders] for five cents, ten cents [cheaper elsewhere]… As
much as possible we try to avoid it… The top 15 customers, they [have been] with
the company… for a minimum of 10-15 years… It’s not that every time we had a
great time. We had, issues, both sides. But ultimately the relationship is what is
able to drive and sustain growth. Without relationship, you just can’t get it.
As with love and friendship, the idea here is that meaningful (business) connections can
outlive small conflicts. The idea extends to apparently technical disagreements. Sanchit,
for example, notes that “we withdrew from [an accessible luxury buyer] over a year ago.
They’ve come back now. Simple things like… they don’t know what they’re talking
about.” No executive in the apparel industry is a stranger to repair work (Goffman 1967).
Corrosive conflicts, meanwhile, are typically framed as the faults of individual
bad apples. Sanchit’s withdrawal from the buyer mentioned above was partly technical,
but it was more importantly about goodwill or respect. He relates the following episode:
They’re rude to my people [staff]. I actually had to throw somebody out. I said,
“sorry, you can leave.” I had someone from their [buyer] country call me and say,
“how can you do that? We’ve given you so much business.” I said, “you can’t
come in and abuse my people, it’s as simple as that. We can continue our business
relationship, but this gentleman can only come in after he has apologized.” And it
took shutting of the business for over a year for this guy to come back and
apologize. We [Indians] are a very proud people if you haven’t already figured
that out. So for [the Indian buying agent] to apologize here really is a big deal… It
was a bit awkward in that sense. We are not (puts hands together deferentially and
does a mock bow), “yes, sir.”
Sanchit’s opposition here appears again as diplomatic and deontological (i.e., highly
principled and independent of utilitarian calculations). Other instances of relational
conflict are more ambiguous.
A particularly interesting case for me involves a buyer who left ACE for MEI to
secure lower costs, only to encounter another set of problems. Mahesh comes back to his
schema of relationships to explain a faltering sourcing agreement:
See, what happens with retailers in this industry is that it is again, sometimes it
becomes an individual-driven business, unfortunately… Suppose example if you
say “no” to one buyer in [a particular] company, you offended him. He kept
begging you, you say “no.” The next day morning he is in [a different company]
as the head [executive]. What will you do? (He laughs.) That drives your
business. And if he’s in the senior management and he doesn’t want to work with
you, then there are hundreds of other factories he can work with.
Mahesh’s explanation of denying capacity is entirely plausible. We have certainly seen
other examples of buying agencies exchanging favors and exerting leverage through
these same kinds of personalized executive requests. Amrita and Ankur, however, learn a
different version of the story when the buyer asks to restart its relationship with ACE.
According to their conversations with the buyer, MEI engaged in unsanctioned
subcontracting (Chapter 6). MEI was given multiple warnings that the practice must
cease, but they did not follow through.
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Documentation or a buyer interview would be helpful for verification. Still, the
underlying relational point is the end of relationships usually involves bitterness and has
to be justified by some failure of goodwill (Dore 1983:464). I have no trouble arguing
that (a) episodes within intimate relationships are highly sensitive to standpoints, and (b)
standpoints have more epistemological force at micro levels of analysis. When power is
attached to executives embodying organizational hierarchies and alliances, “relationships
matter.” We will see further buying agency conflicts in future chapters, but they should
be approached knowing that perceptions of loyalty and control go beyond the fine print of
contracts.
Agency and Vendor Sourcing Summary
As GVCs consolidate, buyers are slowly devolving functions to first-tier
suppliers. Liaison and buying agencies serve as intermediaries. Some offer their own
design services and collaborate with suppliers on other issues in pre-production. Liaison
agencies are strongly preferred by the suppliers I studied. Following a logic of
internalization which minimizes transaction costs, most offer direct local authority in
decision-making. Commitments extend to planning and capacity blocking, both in terms
of orders and advance information. Suppliers generally feel that liaison agencies offer
valuable technical advice while maintaining openness to supplier input.
Large buying agencies operate with a more competitive model of dispersion. They
offer unique privileges to buyers, including access to new ideas from competitors and
suppliers, sourcing specializations of core competence, and the ability to optimize for
quotas (in the past) and tariffs (in the present). Small buying agencies, meanwhile, gain
some leverage through personal relationships and the avoidance of slow-moving
bureaucracy. They may work harder for client satisfaction because, given a smaller client
base, each buyer is comparatively more important.
Despite a much lower prevalence in orders at ACE and MEI, buying agencies—in
contrast to liaison agencies—generate most of the conflict across occupational
hierarchies. Transactions and relations are two major analytical areas of conflict.
Executives play crucial roles in navigating both domains. At the most formal level,
contractual disputes can cover minor issues (a few thousand dollars) up to major ones (in
the millions). Penalties for unsanctioned subcontracting or distribution can be severe,
including the loss of multi-million-dollar contracts. Executives must make important calls
to either preserve or terminate buyer relationships following these major disputes. Across
the domains of technical problems and social interaction, issues of loyalty and control are
central to executives and general managers. Managers tend to feel that buying agencies
seek control without technical understanding. High-level conflicts are sometimes created
or solved at the micro level of executive dyads or triads. Frontstage presentations of
loyalty or respect can make or break relationships, perhaps especially when the
contractual substance behind disputes is difficult to track.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter began with a very brief historical overview of deindustrialization in
the U.S. Similar trends occurred have occurred in Western Europe. Buyers bring regional
institutional preferences into supplier relationships. European brands are regarded by
suppliers as fashionable and creative, but less predictable. U.S. brands seem to operate
under McDonaldization, favoring large orders that are rigorously standardized. Indian
clients get along despite a lack of resources, serving the function of surplus absorption for
export-oriented suppliers.
Asian suppliers have picked up many of the formerly U.S. and European
operations. Among them are MEI, ACE, IFS, and SFI, who use different strategies to
grow their operations. MEI is pursuing aggressive growth through large-volume orders,
positioning itself as a strategic supplier to large brands interested in supply chain
consolidation. ACE is focusing on quality, performance, and value-added design. IFS is
learning to avoid fraud, instead seeking business credit checks that signal financial
stability. SFI is experimenting with original brand manufacturing, motivated by anger
over exploitation, the strategic pursuit of profits, and a sense of national optimism within
India.
Buying agencies are a major intermediary. I have grouped them into three
categories. Corporate liaison agencies have direct relationships that are strongly preferred
by suppliers because of their openness and goodwill (e.g., commitments to booking
capacity). Large buying agencies offer large networks to buyers, including the ability to
optimize trade policies and supplier specializations. Small buying agencies run on
personal relationships. Buyer-supplier conflicts include contractual struggles,
disagreements about the morality of profit and commissions, and accusations of
corruption. This is certainly a non-exhaustive list, but it is a useful preface that does not
fit easily into a framework of organizational routines. Providing context could be a neverending task: in addition to theory and organizations it could include an analysis of
regional competition or domestic economic and institutional history. Perhaps these will
be added eventually. I certainly suspect, however, that the major “value-added” from this
dissertation will be its analysis of organizational routines in the next four chapters.
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CHAPTER 3: DESIGN AND PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
When most Americans or Europeans think of fashion design, they think of global
cities like New York and Paris. Delhi, Mumbai, or Ludhiana are further down the list. As
GVCs grow more extensive, however, and increase trade in services beyond tasks,
suppliers are adding design as part of what I call, building on Gereffi (1999), “extended
full-package manufacturing.” Adding these services to the GVC adds a competitive
advantage to supplier offerings. Although I report ethnographic data from only four
factories, interviews and websites confirm that every first-tier supplier and buying agency
in India offers design services. Little is known about export-oriented design in other
countries, although buyers I spoke with expect similar services (though different product
varieties) in Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Indonesia, and China. Korea (Shin 2017) and Japan
(Kawamura 2004) have advanced design infrastructures.
This chapter covers design research and product development. Design research at
supplier firms begins with the operationalization of trend forecasting. Trend forecasting
services offer advice 18-24 months ahead of market impact and seem to function by
corralling social representations into a collective focus of institutions across the fashion
industry. Downstream from forecasting, designers look to five other sources of
inspiration: the design office, media (especially social media), fashion weeks in global
cities, shopping, and brand websites or brand requests. These influences are collated into
a “mood board” of images and fabrics. Some mood boards originate from buyers while
others are generated by supply-side designers. The design department also has a section
of designers who work on computer-aided programs (CAD) to produce artwork and
program the routing of computer embroidery. Design as a profession is characterized by
the institutional logics of creativity, holism, and sensitivity to trends and aesthetics.
Product developers and tailors, covered in the second half of the chapter, value
somewhat different principles. They mediate between designers and industrial engineers,
who obey the institutional logics of utility and efficiency. Engineering, regardless of the
applied situation, is first and foremost about problem-solving (see Dutton and Dukerich
1991). Product development is situated between art and commerce, as other scholars have
pointed out, and is sometimes criticized by designers as relatively routinized work
(Fayard, Stigliani and Bechky 2016:13, Molotch 2003). By the same token, it is more
practical and arguably more technically sound, even if it results in cost reduction: product
developers use the term “production-friendly.” Their focus on cost is shared with buyers,
but produces conflict with designers who want to retain stylistic features that are
aesthetically desirable even if they entail a greater cost. Although designers and product
developers begin from competing institutional logics, these tensions are ultimately
integrated into functional ambivalence (Ashforth and Reingen 2014, Dalpiaz, Rindova
and Ravasi 2016). Too much ambivalence is prevented by jurisdictional claims over task
flow. Product developers either (a) obviate collaboration with supply-side designers by
connecting directly to buyers, or (b) modify styles after designers have “inspired” buyers.
Finally, tailors work with designers and product developers to construct samples.
Sometimes they identify mistakes in buyer or designer specifications, but at other times
they make their own errors in pattern construction. Collaboration with embellishment
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artisans brings together a host of competing demands including artistic integrity, reducing
cost, negotiating cost, and finishing sample work within an acceptable timeline.
Department Structure and Education
I estimate that 80-100 people work in pre-production at ACE. Design is a small
department consisting of five or six assistant designers (depending on turnover), an senior
designer, and a creative director. An additional eight work on computer-aided design, but
the work is less conceptual, as we will see. The department is split into two teams, but I
spend my time exclusive with the team managed by the creative director, Amrita. She has
the rare managerial command of additional pre-production activities including sampling,
marketing, and costing. Marketing on Amrita’s side is handled by a team of 12.63 Design
is usually separated, or “insulated,” as Vaasu says, from the more technical work of
product development (PD) and the business-oriented work of marketing and costing.
Effectively, it is insulated from the engineering ideals of utility and efficiency which are
pervasive in other units across the factory. I call this “administrative exceptionalism.”
Although all design is channeled through Amrita and her assistants, there are two or three
other teams of marketing and product management staff, and a similar number of tailors,
employed in other parts of the factory. Assistant designers overlap in their areas of
expertise, but it is roughly divided among contracted designs and sleepwear (Lakshit),
ladies and kids knits (Vani), and ladies wovens (Priyanka). Design work at MEI is
divided according to material, gender, and client (3-4 clients for each team)—different
fabrics and garment types require different machines, washing, and production schedules.
Senior designers add a level of hierarchy, each with two or three assistant designers under
their management.
Most designers are young and female, a gendered employment distribution
echoed in production lines and in the world of retail (e.g., Inditex 2016:6). For most it is
either their first or second job. Employing inexperienced women seems to be a pragmatic
strategy to avoid high salaries. For example, a senior designer told me that MEI used to
employ a creative director in each HQ unit, but when the director in her unit left, the
position was not filled. Instead marketing managers each inherited some of her
responsibilities and took the lead on various accounts. (Rahul, another senior designer,
says that the product types had grown too varied to hope for coherence.) At SFI, after the
departure of the sole senior designer, SFI hired two assistant designers instead, both fresh
from university. Purnima, one of those assistants, came to SFI when her previous
employer did not pay her salary on time. She works with the same clients, but her work
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Separating creation from administration and execution is a common feature of
corporate organization and cultural work. Amrita believes that when she retires the teams
will fracture according to the professional division of training established by corporations
and fashion schools. That division is already operable in the other design and marketing
division. I spent a day with the other team only to learn about client variability, not
process flows.
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experience is a total of seven months, leaving her as the most experienced designer at
SFI.
Almost every designer whom I met was educated at branch of NIFT, a national
fashion institute funded by the national Ministry of Textiles. The university was founded
in 1986 with assistance from the New York-based Fashion Institute of Technology,
among the top fashion schools in the world. A few are critical of government
administration— “it could have been very good, it could have been world class,” says an
independent designer who attended a rival school—but it is widely known and respected.
Older generations have more varied trajectories. Many have no formal education. “Don’t
ask me how I got started!” squawks a senior manager at a buying agency, jokingly, when
I ask her about her trajectory. Niharika, the general manager of product management at
SFI, joined at age 17 and has been there ever since. She recounts that she nearly “ran off”
to Delhi from a small village: “I was a pretty girl. Maybe you can see it in my daughter.
But I could have married a rich man if I had stayed in the village. I didn’t want that,
though, I wanted to be in the action of Delhi… At that time there were very few working
women,” she continues. “I took a lot of inspiration from Indira Gandhi,” a polarizing
female prime minister.
Amrita’s response is similar but, as always, more colorful. “I didn’t know
anything when I started, mind you, but [Vaasu’s mother] took a liking to me for some
reason. I told her that I couldn’t draw a straight line, didn’t even know how to cut a
pattern, I had no fashion education, but she really saw something in me, and I ended up
getting the position.” In her early days Amrita was “always curious to see what was going
on upstairs” in the design department. When I later visit Vaasu’s family at their home, I
make sure to tell his mother that Amrita speaks highly of her. She has a balanced
reaction: “I took her by the hand for six years, took her traveling to all the stores—to
London, to Paris…” She makes hand motions that indicate how they sorted through retail
merchandise, then adopts a thoughtful tone and gives a nod of approval. “But, you know,
after that she can take her own credit.” Amrita left ACE a couple of times for other
opportunities, which she frames as “I was young, restless, very ambitious—like you, I’m
sure, you have come all this way [to India]. I was impulsive (she later says “volatile”),
but that’s how all young people are.” She continues: “I went to New York and worked as
a designer there. It was ok, but I thought, ‘What about my [potential] husband, my
[potential] kid—I wouldn’t want to be so far away from my family. And I was not so big
in New York, but I knew I could be much bigger in India. So I came back.”
Amrita evaluates her lack of academic training as a simultaneous lack of
theoretical burden: “I think commercially. I got my education from my clients. I have to
think about what they want, what they’re going to buy. Doesn’t matter if I might like it
myself—no, I don’t care. Some [academically-trained] designers, they get too caught up
in, ‘Ohh, I like this.’” She lovingly touches the sample garment in front of her. “But the
way I think about it is simple: if it doesn’t sell, it’s a piece of shit!” She laughs after a
crescendo into her semi-triumphant announcement, but it comes across in a level-headed
way. “Sometimes I feel like if I had gone to fashion school I would have made it big, but
I’m big enough,” she says later. “You have to be satisfied at the end of the day… that is
important.”
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Design Research
Mirroring the process flow across factory departments, design work moves from
the abstract to the concrete, from a time horizon of two years into a time horizon of two
days and two hours. 64 Major steps include analyzing trend forecasts, gathering
inspiration from various sources, creating mood boards, and computer-aided design.
Analytically, I begin with the research phase of research and development (R&D).
Sample and product development (materialization) depend on tailors, which I discuss in
the second half of this chapter. Some buyers bypass supply-side design altogether and go
straight to tailors. At ACE and MEI, however, design is a major segment of the value
chain. Designers are involved throughout marketing activities, where they engage in
buyer presentations, post-showroom “tweaking,” and end-to-end issues involving trend
cycles and design ethics. I postpone these marketing components of design work until
Chapter 4. What we already begin to see, theoretically, in the design data that I present, is
an economic and administrative model for dealing with the risks of uncertainty in a
variable consumer market (Caves 2000). As in other cultural industries—television,
fashion modeling, or high-tech startups—major studios, agencies, and “big buyers” are
seeking to push the risks of overproduction upstream, toward their suppliers (Hirsch
1972, Mears 2011b, Neff 2012). While the offshoring and outsourcing of such
developments has been considered in technical and scientific industries like
pharmaceuticals (Govindarajan and Trimble 2012, Zhao and Islam 2017), cultural and
qualitative investigation is underexplored.
Trend Forecasting
“Yes, there are trends,” responds a product manager from IFS. “One season we
will get orders for viscose [fabric], viscose, viscose… next season poly, poly… shell
buttons, shell beads…” Trends are nothing if not the intersection of social representations
and collective behavior (Blumer 1969a, Davis 1992b, Lieberson 2000, Moscovici 1984),
but the “internal movement” of fashion can be overemphasized. It is not as if economics
and institutional authority are absent from the market. Trend forecasting, a secretive but
estimated $56 billion industry (Conroy-Randall 2012), is the first breath which gives life
to a collection. Readers can think about forecasting as a mechanism for uncertainty
absorption, which “takes place when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence and
the inferences, instead of the evidence itself, are then communicated” (March and Simon
1958:165). Two specific paths of operationalization be distinguished. First, trend reports
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This movement from first to second actuality, or potentiality to actuality, entails a deep
and ancient status distinction; Aristotle (trans. 2001a) argues that first actuality represents
the capacity of the soul. Design did not have a professional mandate (Abbott 1988a,
Hughes 1959/1994), however, before the 19th century philosophical valorization of
individual artistry and 20th century economic fragmentation of symbolic markets (e.g.,
Sgourev 2013).
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gradually diffuse the legitimacy of high-fashion runway styles toward lower-tier
segments through information sharing (see Chapter 4 on marketing; Godart and Mears
2009a on models, Sorger and Udale 2017:58). Second, forecasting services reduce risk by
reinforcing collective selection within a limited attention space (Blumer 1969a, Hirsch
1972, Lantz 2016:43-46, March and Simon 1958:137-71). Through trends are shorter and
more diverse for women, and though their relevance has been challenged (Davis 1992b),
“nobody seems to seriously believe that the era of trends is over” (Lantz 2016:68).65
Pantone (colors), Première Vision (fabric), and WGSN (Worth Global Style
Network, apparel) are the three best-known forecasting agencies or events in fashion.
Trade fairs are covered in other literature (Aspers and Darr 2011, Lampel and Meyer
2005, Simmel 1896/1991, Skov 2006) and I focus on WGSN here because of its
prevalence in my fieldwork. WGSN offers a slew of marketing and analytic services,
covering trends in fashion, beauty, food and beverage, music, wellness, and technology,
but it appears that each section has a separate paywall. In fashion the forecast extends two
years ahead of market impact. According to Lantz and Sherman, both advanced-economy
brands and emerging-economy suppliers contribute to the estimated total of 38,00075,000 subscribers. European and high fashion companies sign confidentiality
agreements about their use of WGSN. However, LVMH, PVH, G-III, Armani, Brooks
Brothers, Nordstrom’s, Ralph Lauren, Zara, Levi’s, and C&A have all been publicly
named as clients. They pay about $23,000 a year for five users (Lantz 2016:15-16, 42,
Sherman 2014a). Before describing how forecasting is actually used, however, we need
to fix in the reader’s mind its importance to Indian designers.
My research largely supports Lantz’s view (2016:163-66) about the rhetorical
primacy of Western design aesthetics in trend forecasting: in interviews, assistant
designers in India treat WGSN as dogma. Even when I ask a senior designer at MEI if
she could do her design work from anywhere in the world, she stops to think about it
before laughing: “I would say no. I will definitely need WGSN!” Aparna at IFS
authoritatively states that “it’s worldwide. They use it in New York, they use it in Paris.”
When I tell Shreya at SFI that it seems like everyone uses WGSN, she laughs: “We all
prefer WGSN… We get to know what will be the fashion that comes in [the next two
years]… They do specialized forecast research. It is like a scientist. You can say that they
will make the research and we will follow it.” Not content with this simplistic model, I
ask, “but why follow it? What will happen if you don’t?” Shreya replies, “I can make it
[differently], of course. But then I will disappoint the buyer, so we won’t have any
orders.” Shreya’s boss Niharika, the general manager of product management, agrees
with Shreya’s limited operationalization. “The same way that Gap is the best for khakis,
WGSN is the best for design,” she claims. Shreya and Niharika effectively believe that
following trends is part of a wide industrial system of fixing preferences. Magazines,
department stores, brands, and manufacturers do collaborate on cognitive and mimetic
levels to create and satisfy consumer demands. Though this culture-industrial vision of
Lantz faced down a “nearly impregnable wall of PR people” (2016:6-7) to obtain 25
interviews with agency staff as well as ancillary participants. The book unfortunately
lacks analytical mastery over the material, however, so future investigation is
encouraged.
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the fashion system has its critics (Davis 1992b, Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1972,
Lieberson 2000), theory cannot be decided by consumer impact alone. We also need to
consider the role of suppliers and their institutional imperatives to reduce uncertainty—
no small token in creative industries or organizations in general (Cyert and March 1992,
Godart and Mears 2009a).
Some evidence of WGSN’s impact seems direct and concrete. Aparna uses it
every day, starting from 18 months before retail. Ishita at MEI pulls “all” of her
inspiration images from the site. Although it is less commonly used at ACE, it is a fixture
on design screens across MEI, IFS, and SFI. The contribution from Pantone is more
focused. Shreya references Pantone’s color forecasts in unprompted conversation,
including a “color of the year.” “Neon was popular in 2011-12, but now it’s fading. Now
it’s more minimalist, we see more greys.” I immediately recall the trend of neon running
shoes, especially from Nike (a public client of WGSN). Looking back to the Pantone
forecast for Fall 2012, one can pick out “bright chartreuse,” supported by “ultramarine
green,” “honey gold,” “pink flambé,” and “tangerine tango.” It indeed stands in contrast
to Fall 2015, which holds a much more muted palette of “desert sage,” “marsala,” and a
blue-grey “stormy weather.” There is also evidence of buyers requesting suppliers to use
WGSN. Niharika shared with me that when one value brand did regional visits, they
explicitly recommended beginning with WGSN, which Shreya then “adapt[s] to [the
brand’s] taste.” Industry supplier groups in India, including the national AEPC and Delhibased OGTC, sponsor twice-annual forecasting sessions led by WGSN in Delhi,
Mumbai, Bengaluru, and Ludhiana. There is, then, both individual and institutional
mobilization—designers, firms, industry groups, and higher education—toward the
trends dictated by WGSN.
What does it mean, however, for trends to be dictated? Literature from marketing
and the sociology of fashion has explored this question at the intersection of retailers and
the consumer (Davis 1992b, Reynolds and Darden 1972), but “behind the scenes” details
are less well understood (Molotch 2003). Kalyani, for example, says she identifies
something as a “trend” by following buyer requests and seeing similar styles across mood
boards. WGSN, meanwhile, is not a simple list of colors and evocative words. In
Aparna’s words, “they have everything.” She explains that it works as an aggregator,
carrying feeder content from many other companies, sites, and designers. My first “tour”
of WGSN is in the design office at MEI. Rahul, a senior designer, logs into the company
account and sets me up in front of a Mac with a huge screen. (Like many artists, Rahul
believes the color spectrum is wider and color representation more accurate with Macs.)
The fashion portal is broken down into top-level categories of beauty, footwear, and
“complete look,” along with second-level categories including retail (window displays,
garments, interior design) and street style. Each of these, in turn, is worldwide: one can
search by regions or cities. One can also search by specific categories like “knit tops,” or
keywords, or fashion weeks, or season, and so on. Rahul usually begins with product
categories or favorite designers. “One must of necessity go somewhere,” as Dostoyevsky
says, so Bhanu navigates to Ghesquière’s recent Louis Vuitton show from Paris Fashion
Week Spring/Summer 2017. In fact, this was the ninth-most popular show according to
Vogue Runway views (Phelps 2016). This opens a gallery of high-resolution pictures of
each complete look (n=45). Entire collections and individual images are easily
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downloaded, cropped, and modified; designers either use software similar to Photoshop
or sketch with pens on paper printouts. Runway collections of global cities are also
publicly accessible through the Vogue and Business of Fashion websites.
I browse in five principal areas of interest to the sociologist. (1) WGSN has a
algorithmically-generated “recommended for you” section. It is based on user history, so
this reflects the browsing history of Rahul and his assistants. An “Earthed” theme shows
up first, with a color palette of browns and greys and high-resolution photos of fabric
textures. This is part of the Spring/Summer 2017 trend report with four such themes. (2)
There are “most viewed” reports across all users. The same trend report is listed here, so
Rahul is following the global current. (3) There is a section based on analytics and
presented with a popular social science frame. These have reports classified by
generation (e.g., Millenials), as well as specific topics. One of the Millenial topics is a
PowerPoint on “Modern India: Social and Cultural Influences.” It contains marketing
advice alongside consultant-style statistics on broad social trends and examples of
specific cultural phenomena. This report notes that, in India, arranged marriage is still the
preference of 75% of people between 18-35. However, mixed-faith marriages are rising
(30%), and a mobile dating app, Tinder, grew 400% in 2015. Slides contain quotations
from research figures (e.g., an anthropologist) alongside those from activist groups or
celebrities around the world (e.g., the militant feminist Gulabi gang in India). At the end,
links are provided to additional reports on Indian e-commerce, fabrics, and the economy.
(4) Other reports offer edited collections of Instagram accounts, reflecting the power of
social media on design inspiration, as well as micro-trends like “health goth” (e.g.,
Alexander Wang) and 90s-retro “normcore” (a term invented by the K-Hole forecasting
group). Multiple 2016 reports forecast a trend toward quietness, slowing down, nature,
and quality over quantity, forecasted themes since at least 2013.
(5) A final popular report is “Catwalk Analytics S/S 2017.” Each look is
categorized according to specific design features. (WGSN gained expertise in cataloging
from a 2014 merger with Stylesight forecasting.) Numbers show, for example, that
women’s shirts are up 16% from the previous year, trousers up 14%, and skirts down 7%.
In the dress category “cold shoulder” is up 64%66 and ruffles up 74%. The biggest change
is in ginghams, which are currently 7% of the overall shirt mix. Gingham tops are up
786%. When I remark on this to Ishita, she is at first unconcerned because these are tops
and she designs bottoms. The trend applies to bottoms as well, however, so she comes
over and snaps a picture of gingham pants on her phone (now objectified inspiration).
The report sometimes also features longer-term trends, for example highlighting the fact
that wide leg trousers have been growing more popular over the past four years (20132017). There are also occasional editorial comments; editors tip their hats to Balmain
(another Vogue Runway top 10 designer in 2016) for leading the biggest trend in S/S
2017—the 1980s. (This follows either 60s and 70s collections over the past couple of
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Reporter Sarah Halzack (2016) has a good article on the cold shoulder trend, which
was picked up by firms including Shopbop, Bloomingdales, Rent the Runway, and
JCPenney. There was also a rise in “cold shoulder” Google search terms in 2016. Halzeck
argues for inspiration from runway shows and a Katy Perry Instagram post, with
businesses reordering to keep up with demand.
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years or a general trend of “retromania.”) The 1980s trend lines an entire wall in the MEI
design office, spanning textiles, kids, men, women, and young women. Featured 80s
words and movements include “punk,” “anarchy,” “new wave,” and “digital wave.”
We can now see how a dogmatic rhetorical interpretation of WGSN by assistant
designers, fresh from design school, contrasts with liberal possibilities. WGSN is both a
database and curated social media. It is reasonable to conclude, through page views, that
designers at Louis Vuitton and Balmain have exceptional influence. It is also reasonable
to conclude that a few major reports capture the attention of most designers who use
WGSN. Such claims are in line with “winner-take-all” research on fashion models
(Godart and Mears 2009a). It is too much, however, to claim that WGSN or Pantone
“dictates” trends. WGSN’s color palettes are labeled with Pantone colors, but they do not
match the Pantone forecasts for 2016, which are brighter and more polished. Pantone
itself highlights around 15 colors each season, four seasons a year. The creative director
of Fashion Group International, which produces seasonal trend reports, designates a
“trend” if two designers at the four major fashion weeks (perhaps 16k total looks) use
similar design elements (e.g., velvet) in the same season. One can thus create and
designate a trend out of almost anything, and researchers should be skeptical of inferring
strict or authoritarian obedience to trend forecasting. We should also distinguish
producers from consumers and existence from operationalization, which Lantz (2016)
does not effectively do in her interview-based study. Western design principles are still
very important for Indian export firms—they are, after all, in the business of exporting—
but they do not extend across the domestic retail environment as Lantz suggests
(2016:163-66). All in all, pushing WGSN outside of the design picture is difficult to
imagine in current practices. Its global reach—trendsetting as institutional authority—is
supported directly by major international buyers who look to forecasts for coordination
with other brands. Suppliers (supported by buyers in this practice) also seek to merge
central WGSN trends with individual brand aesthetics. This picture of collaboration
thickens sociological theory on the producer awareness of other producers (White 1981,
2002) before a single prototype has ever emerged.
Inferring and tweaking trends from any source still takes work on the part of the
designer. It is a multi-step synthetic process of emotional cognition which we may briefly
try to explore.67 Let us take it from Rahul. The first thing he mentions is “queries from
buyers. If one brand asks for distressed, and another asks for distressed, I will start to see
something. I will talk to the other designers, and I will cross-check it with WGSN and
store websites.” Rahul thus follows current demands, especially through store websites,
and looks for elements that are “a move-on from existing production” toward larger
WGSN predictions. He also pays attention to the trendiest brand of the day. In his
opinion as with many US and Indian designers, this is Zara. “Zara is one which makes the
trend. What they have will be in the other stores next season. Other brands, they will not
be ready to set the trend. They wait, they will check on what the other stores are doing,
Simmel’s writings on aesthetics (e.g., 1918/2007, 1968) are dense, but as a social
psychologist I have found them profoundly rewarding. Interaction Ritual Chains (Collins
2004) is a masterful microsociological and empirical synthesis of emotion, cognition, and
culture.
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then they will follow.” When other stores catch up with their requests to MEI, Rahul will
make the required tweaks from trendier pieces and adjust for cost, but still try to keep
some elements from a larger WSGN-endorsed trend. Designers of course add their own
touches as well: “What we do is we create our own little version” with components
sampled from WGSN… “we don’t create something exactly as it is,” says an assistant
designer at IFS. Finally, for some buyers, designers can do without trend forecasts. With
one value brand, Aparna just uses her experience: “we know what they like from their
taste.” Other buyers “never use poly[ester] fabric, so we will never develop a sample in
that material.” Her colleague adds that the same value brand “recently asked for a
sleepwear collection with a new concept, so we design it in a very generalized way.” This
kind of design opportunity takes us deeper into the territory of inspiration.
Sources of Inspiration
Designers themselves are reluctant to analyze inspiration, but I identified three
main sources in my fieldwork.68 Along with trend forecasting, designers look to everyday
life and the art world (including the workplace), fashion media (social media and
magazines), and brands (runway and retail). One cannot quantify the relative importance
of primary versus secondary design research; both provide important sources of
contextual knowledge (Aspers 2006b, Molotch 2003:41-47). I will begin with the design
office, the situated location where design work takes place.
The Design Office: Insulated Openness
Given my mission of a producing an organizational ethnography of GVCs—and
remember here the long hours and intense commitments of staff—I focus on the
workplace rather than the broader art world or lifeworld.69 Design is granted what might
be called “administrative exceptionalism” relative to every other department. They have
unique privileges. Design is supposed to be a place that is deliberately “insulated” from
other pressures, as Vaasu (the owner of ACE) puts it. This results in what I call “insulated
openness.” Vaasu has worked to create administrative exceptionalism on three levels:
R&D budget, timelines, and office design. While I do not have exact information on the
R&D budget, 70 the design department is rewarded generously with a budget that is rarely
(if ever) overrun. Amrita is calm when discussing possible limitations: “We have a cap
“Research” and “inspiration” may not be exactly interchangeable, but neither is
necessarily inaugural.
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The New York fashion world has dominated qualitative fieldwork on the fashion
world. Interested readers may see Mears (2011b), Wissinger (2015), and Currid-Halkett
(2007) generally. The classical art world reference is Becker (1982), a student of Hughes.
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A typical R&D budget in a knowledge-intensive industry like pharmaceuticals is 1520% of revenue, compared to an industry average of 3% across all manufacturing firms
(Zhao and Islam 2017:352).
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on R&D, but it is not a strict one. R&D in every business has to keep flowing if you want
to keep new buyers coming in.” Creative work is also separated from time pressures. “I
want the design team to be relaxed, actually,” says Vaasu. “If they are worried about the
delivery dates, how can I get on-time delivery, the quality of the design will fall.” We
will see just how intense time-pressure is for product managers in Chapter 5. Office
design,71 meanwhile, best captures the idea of insulated openness.
The design office is an office, more than a studio or a factory. Offices do not have
tables or materials for patternmaking, mannequins for fit or drapery, or machines of any
sort—these functions are carried out in other departments as part of a rigorous division of
labor. The MEI design office where I spent the most time is separated from the noise and
blandness of the cubicle floor with a glass wall and two doors. Canonical quotations from
Western designers are pasted on the outside of the glass, like “Fashion fades. Style is
eternal,” attributed to Yves Saint Laurent. “Sorry it’s a bit messy,” Rahul says when I
enter. He laughs when I tell him “Believe me, I understand—my girlfriend is an artist!” A
flower/cloud mobile hangs from the ceiling and there is a pop of color from a red table in
the middle of the rectangular room. The room is organized into work spaces focused on a
computer for each designer. The interior walls are inescapably lined with trend forecasts
and mood boards. Racks of jeans, hung by S-hooks on their belt loops, stand against the
glass walls facing the cubicle floor. From the inside, they lend a home-like retail feel—
colorful and a bit raw. When I move to the cubicles later in my fieldwork, however, I also
realize that the racks of jeans serve a privacy function, like green hedges for homes. It
saves the designers from the frozen sea of white and grey cubicles outside.
One can also see a drive toward insulated openness in the PD studio—
downstream from the design office—at a MEI denim unit. My visit there was led by
Furkan, a Turkish consultant on a one-year contract as the PD manager. He told me that
after arriving, his first task (generated from an internal locus of control) was to clean up
the area. He shows me a picture on his phone of how it used to look, with messy tables
and boxes strewn around. He cleared these out, painted the walls white, hung some
sample garments high on the walls with chains and twine [Figure 3], and put posters up
for inspiration. As at other locations, the posters feature mostly white women with
conventional modeling looks (see Mears 2010). Where tables were previously not at the
same height and lights not of the exact same color, now they are standardized. “I wanted
it to look like an R&D department,” he reflects. “And also for buyers. I want them to tell.
We should think like the buyers. Even now, I’ve asked [a VP] to put up walls. Where is
the separation of R&D from washing? Can you tell? We should have [digital] access
cards too... Now anybody can come here, and it’s distracting. I want to create a separate
feeling.” Furkan is searching for what institutional theorists call “socio-cognitive
legitimacy” (Suddaby, Bitektine and Haack 2017), for categorical recognition of the
organized activities of his department as design and not production. This can also be
interpreted as part of a broader struggle of professionalization, one which is challenged
by the ambiguity of semi-peripheral location and outdated theories of the geographical
division of labor. Although Furkan is also seeking technical improvements to health and
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Readers should note that Elsbach and Pratt (2007) find no generalizable patterns for
work outcomes in their review of intra-organizational environments.
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safety, his main goal is to reduce the disorganization and claustrophobia induced by
proximity to production processes. He believes that MEI will not gain access to contracts
with high-end luxury companies until the factory becomes organized and rationalized
enough to impress buyers during their visits.
Figure 3: Product Development

Insulated openness may only hold for design spaces which bisect dull business or
production operations. At a large buying agency I visited, for example, there are adjacent
large meeting rooms for buyers, separated only with clean glass walls, so that multiple
departments from the same buyer (e.g., design and marketing) can meet agents while
maintaining visibility. There are spacious, open workspaces throughout the building, a
deliberate strategy to encourage teamwork and creativity. Pavithra, a senior manager with
an exceptional glass office, prefers to meet her staff in the cafeteria instead: “I don’t like
to feel closed off like that.” If Amrita is not in her office in the marketing department,
assistant designers look for her in the showroom where she prefers to do her sketches—
her “other” office. Given structural insulation in the physical design space, let us look
more closely at a single workstation.
Artistic inspiration and the phenomenology of possibility
Designers asked about inspiration during interviews are not easy to pin down: “I
am often asked where I get my inspiration from: but I can honestly say that I do not
know,” writes Dior (1957/2007:57). “Design is so much twisting and turning, like a
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singer deciding what song she will sing next,” Amrita says.72 Ethnography takes us inside
the glass walls of the design office for a closer look. Collaboration, as microsociologists
often show, is built around a common focus of attention that is directed by situational
leaders (Collins 2004). If Lakshit or Vani try to describe a new modification in words
(without the garment in hand), Amrita almost immediately cuts off dialogue with the
command “show” or “show me.” Amrita’s visual memory and direction is strong. In one
episode, Vani brings a few options for design and color to Amrita, but Amrita does not
remember endorsing any of them. She fishes around for a few seconds before telling Vani
to go back and find Amrita’s original instructions. Soon after, we discover that Amrita
was right. She says triumphantly, performatively, “See how good is my memory? How
many sketches do I make, 1500? How many do I have you do, Vani? 20?” She jokes that
this episode is something I should write down, but we laugh as I say that I’m already on
the case!
I learn the most about the process of artistic inspiration from ACE and my hours
with Amrita. Often my favorite part of the day is a 1-2 hour visit with her in the morning,
when she is at her least busy. The “pantry guy” Shantanu quickly learns to bring a chai
when he sees me go in. Eventually I learn that Amrita draws a phenomenological energy
from objects which been designed with the primary intention of creating aesthetic
pleasure (Burke 1757/1887, calls this "beauty"). When she reads the newspaper in the
morning she tears through it for the headlines, but if I catch her with an issue of Vogue
she is slower to look up and initially speaks at a lower rate, as if she has been communing
with a sacred object. When I once ask if she feels like she is drawing energy from these
objects and images (see Benzecry and Collins 2014, Hennion 2001, Schiermer 2011), she
doesn’t have anything to say about it in analytic terms, but shrugs and says that they work
“like a muse.” After a few turns of conversation and questions from her staff I resume my
microsociological line of questioning about inspiration. Amrita shifts her attention to a
sample pattern lying on her desk: “I see a skirt here, I see a tablecloth, I see a blouse.”
She picks up another garment: “This one has been sitting here since this morning. I’ve
asked [assistant designer] Vani to keep it with me, because it is calling me. It’s telling me
to ‘make me beautiful.’ Sometimes I keep something beautiful in my desk just to have it
around.” Material items, like the images of trend forecasts, serve designers as visual and
tactile cues for future directions.
By the same cognitive process, Amrita’s comment about placing items around her
rings an associational bell for me. As if by a cognitive flood, I begin to draw an
emotional map of garments within the room. The right side of her desk holds her laptop,
the left side is active work. The most pleasing garments are on top of that left pile. When
Amrita really needs to make a decision about a garment, she hangs it over her laptop
screen so that she cannot check her e-mail without getting to the garment first. Things for
later get thrown in the nearby left corner; occasionally she’ll tell an assistant to pick
something up from the pile. The far-left corner of the room is beyond throwing distance if
there are visitors (she would have to throw over their heads), but it serves as an overflow
Building architecture, “telling a story,” or cooking are other metaphors that I hear
about design. The rapid-fire pace of design leads me to favor cooking (see Di Stefano,
King and Verona 2017, Fine 1992, Trubek 2000).
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space for things that are likely to be forgotten about. The bookshelf behind her is the dead
zone. Although it is quite close, it also the most shielded from her vision. Her tosses there
evoke the most negative energy, witnessed in a grimace or frown; these things are old or
ugly and thrown out of sight. They are emotionally disposed of.
Artistic inspiration is at its most useful when there are few directional signals
from buyers. One example of this comes from a bridge brand buyer looking for an
“occasion” garment, “something dressy dressy dressy, over-the top… I’m thinking white
and gold, [or] white and silver…” A few days later Amrita is stuck with “designer’s
block.” She feels like she is “in the right area, but not bang on the mark.” She asks me to
bring her some images for inspiration. It is hard to get the right silhouette when Vani and
Amrita are saying “jacket.” I am from Wisconsin, where a jacket made of lace is quite a
strange idea. Vani tells me that my first set of images is not the right shape and should
have a looser drape. In the next set I bring repetitive images of white lace kimonos. There
are only so many things that can be altered, it seems: looser sleeves, fringe, more buttons,
a solid trim… When I tell Amrita about this feeling of limitation through repetition, she is
empathetic: “That’s part of why I’m feeling a bit stuck, why I keep looking for more
inspiration. But instead of doing a solid trim, we can add lace on top of lace, we can do
beading...” When I show her the images I’ve collected and other sample garments I’ve
seen in the design office, I suggest adding a foil or sequin layer underneath the lace. “Or
on top…” Amrita interrupts… her designer mind is already running where I am
beginning to crawl.
A final source of artistic inspiration is the design archive, four long and crowded
racks of garments stuffed into a hidden room next to the showroom. While the showroom
floor is always clean, the archive floor remains unwashed, hidden from designers and
buyers. A few garments are on the floor. Racks are organized according to season and
collection, but not rigorously. The newest developments are kept in suitcases near the
door, ready for travel. Amrita regards the archive as “food for all of us” designers. For
example, as Vani prepares a collection for the children’s buyer at a bridge brand, she sifts
through the archives for ladies’ garments presented to the same company: “I’m looking
for styles that will relate to them,” she says, “and that can translate into a [congruent] kids
style.” Because Vani and Amrita “always try to show the freshest things” in
presentations, this means that the design archive must be purged every few months.
Amrita waves it off: “The samples are too small to worry about” in terms of energy or
capital value. In buying agencies too, the cost for failed developments is absorbed by the
agency as “part of the partnership” (Barrie 2014).
Media (and Authenticity)
Pinterest—second to WGSN—is the most important social media site for Indian
fashion designers. Users build collections of digital images around a theme, for example,
“business outfits.” Because Instagram is the dominant platform for American artists and
models, I am somewhat surprised by the attention Pinterest captured, but I leave it to
others to investigate successions and global differences in the use of social media
platforms (boyd 2014, Wissinger 2015). Style.com, now absorbed into Vogue, is the only
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other platform I hear referenced more than a few times. Designers also spend a lot of time
browsing company websites, which I discuss separately as a path to inspiration through
brands. Magazines are also around, but decidedly less critical than WGSN. Near my desk
in the design office of IFS, there are a series of glossy catalogs from InTrend. In addition
to embroidery trends from runway shows in New York, London, Paris, and Milan, there
is also coverage from Rio and São Paulo. Industry magazines in the library and design
office at MEI (e.g., Apparel, published by AEPC) almost always feature coverage of New
York and Paris. Amrita’s office table (not her desk) has fresh copies of Elle and Vogue
from Paris, Australia, the US, and the UK. She doesn’t admit to a preference for a
national edition so long as it is Western—she feels that Indian Vogue is “not useful”
because it is features too much “ethnic” content. “We are more likely to make Mexican
ethnic wear than saris,” she says at one point. Although she studiously believes in the
power of the Marshallian niche in embellished ladies styles in Delhi, she sees her work
through the Western buyer-industrial vision of North Indian capabilities. While popular
discussions of authenticity portray it as essential isolation, more sophisticated accounts
readily recognize the effects of centuries of trade, war, colonization, and adaptation in
cultural projects across the world semi-periphery. Such adaptation in apparel export has
occurred since at least the late 17th Century, when “the patterns and designs traditional to
India… were too alien to make an immediate appeal in the West. Hence, European
merchants sent out musters appropriate to their taste [which already included Chinese
design elements] for the Indian craftsmen to copy or adapt” (Calico Museum of Textiles
1988:13-14).73
Runway to Inspiration: Translating the “Big Four” Fashion Weeks
At some basic level, “everyone copies from everyone else,” as Vani initially
explains. Careful questioning, however, reveals patterns worth analyzing. When
designers in India talk about “the runway” as a source of inspiration, they are typically
referring to the “big four,” as measured by media coverage: New York, Paris, London,
and Milan (Godart 2014a). Amrita sometimes calls these runway shows a “trend forum”
or trend forecasting for six to twelve ahead—the first material realizations of trends.
Some basic seasonal patterns from the runway calendar are relevant (Weller 2007). In the
four-season model that includes spring, summer, fall, and “holiday,” the last season has
“more bling, more sequins,” Rahul says, and a bridge buyer regularly asks for
“sophisticated” styles for Christmas, “like [in] a French boutique.” At the same time, “no
one really does six months anymore,” referring to spring/summer and fall/winter fashion
shows. For most brands, “it’s more like a monthly feeding.”
Apart from these elementary seasonal patterns, eccentric runway designs are a
good place to begin. As I hear from Amrita, “It’s only the haute couture designers who
actually need to be berserk… The couture people, let them be couture people. But you
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Hundreds of such examples can be found in other products, including adaptations of
curries and India pale ales (Pryor 2013). See also Wherry (2008) on the intersection of
local craftsmanship with global export markets.
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can’t have that attitude for everyone.” When I ask if this is because the majority of
fashion is commercial, Amrita fires back, “Not the majority—the mega-majority.” She
names a series of brands ranging from affordable luxury to value segments. Instead,
runways have a different function: “Let’s say that a couture designer sends someone
down the runway dressed as a tree (she holds her arms out to illustrate branches). I
always hear Americans talking about, ‘Wow, the runways are so crazy, no one would
ever wear that.’ But that’s a totally wrong way to think about it. The designs need to be
crazy so that they are interesting. That is what gets people to pay attention—no one wants
to watch a department store do a runway show. That’s why [value brands] don’t do
shows, because they would be so boring (her face falls as she imagines a drab
performance). But if I see a tree coming down the runway (her voice trails off a bit as she
begins to imagine it)… This makes perfect sense to a design person… I see a mood. I see
greens, I see natural [associations]. Maybe the branches are really wide (she holds her
arms out), so I see volume. Ok, I can think about wide skirts, puffy sleeves.”
Amrita’s description fits well with sociological models of fashion weeks, which
are about emotional energy before anything else. Major shows often lose money on the
show itself; instead they are marketing tools to build brand cachet and keep the brand in
public conversation (Collins 2004, Crane 1997:402-10, Godart 2014a). This is also the
function of expensive celebrity invitations to the front row (Entwistle and Rocamora
2006). Events have become more important among a broader economic backdrop of retail
disruptions, mergers, and acquisitions, leading to brand licensing and financialization
(Crane 1997, Soener 2015). Amrita reports that she regularly attended shows when she
was younger, “especially to Paris, but now I just pick it up on my own. I use Pinterest, I
look at my archives, I use my creative instinct.” Her most vital tool for runway looks is a
big coffee-table book with glossy pictures from all the top runway collections of the
season. Smaller forecasting companies like Edelkoort produce these high-quality
glossies.
Shopping
When senior designers travel for presentations, their travel schedules allow an
extra day or couple of days to shop in global cities. These sites are privileged over both
peripheral foreign cities and domestic possibilities. When Tanya, a senior designer at
MEI, traveled to Wisconsin for a design meeting, she did not shop in Madison or
Milwaukee but added an extended layover in New York. Rahul mentions Stockholm and
London as his favorite foreign destinations. Shopping foreign brands is a new, exciting
opportunity that designers feel they need to take advantage of, both for their firms and for
themselves.74 Amrita doesn’t have the patience to design clothes for herself: “I want to
shop, to have it first! Shopping is the best!” she exclaims. She buys most of her personal
clothes from abroad, mentioning Paris and Hong Kong: “I’m going shopping for work
Amrita criticizes Americans who only eat at McDonald’s when traveling, even in Paris,
because it is “not a café. That’s so distasteful.” On another occasion, however, she admits
to searching for a McDonald’s during a trip to mainland China.
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anyway, so I might as well get some things for myself,” she rationalizes. She claims,
“when I go shopping in New York I can walk 10 or 11 hours in a day… I’ll go to Fifth
Ave., Topshop, Madewell, Free People. I will take one thousand pictures in a store. And
there’s one thing about me—I have a photographic memory. I can copy the whole store
just from walking through it.” These claims are obviously exaggerated, but they capture
the “buzz” of shopping as an interaction ritual (Collins 2004:63-64, Silver, Clark and
Yanez 2010).
Designers, marketing staff, and product managers have mixed opinions about the
domestic market, but the designers I met restrict their attention to Western wear and
international brands. The Indian government has long promoted import substitution by
restricting FDI in the retail sector.75 Only in January 2018 did the Cabinet move to allow
100% FDI in single-brand retail. Thus Rahul avoids shopping in Delhi, Bengaluru, or
even Mumbai “because the market isn’t so good here.” Although some scholars have
argued otherwise (Aspers 2010a), designers do not need local retail outlets to imagine
successful styles. Although major brands like Gap and Zara have entered the Indian
market relatively recently, many assistant designers have never left the country or even
seen retail stores of the brands they design for. Of course, however, available stores are a
resource. A senior product manager conceives of malls as “branded showrooms” where
factory staff can learn more about a brand aesthetic in isolation (see next section),
perhaps enhanced by visual merchandising like the wood paneling at Ralph Lauren
stores. Shopping is an opportunity for “sensual encounters,” as Entwistle has emphasized
(2006:711-13). When I ask Tanya how much of her work she could do with only WGSN
and an internet connection, she pauses to think it over: “I would say… 70% I can do.
[But] 30% I need to go to market. Especially for fabric, you cannot feel textiles in
internet.” (See below for a discussion of fabric development.) When designers shop, they
see current product assortments as fair game for inspiration. Amrita, for example, buys a
crop top with Schiffli lace from Zara for herself, but it doesn’t fit quite right. She brings it
in to work and tells Vani, “You can copy-copy without damaging the tag and return it
later today.” Similar practices are common at a large buying agency I visited, where
designers “will visit stores in US [and] take counter-developments directly from the
stores.” Shopping, with or without actual purchasing (i.e., “sell-through”), is thus not
only a crucial part of trend forecasting, but an opportunity which permeates the lives of
buyers, designers, marketing staff, product managers, and others across the apparel GVC.
The last pillar of inspiration comes directly from brands, which focus other sources of
inspiration into a mood board that edges closer to a design sample.
Channeling Inspiration into Market Niches: Brands
Brands are arguably the most important component organizing the structure of the
fashion industry (Godart 2012:110-28). (The appendix explains the brand segmentation
that I employ for analysis and confidentiality.) Brands offer many things to customers (cf.
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Luxury brands gained access earlier than other brand segments (Hsueh 2011:48). See
Cappelli et al. (2010:19-48) on neoliberal economic reforms in the 1990s.
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Crane 2000, Kapferer 2005, Williams and Connell 2010), but to suppliers they offer their
business. Brands place orders for designs they believe their customers will buy.
Designers must respond with what social psychologists and strategic researchers call
“optimal distinctiveness,” a balance of conformity and differentiation that satisfies socialpsychological needs or achieves optimal organizational performance (Brewer 1991,
Deephouse 1999, Simmel 1895/1904, Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury et al. 2017). Designers
must offer buyers something familiar—styles that will fit within a seasonal collection and
a brand aesthetic—as well as something essentially interesting. This tension and balance
will be explored extensively in the sections on product development (this chapter) and
marketing (Chapter 4). Matching aesthetic expectations is the primary parameter covered
here, but the reader should note that price points, quality, and service expectations must
be matched as well.
When suppliers prepare for new clients, teams study the “design profile” of the
buying label. According to Amrita, ACE must always be ready to approach a new client
with curiosity and an old client with deep knowledge of the brand’s heritage and
demographics. They need to know that “Abercrombie and Fitch is university prep,
Hollister is secondary school prep.” “The customer” of one mid-range brand—the
imagined customer is always singular—is “a bit older,” which can translate into
materiality based on Amrita’s knowledge that “this [coral] color (of the garment in hand)
works for older women.”76 Such distinctions are facilitated by a division of labor in
design and product management that corresponds to brands: staff are assigned to work
with a specific brand portfolio or market niche. Niches are combinations of price points,
aesthetics, and product assortment that are disciplined by quality or convention (White
2002:129).77
I sometimes helped ACE designers with design research by collecting images and
suggesting ideas. In the process I learned that there are two major points of departure for
a brand: internal and external. The internal point of departure references the brand’s
founder, heritage, previous collections, and current product assortment. Shopping at
specialty stores provides the richest internal exposure: not only are products enhanced
through visual merchandising, but one can observe customers as well. The most common
internal focus of attention, however, is a brand’s website. As I browse a bridge brand
website to help Vani with her research, I see a lot of animal prints and wonder about
placing a zebra print behind a layer of lace. “Do you ever do animal prints?” I ask,
suddenly recognizing that I haven’t seen any in the design office or showroom. Vani
responds, “[That brand] really likes animal prints, but apart from them nobody else...
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Based on interviews, focus groups, surveys, and behavioral data (e.g., purchases),
buyer-side customer analysts offer similar suggestions to designers. See Chapter 4 for
examples.
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Gender is a more basic product category than age. It is common for a designer to be
responsible for ladies’ and girls, but I met no designer who is responsible for both men’s
and women’s. American and European creative directors may have wider capabilities in
this regard. How designer identity matters (e.g., women designing clothes for men) is a
wonderful question for future research. References to race in India were always coded in
the distinction between Western and ethnic wear.
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Personally I think they look gross and nobody in India would ever wear them.” I had
never heard of this bridge brand before going to India, but a couple of minutes on their
internal website is enough to notice this point of differentiation. Newsletters are another
excellent way to become acquainted with a brand. Newsletters, like social media, offer
images as news items; a few minutes with the same brand each day soon leads to
familiarity. As mentioned earlier, direct experience with buyers representing a brand
helps too. As brands gain sourcing experience in a semi-peripheral country, they rely less
on sourcing agents and more on local suppliers directly (Carlsson 2017). Vani says that
one can predict what fabric thickness and handfeel buyers will want based on their
comments from each presentation (see Chapter 4).
External references rely on “benchmark stores” or “fashion leaders” occupying a
similar market niche or retail category (Porter 1985:231-72, White 1981, 1993). Kalyani,
like Rahul, says of fashion leaders like Zara that “many brands are looking to them and
follow them.” Amrita’s first turn of thought is to match new brands with less familiar
design profiles to benchmark stores,78 regardless of whether ACE supplies to that
benchmark. Across the buyers and suppliers I studied, Gap is understood as a market
leader for basics. “Clean” design signals M&S, Calvin Klein, or Ann Taylor. For
bohemian or “boho,” Free People or Anthropologie (both owned by Urban Outfitters) are
the first places to look. When critiquing Vani’s design for a client in the boho niche, for
example, Amrita reports, “I don’t care for that much structure” in the garment, preferring
a “very Spain” look. In buyer presentations, designers add prototypes developed for
competing niche brands to the collection. Rather than individuals (designers as
couturiers), reference group leaders for suppliers are more often collective (brands in a
market).79 Aparna, an assistant designer at IFS, was a notable exception. Her favorite
designers include Marc Jacobs (US and France), Zandra Lim (a bridal designer from the
Philippines), and Augustine (New Zealand). “If I was doing Marc Jacobs I would look at
Giamba [Italy],” she says. “For specific things like embellishments, I like Zuhair Murad
[a Lebanese designer based in Paris]. He’s very good for Indian embellishment,
especially for [British value buyers].” This breadth of global inspiration is hard to
quantify, but it filters into collections spanning retail outlets in multiple value segments.
These imaginary connections are materialized in design and linked, through GVCs, to
consumers around the world. The next step in the design research process brings together
various images into a condensed artwork called a mood board.
Mood Boards
Mood boards (also called style or story boards) collate, objectify, and clarify
inspiration. They serve as the working basis for a sketch and sample. A mood board is a
collage of images with a color palette, selected according to trend forecasts, the social
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This method is applicable to intellectual practice as well: Randall Collins reads a
book’s reference list before the introduction.
79
Based on literature and interviews with designers, designers in the true luxury segment
seem to reference individual designers before brands.
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representation of an ideal customer, a brand aesthetic, and the lifeworld. They originate
from either suppliers or buyers. Figure 4, for example, was developed by an assistant
designer at SFI and figure 5 by an assistant designer at ACE. For large bridge, mid-range,
and value brands, mood boards are developed 10-12 months ahead of market impact. Fast
fashion brands work on a shorter timeline (see Chapter 5 for information on the “time and
action” plan). A senior designer at MEI reports a two-week timeline for creating a
collection of samples, beginning from constructing a mood board and ending with buyer
presentations. She does not count trend or brand research as part of this two weeks
because that is “always going on,” she says as she waves her pointed finger in a circular
motion. Kairavi, an assistant designer at MEI, says that “it should not take more than a
day to make a mood board—24 hours max. If someone is taking longer, they are either
not good [at their job] or they are lazy.”
Figure 4: Mood Board
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Figure 5: Mood Board

Mood Boards by Suppliers
When supply-side designers construct mood boards, some work directly from it
and never show it to buyers. This is more common at ACE, SFI, and IFS, where “boards”
are printed on or attached to paper. At MEI, on the other hand, Rahul and Tanya often
send mood boards to buyers to get their feedback even before developing a sample.
Though the content is similar, these boards feel more substantial because they actually
use a thick plastic board. Rahul usually sends the same board to different buyers at the
bridge and mid-range brands he works for; this increases the chance that a brand will
push the mood board into the next stage of production (i.e., sample-making). If two
brands make the same positive decision, he informs the secondary brand80 that a primary
80

At ACE the primary brand is temporally first. MEI has a larger number of clients and
more sophisticated marketing operations, however. Priority access to mood boards is
driven by brand status, order size, or strategic goals of growing or satisfying a specific
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brand has already taken the board. He offers tweaks instead (see Chapter 4), which
secondary brands typically accept.
Mood boards draw the four sources inspirations covered above. When I observe
Kairavi, for example, she uses two WGSN themes from the Spring/Summer 2017 trend
report and titles the mood boards (one for women and one for men) with the theme
names. For Rahul, a mood board is less often about a single trend. One of his mood
boards, designed for sweatpants or joggers, combines a “destruction” trend with an “open
hem” trend. Above all, mood boards should be designed to arouse emotion and attention:
they should indeed make the viewer feel a certain mood.81 A Pantone editor, for example,
notes that “orange can always be counted on to inject a bit of surprise.” When Rahul
finds a fabric that he likes, he attaches it to a mood board and starts there. “It’s coarse,”
he says as he feels the swatch, “so I was thinking it could be a pair of shorts.” Shreya, at
SFI, focuses on details: based on a mood board of sea-inspired themes, she might develop
an image of a conch shell into “deep pockets,” or architectural geometry into cutwork (a
lace technique). Although mood boards can be highly conceptual, Vani understands them
as constructions which are “very clear from a design perspective,” focused through
training and selective attention. The process is psychologically similar to other
translations of trends or “bizarre” runway styles.
While the outsourcing of design samples (actual garments) is increasingly being
outsourced, the extent to which this outsourcing will penetrate the early, inspirational
stages of design research is unclear. Early brand involvement may support a competitive
advantage in differentiation at a minimal cost. Many buyers already receive research
design services online (e.g., WGSN) or from a distance. An ACE senior product manager
reports that a children’s wear brand “came two years ago, but they don’t come any
more.” Instead, “we generally send them the [mood board] selection and ship the [fabric
and trim] samples to them.” She takes me through her e-mail to show what the
communication looks like. In a style that she is developing now, she has air-mailed three
items to the buyer: fabric from a scarf (for the palette), a swatch that appears to be denim,
and a tear sheet from a magazine. The buyer does not mail back the items, but responds
by e-mail that he likes the swatch and wants a similar fabric quality and blend (60%
cotton, 40% poly), but not in denim. Again, whether brands want their designers to be
involved with suppliers this early in the process is a decision of strategic sourcing. Some
prefer to skip consultation on mood boards and move directly to the evaluation of
samples. Others increase creative control by constructing their own mood boards and
sending them to suppliers.

buyer account. Rahul would not consult his superiors in the marketing department for a
decision like this, but he is aware of the relative importance of each buyer account based
on contact with the general manager and vice president of marketing. For more about
clients, see Chapter 4 on marketing.
81
See also Corrigan’s analysis (2008:97-98) of emotional associations in the marketing
of perfume and skincare products.
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Mood Boards from Buyers
If mood boards originate from the buyer side, collaboration does not occur until
the later sampling stage. Amrita is clear that if a brand sends a mood board, “they already
know what they want.” These boards are either sent by e-mail or air mail; buyer-side
designers sometimes send hard copy glossy images ripped out from fashion magazines,
called “tears” or “tear sheets.” Buyer-side mood boards, except those from fast fashion
brands, generally contain more depth than supply-side boards. There are three possible
reasons for this. First, buyers must communicate moods to suppliers. Kairavi can easily
identify an image which inspires her, but buyers must inspire Kairavi. Second, one bridge
buyer confirmed that her brand sends the same mood board to other factories in India as
well as factories in China and Vietnam, enlisting each supplier to develop its own
samples and compete against each other. Mood boards will thus need to be more
elaborate to create a common platform for interpretation. Third, buyers may have greater
capabilities than suppliers. Other scholars have argued for unique capabilities in New
York or Stockholm, and I did find that designers at second-tier factories have more
limited capabilities than those at large first-tier suppliers. Buyers may have less
confidence in the design capabilities of lower-order suppliers.
Images from buyer mood boards are most commonly culled from interior design
(e.g., pillows, lattice windows), ethnic and city scenes (e.g., an Italian villa, a rustic
alleyway), textiles, and fashion photography. While the photography selection initially
seems eclectic, these images have been deliberately designed and visualized.82 Take for
example a composition of smooth rocks on a beach, where an apparently simple shot
contains no seaweed. The exposure has in fact been adjusted to get just the right shade of
pale grey. The image has been selected to balance the color palette of an “Indigo Mood”
theme; the ombré hues of “lunar tide” from a bridge brand here are more sophisticated
and fashion-forward than the standardized blue and greys at value brands.
The mood board from one bridge brand is organized at the top level according to
four themes: “Indigo Mood” for deep blues, “Shine On You Crazy Diamond” for sequins
and summery flashes of color, “Texture-matic,” and “Put a Cherry on Top” for red tops.83
There are usually nine garments and six looks per theme, always more tops than bottoms.
Each theme has an overarching seasonal message in one paragraph of prose with about 10
words in bold. The words are evocative, like “adventure,” craftsmanship,” “details,”
“shades,” and “fashion.” Some are obviously more helpful than others in conjuring up a
specific image to be produced. One line says, “follow the sun with a jet set getaway to
Cannes.” Here Amrita repeatedly underlines “sun” and tells me that words like this can
sometimes be more powerful than images. To her it conjures yellows and oranges.
Another theme is “Albuquerque Summer,” with desert pink and orange (think cactus
flowers), while “Cubana” includes pale shades of orange. In a different case, Amrita
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See Aspers (2006a) on the phenomenology of fashion photography.
Theme names are altered for confidentiality, but word play is extremely common in
trend forecasting and design.
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relays her interpretation of a mood board to Vani, telling her to “mix it. She [the buyer] is
saying mixed media. Add a panel, blocking, some black embroidery…”
Supply-side designers respond to a mood board with selective attention. At ACE,
following Amrita’s lead and factory competence, they gravitate toward conceptual or
highly embellished pieces, approximately two out of every five. One of these they will
attempt to nail “bang on” and another “close enough.” They ignore fabrics for which they
do not have expertise (e.g., denim) as well as basics (e.g., plain t-shirts). In addition to
circling a few styles as a whole, Amrita circles particular features, like the geometric lace
pattern on the bottom third of a skirt, to focus her assistant designers. The second-tier
factories I studied receive a smaller selection of mood boards but follow the same
selective logic: assistant designers circle two out of six or eight images “according to
what our company does best.”
The mood boards that I see from fast fashion companies do not contain highconcept references (e.g., ceramics, art history). Instead they contain either pictures of
garments (occasionally trims) or models wearing garments, with 3-6 styles per page.
Selections can be extensive, with one company sending 197 images, but this is based on
the understanding that suppliers will develop samples selectively. Though “copying” and
“tweaking” are widespread industry practices (see Chapter 4), mood board analysis
suggests that fast fashion brand reputations for “copying” are especially well-deserved.
One pack of inspiration images features a WGSN triptych, cropped images from a
magazine editorial, and branded designs from five different bridge brands. In a few cases
a buyer-side designer inserts handwritten notes for modifications, like asking to tweak the
lace shorts of a competitor by using a thinner waistband.
Although the aesthetic targets of tweaking are stratified—designers within a
segmented brand system only look up to aspirational brands or horizontally to peers—the
role of supply-side designers in the creative process is absent or seriously underplayed in
textbook treatments of fashion design (Sorger and Udale 2017:174, Stipelman 2017:xii)
and network arguments about production (Uzzi 1996, 1997). At the ethical minimum or
worst (within the scope of my empirical observations on mood boards), a supply-side
designer can appropriate mood board images sent from one buyer and insert them into her
own mood boards sent out to other companies. Aparna is the only designer I meet who
does this, in one case recirculating images previously selected by a value brand. Although
mood board images are not copyrighted and already drawn from external sources
(typically without credit), Amrita considers this practice unethical because it obscures the
work of curation by buyer-side designers. (See Chapter 4 for more on design ethics.) At a
maximum, ACE and MEI designs rise to the forefront of aesthetic fascination at the
largest fashion brands in the world. Especially at ACE, I made a game out of identifying
garments made or designed in India.84 As I sorted through mood board images I would
check my guesses with Vani. Sometimes I happened upon ACE designs that had reached
the retail market and entered back into the design cycle. A bridge brand mood board, for
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This is still a fun party trick, but identifying country of origin is a game of taste.
Aesthetic rules are learned through attention, exposure, and familiarization (Benzecry
2011, Hume 1757/1995). For the US and European buyers I interviewed, such games are
an essential part of their work.
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example, includes two accessible luxury garments that had been designed by Amrita and
Vani. These exact same two images show up later in the mood board of a separate bridge
brand. I am deeply surprised by this, but Vani rolls her eyes at my naiveté and says that
such impact happens “regularly.” She tells me of another example from last season, when
Amrita developed a prototype that is now featured on the cover of the global mood board
from an influential bridge brand.
Theoretical Mediation Between Buyers and Suppliers
Sociologists, especially symbolic interactionists, may not be surprised by the
circuits of attention that I describe. Blumer (1969a), for example, observed and theorized
a similar “collective selection” process long ago. While the process that Blumer describes
is still valid, it deserves critique from two angles. First, the research looks at Paris, not
Delhi. Scholarly fascination with the “big four” fashion capitals—Paris, New York,
London, and Milan—has long dominated fashion research, a bias that continues today
(Entwistle 2006, Godart 2014a, Mears 2011b). Even studies of semi-peripheral suppliers
continue to doubt their competence for reasons of cultural geography, among others
(Aspers 2010a, Tokatli and Kızılgün 2009:160).85 Second, Blumer proposes co-presence
as a crucial, possibly essential mechanism of emotional transmission. Contemporary
sociological models of interaction continue to rely on co-presence as a building block for
general theory (Boden and Molotch 1994, Campos-Castillo and Hitlin 2013, Collins
2004), even one that is essential to creativity and a precursor to diffusion (Currid-Halkett
2007, Molotch 1996).
Scholars across the social sciences are still coming to grips with the scope of the
1990s IT revolution and its implications for international trade and cultural diffusion
(Castells 2000, WTO and IDE-JETRO 2011). This dissertation is a part of that project.
As I see it, the GVC paradigm does not seek to replace co-presence, but to supersede it.
We need to consider global institutional arrangements more aggressively. This means not
only an increased recognition of media and digital media in the international cultural
work of design, but new models of hybrid institutional arrangements which restructure
patterns of co-presence altogether. Most designers and buyers continue to believe that copresence is irreplaceable at some level (even if it is increasingly restricted to high-level
positions within brands and suppliers). Because GVCs create intricate new arrangements
for trade in services, however, they can be understood as institutions that structure
professional interactions and facilitate co-presence in the first place.
Computer-Aided Design
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Methodological sophistication in global ethnography is quickly increasing.
Distinguishing among tiers of suppliers introduces scope conditions that may help to
resolve or specify current disputes.
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Computer-aided or computer-assisted design (CAD) is a technologically-mediated
process that highlights the limitations of unique capability theory. Basically a cross
between Photoshop and architectural software, CAD software like Illustrator, Optitex,
Wings, Pulse, and Wilcom allows designers to digitally draw and render in 3-D. WGSN
offers 65,000 CAD patterns (Sherman 2014a). Skeptical of the capabilities of designers in
emerging economies, unique capability proponents have focused on the hierarchical
rather than democratic potential of CAD. The U.S. Department of Energy and NASA, for
example, funded technology research and transfer in sewn products with applications to
CAD and computerized embroidery (U.S. Department of Commerce 1994, pp. 32-5, 326). The strategic rationale is that it facilitates “quick response,” allowing American textile
and apparel industries to “remain internationally competitive” (see also Doeringer and
Crean 2006). CAD has also been celebrated as a way to communicate detailed
information from the core to the semi-periphery (Molotch 2003:40). This aligns with the
widely held assumption that labor is or should be internationally divided, with
sophisticated and culturally-informed tasks like design in the Western home base. Deskilled component work like assembly, meanwhile, is still understood as more suitable
for the global semi-periphery (Fröbel et al. 1980, Rantisi 2004:101, Sassen 1988:163).
At the suppliers I studied, CAD is a separate department, a backstage of design
(literally in the basement at ACE). It is often adjacent to production rooms with computer
embroidery machines. Assistant designers like Vani learn CAD in their education but
liaise with CAD designers rather than creating or executing patterns on their own. All the
CAD designers at ACE (n=10), SFI (n=4), IFS (n=5), and most at MEI (at least 20), are
male. In all four locations, designers, sampling technicians, and CAD designers
themselves frame CAD work as “technology,” not “fashion editing,” and thus more
appropriate for men than women.86 The CAD departments I observed in India do receive
and execute CAD designs (large digital files) from buyers, as unique capability theorists
expect. In addition to the fact that execution is not technically simple, however, CAD
designers also collaborate artistically and create new designs altogether. Such work
highlights the poverty of unique capability models of the international division of labor.
Some CAD departments I visited are split into design and routing. In design,
CAD staff work with supply-side and buyer-side garment designers to develop new or
collaborative image files. When a bridge brand comes to ACE for a showroom visit, for
example, the designer brings two original CADs and a third that mixed stylistic elements.
The designer explains that he is looking for other ways to mix the patterns, so ACE
develops further CAD options that eventually find their way into both a patchwork maxi
skirt and a swing cami (top). Supply-side CAD designers frequently develop their own
images independently as well; flowers and Schiffli lace patterns are common. However,
Vani says that CAD images are often limited to the front of a garment. If a sample with
the image is selected by a buyer, CAD will need instructions from a garment designer to
finish the sides and back.
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CAD staff, like the all-male IT staff, tend to speak precisely and efficiently. It is a stark
contrast to the jokes and color that infuses designer language. Leidner (1993:196-213)
and Salzinger (2003) show how gendered activities can be dynamically re-framed and
naturalized at work.
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I learned about routing or “punching” from Agni, a mid-20s “fresher” at IFS with
a BS in computer science. He says it took six months to learn the basics of the software
used on the job. Watching him at work makes it clear that “execution” is not a simple,
automatic process, despite Agni’s preliminary claim that his job is “simple.” Most of
what he does is geometric programming. The goal is to translate art into “something that
a [computer embroidery] machine will understand.” I think of it as a very complex game
of “connect the dots.” Physical thread must connect A to B to C in an unbroken line that a
machine can follow, obviating the human work of thread cutting and re-setting. Efficient
routing makes direct, nearby connections to avoid wasting thread. Many of these
connections must be hidden on the back side of the fabric, however, so programmers
have to think about a two-dimensional fabric in three dimensions. They must also
consider stitching density, which simultaneously affects efficiency, quality, and
aesthetics. These decisions are not automated (except in pattern permutation), but made
by the human mind and eye. Given that a complex flower can have 10,000 stiches, we
can begin to appreciate the level of detail and sophistication that is required in CAD.
Product Development
At this point we have covered the major processes of design research: trend
forecasting, sources of inspiration, mood boards, and computer-aided design. These
processes are preliminary to product development (PD) and sample tailoring. Supply-side
PD87 plays an important role as a structural broker between fashion design and industrial
engineering. It is, in my evaluation, the first point at which institutional logics of
engineering and the market become integral to administration.88 Designers do grapple
with cost, but they usually see it as an imposition from a morally inferior logic of
engineering. Product developers and managers are more ambivalent, valuing technical
knowledge at least as much as cultural knowledge (like trends). A product developer
working with denim, for example, must have significant knowledge of the chemicals used
in denim washes. As we reach PD, materiality is irrevocably introduced to the production
process—PD really begins with fabric development. For this reason we will take a short
detour to the fabric mills returning to apparel PD in the garment factories.
Fabric Development
A few terms of basic vocabulary are in order before we begin a discussion of
fabric PD. In order of specificity from broad to narrow, “cloth” is the most generic,
woven or knitted from fibers. “Fabric” can be either finished or unfinished, while the
word “textile” refers to large sections of cloth that have been finished (e.g., dyed and
87

Buyers also have a PD department, but their role is to liaise with suppliers.
Although it takes a tremendous amount of effort, firms like Alessi appear to blend
institutional logics of art and industry throughout the entire company (Dalpiaz et al.
2016).
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patterned). “Apparel” has been transformed from cloth into clothing or garments. Product
managers routinely argue that fabric is the most important component of a garment, as we
will see in Chapter 4. One reason for this is that fabric delays cause the most serious
damage production timelines. Most participants, however, agree that fabric is the “most
vital part” of garment production, as Amrita once admits. Her comment surprises me
because although she began her career in the fabric department, she lasted only a year
before growing bored and wanting to move on. But fabric is the raw material of a sample
garment, so no design can materialize without it. Mahatesh, the general manager of the
MEI mills, emphasizes the role of cotton “sorts” and fabric in creating the final look and
performance of a garment: “You cannot start with fabric A and expect to get look B. No
matter how hard you try, you cannot expect the fabric to behave outside its range.” When
I ask how much potential there is to create different fabrics, he says that in denim alone,
among cotton varieties, carding, weaving, yarn count, and other fabric blends with
polyester or Spandex, there are “endless permutations.” Readers interested in cotton can
turn to other research deeper in the commodity chain (Ramamurthy 2004, Rivoli 2005).
Fabric begins as “grey”89 or greige fabric which is raw and undyed, “woven but
not processed.” It does have a grey color. While most mills do only printing and dying,
according to the factory manager at the ACE mill, some focus on greige alone. The ACE
and MEI warehouses that will feed production of ladies’ clothing keep a large stock of
greige to be used for “reliable” and “normal” orders. IFS, SFI, and MEI men’s, on the
other hand, order greige fabric for each new order. When I ask a product manager why
IFS doesn’t store greige, he becomes confused: “But we don’t yet know how much we
have to order. It will be different for every buyer…”90 Ordering greige for each new order
reduces warehouse costs but entails a tradeoff of longer lead times. On the question of
using greige for men’s production but not ladies’ (<1%) at MEI, a fabric sourcing
manager narrows it down to product variety. Basically, men’s garments have less variety
than women’s.91 Because of larger order sizes which demand standardization, matching
the shade is “more critical” for men’s orders. In general, however, I am unable to
determine strategic principles for greige sourcing. My lack of training is fabrics is one
reason for this. Another is the fragmented structure of the competitive environment
(Porter 1980:191-214), with more than 13,000 mills in India alone (Central Statistics
Office 2016:S4-4).
Three Paths to Fabric Development

Although “grey” is far more common in the field, I use the technical term for clarity.
The unwillingness to generalize is common among product managers. Many treat
buyer requests as sacrosanct, using the phrase “as per buyer request” as the final word on
the subject. See Chapter 5.
91
The same principle applies to shoes. The owner of a shoe factory estimates buying 20
different “lasts” (basic shoe structures) each season. They can be reused, but because of
changes in fashion, he says that a last for women has only a two-year lifespan. Men’s
lasts, on the other hand, can be reused “for years and years.”
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Mahesh, the vice president of marketing at one division of MEI, argues that fabric
developments have the power to turn around a failing brand. Taking the case of a bridge
brand that suffered revenue losses before a turnaround, In an interview, Mahesh drives
home his belief that “they are the only one who is successful with what they have done.
Why? They are successful because of fabric innovations.” Intensive design and PD,
including fabric PD, is a solution offered by first-tier suppliers like ACE and MEI.
Abhishek, the general manager of PD at a MEI fabric mill, provides a far-sighted view of
how PD activity is organized when I settle down to talk with him at the end of my weeklong visit. He explains that developments happen by forming attachments to three sets of
partners (see Uzzi 1996, 1997): buyers and competitors, mills, and designers. (1) The mill
focuses on “technological developments” in the field and introduces new textile designs
through this route. Digital printing is a great example: technically, it provides incredible
clarity and high definition. In one of my meetings with Vaasu, he pulls out large
digitally-printed fabric posters, immediately accessible in his office cabinets. The
daughter of an SFI executive, similarly, is an independent fashion designer whose
collections have included digitally printed saris. Abhishek, for his part, meets with
designers or buyers about once every two months for a trend meeting. At these meetings,
they discuss “market intelligence,” which comes mostly from buyers. Abhishek gives an
example in which “China is doing this technique; can we do a similar thing for MEI, and
either change it a bit or make it cheaper?” Or the marketing team may note that “the
market is looking for this kind of yarn,” where “the market” signifies a couple of
different buyers at the same time. Thirty eight percent of the base fabrics produced at this
MEI mill are internal developments.
(2) MEI designers work with leading Indian mills on innovations, as well as other
Asian textile technology companies and mills: “Indirectly we are their largest customers,
so we have room to develop some great blends,” Mahesh claims when attempting to reel
in a sportswear company at a buyer presentation. When I bring up this comment in an
interview later, he adds that fabric developments sometimes involves direct collaboration
with buyers. I witness this during other showroom presentations. When a fabric
technician from another sportswear company frequently brings up her relationship with a
textile technology firm in Southeast Asia, Rahul suggests that a collaboration could be
arranged. He tells the technician that next week he is going to an Indian mill to develop
fabrics “with specific buyers in mind,” implicitly suggesting that this level of
development attention could be extended to the sportswear brand. When the fabric
technician says she wants to incorporate DWR (a water-repellant finish) but wants to
know how that would affect the handfeel of the textile, Rahul’s characteristic response is
that “we can just try it.”
(3) Design facilitated through suppliers is a third path of PD. Another MEI unit
provides an illustration. Furkan, the PD manager at a unit specializing in denim, is a
Turkish consultant on a one-year contract. Before MEI he worked for two years in
Bangladesh and one year in Pakistan. He is less interested in making a trendy designer
garment than an interesting one, interesting from the perspective of experienced taste.
Jeans are common among employees in the unit, and Furkan’s taste is reflected in his
own embellished and ripped jeans on the days that I visit. “We are making development
corrections for the buyers,” he explains of the PD department. This involves “copying”
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and “matching [fabric] standards.” In his experience research and development is “more
like design” than PD, but at MEI Furkan has been given the resources to build a PD
laboratory. His current pet project is sustainable design. As we walk through the washing
unit, he lays out how a regular denim wash includes separate processes of desizing,
rinsing, adding enzymes in a wash, rinsing, bleaching, neutralizing, softening, and rinsing
again, using a total of 350 liters of water. A process that he is developing now, one which
he enthusiastically believes will be “the future of washing, what everyone will be doing
in 10 years,” combines stone washing, enzymes, and bleaching together—without rinses
in between— followed by neutralization, rinsing, and softening. This uses only 100-250
liters of water. New denim samples are produced with this sustainable process, so if
selected by buyers, each MEI design will be produced using fewer resources. Furkan
calls this “lean design.” Buyers and factory executives are both eager to reward
quantifiable developments in sustainability.
First-tier buying agencies also offer access to supplier design. First, they employ
their own design staff. Some even offer full private-label collections, meaning that
retailers can entirely outsource design and production through an agency. Only a few
brands are testing this model with one buying agency that I studied. Given that buying
agencies have their own designers, I wondered in an interview how important it is for
agencies to engage with factories who do full-package production. Kunal, a division
product manager, feels that it builds on existing capacities in an important way.
Designers from a buying agency can work with factory designers to offer an outstanding
product. “When we approach a new customer,” Kunal says, “we have to give ‘showcase’
developments. That way we have to have relationships [with factory designers]… We
will call the buyer and talk to them about trends, mood boards... Then we go to the
factory and ask for developments.” Collaborations lead to developments which were not
directly discussed with the buyer, but which anticipate or surprise them: “you have to
stay one step ahead of the customer.” Buying agencies may also do “visits to a knit mill
together, developing 50-60 swatches, working on developments…” Without more access
to buying agencies, it is hard to gauge the regularity or extent of collaboration. As we
have seen, agencies claim to offer better quality, better execution, and larger networks
than direct suppliers. As Kunal presents collaboration in product development, however,
nothing is different from what first-tier suppliers themselves can offer.
Product Development: Cost and Creativity Between Engineering and Design
Now that we have completed our detour through fabric PD, we can turn back to
the main road of apparel, where I had wider and deeper exposure. Instead of merely being
able to outline PD routes while studying fabric (e.g., collaborations with mills), in apparel
I was able to discern strategies specifically related to cost versus differentiation. While
the tension of “art versus commerce” is visible across the culture industries (Bourdieu
1993a, Caves 2000, Glynn 2000), the strategic management binary of “cost versus
differentiation” applies to all industries, from concrete manufacturing to banking
(Deephouse 1999, Navis and Glynn 2011, Phillips, Turco and Zuckerman 2013, Porter
1985). Although work in organizational and institutional theory is seeking to bridge this
86

gap by conducting research specifically on product design (Dalpiaz et al. 2016, Molotch
2003), scholars still disagree about the extent to which cost and differentiation can or
should be pursued simultaneously. I found substantial variation in my fieldwork:
depending on the internal team, brand, or garment style, PD may have a supportive,
contrarian, or absent relationship with design. The main finding is that when these
departments collaborate, PD and design have functional clashes between cost reduction
and aesthetically pleasing results (see also Ashforth and Reingen 2014, Simmel
1908/1955). This conflict of roles and institutional logics is visible on the demand side as
well; I witnessed it during buyer meetings (Chapter 4). In other product categories too,
like power tools, buyers are more interested in cost and designers in aesthetics (Wolter,
Bacon, Duhan et al. 1989).
Making it “Production-Friendly”: Technical Utility
When I ask ACE marketing manager Arjun about how to lower costs, he censors
himself when he talks of “degrading the design—I don’t want to say ‘degrading,’ I will
say ‘making more cost-effective.” PD, however, does have a more technical orientation
than design. Some PD staff at MEI are trained in design and others in industrial
engineering. In either case, PD works to make designs more “production-friendly.” I
focus on this term in my session with Parth, an industrial engineer who receives quality
parameters from buyers and works with tailors to actualize them (for example, which
types of stiches should be used for various seams). I ask him about a debate that I
overheard between him and a senior designer: “She wanted to use some small fabric
binding,” he sighed. “That’s ok for design, but when you take it into the factory, it’s not
production-friendly. That will be a big problem there, it will break… In [ladies’
garments], you will have a lot of handling issues. Ladies garments, thin fabric, it may
break.” He pulls a ripping motion to demonstrate, adding, “The operators have to work
very carefully.” Another example comes from Rituraj, a post-college hipster with big
trendy glasses. Each season, Rituraj receives a list of development ideas from an
accessible luxury brand. Last season, out of approximately 25 styles, 20 of his
developments were confirmed. He pulls out a denim development overlaid with patches
and a large brand initial. First, he says, “we had to move the placement. I wanted it here
[on the upper thigh], they wanted it lower [near the knee]. So we moved that. Then they
wanted the patches off-grain [i.e., not matching the warp and weft underneath]. But with
the washing, that will create shrinkage. When we tried it, it was not looking good.” Now
the patch is on grain. For these same jeans he talks about the metal components in the
zipper: “There has to be a lot of washing time [for denim], so a zipper may break…” This
utilitarian vision of PD is endorsed by technicians. Product managers and designers,
while they also engage in cost reduction, have a more critical analysis of what the term
“production-friendly” signifies.
Reducing Cost
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Cost is not the same as price. Cost captures production expenses while price
captures perceived customer value, or how much a retailer believes a consumer is willing
to pay. I will not discuss pricing strategy here92 and will save a detailed discussion of
costing for Chapter 4. In this section I will discuss only narrow parameters and strategies
for cost reduction which directly affect design. The simplest way to reduce cost is to
reorder. Rakesh, a senior product manager at ACE, says that for reorders at a large midrange brand, “they change the color only or make some little modification. That’s easier
for them to make some product which is already top-selling.” Reorders seem to be more
likely for kids and babies than men’s (and definitely women’s) and at value brands and
outlets as opposed to mainline stores or flagship brands.
Outlets serve as off-price channels for branded retail or department stores. Some
carry styles that simply did not sell at regular locations (e.g., Nordstrom Rack). Others
combine this strategy with new product developments designed specifically for “factory
outlets.” There is some disagreement on this point, but Rakesh and most of his PD
colleagues say the quality (i.e., technical utility) is the same for retail and outlet
collections: “You can say it’s a sister brand… they are produced at the same
manufacturer.” The main difference to quality comes from differences in design that are
generated in the PD department. The main narrative is that in “some of the cases [the
outlet] took the samples from their own [retail brand] productions,” leading to 10-20% of
production that is “knockoffs” and “look-alikes” of extant successful styles. For a kid’s
outlet in the value segment, he estimates that 60% of the developments are rehashed from
previous styles. The other 40% are “knockoffs” of new developments for the full-price
retail line that have a “similar look,” but are modified to achieve lower costs. The subplot to the main narrative is that the difference between retail and outlet channels is
changing at major brands. Shivangi, another senior product manager with 12 years of
experience, works with some of the same brands as Rakesh. She claims that the outlet is
moving toward the brand in terms of style and design administration. “Originally,”
Shivangi says, “there was a lot of cost difference. The outlet took cheaper stuff and the
brand had a design team [while the outlet did not].” The outlet would adapt last season’s
styles from retail channels. Now the outlet has its own buyer-side design team, which has
resulted in the “difference getting narrower, now there is not that much of a difference
left.” Still, however, outlets do not receive input from supply-side designers; they work
exclusively with the more technical supply-side PD. Shivangi also notes that the outlet
negotiates harder on cost than the brand. The simple result of this, from the PD
perspective, means cheaper buttons, removing embroidery, using cheaper fabrics, and
other modifications.
Product developers and product managers do not believe that they are changing
technical utility when they work to reduce cost. They would never issue instructions to
production managers, for example, to lower standards of quality control or use cheaper
thread. Instead, PD embraces cost engineering when they feel it will not affect the overall
style. What they will change is fabric or design elements with the goal to make a style
more basic. In a buyer presentation at ACE, for example, a marketing manager and a
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Recer (2017) reports an industry standard of 60% full-price sell through, meaning 40%
of apparel is sold at less than full price.
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buyer brought the cost of a garment down by reducing all-over lace to 3/4 coverage and
the collar. Accessories, trims, and safety stitches are some of the first things to be
removed. If the reader owns shorts or a skirt without zippers or pockets, chances are that
a product developer has intervened to eliminate that cost. A more sophisticated PD
strategy, related by a buying agent, is to make “invisible changes” that actually appear to
add value at a low cost. “What we try to do is give the same price,” the agent says, “but
by playing around. If they are asking for a GSM [fabric weight]93 of 180, we will try to
cut it down to 160 but add a finish. That way, we add just 50 cents [to the buyer price],
but the buyer hasn’t seen [the reduction in weight], so definitely the buyer will go for it.”
In the end, PD has a functional imperative to reduce cost and ensure production-friendly
designs, reducing the gap between designers and production managers. Designers may
peripherally defend a cost-reducing move by saying, “I’m making it more wearable,” but
by and large they push to preserve or add design features.
Innovation and Aesthetic Value
The danger of bringing cost down too much is a loss of aesthetic value. In one
case Amrita tells a buyer over the phone that “we will work on embroidery cost, but I
don’t think it will look so good.” Amrita regularly instructs her assistant designer Lakshit
to “keep it smart” with “design integrity.” After hearing about the importance of
“production-friendly” designs from Parth, Rituraj, and product managers at ACE, I went
back to the designers to hear their take on the term. Rahul’s response shows why
differentiation should not be sacrificed to cost reduction: “Designers in New York will
send a mood board to many different suppliers. If you just hold up a mirror (he holds up
the palm of his hand) and show them the basics, they will not like that. They can find that
anywhere. Even [a value brand], who does basics… you have to show them something
new, thinking ahead, and maybe that will not be production-friendly. But you have to
inspire them, and then they can tone it down later.” Rahul’s comment argues that the role
of design, temporally prior to PD, is to provide inspiration. He believes that without
inspirational design, buyers will take their orders elsewhere. Engineering goals like utility
and efficiency (e.g., cost reduction, production-friendly design) are decidedly secondary.
Although they are not exempt from other forms of pressure, designers across the
board privilege inspiration and creative freedom before utility and efficiency. Executives
insulate them against cost and time pressures that are pervasive in other departments
through administrative exceptionalism.94 Aparna, at IFS, believes with Rahul that “we
have to attract buyers… I don’t worry about costing being too expensive. [Product
managers or PD] will do that.” Her counterpart Kalyani has a different emphasis,
responding that the “budget is a fact which is in our mind” during the design process as a
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Fabric is the most expensive component of apparel, as I document in Chapter 4. Grams
per square meter is the standard measurement of weight, with a higher weight in cotton
typically signifying better quality.
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See also Jourdan, Durand, & Thornton (2017) and Álvarez, Mazza, Pedersen, &
Svejenova (2005) on insulation as a strategy to preserve differentiation.
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“rough idea.” Rahul and Amrita also adjust cost to individual styles, but work on the
assumptions that mood boards, inspiration, and client service all come before cost. Of the
latter, Rahul says, “I have to be aware of cost, maybe if I need to tone it down, but I can’t
always do low-cost. Otherwise it would be a nightmare.” “Basics,” I nod, and “basics” he
confirms.
Tech Packs
Rahul’s “nightmare” is essentially the unique capabilities understanding of how
supplier design works. In this case buyer-side designers simply send instructions,
sometimes via CAD (Collins 2003:119, Molotch 2003:40). There might be some design
work that is outsourced from New York, these authors argue, but it is minimal and
unlikely to expand. Inspiration that will resonate with customers depends on cultural
competence, which is difficult to acquire without access to a localized lifeworld and
creative scenes (Aspers 2010a). Supply-side design faces major structural pressures:
buyer-dominated GVCs, long distances from consumers, and intense competition from
other suppliers (Schrank 2004, Tokatli and Kızılgün 2009). These are all presented as
reasons to be skeptical of supplier-led upgrading. The empirical reality suggested by most
of the literature on apparel GVCs is simplified or deskilled design. To put it simply,
suppliers merely engage in contract manufacturing via specifications called “tech packs.”
This vision is not completely inaccurate—it does have a historical basis (Fröbel et
al. 1980, Gereffi 1999). At ACE, tech packs were the dominant model of production from
the 1970s until at least the 1990s. MEI still processes more than 60% of its orders
through tech packs, although Amrita estimates only 20-30% at ACE. Tech packs,
however, are continuing to be replaced by supply-side design at both factories. There are
three reasons that could explain the divergence of my fieldwork from previous studies.
The first is difference in theoretical orientation. As I have argued, economic theory
(applied in sociology and geography) and cultural arguments (including those founded in
microsociology) have accepted a bias of unique capabilities. Second, researchers may be
misled by the labor-oriented parallel between footwear and apparel (Scott 2006).
Footwear, especially athletic footwear, is more technologically sophisticated than apparel
production. Independent design occurred at the shoe factories I visited, but all of the big
buyers used tech packs (see also Schmitz and Knorringa 2000). Third, it is possible that
there have been a series of other methodological differences that account for the
divergence of my findings from those of previous studies. Qualitative investigation on
sourcing practices, as I have argued, systematically lacks ethnographic rigor. Quantitative
data focuses on macro-level measures without penetrating firm decisions. Only a few
studies, like that of Schrank (2004), even distinguish between tiers of suppliers. IFS and
SFI, for example, are at the low end of the first tier; they execute about 90% of their
production through tech packs. Ethnographically, however, it would be upsetting for a
researcher to miss the geographical and institutional origin of 10% of designs.
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A tech pack or garment specification sheet (GSS) typically provides extremely
detailed instructions for a single garment.95 Unlike mood boards, samples, or
prototypes,96 they are copyrighted.97 A US buyer told me that signature garments, like
Levis-501 jeans, will always be produced through a tech pack. They typically consist of
5-10 pages, depending on complexity. Computer-aided sketches show front and back,
with at least 15 exact measurements, a precise Pantone color (e.g., marine blue 15-4712),
a fabric swatch to be matched, and any details for specific parts of the garment (e.g.,
pocket details). They also come with a bill of materials. This will include the type of
fabric to be used (e.g., “cotton twill”), thread count, weight, and any accessories (e.g.,
metal eyelets). It is necessary to procure everything from the bill of materials before
going to the master tailor, which often entails a sort of matching treasure hunt in local
markets (Chapter 5). There is substantial variety in the level of clarity and detail, but a
good tech pack, as evaluated by tailors, requires no interpretation.
Accuracy is more important than beauty, which can be frustrating to designers.
Lakshit, the least talented assistant designer at ACE (by consensus except his own),
handles all the tech packs. In turn, he feels that they are beneath his skill and tries to push
them down the value chain to tailors. This is common across the factories I visit: a senior
designer at MEI refuses to talk about tech packs altogether, saying “They go straight to
[product managers]. We have none.” At SFI, an assistant product manager tells me that
“mostly the tailors have experience with tech packs, so they will execute the design.”
Pushing tedious details down the status structure is a familiar move for scholars of work
and occupations (Bosk 2003, Hughes 1956/1994, Jackall 1988:20-21, 81). The expertise
of designers and product managers is still required, however, when tech packs are not as
airtight as buyer-side designers (or unique capability theorists) may believe. Some tech
packs have gaps or errors; there are many places for such errors to occur.
Specifications can fail to account for important parameters. A large mid-range
buyer, for example, regularly provides patterns to SFI that do not allow for fabric
shrinkage. These specifications assigned by the buyer do not lead to desirable final
measurements. They need multiple rounds of adjustment. An assistant designer, for
example, shows me a recent prototype in which half of the sample measurements were
outside of the buyer tolerance limits. To avoid these headaches and delays, most of SFI’s
clients allow SFI to develop their own specifications so long as they fit final buyer
measurements. The same is true at ACE and MEI, where buyers more often ask suppliers
to produce their own tech packs and bills of material. As I learned more about the
exacting standards of buyers (see also Chapter 4), I became surprised that there are not
more errors. A quarter of an inch difference on any one of 15 measurements can cause a
defect in the final sample. Like WGSN, tech packs facilitate an international division of
labor. Although most scholars assume that tech packs promote deskilled work, their
execution is not foolproof. Looking at almost any labor task with a phenomenological or
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Flat sketches, also known as working drawings or tech drawings, are accurate and
proportional but technically do not contain measurements.
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A design sample becomes a prototype when selected by a buyer (see Chapter 4).
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I cannot include images for this reason, but an online image search may be helpful.
They look rather like assembly instructions for household objects.
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ethnographic lens, however, will show the work and skill that is involved (Attewell 1990,
Ehrenreich 2001:193, Mears and Finlay 2005). To learn more about this, let us turn to
tailoring in the PD department. These are the “masters” who construct samples and
provide the first fabricated indications of a style.
Sample Tailoring
There are about 20 supply-side staff at ACE who collaborate to make a design
sample. Designers and product developers remain involved, but tailors, fabric
technicians, embellishment artists, and support staff (“runners”) are added. There are
many rounds of sampling that occur throughout the value chain; each substantive chapter
will include a table with relevant rounds of samples (see Table 3). Each one must be
approved by the buyer before the next step can proceed. (As a reminder, a swatch sample
is often included in a mood board. A PPT sample contains CAD designs or photographs
of samples.)
Table 3: Design Samples

Sample
Swatch (of fabric)
Design
PPT

Also Known As
Reference swatch
Initial, presentation,
design, hanger
PowerPoint

Department
Design, PD
Design, tailoring, marketing
Design, PD, tailoring

At ACE and MEI sampling tailors only work on samples. As Amrita frames it, “a design
sample is always one. It’s like you get it in a store, like a sample medicine or [tester]
perfume.” Tailors at smaller factories like IFS and SFI, meanwhile, work on both samples
and bulk production samples (Chapter 5). A design sample is not to be worn as a
garment. As a result, while designers joke about bodies and weight all the time, they
never talk about how a garment will look on the body before buyer presentations. Instead,
as Amrita, says, the sample should be “fitted to a [clothes] hanger… it shouldn’t look
crooked… and it should be the right size: you can’t make a woman look like a baby or a
baby like a woman.” As I will soon discover, this last comment is not pulled from thin
air.
Although assistant designers are charged with overseeing the translation of a
sketch or tech pack into a design sample, master tailors are the stars of the situation (see
Collins 2004:258-96). They earn the deference of almost everyone they work with.
Tailoring is respected as technically skilled craft work with machines. (All the tailors and
master tailors at ACE are men.) They prove that there are opportunities for innovation in
machines as well as design. In one example, MEI rents a machine to develop a sample,
but returns the machine before the sample is selected. To replicate the machine’s effect, a
master tailor develops a technique of inserting multiple threads through a single needle.
This openness to innovation is more common in sample tailoring than in production. In
the former there is a relatively slow pace of execution. The work is minimally
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subdivided. No more than three tailors will work on a garment (often one constructs the
front of a shirt and another the back), there are no time-motion studies, and there is little
visibility of industrial engineers. Master tailors and pattern cutters, at least from the
perspective of the master I spent the most time with, work as engineers to the
architectural ideas of the designer. He will tell the designers “this is possible, this is not
possible,” and advise on technical questions about which seams to use. Although I had
anticipated that this role tension would be a source of conflict, it is not salient and Lakshit
confirms that “master is very flexible.” In the time that I spend observing, the master’s
only form of anger seems to be the silent treatment, waving a designer away to one of the
other three master tailors when he is busy with a different project.
Amrita and the assistant general manager of product management are the only
ones I meet who are openly critical of master tailors. In an example prefaced earlier, Vani
wants to reduce the size of a ladies’ dress to a girl’s size. Amrita predicts that the master
will not understand how to convert the proportions—she is right. After it comes out, the
horizontal sweep is too wide at bottom of blouse, which makes it look like it would be a
better fit for an upside-down balloon than a child. Amrita is unsurprised: “Basically your
master has no sense, he does not know how to downgrade it [in sizing].” Vani remains in
disbelief as we return to the design office. She holds up the garment to show it to Lakshit:
“This is super defective. Ma’am [Amrita] could actually fit into this.” They laugh. Amrita
holds assistant designers responsible for errors as well, however. Her critiques, usually
aimed at Lakshit, are deflating but constructive: “This is horrible, super ugly. Who made
this sample? Something is really wrong. Why are there so many panels?” After studying
the sample for about 10 seconds, she identifies a key point: “This cut here is very bad.
The problem starts from here. This is no aesthetics, zero…” In another example, she
frowns, “This is not looking romantic. This is looking like a piece of fabric. Put in a
princess seam, [or] a peplum, [or] scalloping.” She simultaneously bunches in the sides
and holds it up as a demonstration of another possibility of how the garment can be made
to look more romantic. Few Indian tailors outside of the export industry, Kalyani claims,
are trained to produce Western wear. Designers thus need to ensure that prototypes are
satisfactory before they reach buyers.
Embellishment and Finishing
Embellishment is a general term that includes lace (Schiffli, chemical, handmade,
etc.), beading, embroidery (by machine or hand), or other accessories. Embellishment
artists at ACE share workspace with tailors but are still under the direction of designers.
There are only two women in the space doing hand embroidery, beading, and hand
cutting. When I note the presence of the women to Lakshit, he refers to it as “finishing
work” by way of explanation. Finishing work can be quite specialized. One man’s job is
to attach buttons, for example, on any garments that need them. Another sews on sequins:
applying sequins by hand to a shirt for a bridge brand will take three to four hours to
complete. Sample inspection also takes place during finishing, during which one out of
10 styles are sent back to tailors for alterations (e.g., fixing a crooked seam).
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ACE does not do couture work as a matter of course, but during my internship
there are two teams of men (n=14 plus a supervisor), sitting on the floor, doing hand
embroidery on a bridal dress. It is a special favor for a designer at an accessible luxury
brand that is an ACE client. Two months of work are expected to complete it: it will be
the most expensive dress ACE has ever produced. One month in, Amrita has come to
view it as an expensive mistake. Originally, she and the executives agreed to take on the
project as an experiment, with the idea that their work could be exchanged for future
favors. However, the brand designer is now in fact a former brand designer who has
decided to freelance instead. Such experiments help to define the productive niches of
supplier firms.
Design Sample Timelines
A design sample for most buyers can be constructed in 2-6 hours; designers and
tailors often finish two styles per day. (Zara designers construct three per day, according
to Walt 2013.) Variation is significant, however, and attending to it will give us the first
hints of the coordination and conflict in work rhythms that permeate factory operations.
Five factors rise to significance. (1) Styles vary in their level of complexity. Value brands
prefer basic styles: in one case ACE committed to finishing 25 samples within 20-25
days. Accessible luxury samples, on the other hand, can take 25 hours for embellishment
alone. A special trim or reversible zipper might need a special machine. (2) The workday
is more limited for tailors than for assistant designers. Tailors leave the factory at the 6:00
whistle, but designers routinely stay until 7:00 or 8:00. In peak seasons they can stay until
9:00 or later. (3) Factory size might be inversely related to average sample time. Sample
timelines at IFS and SFI, relatively small factories, range from 1-3 days. ACE designers,
meanwhile, report 4-10 days and MEI 2-10 days. While IFS designs a minimum of 10
styles per month, a sampling manager at MEI estimates that 400 sample pass through
sample tailoring (an entire floor, not just one room) in the same period. Large numbers
induce a bureaucratic administration of machine time: there are a limited number of
tailors and machines. At smaller factories designers and tailors coordinate machine time
among themselves, sometimes bringing a dispute to the general product manager or
creative director. If the sample of one designer is stuck in a production bottleneck (e.g.,
dyeing), he will move on to another style in the meantime. (4) Finally, marketing
executives introduce external time pressures. At MEI, if a garment needs to be ready for a
meeting or presentation, a designer will call a sample tailor to rearrange the order of
sample production. At ACE, in the value brand case with 25 samples, executives pushed
other production aside to impress a new and potentially large buyer. At IFS, Kalyani says
that for some brands the “timelines are very tight” and product managers are “on our
head” asking for status updates and pushing for completion.
During the design sample stage, assistant designers must balance all of the
institutional imperatives that we have introduced in this chapter. Styles must inspire a
designer through aesthetic novelty and clarity, satisfy industrial engineers by being
“production-friendly,” attract a buyer though a feasible price-point, and fit within a
reasonable timeline of design sample development. Lakshit struggles with this balance.
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He is primarily responsible for tech packs, but also develops his own designs. I spend a
day with him walking through various departments to check on the progress of his
samples. One is “out” (outsourced) being dyed, one is under the care of a fabric
technician who is locating new fabric, and a third is “stuck” in the embroidery
department undergoing heavy beadwork. This last style is a design of Lakshit’s own
making, one which he is particularly proud of. Unlike lacework or sequins, most beading
can only be done by hand. A single embellishment artist has been working on the sample
for two and a half days (beyond the time needed by tailors). As I sit in Amrita’s office the
next day, she chews out Lakshit after Arjun, a marketing manager, brings the issue to her
attention. While designers are usually in a higher position of authority than marketing
managers at ACE (but not MEI), in this situation the power balance is reversed. “You
have taken two days to work on this sample!” Amrita thunders. “What’s the point?”
Arjun and Amrita agree that the cost of Lakshit’s development will likely be too high for
the targeted buyer to accept. After Lakshit leaves, Arjun briefs me on complications that
could ensue: “Who will educate the buyer [about the cost]? What if the buyer gives a
[low] target of $6? That would be dangerous.” Amrita eventually cools off and issues the
solution: Arjun will inform the buyer of a high labor cost and work backward in $3
increments until a desirable price range. In the meantime, the cost must be agreed upon
with the buyer before the artist under Lakshit’s direction will be allowed to continue his
work. In this case the buyer ends up taking the garment without modification at an
acceptable price, but tensions indicate that the situation could have easily turned out
otherwise. Indeed, for the second round of buyer meetings (Chapter 4), it is increasingly
common to make two samples—one as the buyer originally requested, the other to
anticipate a request for a lower-cost option. This cuts the sampling lead time by as much
as 50%.
Sampling time will be cut further as American and European firms improve
digital or 3D design and fit sampling. The technology has the possibility of eliminating
sample tailoring altogether. It is not merely a buyer-led development, however. Li &
Fung, based in Hong Kong, is the world leader in digital supply chains. The system of
NIFT colleges in India is also developing 3D technology. For the time being, apart from
some experimentation at MEI, 3D activity is not significant part of the value chain in
India. Although master tailors currently have high status, they will have little training or
institutional capacity to resist or coopt digitization. Rather than displacement to the
production floor, the most likely route for MEI tailors will probably include exit to lessadvanced factories where the value of their current capabilities will be temporally
extended. If CAD is any example, 3D sampling will be a globally collaborative activity,
not one that simply emanates from global cities to semi-peripheral production sites.
Chapter Summary
The work of first-tier factories in the apparel GVC begins with design research.
Contrary to existing scholarly studies, design is a major activity that is commercially
successful. The process flow is not strictly ordered, but it always starts with inspiration.
Trend forecasting is one path to inspiration. It does not create automated solutions or
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specific styles, but rather provides suggestions that are both popular and novel. Other
sources of inspiration include the design office, based on the principle of “insulated
openness,” and the arrangement of material culture—for example, the way Amrita tosses
garments of varying like or dislike to different corners of the room. Social media and “big
four” fashion weeks are important, while shopping (“branded showrooms”) and other
brand information, like a website, provide information that channels generic inspiration
into a specific brand aesthetic. Designers bring these suggestions into mood boards,
which are the principle point of departure for a single style or entire collection. Because
brands are segmented into market niches, buyers and designers alike make extensive use
of other brand images for their own inspiration, even at the early stage of producing and
sharing mood boards. CAD, rather than a diffusion from the core to the periphery, is a
collaborative activity between buyer markets and Indian designers.
PD encompasses four main activities: fabric development, product development,
tech packs, and design sample tailoring. Fabric development proceeds along three paths:
technological developments diffusing across the industry (e.g., digital printing),
collaborations with leading Indian mills and other Asian textile technology companies,
and innovation through buying agencies and first-tier suppliers (e.g., “lean design”).
Product developers work with both designers and industrial engineers to bridge
institutional logics. Differences in logics and jurisdiction manifest in the functional
tension between cost reduction and differentiation. Product developers are not especially
challenged by a commercial relationship to a client, as the “art versus commerce”
dichotomy might suggest. They share this client relationship with supply-side designers.
Instead product developers identify more with the institutional logic of engineering,
which focuses on technical utility (efficiency and problem-solving). Designers and
industrial engineers rely on strong professional norms in the creation of style, while
product developers effectively represent the demands of buyers. Both buyer- and
supplier-side designers push to preserve or add design features while PD and buyers push
for production-friendly designs with lower costs.
Tech packs continue to play a major role in the Indian apparel GVC, but their
significance is declining among first-tier suppliers. 100% tech pack production in the
1970s-1990s has fallen to around 90% at IFS and SFI, 60% at MEI, and perhaps 20-30%
at ACE. Although unique capabilities theorists are skeptical of this trend for both
theoretical and empirical reasons, I have argued that both sources of skepticism should be
radically curtailed. Changes in the global division of labor can include high-value
activities because of broad revolutions in IT, international travel, and improving design
education in semi-peripheral environments: the importance of “buzz” in local production
scenes has been overrated. Trade in services is increasing across multiple economic
sectors—not just technological, but those which are culturally intensive as well. In India
tailors continue to play a vital role in sample production, correcting tech pack errors and
working with embellishment artists on a variety of styles. Sample production timelines
vary based on style complexity, staff hours, machine time, and marketing considerations.
Assistant designers must collaborate with tailors, embellishment artists, marketing staff,
PD, and buyers to ensure mutually attractive price points, production-friendly yet
aesthetically inspiring design, and reasonable production timelines.
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Until this point, buyers have played a largely imaginary role. They are, however,
embedded within a segmented brand system and intermediary role between brands and
suppliers. To suppliers, “buyers” embody and represent a brand itself: first-tier suppliers
undertake enormous preparatory efforts to excite and satisfy them. Supplier efforts and
collaborations are exceptionally visible in buyer presentations, covered in the next
chapter. I discuss buyers (a) as clients within a portfolio of supplier brands and (b) and
individuals who attend presentations. Pre-production formally concludes when a buyer
places an order for a specific style.
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CHAPTER 4: BUYER PRESENTATIONS
Design and product development does not sell itself. Supplier services and
products are presented to buyers through a marketing team, sometimes called “sample
merchandising.” Supplier marketing activities are vastly more limited than those on the
retail side. Traditional consumer advertising, for example, is totally excluded from
analysis; the suppliers I study are mostly business-to-business enterprises.98 The most
concise way to understand the limited marketing activities presented here is under the
rubrics of sales and sales development. Sales, at least, is characterized by an institutional
logic of responsiveness. Buyers are the active reference group (Hyman and Singer 1968,
Shibutani 1955). Suppliers must find ways to meet the needs of buyers on many
dimensions, but product—quality, assortment, etc.—is fundamental. Some products are
shown through PowerPoint presentations, as noted below. I focus, however, on copresent buyer presentations. It was these interaction rituals (Goffman 1967), situated
within global interaction ritual chains (Collins 2004), which brought me to Indian
suppliers in the first place. The dynamics are as fascinating as I had hoped; I hope readers
will agree.
Sales development, meanwhile, is not easily forced into any institutional logic
that I was able to identify across suppliers. Instead there are heterogeneous responses to
growth. The major reason for heterogeneity, I believe, is market structure. Apparel retail
is highly fragmented and the apparel industry is a buyer-driven GVC. It follows that
structural analysis at the retail industry level is necessary to understand marketing as a
major GVC linkage. Based on the argument that contemporary fashion is a status market
organized by brands (Aspers 2008, Godart 2012:111-22), I introduce a pyramid-shaped
model of retail segmentation. I use this model throughout the rest of the dissertation to
refer confidentially to brands—contrary to some academic opinion—which engage in
meaningfully different strategies and enforce meaningfully different standards of quality.
After introducing the marketing department structure, I describe the composition
of clients at the suppliers I studied. When it comes to sales I split major sections
according to preparation, selections, costing, and pricing. Ethics in design outsourcing are
also considered through laws, norms, and the social psychology of creative attribution.
Moving on to sales development, I consider differences among European, American, and
Indian clients. Downstream supplier departments like design prefer to work with more
open and creative Europeans while upstream supplier departments prefer the organization
and standardization of Americans. Finally I identify different strategic responses to
growth. MEI, for example, focuses on quantity while ACE focuses on quality. Each
supplier raises issues of client demand, productive niche occupation, capacity utilization,
risk, and upgrading to varying degrees. I argue that the practical concerns of account
management have organizational impacts that reverberate throughout each supplier and
ultimately the GVCs that they are embedded in.
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As suppliers improve their capabilities, future studies may investigate advertising and
sales development in depth as part of extended full-package manufacturing. SFI is
developing is own brand.
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Department Structure
I am fortunate to have a cubicle in the marketing department at MEI. Marketing
and its downstream neighbor, product management, are centrally located in the middle of
a large third floor. The design office and showroom occupy the east wall, shielded by
glass and wood-veneer walls. Enclosed executive offices, including that of the vice
president of marketing, are located along the north wall. Rather than secretaries or
administrators in front of the executive offices, senior marketing managers along the
outside of the floor function as informal gatekeepers.99 Most of my contact in the
department is with these managers. The west side of the office is a continued expanse of
cubicles; it houses the sourcing department (whom we will meet in Chapter 5). The south
wall, finally, is a series of meeting rooms (again with glass walls) that is frequently
occupied by external consultants. My access is limited to the internal counterparts of
consultants, but advice is most visible in industrial engineering (Chapter 6) and at the
executive level.
Entering the marketing department and its four-by-four cubicles is
psychologically alienating: it feels empty and unsettled without the warmth of fabric
piles. It is far more spacious than design, and for the first time I have an independent
space to write and retreat, but the grey cubicle is an anonymous space. In my first few
days the phone rings repeatedly with calls intended for someone else. English and Hindi
are most common as staff talk on cord-bound phones (a distancing prop rarely utilized in
the design office). But where Hindi dominates the design office—designers, with higher
human capital, are more mobile than marketing and product management staff—the local
language100 is unrecognizable to me at the beginning. My cubicle-mates are not often
present; the woman who sits to my right seems to be quite afraid of me and doesn’t
respond when I attempt to introduce myself.
Riya, the general manager, is my initial point of contact. She works closely with
Rahul and the other designers, feeding them marketing information about sales and
customer service data. She is generally knowledgeable of trends, but by her own account
has no authority over the aesthetic content of design samples. Her approach reminds me
of Ankur, an ACE marketing manager. As far as he cares, he once laughs, a trend dies
“when orders stop coming to the merchandisers!” Riya’s job is first and foremost about
sales and business development, “keeping the customer happy.” She earned her degree in
manufacturing technology in the mid-1990s from a regional branch of NIFT. She reports
that university facilities were limited and procedures unclear, but these shortcomings
were compensated with frequent trips to industrial firms. “School teaches you the
language, that is all. When you start working in the company, then you come to
understand how it really works.” Although the following quotation is from a closing
interview with her, it provides a point of entry into the need for responsiveness that
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At the factories I studied, only owners had an independent executive secretary.
Unnamed to support confidentiality.
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characterizes the institutional logic of marketing. The response is to my question about
potential differences of fashion management relative to other industries:
“See, the basic concept of business remains the same, irrespective of the industry.
But the volatility is different… It is very volatile. It depends upon the trends…
how well you can adapt. Here there is no set formula! There’s no set formula.
What forecast they do… what the runways are showing, based on that, it may
click, it may not click. So there has to be a flexibility of what you can offer to the
customer with a short-term time… You have to change your strategies very
often.”
Naming weather conditions, local festivals, and the stability, support, and policies of the
government, Riya closes by saying “the variables that affect my performance are huge…
You have to be [constantly] updated.” Analytically, one of the central functions of
management is to reduce uncertainty by transforming it into risk. Because risk is
quantifiable (at least in principle), executives expect managers to control risk through
their own performance and leadership of their teams.
Although I learned more about marketing from MEI than from ACE, the division
of labor
at ACE is wider. This means that a fuller range of activities are the responsibility of one
person, like senior managers Ankur and Arjun. Both have worked at ACE for around a
decade. Ankur, who has a BA in commerce and a NIFT certificate in clothing production
techniques, is “Punjabi husky”101 and always looks put together in polo shirts. He handles
some of ACE’s largest accounts with the assistance of two junior staff, amounting to 50k
units and $10 million in sales per year. Arjun “the jokester” manages four brands and is
responsible for about $4 million. Other marketing personnel have smaller accounts,
typically in a ratio of two staff to three accounts. Sales targets, set by the owner and
Amrita, are measured quarterly. Arjun reports that the way to achieve rising targets
involves anticipating buyer preferences and fulfilling accurate, on-time delivery. Ankur
adds the importance of anticipating smaller orders from declining retailers (e.g., Sears),
drumming up new business, and intelligently training and delegating work to
subordinates. Most of these strategies are covered later in this chapter. The relationship
between the supply-side designer and marketing staff, as Ankur cheerfully describes it, is
one of “sharing and caring.” There is a tendency for brands in similar segments and with
similar aesthetics to be assigned to the same design and marketing account, though new
accounts are also sometimes divided according to staff bandwidth. To discuss brand
profiles accurately and confidentially throughout the rest of the dissertation, it is
necessary to introduce a general model of retail segmentation.
Preparing for Buyer Presentations

“Husky” is an unusual word in English, but it is used for boy’s clothing sizes.
According to the Punjabi family I lived with, Punjabis have a cultural reputation for
being excellent cooks (certainly true in my experience).
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Buyer presentations (also called buyer meetings) do not guarantee sales. Some
buyer presentations are not about garment products at all, instead focusing on working
conditions and corporate social responsibility. Especially among big buyers, these latter
meetings are prerequisites to product sales. For now, we will assume that they have been
successful and that buyers have corporate authorization to purchase orders from
suppliers. In the following sections I describe buyer and supplier travel, the permanent
showroom layout, individualized showroom preparation, the composition of buyer teams,
and marketing introductions at buyer presentations. Each provides support to my claim
that responsiveness characterizes the institutional logic of marketing.
Buyer and Supplier Travel
There are four arrangements for buyer presentations. Buyers visit suppliers,
suppliers visit buyers, teams meet in an intermediate location, or presentations are
digitalized. I will discuss each option in reverse order, building toward information-rich
situations. What few sociological studies of buyers are available (Blumer 1969a,
Entwistle 2006, Schulz 2008) are interview-based and take place in either Paris or
London. The buyer-side focus is, as I have argued, is a shortfall of the unique capabilities
approach. Current studies do not attend to suppliers even though buyer-supplier
relationships offer important windows into the institutional shaping of aesthetic content.
By research design, I thus concentrate most of my attention on buyer presentations in
India. These presentations—as they would be in buyer offices, if captured
ethnographically—are rich in microsociological information. As strategic sites of
concentrated, embodied interaction, buyer presentations “represent with special clarity
phenomena that exist widely but in a more diluted form” in other situations (Katz 1997,
2012:259). Let us begin with these more diluted forms before exploring the showroom in
depth.
(1) Digital presentations, called PPT presentations, are nothing more than
Powerpoint slides. They do not contain information about supplier capabilities or
previous sales, just photographs of finished design samples and occasionally a tech pack
or sketch. Digital presentations are the cheapest way for buyers to obtain supply-side
designs. There are four strategic facets to discern within this cost-reducing buyer
strategy: (1a) At its most advanced, it reflects deep trust. An accessible luxury buyer at
ACE that has been sourcing with the supplier for more than 20 years, for instance,
sometimes asks for digital presentations. (1b) Some buyers would prefer to visit,
according to supply-side marketing and product management staff, but most small
companies cannot afford a travel budget. They depend instead on digital presentations as
well as buying agencies. (1c) At MEI, though not at ACE (for the same brand), designers
and product developers have a design quota for a bridge brand. I learn this from Rituraj, a
product developer, who walks me through a PPT that he is assembling. He shows images
and talks about their development trajectories, highlighting one with a red hem: “This
one, we have sent the same, 2-3 years back. We have to send 15 designs per season,
minimum… so sometimes we can do like that.” Anjali, a hard-charging designer who
works with the same brand, sometimes repeats design sample offerings as well. She also
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instructs junior designers to hand over their designs to her so that she can fill her design
quota. I witness a junior designer protest this practice on multiple occasions, but Anjali is
always able to dominate102 or cajole her subordinates. (1c) Finally, some buyers simply
do not seem to care, trusting the supplier or always accepting its offerings without
modification. This is only noticeable for domestic buyers, whom I discuss as part of
account management later in the chapter.
(2) Buyers and suppliers sometimes “meet in the middle,” especially in Hong
Kong. The city, today home to the largest supplier and largest buying agency in the world
(Crystal Group and Li & Fung, respectively), has long been a base for intermediary
connections to Asian supply chains, reinventing production and network functions toward
big buyers since the 1960s (Berger, Gartner and Karty 1997, Lardner 1988b, Skov
2002).103 There is public information that Old Navy, which buys in four seasons (see
Chapter 5), sources fabric from its Hong Kong office and meets vendors there every other
season (Sorger and Udale 2017:148). It is reasonable to assume that Gap and Banana
Republic, owned by the same parent corporation, follow similar practice. One bridge
brand that I studied has four costing meetings per year: two in New York, one in India,
and one in Hong Kong.
(3) A third arrangement is for suppliers to visit buyers at buyer headquarters.
Representatives of IFS and ACE undertake 15-25 foreign trips per year, while MEI
undertakes more than 50. Usually this is part of a reciprocal arrangement, but some value
buyers never visit their suppliers. As with buyers, suppliers sometimes cut costs by
reducing the number of staff who go on these visits. When Vaasu and Amrita go to New
York, for example, they bring samples from the other internal design team that Amrita
has had no hand in creating. The owner of IFS, Sanchit, travels alone to the UK every
two months, the US every three months, and Italy every six months. An assistant designer
is impressed that Sanchit does it all by himself: “When Sanchit travels, he represents the
whole company.” Amrita goes on eight or nine trips per year, mostly to Europe and the
US. She doesn’t like traveling so often, especially because of long flight times... Almost
immediately, however, she catches herself from any embrace of downward emotional
momentum. She straightens up in her chair and regains her sense of charging energy:
“But I never say no to Vaasu. Every time he asks, I will go.”104 She earns respect
throughout the company for doing so. “We get more than enough ideas and direction
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See Collins (2008:37-82) on the microsociology of confrontational tension.
Bonacich and Waller (1994:82) note rising manufacturing in Hong Kong from the
1950s.
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“Always say yes” is a phrase commonly heard in my fieldwork among workers in the
US fashion industry as well. See also Neff (2012) on “venture labor” and Kunda and van
Maanen (1999) on the neoliberal YOYO script: “you’re on your own.” Worrying about
performance and job security is common among executives and managers in the US
(Jackall 1988) but perhaps less so in India (Cappelli et al. 2010:49-84). Because almost
all Indian apparel suppliers are privately owned, only smaller owners (like those at IFS
and SFI) worried about enterprise viability on a short-term basis. Chapter 9 covers risk
management.
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from ma’am,” Lakshit says of her trips. “Ma’am travels around the world (circles his
fingers) and she will make us ready.”
SFI previously employed a well-trained and experienced designer who brought in
a lot of business from a value buyer. As Niharika, the general manager of marketing,
painfully relates, “I really worked hard on her, gave her trips to London to train her. But
she had some personal issues that she could not work anymore…” her voice trails off.
Nevertheless, I can tell by the sincerity in her voice that she is still adjusting to the loss.
Because of the smaller orders that come with changed sourcing practices, “now we don’t
need that big [of] a designer, that fat a salary, trips to London every six months!”
Niharika rationalizes. In terms of content volume, when executives and designers depart
MEI to visit a value client, they bring four suitcases full of design samples (in addition to
their personal luggage). Ramya, a division product manager, says of European
presentations that, “we go, we keep showing them stuff… The biggest reason to travel is
to build a rapport, of the [supply-side] designer with our people.” Marketing managers
must accompany supply-side designers, she feels, because “the managers have to take
care of the marketing questions as well. It’s very important for us to work on product
development with them… to gain more business with them” that is supported by
expertise in sales development and capacity blocking (see Chapter 6 on capacity
planning).
Buyers may invite multiple suppliers to buyer headquarters at the same time. This
increases efficiency for buyers, but for brands with multiple private labels it is especially
effective. Tanya’s trip (with the four suitcases) is to a “vendor fair” structured to
accommodate different private labels at a US value brand. It runs from 8am-6pm, with
meeting slots available that range from 30 minutes to three hours (varying according to
supplier collection size). Tanya widens her eyes and raises her eyebrows as she adds,
“These people are on time. If the meeting starts at 8:00, they will be there at 8:00.” After
the selections, Tanya and her assistants will work on modification requests and send them
to an agency (this time in India) within 30 days. Smaller suppliers travel less frequently,
sometimes only a handful of times per year. The general manager of product management
at SFI goes to Moscow once per year to give a presentation, but buyers more frequently
visit Delhi.
(4) The final travel arrangement of buyer presentations is for buyers to visit their
suppliers. According to the director of sourcing at an accessible luxury brand whom I met
during a buyer presentation and factory tour, going to factories is especially important to
witness the “culture of production” (coincidentally the title of a classic article by Fine
1992). “Even in today’s digital age, this is something you cannot access online,” she
believes. At the broadest level, some companies increase the efficiency of conveying
design information to multiple suppliers by offering co-present “design briefs.” At lunch
following a buyer presentation, a mid-tier buyer newly sourcing from ACE invites
Amrita to an upcoming brief, which Amrita later explains as essentially a mood board
delivered as a live presentation. The buyer holds these in India every two months; they
bring retail samples and “they do the talking.” A smaller bridge brand also hosts design
briefs twice a year in India. Amrita loves these opportunities because co-presence adds
channel-rich information: “it’s so focused,” she spits. Because supply-side designers can
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ask questions and “get a clearer idea about what the client wants,” they can “catch on
quickly,” ultimately reducing the development timeline (Chapter 5).
On the country level, the big buyers I observed visit India three or four times a
year, spending three to six days in India and perhaps another week in Bangladesh,
Vietnam, or China. “Usually we have a separate trip to China,” a mid-tier buyer relates,
“but this time we're doing it on the same trip.” They will visit one or two suppliers each
day. A bridge brand visiting ACE has plans to visit 7-11 suppliers in total, while a midtier brand has plans to visit 10-15 (including China). Visits to strategic suppliers are
mandatory (see below); smaller or less capable factories are discretionary. From the
supplier perspective, there are 15-20 buyer meetings per season at ACE, or about one per
week. MEI hosts upwards of 200 meetings yearly, according to a division product
manager, though the meetings are more varied in content. An ISF assistant designer says
that most buyers visit the showroom only twice per year, but all the factories in my study
receive at least seasonal visits (once every three months) from most of their large buyers.
Preparing for buyer presentations in the showroom, above and beyond design research
and product development, is a significant stage in the GVC process flow.
Showroom Layout
The showrooms at ACE, MEI, and a large buying agency that I visited are sacred
places, temples of design. ACE’s main showroom is my first workplace “home” in India.
On my first day there, after HR processing I am taken upstairs to the showroom to meet
Amrita. I immediately begin to feel at ease under the smell of fresh cotton, the warmth of
cheery sunlight washed through a large tree, and the sight of well-designed lighting that
reflects against white walls. Unlike the design archive next door, it is spotless and
commodious. Unlike the marketing and product management departments, there is no
hustle and no bustle unless a specific presentation is planned. In fact there are usually no
people at all. Although I also spend a lot of time in the design office as I settle in, when I
need to write and think I regularly drift into the calm and sunny showroom. When Amrita
discovers me there one afternoon I tell her it is my favorite place at ACE. She smiles:
“mine too.” She tries to come here to sketch, uninterrupted, when she can. Sketching for
her (like writing for me) demands complete attention. When Vani once asks Amrita to
sketch some designs from Amrita’s office, Amrita shoots back, “I need space to do that! I
can’t be up here, I have to have the time to feel it…” The avoidance strategy of relocating
to the showroom is not entirely successful: assistant designers and marketing managers,
at least, are well-aware of her hideout and simply migrate in a queue around the broad
glass table in the middle of the room. They stand, rather than sit in the 12 black
perforated roller chairs, adding suspense as to when moments for unbroken attention
might return. Two additional showrooms down the hall have fewer windows; they are
only used when the largest buyers visit. Subsidiary manufacturing units in the
metropolitan area have showrooms as well.
MEI has two and half showrooms at the unit in which I observed design and
marketing: one is for knits and outerwear, a second large showroom is only for jeans, and
a third smaller space is often used for follow-up meetings. The first two have a strong
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retail feel with thoughtful visual merchandising. Featured garments can be placed on a
central display, either on a mannequin or flat on the table.105 One showroom is stocked
with artistic found objects like old books, rope, an hourglass, and toy antique cars and
motorcycles. The jeans showroom has wood floors, a rarity in India, and uneven wood
panels on the walls, lending a rustic retail feel. One can smell the wood as well, a
welcome change from the pollution outside. When I tell Rahul that I can (pleasantly)
smell the wood, he misses my appreciation and replies, “Not when the AC is on.” Each
major MEI unit, including the mill, has showrooms as well. Most are dominated by
modernist bright lights, white walls, and glass (as at ACE and the large buying agency I
visited). The buying agency also hosts some meetings in the CEO’s office, which has the
size and potential function of a meeting room. Antique-styled decorations adorn the room
(e.g., old clocks), semiotically suggesting a luxurious mastery of time (Bourdieu
1984b:63-65). Expanded showrooms on the ground floor, as at one of the other MEI
units, allow for simultaneous but separate meetings of design, marketing, or sourcing
teams.
The showroom at SFI is another story. My first hint of this is Niharika and
Shreya’s surprise when I ask to see it. It is immediately obvious that it is not used very
much. The showroom, behind heavy wooden doors, is actually locked with a padlock. It
is full, but dark and musty. There is no AC—a distinguishing feature of design,
management, and executive offices in Indian factories—just a lone fan. Selections are not
curated (see below); I see everything from sweatshirts and winter coats to summer
dresses. In contrast to the constant preference for new rotations at ACE and MEI,
Shreya’s rotation estimate lasts longer than her career so far: “I normally don’t want to
keep them for more than three years,” she speculates. IFS has a small showroom, glass
and modern, but Sanchit prefers to travel, meeting his clients on their home turf.
Showroom layout, then, is stable. Walls and tables do not move. Props, lighting, and
garment racks, on the other hand, are subject to the more rapidly changing principles of
visual merchandising.
Showroom Preparation
Scholars studying product management, like buying, make theoretical choices in
their explanations of activities. Buyers can be understood, for example, as cultural
intermediaries who internalize and reproduce of the structure of social space through the
habitus. Designers may be viewed as tastemakers whose transgressions are not mistakes
(Bourdieu 1984b:253, 318-72). Object may seem to “speak” or “act,” as in actor-network
theory (cf. Entwistle 2006, Schiermer 2016). Specific colors are sometimes highlighted
by psychologists: “yellow actually scientifically stimulates serotonin in the brain, so it
does have a chemical effect on us,” a bridge brand designer tells me. My ethnographic
experience and theoretical training leads me to favor symbolic interactionism and the
These are often “statement pieces,” more conceptual than commercial, as with concept
cars in auto shows (Molotch 2003). Designers make exceptions for specialty brands,
where technical capabilities (e.g., water-resistant fabric) are highlighted instead.
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fetishism of interaction rituals over other approaches. This influence (Collins 2004,
Schiermer 2009) extends throughout the discussions of preparation, selection, and
modification which follow. Especially in the buying situation, I agree with Blumer
(1969b:80) that “instead of the individual being surrounded by an environment of preexisting objects which play upon him and call forth his behavior, the proper picture is that
he constructs his objects on the basis of his on-going activity.” The ethnographic method
is uniquely suited to capture this collective activity as the fundamental motor of the
fashion world. Citing Simmel, Goffman, and Becker, Katz (2012:272) writes, “The
broadest warrant for ethnography is given by the dialectical, show/hide, express/repress
ontology of social life.” Supplier showrooms, tucked away in industrial districts
throughout India, offer magnificent opportunities to demonstrate just what fashion is and
how fashion works.106 Examples, of course, are “the go-cart of judgment; and those who
are lacking in the natural talent can never dispense with them” (Kant 1787/1965[1787]
1965, A134/B174), so let us plunge in.
Designers do the brunt of visual merchandising in supplier showrooms; marketing
managers act as support personnel. Visual merchandising means displaying products in
an attractive manner to facilitate sales and positive reputational judgments. The scope of
activity is far wider than I expected after reading previous deprecating accounts of
supplier capabilities. It begins, for example, with lighting. There are two rows of lights at
one of ACE’s ancillary showrooms near the airport, where we travel to meet a bridge
buyer on short notice. The inner row brightens up the room and the outer row focuses on
the garments (like the lighting at art museums). I don’t notice any difference between
them until Amrita complains, “This is the problem when you have some yellow [lights]
and some white.” It changes the appearance of some of the garments. The lighting colors
slowly brighten and even out, but right away I subjectively note how limited my visual
perception is, like the color spectrum of a dog compared to a butterfly. Through Amrita
and other designers, especially Vani, I will learn the various facets of visual composition
in the showroom: lighting, interior design, position of the display rack, positioning of
themes adjacent to other racks, and positioning of garments on each individual rack. This
is in addition to a balance of color, texture, fabric, pattern, color hue and saturation,
intricacy of design (basic vs. embellished), and trims in the garments themselves. The
first major step of placing actual garments into the showroom, at least, is sorting them
into themes.
Sorting by Mood Board Themes
A few days earlier, Vani received news that a potential bridge buyer would be
visiting the area and perhaps an ancillary ACE showroom in just a few days. Amrita
immediately pushes back against the short timeline: “To woo them, I need to show them.
I need preparation. I don’t want to look unsmart,” she worries. She sends Vani and me
ahead to lay the groundwork. We (mostly Vani) select 250-300 pieces that “runners”
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(support personnel) will load into trucks. Most of these are from the main Delhi
showroom “especially since it’s our newest line”; perhaps 50 come from the design
archive. Vani’s selections follow the logic of design inspiration discussed in Chapter 3.
When I ask about the first steps, she instructs, “They have given us a mood board
according to colors. So they have a theme on blues. They have a theme on corals. So we
will probably arrange them according to those. And then we have white and off-white,
which are classic, so those can go anywhere.” Through the themes are relayed to ACE on
short notice, they are similar to those requested by other buyers. This is likely a result of
trend forecasting and an apperception mass: “coral is always a good spring color,” Amrita
had told me just last week. Vani continues, “at the end of the day it’s just general trends:
blue is big, white is big [a year ahead, for summer 2016], so what know that’s what is
[the buyer’s] requirements.”
Also working in Vani’s favor is the regular practice of mixing in garments for
other brands which have already arrived at international retail destinations (“market
impact”). This practice has at least three functions: (1) Extant designs provide a
foundation for tweaking (see below). Fashion is not evolutionary in a linear sense, but
there is a sense of movement that springs forward from the present. Blumer calls this
“incipient taste,” a structured subjective mechanism that signals “orderly preparation”
and a “collective groping for the proximate future” (Blumer 1969a, see also Emirbayer
and Mishe 1998, Mead 1934:119). Buyers accept and expect tweaking. (2) Prototypes
demonstrate technical competence. This is especially valuable for new textiles or
manufacturing processes that are unfamiliar to buyers. The bridge buyer will later ask, for
example, about a “proto” made with chemical lace: “Is this affordable, this chemical
lace?” He does not make any selections on this round but appears newly informed of the
production technique. (3) Finally, garments sold to other buyers—brands identifiable by
their tags—legitimate ACE as an established, high-quality supplier. This knowledge
demonstrates and reinforces ACE’s position in the supplier market (White 1993,
2002:129). Interestingly, when ACE prototypes are shipped to buyers before final
selections, the supplier attaches its own tag to the garment (e.g., “ACE-102”). Supplier
tags facilitate identification for later discussions of modifications or purchase orders. As
Vani and I put up the market-impact garments, I silently note the irony of Americana
labels and taglines. It even extends to European and Asian brands, designed and
manufactured in India, attempting to claim American heritage!
When Vani and I arrive early at the showroom we place garments up one at a time
in a rough first cut. Garment racks function as picture frames, materially foregrounding
and isolating legitimate aesthetic material (Simmel 1902/1994, 1906/1968). “Whatever is
the latest will go right in front,” she says, leaving the first garment rack empty. “Ma’am
[Amrita] has a great sense of that, what’s going on the international markets, so she will
arrange that” when she arrives. Because this ancillary showroom is smaller than the Delhi
space, we also store some designs on a rolling garment rack in a side room. Vani says
that trying to fit them into the room would make the presentation feel “claustrophobic.”
As we continue placing garments, she tells me that “we are trying to create what the
[buyer] wants, just to get their attention.” At the same time, however, neither she or any
other designers are interested in styling—adding accessories, for example, which
frequently show up in mood boards, photoshoots, and fashion shows. Instead supply-side
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designers are more focused on the product: fabric, technical properties, and
embellishment come first. “I would rather represent my garment and stay focused,”
Amrita later says. I eventually understand this move in parallel to the raw “look” of a
model (Entwistle 2002, Mears 2011b:71-120) as opposed to the styled look of a runway
or photoshoot (van der Laan and Kuipers 2016). Some of the preparation for buyer’s
attention is even further backstage. Garment steamers (the new ironing), for example, are
a major part of the backstage landscape at fashion shows. After a few weeks I suddenly
realize that I haven’t seen one. “Oh yeah!” Vani laughs, “we don’t have steamers here.
We have a [sample] finishing department, we just send things up there.”
As I observe more preparations and presentations I am increasingly “tested” by
Amrita. This is partly to increase my appreciation for the techniques of preparation,
partly for Amrita’s amusement, and mostly as routine, inching toward the regular
responsibilities of assistant designers. Sometimes I am asked to predict, based on mood
boards and brand aesthetics—trend research is already baked into design samples—which
pieces buyers will choose. I try my hand for two themes which we will call “Desert Red”
and “Razzle Dazzle.” For the first, my test results are “not bad. Everybody has to try their
first time.” I am embarrassed and amused by Amrita’s matter-of-fact delivery. She adds
another tie-dye piece and two partial samples, the latter of which I had not even
considered. Partial samples, like a swatch of embroidery, can serve as inspiration for new
design samples. She also adds a navy piece with red tassels. I had ignored the red accent
colors, but “this ties into the Desert Red theme, do you see that?” For Razzle Dazzle,
Amrita adds a piece with strong geometric designs, though it is only black and white, “to
add more mood.” After a few more questions about how to make good selections, Amrita
acknowledges that the “brand aesthetic is more important than the particular mood board.
The brand aesthetic is what’s going to sell.” Let us now return to the ancillary showroom
to view curation in action. After the raw sorting by Vani and me is finished, Amrita
arrives with the firmer hand of a creative director and marketing executive.
Thinning
When Amrita arrives she brings with her amplified emotions and a heightened
focus of attention, two essential features of interaction rituals (Collins 2004). As Blumer
points out, helping to orient Amrita’s next moves, “One has to get inside of the defining
process of the actor in order to understand his [or her] action… People—that is, acting
units—do not act toward culture, social structure or the like; they act toward situations”
(1969b:16, 99). What Amrita proceeds to do is to embody and employ the organization of
attitudes of those involved in the same process—in a word, to embody the “other” (Faris
1937, Mead 1934:154). Attitudes for Mead, Faris, and Blumer are not static
psychological constructs but rolling internalizations of action and representation. In this
case Amrita, distancing herself from authorship, embodies the perspective of the potential
buyer. Though there is about a half inch between hangers, her first evaluative word was
foreshadowed by Vani: “claustrophobic,” signaling perceptual internalization and
alignment. For the next 45 minutes Amrita leads a radical thinning: “Let’s reduce the
congestion… We still need to shortlist… What needs to be removed?” Where there were
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45 garments on each rack before our arrival, there are now just 17. Some hang from the
scoop necks of other garments; they thus appear at a different levels and enliven the
presentation.
Because of an original overproduction of samples, there are many rounds of
filtering. Supply-side assistant designers take the first cuts, followed by the creative
director of a supplier. Design-side buyers and designers will make further selections in
supplier showrooms; they will repeat the process yet again, this time under the direction
of a lead buyer, in the showroom at the buyer headquarters. Although I did not witness
selections at buyer-side headquarters, it would seem that a similar process takes place.107
Initial selections are all ostensibly aesthetic (although cost marginally permeates the
original design conceptions). When undertaken by suppliers this represents a value-added
service of curation. It is not a choice to be taken lightly. Even a few years back at MEI, a
senior designer tells me, showrooms were typically set up to broadcast product capability.
This meant that shorts and outerwear (e.g., heavy jackets) would be set up in the same
room.108 SFI’s padlocked showroom is still organized in this way. One might compare it
to bulk bins at thrift or discount stores, where the customer must sort through
merchandise him- or herself. At high-end stores, on the other hand, buyers make more
choices for consumers, presenting options in a streamlined format. The idea behind so
much curation is that, fundamentally, a high-end customer cannot make a mistake.
Appreciably, thinning and curation is hard work. An hour into Amrita’s and Vani’s
continued thinning, Amrita drops her upbeat attitude for a few minutes (an extremely
long interval for her). “Please give us your feedback,” she complains to me, “because we
are exhausted.” Although the curation appears at long last to be finished, just before the
buyer arrives Amrita moves a dress from one rack to another. During the final buildup
she exclaims, “till anyone comes I can’t sit still, I have to do something!” Her actions
remind me of how models or athletes dance around and shake themselves out just before
locking on their “fierce” faces as they transition from backstage to frontstage.
Sorting and thinning is similar at MEI. For an accessible luxury brand that focuses
on technical outerwear, it takes the senior designer Ishita half a day to set up the
showroom by herself. In the center of the room a marketing poster from a brand
competitor is prominently displayed next to a quotation from Ralph Waldo Emerson: “Do
not go where the path may lead. Go instead where there is no path and leave a trail.” My
impression is that today’s buyer will be upset to see this kind of competitor endorsement
(even if it signals supplier capability), but I say nothing and wait to record the buyer’s
reaction. After Ishita’s curation and about an hour before the buyer is scheduled to arrive,
the vice president of marketing goes through with his own editorial eye. Rather than
moving garments himself (probably reflecting executive authority as well as the role
difference between marketing and design), he instructs Ishita to shift some pieces to other
themes, leaving the marketing poster in place. (When he leaves, Ishita affects
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disinterestedness in his suggestions.) Ten minutes before the buyer team is scheduled to
arrive, the showroom is empty. It is surprisingly calm… too calm, I think. Excitement
would be palpable in a situation like this at ACE, where the organizational culture is
more tightly bound and where presentations are less frequent. I later learn that is not
unusual for buyer presentations to be pushed back, even for a full two hours, because of
Delhi-NCR traffic109 or a buyer change in schedule. Thus when I see the vice president of
marketing walking with Riya toward the showroom a half hour later, I know it is time for
the presentation to start. During the slack time someone (not me) displaces the competing
brand’s marketing poster to a side shelf, highlighting the buyer-side mood board instead.
Buyer Teams
Buyer teams can be as few as two members, perhaps a bridge segment designer in
his 40s and an Indian buying agent in her late 20s. Five or six is common, often a buyer
and designer accompanied by a lead buying agent and about three assistant buying
agents. In a few cases the lead buying agent is male, perhaps suggesting a glass escalator
(Williams 1992). Buying agents set up meetings and provide expertise in sourcing,
logistics, and product management.110 The same designers and buyers come to India each
time, if possible, so they develop relationships of “professional intimacy” (Jackall
1988:51) with their buying agents and supply-side design and marketing teams.
Designers and buyers who work for different labels at the same parent company
sometimes travel together; in this case supply-side collections are divided according to
private labels. The largest buyer teams of 10-15 members come for meetings that include
multiple departments (e.g., a buyer presentation in one room, CSR updates in another) or
new relationships. Buying timelines vary: a fast fashion brand may shop for garments a
full season ahead of a traditional retailer. Differences are minimized at ACE because of
their concentration on summer wear, but readers will learn about supplier timelines in
Chapter 5.
Emotional involvement is heightened by co-presence—bodies sharing a limited
space (Boden and Molotch 1994, Campos-Castillo and Hitlin 2013, Collins 2004:53-56).
It is also heightened by the anticipation of co-presence, like preparing for a romantic date
(Grazian 2007). Before I left the US, when I asked about what kind of clothes to bring I
was advised simply in favor of collared shirts and a formal jacket or two, “maybe for
buyer meetings.” Before my first meeting I check in again with Amrita, who casts her
eyes up in mild confusion and points down to her faded, ripped jeans and basic printed tshirt: “This is fine,” she says vaguely. “This is what design people are like,” she laughs.
The next day she wears ripped jeans again, but does dress up with low chunky heels, a
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white button-up shirt, and a casual lace jacket. I decide to wear a basic synthetic longsleeved shirt with an unstructured black jacket. I soon discover that is my white skin,
rather than my clothes, that is remarkable. When Amrita and I arrive together, the
middle-aged female receptionist dons a worried look and asks Amrita a harried question
in Hindi before Amrita and Vani start to laugh. According to Vani, the receptionist says,
“You brought the buyer with you? I thought he wasn’t coming for another few hours!”
Delhi is not a cosmopolitan city comparable to New York or London; the receptionist had
good reason to suspect a different role for me. Indeed, almost the only white people
whom I interacted with throughout my time in India were buyers or designers from the
US or Europe. A few of these representatives live in India, but not many.
At most buyer presentations basic and casual dress is the norm. I am surprised by
this, expecting bodies and fashion to align more closely with retail brand identities
(Goffman 1961:89, Williams and Connell 2010). Entwistle, in her study of high-end
luxury buyers, notes a buyer requirement to “look the part” (2006:717). Perhaps because
sourcing is at the back end of the apparel GVC, the requirement is relaxed for foreign
buyers (see generally Goffman 1959 on backstage interactions). When an accessible
luxury buyer team visits MEI, basic athletic shoes are as common as simple dress shoes.
Uncomplicated company-branded t-shirts adorn half of the buyers; a long-sleeve t-shirt,
blouses, and simple dress shirts cover the rest. One middle-aged buyer wears an oversized t-shirt; another buyer wears short white athletic socks under khaki dress pants and
brown loafers (the latter choice certainly against the basic rules of fashion). I would feel
overdressed in my khakis and a bridge brand patterned dress shirt111 if I did not have the
sleeves rolled up. Buying agents, as far as occupational roles go, are the most likely to
look sharp and put together. On the supplier side, only Riya wears the MEI lanyard
required of factory staff and workers. Supply-side designers are among the least likely to
wear lanyards around their necks, suggesting role distance and respect for creative
identification instead (Goffman 1961:142-46). Across all roles, it is young women who
are the most likely to embrace fashion as a form of identity enhancement (see also Crane
2000:202-34, Simmel 1904:144-45).
My presence at buyer presentations is more delimited at ACE than at MEI. This is
hardly a methodological sacrifice considering that ACE provides my first exposure to an
overwhelming situation. There I am permitted to attend as a “silent observer,” perhaps
asking a few questions at the end. Having quickly learned the intensity of my curiosity,
Amrita pulls me aside during a presentation while mid-tier buyers are making their
selections: “Don’t ask questions while they are working,” she warns me. “You need to let
them concentrate. Just observe.” Silence is easier to attain than invisibility, however, as
we learn from the visit of a bridge segment designer. Mick, a mildly overweight
American man, is simply dressed in lattice sandals, black dress pants, a navy dress shirt,
and a long, thin navy scarf. His dainty walk, arched posture, high tone of voice, and word
choice suggest that he is gay. While polite and entertaining, during the presentation he
finds numerous opportunities to distractedly look at me and ask questions about my life
in India and the US. After the meeting ends Amrita and Vani tease me about these
111

Garment tags in India, at least in the formal sector, are more detailed than American
tags regarding origin labeling. This shirt is actually produced by a MEI competitor.
111

exchanges. When Vaasu calls to get an assessment of the meeting, Amrita tells him that
my presence adds “foreign value—they like having him there and [the buyer] was hitting
on him!” After she hangs up, Amrita smiles delightedly and tells me that Vaasu “is very
innocent” about sexuality. At MEI I make less attempt to stay in the background after the
presentations are finished. Buyers usually introduce themselves with the same basic
questions that Indians ask: “How long are you here, where are you from, what is your
project about, how do you like Indian food?” They do not continue into the Indian
pleasantries of “how many people are in your family, are you Christian, and are you
married?” For both groups, I think, I tend to appear as a sort of an entertaining curiosity. I
am sure that my red hair adds to this!
Marketing Introductions
Buyers visiting any first-tier supplier will likely see plaques or award certificates
from other buyers just before entering the showroom. Buyers who are new to MEI, or
who have not visited in some time, may be shown an introductory marketing video that
covers the history, capability, and sales of MEI. For corporate social responsibility
visitors there is also a marketing “documentary” about services to workers that are
offered by the company.112 The most detailed notes I have of these marketing
introductions are from a new potential accessible luxury client that specializes in
outerwear. The buyers, seeking to move production away from China, are looking for
samples that could hit the market a full two years from today’s visit. Mahesh, the vice
president of marketing at MEI, leads the presentation, half-heartedly running through
sales numbers, capacity, etc. His voice is soft and his presentation a formality until he
comes to the topic of strategy and until some energy is infused with questions from
Cathy, the lead buyer. Mahesh gives exact statistics about the volume of sales for two of
the buyer’s market competitors who are already ordering from MEI. He markets MEI as a
company that can achieve low-cost garments by following three major principles:
efficiency, verticality, and speed to market.
Efficiency is attained through lean manufacturing, 5S, and zero-defect strategies.
Mahesh also pitches the idea that “we are a low-cost region, with good purchasing power,
matching prices with Vietnam and Bangladesh… Trump is in [as president-elect] and
now the TPP is thrown out. All the companies were rushing into Vietnam, but those
[expected free-trade] benefits will not come.” (At lunch, the director of product sourcing
brings up the possibility of Trump renegotiating NAFTA.) Vertical integration is stronger
on some dimensions than on others. Seventy to eighty percent of denim is vertically
integrated, but more than 50% of outerwear fabric—a key point for this buyer—is
imported. Mahesh’s last pillar, speed to market, “is mainly influenced by our design.
Because we work with so many clients, we have a strong intel in telling the company
what to buy.” On this point, instead of listing competitive niche companies as before,
Mahesh lists relationships with “fashion leaders” and benchmark stores for fast fashion.
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In addition to asking about the sources of growth (new or existing clients—mostly
existing), Cathy asks about the “gender split,” which in this context refers to sales. It is
60/40 in favor of women, “because they have the money to buy,” Mahesh jokes. This
earns a bit of collective laughter and serves as the transition to open perusal of the
showroom.113 Before we enter the showroom ourselves, let us quickly review the
preparations that have been made.
There are four arrangements of buyer and supplier travel. One involves only the
travel of digital images as PPT samples. They can be handled by either designers or
product developers. Buyers and suppliers can “meet in the middle” (for example in Hong
Kong), suppliers can travel to buyers, or buyers can travel to suppliers. My data
concentrates on the last arrangement and the staging of the showroom. Hundreds of
samples are first sorted into themes suggested by mood boards. They are later thinned
and more carefully curated by senior designers who anticipate the attitudes of buyers.
Buyer teams, at their largest, include designers, buyers, buying agents, production
consultants, fabric technicians, and perhaps a sourcing director. At their smallest they
consist of a designer and a buying agent. When buyer teams arrive, they are sometimes
greeted with a presentation led by the supplier marketing department. This is prefatory to
the action of selections themselves, to which we now turn.
Buyer Selections
Entire presentations are usefully treated as interaction rituals of structured
symbolic interaction and emotional exchange (Collins 2004, Goffman 1967). As Collins
defines it, “ritual is a mechanism of mutually focused emotion and attention producing a
shared reality, which thereby generates solidarity and symbols of group membership”
(2004:7). The goal of suppliers in these interaction rituals is to generate emotional
energy—a phenomenological embodiment of group energy—and to translate that energy
into a relational contract that will eventually be formalized (cf. Durkheim [1893]
1997:149-65, Williamson 2008). MEI works on formal contracts, but relational contracts
(formalized only through monetary exchange and repeat business) are operational with
some ACE clients; the latter arrangement is also noted in other studies of buyer-supplier
relationships (Tokatli 2007:69, 81, Uzzi 1996, 1997). The peak of emotional energy is in
the selection process itself, which I analyze from the supplier perspective as a hightension frontstage performance (Benzecry and Collins 2014, Goffman 1959, Schutz
1962). The performance maximizes apperception, as Blumer (1969a) identified but failed
to describe. As in design inspiration (Chapter 3), emotions dominate the beginning of the
interaction ritual. Rational calculation is consistently downplayed until the bulk of
selections are finished and the focus shifts to costing (and its attendant logic of
accounting).
I am always prepared for the emotional tone of buyer presentations by Amrita or
Vani. Before a mid-tier buyer arrives, for example, Amrita and Vani are excited and
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happy, reminding each other of how the “buyer was so excited, she was jumping like a
child! She wanted to buy everything!” Mick, on the other hand, seems “cold” and “hard
to work with” based on a prior meeting in New York. He is “largely unresponsive” as
well as “irritating” and “very fussy” about certain styles, but at least asks for very
minimal changes from year to year, creating less modification work. In the Delhi
showroom, after perfunctory small talk and receipt of his Diet Coke “always with ice,” he
gets straight to business: “Let’s start right in.” The proclamation is followed by supplyside designers holding their usually chattering tongues. Indeed, Amrita sometimes
worries if she asks too many questions or might “say something offensive.” “What is one
man’s over-eagerness will become another’s alienation,” Goffman notes (1967:123).
Mick starts on the left side of the room, sorting one by one. As with most buyers who
“start right in,” he makes heavier selections in the beginning than toward the end. The
alternative method of browsing before selections leads to more even selections. A team of
young bridge brand buyers for a children’s brand, for example, takes five rounds through
the showroom. The first is to look without touching, as an overview. Second is the main
selections. Third is a quick look through womenswear, where only one garment is
chosen. Fourth is one last look through the kid’s collection, where a few more items are
pulled or exchanged. Last is a look at fabric samples for future development.
According to Amrita, most “buyers makes clothing decisions the same way you
do when you go into a store (pointing): “‘that’s fashionable’ or ‘that’s not.’” As Mick
looks through the collections, his verbal evaluations are simple at the beginning:
“Pretty… pretty, uh huh… very pretty… fabulous…” he says as he hands selections to
his Indian buying agent. The third rack is a selection of whites—big this season,
according to Amrita. Mick breaks his taciturnity when he gets there and his voice grows
disappointed, although he still selects heavily: “When I first started this trip, I loved how
much white I was seeing, but now, you know, I’ve seen so much of it that I’m tired of it.
Now it’s boring.” Amrita empathizes with him, explaining that when she put on a white
shirt this morning she added an off-white lace vest “to change it up.” I soon discover that
Amrita, in stark contrast to her usual sharpness, is always exceptionally accommodating
to buyers and buyer-side designers. Tact and deference are ways to show one can be
counted on to support the ritual code, as Goffman argues (1967:19, 31), and “face” can be
a sacred thing in market interactions as well as public ones.114
Buyers, for their part, contribute to ritual equilibrium through what might be
called “civil inattention” to garments that are boring or disliked (Goffman 1963:83-88).
As a bridge brand buyer and designer happily recognize garments that Amrita designed
two years ago115 for another brand within the parent company, their attention quickly
passes to new designs. As in fashion runway castings, evaluators never say, “I don’t like
this” as a holistic judgment. Instead a mid-tier buyer will say that a peasant top is “too
peasant,” a loose-fitting garment needs to be “more structured,” or that a macramé
festival look is “too literal.” If buyers cannot imagine a tweak, the preferred method is to
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avoid commenting altogether. If “the impression of reality fostered by a performance is a
delicate, fragile thing that can be shattered by very minor mishaps” (Goffman 1959),
buyers presumably seek to avoid assaulting the competence of supply-side designers—at
least in direct interaction.116 This is especially likely in the fields of fashion and modern
art, which operate with individualized moral and cultural overtones.
More generally, researchers in the Durkheim tradition (Collins 1994:181-241)
have argued for a social-psychological bias of conflict avoidance. Human interaction, at
least in situations of public co-presence, is biased toward the prosocial interactions of
positive rites. Conversation participants take turns (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974).
Audiences are quicker to express affiliative responses like clapping than they are to
disaffiliate through booing (Clayman 1993). Close examination of even the extreme case
of violence supports a similar conclusion: interpersonal violence is extremely hard to
execute (Collins 2008). Extending this principle to the evaluations of designer objects,
which after all are personal investments of craft (Aristotle trans. 2001b:1167b-68, Ocejo
2014), is a sensible theoretical enhancement. It does not, however, suggest the avoidance
of indirect conflict. Such conflict is appropriate under the frame of a different
institutional logic (e.g., the mathematical distancing of accounting) or ritual (e.g., art
school critiques).
Evaluative Tweaking
Conflict has powerful generative potential (Simmel 1908/1955), both in its major
and minor forms. In the context of buyer-supplier collaboration, buyer evaluations lead to
what we might call “customer-friendly” evaluative tweaking. Tweaking or evaluative
tweaking, the work of intermediaries, is the process of modifying or reframing cultural
production beyond gatekeeping (e.g., Hirsch 1986b, Wei 2012, Wohl 2015). “Tweaking”
is the dominant term in apparel, although the owner of a first-tier shoe supplier refers to
tweaking as “personalizing” for different clients. “Reverse sampling” is occasionally
heard as well. However, reverse sampling is more accurate for a one-way process—like
the Soviet reverse engineering of Western automobiles and other products (Molotch
2003:231-33)—than for the research and development activities in many small and
medium-sized enterprises around the world (Guillén 2001:223-25). In a lawsuit filed
against bridge brand Chico’s by a US assistant designer who says she was forced to
exactly reproduce an accessible luxury Michael Kors design, the plaintiff alleges she
“was told not to use the term ‘knockoff,’ and to say ‘inspired by’ other designer labels
instead” (Feitelberg 2014).
A few fast fashion clients, both in the fashion industry at large and according to
Amrita, are particularly known for being “the master[s] of tweaking. They do clever
copying to make it customer-friendly.” The term “customer-friendly” is used more often
Wohl (2015:321), in her study of an erotic arts group, similarly finds that “to sustain
the group’s public face of taste, nondominant aesthetic judgments were largely dealt with
backstage.” See also Snow and Anderson (1987:1368) on public respect for the
biographical privacy of homeless people.
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in the retail world than at suppliers, but it is the analytic cousin of the “productionfriendly” modifications of Chapter 3. Customer-friendly modifications are based on
consumer identity and price points before technical utility and efficiency. Tweaks face
toward the consumer rather than toward planners or industrial engineers (Chapter 6).
Tweaks suggested and requested by designers (on both sides) tend to focus on aesthetics,
while buyers more align with supplier-side marketing staff in the interest of cost
reduction. These relevances, shown in the text below, seem to be an institutional function
of designer and buyer/sales roles (Hughes 1937, Schutz 1962, Wolter et al. 1989).
About half of buyer selections will be accepted “as is,” without the need for
modifications (see “hit rates” below). The other half are tweaked first with indirect
comments during the initial selection. Buying, as brick-and-mortar shoppers know, can
be a sensual encounter (Entwistle 2006:711-13). As Mick hands a garment to his buying
agent, he speculates, “There’s something there, so let’s pull that one out… I don’t need
the beads, [but] I’d love to see some tie-dye to get the more irregular look.” As he says
this he holds up another tie-dye piece to demonstrate. Buyers and designers regularly
personify a garment as “this guy” while holding it, enlarging its life and recognizing the
developmental trajectory of the object. After indirect comments and exchanges, buyers
close the selection process by formalizing tweaks through explicit instructions. Vani or
Priyanka attach a blank ACE label to design samples, noting desired changes to
construction, color, fabric, etc. Examples include, “no novelty waistband, just turn back
the elastic waist” or “keep color and pattern, change to chino fit.” For a re-order, a tag
can note, “last year’s color, no lab dib needed. Change embroidery.” In the end,
modifications are never more than two or three per garment. Modifications are easy, but
with hundreds of samples to choose from there is not much point in pursuing exacting
ideals. If a designer has an idea for something special, it is more efficient to ask for a new
development (see next section). Below I classify modification requests into three
categories: (1) requests anticipated by suppliers, (2) references to a customer image, and
(3) technical considerations. Cost and ethics are additional considerations to be covered
separately.117
Supplier Anticipation
Evaluative tweaking begins already during the inspiration for and construction of
design samples, as documented in Chapter 3. According to symbolic interactionist
analysis, “we only have ideas in so far as we are able to take the attitude of the
community and then respond to it” (Mead 1934:180). In applied terms, supply-side
designers work in iterative cycles to integrate buyer responses into new developments.
Assistant designers bring samples-in-progress to Amrita’s office for her evaluation on
patterns, styles, and colors. Tacitly anticipating buyer comments, Amrita responds by
calling supplier-developed colors “too maroon,” “too winter,” or “too winter-rose.”
Preparing for the visit of a conservative mid-tier buyer, assistant designers might hear the
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instruction, “just make it navy, navy is the safest color for anyone.” “Too ethnic” is a
common internal criticism, perhaps applied to single-color embroidery across an entire
garment. Similar critiques extend to supply-side interpretations of buyer-side mood
boards: “That doesn’t match,” Amrita once tells Lakshit. “It’s black and white, yes, but
there’s too much black and not enough white.” Even these early evaluations mix
institutional logics of creativity (design), utility (product development), and
responsiveness (marketing). Indeed, design functions would be trapped and useless by
engaging creativity without responsiveness. Thus beyond the initial appeal to the buyer,
ACE “does not care about color; we have no [aesthetic] interest in it. We’ll just change it
to whatever [the buyer] wants it to be.”
Successful anticipation for buyer presentations follows wider diffusion patterns in
the industry. As argued in Chapter 3, although information is widely available with the
internet, the attention space is biased toward a few highly visible (and heavily
capitalized) high-end luxury designers who focus on womenswear. Womenswear, not
surprisingly, is more influential than childrenswear. “Just try to think of a [major]
designer who is producing only for kids,” Vani argues. “Just try it. It never goes from
kids to ladies.” When supply-side designers are asked for childrenswear samples, then, it
should not be surprising that Vani pays special attention to “hits” (i.e., successful orders)
from ladies’ styles that can be adapted to children’s sizes. As buyers from the
childrenswear division of a bridge brand visit ACE, they identify the resizing strategy and
laugh playfully. “Most of the good [selling] ones we have made into smalls,” Amrita
acknowledges.
Trend forecasting reduces risk by reinforcing collective selection, but so does
supplier innovation. Using WGSN can mean that supply-side designers view runway
collections with a market impact of six months in the future, alongside trend forecasts for
12 months ahead and fabric forecasts for 12-18 months ahead, with the object of
designing 12-18 months in advance. It is thus a job requirement to be “ahead of the
curve,” as the expression goes. This naturally includes the possibility of timing errors.
Just as trend forecasters sometimes claim to be “too early,” (Lantz 2016, passim),
suppliers sometimes offer samples that are ahead of their buyer audience. As we set up
the showroom one day, Rahul says that “sometimes we show some garment that they
don’t like it, then we show the same [or similar] thing a year later and they really love it,
like ‘Ooh, we like this!’” He laughs. Such errors and adjustments also help to explain
why Rituraj and Anjali sometimes re-send images in PPT presentations (see above).
Finally, forecasting reports or runway shows can validate supply-side innovations. In my
first few weeks at ACE Vani tells me that Amrita was doing Schiffli lace eyelets before
Valentino (RTW, Spring 2015). Lakshit adds, “these eyelets that we’ve been working on,
ma’am was working on those two, three months before the buyers came and now that’s
what they are asking for. So we are ready.” The technique, applied first to tops and later
to skirts and pants, is picked up during my observations by a mid-tier buyer, indeed
pleased that ACE already has samples available.
One final example of supplier anticipation and information sharing may be cited
during a buyer presentation. As Rahul leads a small group of accessible luxury buyers
through the showroom they zoom in on a pair of camouflage pants. “Right now
everybody is asking for camo,” he explains. Later he holds up another pair with a heavier
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camo print that has been picked up by a competitor. Cathy, the lead buyer, responds,
“The French are wearing this, huh?” and laughs. Minutes later as they continue to browse
the collection, Cathy is still clearly thinking about the pattern. “In the US camo is always
there, but Europe has resisted it…”118 Rahul, in his calm and collected way, informs her
that “another buyer was here just five days back…” Cathy fills in his sentence—“and
they were asking for it”—and Rahul nods. One can almost see Cathy shifting away from
her old opinions, subtly guided by the objects and information in front of her. With the
exchange of these kinds of comments, taking pictures of samples, or trying garments on
their own bodies, both buyer-side and supply-side designers gain information about
competitor behavior and embodied reactions. These signals of attention become
intelligence, in the Meadian sense of the word.119 They inspire iterative modifications and
new developments, forcing new symbols and styles into a limited attention space and
pruning links to ignored associations.
Anticipation and responsiveness are essential features of fashion as a collective
behavior. Before advancing toward the ideal customer, where symbolic interaction will
continue to be theoretically useful, let us read again a brilliant passage from Mead
(1934:193) about preference shifting. It goes beyond Simmel, Durkheim, or Veblen—
who expressed similar ideas—in Mead’s phenomenological observance of environmental
consciousness:
Take a person’s attitude toward a new fashion. It may at first be one of objection.
After a while he gets to the point of thinking of himself in this changed fashion,
noticing the clothes in the window and seeing himself in them. The change has
taken place in him without his being aware of it. There is, then, a process by
means of which the individual in interaction with others inevitably becomes like
others in doing the same thing, without that process appearing in what we term
consciousness.
One may debate the meaning and extent of “conscious” activity in fashion behavior, as
Mead’s contemporaries certainly did (Beauvoir 1949/2011:571-98, Gilman 1886, 1918,
Park and Burgess 1924:933-34, Spencer 1898/1915:214). My own sympathies lie with
Faris (1937:75), who once wrote that “women who follow the new styles are hardly
swept off their feet in an unconscious way… nor do they gradually realize that they have
bobbed their hair or shortened their skirts without knowing it.” Nevertheless, Mead’s
insistence on the social subtleties of inspiration, embodiment, and cognition should
continue to provoke and inspire theory about the sociological heart of fashion.
References to Customer Image and Habitus
While a mood board gestures toward an ideal customer in the abstract, the
window for inspiration is narrower in face-to-face interaction. An ideal customer or
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customer image is a social representation formed by demographics, customer interaction,
and imagination. Schulz (2008) argues from interview data that representations120
function to reduce uncertainty and diminish conflicting role preferences among designers,
buyers, and product managers. One detailed example from Mick will suffice to illustrate
how the representation of an ideal customer is invoked to facilitate a specific design: “I
like the whole idea of the dressy kimono,” he begins. “I’m looking for an ‘occasion’
garment, something dressy dressy dressy, over-the top… He pauses to collect his
thoughts:
I’m thinking white and gold, white and silver. She’s going to wear this to a
wedding, maybe… You see, our customer is coming in and she’s asking for
something she can wear to a party… She wants to be the center of attention. The
other thing they are asking is, ‘Do you have it in white?’ So it has to be in
white… This collection is going to come out in May, so there is going to be
graduation, there are going to be summer parties, and she needs something that
can make her stand out. It’s like, I’m going to be the hottest one at the party. In
white. She’s not wearing a neutral [color] to a party. Plus [if it’s white] she feels
very dressed up and it’s easy for her to find shoes to wear… Let me show you the
picture [from Instagram] and then we can work out the idea…
Mick’s ideal or imaginary customer is young, female, and possesses substantial reserves
for discretionary spending. Mick’s vision includes not only components of silhouette (at
least kimono sleeves), color (white), and embellishment (standout), but also attitude (hot)
and an occasion (party, graduation). Organized reflected intelligence (Mead 1934:118),
or imagination as activity based on the internalization of community attitudes, is the key
to unlocking the customer image.
Other designers and buyers seem to rely less on the cognitive aspects that Mead
and Blumer emphasize and more on the embodied awareness of habitus during evaluative
tweaking. Entwistle (2006:718-21) argues that buyers have few encounters with actual
customers, relying instead on retail intermediaries, statistics, and gut feelings. Not
surprisingly, the guidance of habitus seems more useful when buyer characteristics and
preferences line up with a company-wide image of the ideal customer. The conflict
between a designer and buyer at a mid-tier brand helps to illustrate the tensions of
habitus. Emmie, the former, is probably in her early 30s and vivacious. Patricia, the latter,
seems to fit Rahul’s and Ishita’s descriptions of the brand’s ideal customer: a practical,
aesthetically moderate 40 to 45-year-old woman. Emmie selects more heavily than
Patricia, who wants to see modifications for more mature ladies. Considering a goldcolored beach cover-up, Patricia squints, “I find this a bit too shiny… we need to widen
the chest and shoulders; we don’t want her boobs hanging out.” She adds a slightly
embarrassed laugh. Emmie protests, “But I thought it’s for the beach, so she’ll be
wearing a bikini underneath.” Patricia takes back the upper hand, telling Emmie that “we
can’t assume that everyone will take it for the beach.” For another beachwear item, while
Patricia maintains that it is “practically important” to cover the bra and bra straps, she
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agrees to Emmie’s and Amrita’s suggestion to leave some room to maintain an “open
feel” of the garment. After similar critiques, five out of fifty-five selections are discarded
on the more moderate opinion of the buyer.
Technical Considerations
Designers and buying agents are more attentive to technical considerations than
buyers. These concerns are largely about garment testing and fit, both of which are
covered in Chapter 5. When a designer at a mid-tier brand looks at a garment with blue
lining and white embroidery, she skeptically asks, “Can you do this [pattern repeatedly]?
We’ve tried to do this color with white embroidery, but no one says they can do it
[without color bleeding].” Amrita responds affirmatively, “Yes, we can do it in any color.
Coral, whatever, no color bleeding.” In another case a buying agent for a bridge brand,
silent for most of the meeting, asks for a seam test when holding a garment in her hands
and playing around with it. Kalyani adds that at IFS, no design samples are selected “at
one go. Even for basic styles, it could have a silhouette problem, maybe a seam slippage
problem…” Fit is another concern, as design samples are “hanger samples” that are not
designed to fit on an actual body. A designer for a kids’ bridge brand is unhappy with the
proportions of a few samples, which she feels are too small (and which Vani and Amrita
earlier tried to correct in the tailoring process). She also wants to reduce the size of an
armhole on a girl’s dress. Amrita gently and warmly reassures her, “We’ll use your specs
[measurement specifications], don’t worry.” Modifying a size from ladies to kids and
simultaneously changing the print is the furthest distance from an original sample that I
hear requested by a designer.
In addition to testing and fit, a third concern of capabilities is specific to specialty
companies, for example outerwear or lingerie. The lead buyer of an accessible luxury
outerwear brand, Cathy, is extremely clear at the end of MEI’s initial presentation:
[We are] a technologically-driven company… So if we’re meeting with a vendor
and they can’t answer a technical question, that’s a real challenge for us, about
where it will fit in and compare within our existing products and against or
competitors. [Our suppliers] need to know that information.
Cathy tells Mahesh and Rahul that MEI has passed her personal assessment, but that her
team needs to go back and discuss the next course of action among themselves. They
place only one order for now, a tweak of pants for a value brand that were picked up from
a tour of the washing unit and carried back to the showroom. Cathy asks for a test run of
“maybe 15k units,” to which Mahesh responds mildly, “Ok. That’s a decent run.”
Rahul is more optimistic than Mahesh, though it takes a while for me to figure out
why. I am with him and Ishita when they select garments and set up the showroom. The
denim selection is almost all technically-oriented garments with “performance finishes”;
there are no unique features in cut or color or embellishment. To me they all look the
same, and privately I doubt Rahul’s and Ishita’s choices. This doubt is enhanced when
none are selected for production runs; I have a rare opportunity to talk to the director of
the sourcing team simply to relieve her boredom. As the meeting concludes, however,
Cathy says that “we are very much on the same page, with performance-enhancing
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cottons.” Rahul later tells me that while I was talking to the sourcing director, he was
handling intensive inquiries from a fabric technician. Rahul is optimistic because he
knows that while factory sourcing approvals come from executives, orders come from
designers and buyers in consultation with technicians.
Winding Down Buyer Selections
While they last (for three to ten hours), buyer presentations require sustained
emotional labor (Hochschild 1983). This is especially true on the part of suppliers and
their totemic representatives—i.e., Amrita. Even as an observer, my mind after one fourhour presentation has melted into a deep pool filled with the rains of symbolic
interaction. Apparently designers build up endurance. Vani, for example, is in no such
state. Deservedly proud of a successful presentation, she has already finished tagging
selections and is now photographing them. She will begin producing counter samples—
exact copies of prototypes—first thing tomorrow morning. As soon as the counters are
finished Vani will airmail the prototypes. The buyer needs to have all the prototypes
shipped “back to the [headquarter]121 office, just to see how it looks in the range” along
with selections from other suppliers. Mick finally expresses that his trip to India is “too
rushed” and that he “wants to spend more time” to establish better connections with
suppliers. Amrita supports him, adding, “and then we get to learn more about [your
brand], what you like…”
Buyer presentations are interaction rituals that peak during selections and
modifications. As they wind down, emotional energy dissipates and a collective focus of
attention diffuses. At the end of a MEI meeting, a sourcing director and two Chinesespeaking buying agents halt any pretentions to interest in showroom samples. Where the
individual personalities of Mahesh, Cathy, or Rahul formerly occupied the attention of
the group as representations of collective authority (see Durkheim [1893] 1997:143),
“individuals and little subgroups [are now] drifting away until those who are left are
caught up in a deflationary emotion like rats leaving a sinking ship” (Collins 2004:51).
The physical locations of participants spread out as they move into groups of two or
three: Rahul and the fabric technician, Mahesh and the lead buying agent, the Chinese
speakers among themselves in a group of three. This organization into smaller formations
will be sustained throughout the factory tour and still further as participants drift into
cars, offices, or cubicles.
Once buyers leave, frontstage interaction transforms to backstage relaxation and
reflection. The valence can be positive or negative, but I am rarely able to match an
internal emotional assessment to that of participants. In the beginning of my fieldwork I
believe that the mismatch is due to information error—I don’t yet know enough about
how purchase orders work or how client relationships can develop. As I come to learn
these processes, however, I eventually feel that there is no collective assessment to grasp.
Emotionally exhausted participants at the end of long days recede into their own worlds
(see Katz 1999 on the extreme case of crying). Sometimes reactions differ according to
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role differences: Amrita may be upset as a creative director but Ankur and Arjun happy
as marketing managers. Rahul may be inspired by the resonance of his designs with a
fabric technician but Mahesh blasé about the placement of only a small order. Sometimes
participants express relief, as Amrita does after a mid-tier brand meeting with a new
client: “I have been putting my whole energies into this,” she says while waving to the
selection rack we are standing next to. “This is only our second meeting, but now I feel
secure.” Other times designers are already digging, worriedly, into a short lead time or an
“ugly” request, like Mick’s “over-the-top” dress. As I ride back with Amrita and Vani
after the presentation with Mick, Amrita feeds ideas to Vani that include “India,” “very
rich buttoning,” and “mixed media.” Still, she admits to “designer’s block” and says to
me that “the account doesn’t give me any pleasure.” After Vani brings in an all-sequin
sample a few days later, Amrita concedes that that she is “satisfied” with it. “It could
have been better, but it’s pretty good. I’m happy with it,” she concludes.
Ethics of Design Outsourcing
Outsourcing is not equivalent to offshoring (which can be intra-firm) or offshore
outsourcing (see Davis-Blake and Broschak 2009 for a review of domestic outsourcing).
It instead simply marks the division between lead firms and supplier firms, often
theorized in economics as a “make-or-buy” decision that leads to bilateral dependency
(Williamson 1981, 2008:555). Outsourcing is a decision to utilize market transactions
rather than administrative ones (cf. Porter 1980:300, Stinchcombe 1959). GVC literature,
on the other hand, with the exception of Gereffi (e.g., Gereffi et al. 2005), routinely
sidelines strategy and economic nuances. Theoretical origins from Marxist geography
and world systems analysis are instead clearer, presenting vertically disintegrated
suppliers as firms disadvantaged by a massively uneven playing field (e.g., Anner et al.
2012, Broughton 2015, Schrank 2004, Sklair 1993). This latter approach is critically
useful at the macro level, capturing inequality in humanistic terms evaded by economists
and offering policy alternatives (Bair 2009, Wallerstein 1997). The ethics of design
outsourcing, as a value-added service provided by first-tier suppliers, are situated
somewhere between neoclassical economic and neo-Marxist positions. Suppliers are
certainly not in control of buyer-supplier relationships, but neither are they inescapably
dominated or strategically incompetent. At the level of the art world and apparel industry,
I will discuss three components of ethical considerations directly relevant to design: (1)
laws and norms, (2) legal and normative violations, and (3) social-psychological
attributions.
Laws and Norms
There is a fine line between tweaking (legal) and copying (illegal). But in
Amrita’s evocative metaphor, “I can tweak the same garment in 20 ways. It’s like
cooking—you just change the recipe.” In fashion as in cuisine (see Di Stefano et al. 2017,
Leschziner 2007), intellectual property (IP) protections are inefficient and ineffective.
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Trademarks like brand names—a small part of IP as a whole, and one which largely
excludes design—are the only major exception. Violations are enforced either through
customs and border protection or court cases, usually involving imports anyway (e.g.,
2015, Conlon 2015). While the frequency of litigation is increasing, it is also increasingly
costly and decreasingly successful (Alcácer, Beukel and Cassiman 2017:197-202). Most
of the goods seized by customs and border protection are consumer non-durables
(clothes, shoes, handbags, consumer electronics),122 the most popular import category
behind petroleum products (Hamilton and Gereffi 2009:146-47). Seventy-one percent of
these good ($8.6 billion in value), whether bound for the US or Europe, originate from
China (Alcácer et al. 2017:205-07).
Legality is always in the background of tweaking, but norms are more visible in
the shaping of cultural conduct. Studying gourmet chefs, Di Stefano et al. (2017:290) find
that for recipes, “don’t copy exactly” is much more important than “cite the source” or
“don’t pass on.” Against conventional accounts of fashion as an exclusionary trickledown phenomenon that is essentially about guarding an honorific lifestyle (e.g., Veblen
1899/20072007, Weber 1922/1946), being “copied” can even be viewed honorifically by
original designers (Lantz 2016:113 et passim). Three things account for this possibility.
First, design is an art world of production that is not tightly coupled to lifestyle as a
pattern of consumption (cf. Bourdieu 1993b:132-48, Crane 2000). Second, being copied
can affirm to a designer that he or she is a trend leader—that he or she was first. Third,
we ought to differentiate rationalizations and attributions (especially those gathered
through interview or survey data) from propensities toward trust or indifference. As Uzzi
discovered in his studies of New York supplier networks (1996, 1997), buyers and
suppliers with long-term relationships trust that each other will not “burn” ties to make a
quick buck. Tweaking is almost unquestioned as a design practice in new relationships as
well, though. Designers on both sides are comfortable asking for and offering tweaks.
Industry Practice and Supplier Precautions
The first and second things to understand, if it is possible for readers still to be
skeptical of supply-side design, is that buyer-side designers well-aware that first-tier
suppliers can offer them design options. Beyond this, however—and consistent with
expectations of strategic positioning and competitor monitoring (Porter 1980, 1985,
White 1981, 1993)—they are also aware that competing brands are already utilizing these
resources. In addition to industry information provided by networking, journalism, and
staff turnover, buyers have evidence from supply-side marketing information and
showroom tags. Everyone understands—even those who devalue copying—that tweaking
is an industry-standard design practice. Before a bridge brand visits, for example, Amrita
tells me that her designs for them have been very successful. Last season four separate
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buyers came to ACE with the same design in hand to ask if ACE could make a version
for them.
Buyers mix moral, ethical, and strategic considerations in their sourcing practices.
When a bridge brand designer is obviously pleased with ACE’s options, she exclaims, “I
think we could buy the whole collection right here!” The buyer, more authoritatively but
also with some teasing, orients her response toward the whole group: “She thinks we
could buy the whole collection right here.” The buying agent chimes in next, trying to be
fair and perhaps taking the designer too literally: “No no no, we have to give an equal
opportunity to every sourcer.” The designer begins to concede in her tone of voice, but
clearly disagrees: “But if one [supplier] works very hard to produce for us…” Seizing the
opportunity to shift the tide, Amrita enters the fray to back up the buyer-side designer.
She says with deferential commitment: “Yes, we have done this all from your fabric
selection. We have made all of this in kids’ sizes specifically for you.” (The designer and
buyer had indeed previously expressed their appreciation for proportional
“visualization.”) The buyer and buying agent back down. Amrita’s timing, keen sense of
emotional dynamics, and attention to buyer preferences strikes a winning chord and the
conversation dies down as selections continue. Despite years of failure on labor standards
and corporate social responsibility—and frequent denunciations of greedy fashion
corporations—the buying agent’s rhetoric of fairness reflects a committed liberalism that
permeates fashion politics in the US and Europe. The politics of firm strategy and design
are less serious and less consequential than the politics of labor and development, but
they are not unrelated.
Amrita has clearly thought through the implications of tweaking during her many
years on the job. In addition to legal and normative concerns there are important strategic
ones. In earlier days, she says, booking an order for a similar style was probably ok if the
products were destined for separate markets (e.g., UK vs. US). Today, however, “most
companies are international,” a development which has accelerated because of online
retailing. Now it is not only “not safe” to affirm a purchase order without both tweaks
and brand communication, but “not ethical” and “consciously, strictly avoided.” The
highest level of disclosure occurs, she says, with retailers who compete in the same retail
segment. In this case Amrita will disclose not only that another company has picked up
the style, but that it was picked up by a specific competitor. (In fact I observe this level of
disclosure regardless of retail segment.) In competitor cases it is also “not smart” to avoid
communication. Copying would be more significant:
[It would mean] killing their business. Clients don’t want the same thing as their
competitors. You see, what will happen if a customer finds the same thing at two
different stores? They will buy the cheaper one. This drives the [retailer] business
down, which means less business for us. Clients want tweaks. They want the same
fabric as [an accessible luxury brand], but a different pattern of embroidery.
Finally, Amrita claims that in no case will a design sample under product development be
shown to a different potential client (like the “over-the-top” collaboration above). With
special requests, designers “must protect the garment.” It can enter the showroom as a
prototype only after the order has made market impact.
Although attributions for inspiration float upward (Jackall 1988:20-21, 81),
sustaining a hierarchical attention space in design, with supplier access it is sometimes
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possible to trace multiple iterations of a single design. Fast fashion companies are
certainly not the only ones who do “clever copying.” As an example, Amrita traces the
path of a garment that she remembers seeing “on some runway.” A fast fashion brand
copied it first, but an accessible luxury buyer came to ACE with the fast fashion version
to ask for their own version. The accessible luxury version, meanwhile, was later tweaked
and picked up by a bridge brand. When I ask Arjun for more information about this
trajectory, he adds that in this final case ACE even enlisted an external designer for the
latest tweak. This has a legal rationale—the design cannot claim to have been copied—
but following Jackall’s (1988:110-11) logic, it also adds to the appearance of
trustworthiness and due diligence. Established buyers know that tweaks from ACE and
MEI are automatic, but new buyers sometimes check to make sure that suppliers are
metaphorically “part of the club.”
I observe this hesitation as a new mid-tier buyer prepares to place orders at ACE.
The company develops many of their own prints and the designer pulls out a book of
them. She has already given one print to another supplier but allows ACE to use parts of
it, mixing and matching with two other brand designs to make patches for a maxi skirt.
This mixing and matching will be done by ACE’s CAD department. In another case the
buyer cautiously brings a retail dress out of her suitcase to show to Amrita. The face of
the buyer-side designer squirms as she decides to cut a large section of it to give to ACE,
damaging the integrity of something she considers beautiful. She gets over it, however, as
she tells Amrita, “You've got to tweak the embroidery a little bit so I don’t get…” She
mutes herself, refuse to speak the words “in trouble.” Then she laughs. The more
experienced and authoritative buyer gives more explicit instructions: “It’s not to copy it,
it’s to use for inspiration only.” Amrita’s reassurances reach the buyers. They also extend
throughout her own organization. Sanjana, the assistant general product manager, doesn’t
worry about copyright issues because she knows they have already been handled by
Amrita. There is relief in Sanjana’s voice as she re-iterates the now-familiar precautions.
Not every buyer or supplier is as scrupulous or as diligent, however, so it is worth
exploring violations as well.
Legal and Normative Violations
Buyers and suppliers alike commit legal and normative violations in their design
practices. I will tackle buyer-side violations first. The stories that receive the most
publicity are domestic, like the dispute between Harlem-based Dapper Dan’s 1990s
knockoffs of Gucci and Gucci’s 2010s appropriation of Dapper Dan (originally without
attribution). Inspiration is for everyone, elite designers sometimes argue… until it comes
to company profits. Copyrights are about market power, critics say, not about defending
cultural or artistic originality (Tokatli 2011:1267-69, Wallerstein 2009). Brands like Zara,
H&M, and Urban Outfitters regularly make headlines in the fashion world for their
alleged copying. A US-based fashion photographer whom I interviewed, for example,
criticizes Urban Outfitters:
I don’t agree moralistically with the way Urban Outfitters acts… They scour the
internet… for designers that have good ideas and then they just steal them. And I
125

think that’s shitty… It’s bad business. It’s going to catch up with them. What I
saw was so specific, it was nauseating. I saw an Etsy account of a girl that was
making earrings of every state shape. And at the bottom of the state she cut out a
heart. Urban stole those, exactly. That’s really specific... And that to me is so case
closed, you’ve got no argument. There is no chance in hell you thought of the
same thing. And she put up blog posts on Tumblr and was like, look what
happened to me, this could happen to you, be careful.
Years later I was easily able to locate a Huffington Post article about the controversy
(Linkins 2011/2017). Urban Outfitters, for their part, counters that other similar designs
were commercially available a year before accusations of copying surfaced. The
surprising analytical value of this anecdote comes from identifying the collective
inspiration of design as well as the potential hypocrisy of Anthropologie (owned by
Urban Outfitters) suing Forever 21 for copying. Intellectual property protection is a
resource for highly capitalized firms that is rarely worthwhile for independent designers.
Finally, we should note that moral language is often very sharp in the fashion world, as in
the quotation above. While a few buyers face the rhetorical wrath of their Indian
suppliers, small suppliers may possess even less power to retaliate than independent
artisans because suppliers depend on continued business.
Niharika, the general manager of marketing at SFI, tells me a story of searing
ethical disappointment, pain still resonant in her voice. Although SFI no longer employs
a senior designer, when they did a value brand asked the supplier “to produce a whole
collection, start to finish, based on our [factory] specialties. This is what we love, this
was a chance to impress them by doing what we like,” Niharika warms up. After
digressing to talk about core competency, she relates with pride that 25 out of 40 samples
were selected as prototypes. None of the styles, however, made it to purchase orders.
Niharika tried to drop the collection from her mind, she says, but later saw some of the
styles in the brand store in London that were developed by SFI. They had obligatory
modifications, as Niharika recognizes: “But [the brand] is so smart, they made small
changes, so they can say ‘No, look, this is different, we have got this from a different
supplier.’ [And] they are so big that we have no power to do anything.” On the one hand,
she tries to empathize with the buyer by conceding that “I know that the buyer has their
own pressure to get low costs.” On the other hand, she expresses righteous anger: “We
were very angry about that—and not only us. Many suppliers were angry with what [the
buyer] was doing.” Suppliers that belong to industry groups will share such information
among themselves; I observed a few minor strategic mobilizations designed to impede
unethical buyer practices. My perspective was limited, however, and does not generalize
to the cluster level. Other research in the Dominican Republic, consistent with
dependency theory and world systems analysis, argues that supplier retaliation is likely to
have limited effects (Schrank 2004).
Buyers pay only for shipping, not for labor or materials of prototypes, so Amrita
calls development a “latent” or “hidden cost.”123 Non-payment is also a typical practice at
large buying agencies (Barrie 2014). There are three possible reasons for this: First,
designs are relatively cheap and easy, negligible in a purchase order valued in the
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IFS, an exception, charges a flat fee of $20 to accessible luxury clients.
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thousands or millions of dollars. Second, they function as signals of aesthetic capability
and an inducement to future orders. Third, marketing managers are fearful of
antagonizing existing relationships. If ACE were to institute a sampling or development
charge, Amrita feels that “buyers will go elsewhere for better service.” I ask her if ACE
has ever tried—she pauses to admit that she has not—but dismisses the idea upon
recovery. “I know it,” she rationalizes. “The buyers are fighting for every penny.”
The expectation from suppliers is that business will follow and that buyers will
not send out designs to competing suppliers. In fact, ACE dropped one bridge brand and
considered dropping another when Amrita believed that buyers were taking ACE designs
and “feeding” them to China. Suppliers may get caught if they do not tweak the designs
of other suppliers. Failures of tweaking (i.e., copying) seem to have diminished with
buyer and supplier experience.124 “Many years ago,” Amrita begins as she lays out a
scenario:
At a buyer meeting in New York, there was another Indian company that showed
a product that we developed. They were both ‘Made in India,’ but the buyer was
ticked. They brought it to both of us (holds up her hands as if she is holding the
garment). And you know how they figured it out? They asked to see the original
purchase order. We actually had it, so we could go back and show them.
Both suppliers claimed credit for this design, but the competitor failed to tweak
sufficiently. One final way to understand the “hidden costs of design,” in Amrita’s
phrase, is to consider the information-sharing advantages that suppliers gain from
working with buyers. When I relay Amrita’s complaints to an assistant general product
manager at MEI, he responds, “Ah, but [the brand] is a fashion leader. We gain prestige
from working with them, and we also get lot of design input. We gain some hidden
benefits also!” Information sharing interacts with strategy, psychology, and morality in
ways that are hard to disentangle. Attribution and compensation are probably the best
bets for resolving ethical conflict. They are complicated on their own terms, but let us
explore what they have to offer.
The Social Psychology of Creative Attribution
Celebrating the self often comes at the expense of collective recognition.
Conformity, for example, has been widely devalued in American society since at least the
1950s and 1960s, with roots in that reach back to Romantic philosophy and perhaps even
Augustine (Dumont 1986, Emirbayer and Mishe 1998). The recognition that others
engage in an activity devalued by an attribution of conformity does not, however, extend
to the recognition of one’s own behavior. Psychological social psychologists call this the
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As noted earlier, the Chinese case seems very different. Rogue suppliers in an
unregulated business climate are incentivized to infringe on brand trademarks because
they gain benefits from a perception of quality with very minor actual investment
(Alcácer et al. 2017, see also Podolny 1993).
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“outgroup homogeneity effect” (Quattrone and Jones 1980).125 In an example from ACE,
Emmie asks to whom a market-impact prototype was shipped. Amrita responds that it
went to “[an accessible luxury brand], after they shopped [i.e., tweaked] from [another
accessible luxury brand].” Refusing to acknowledge the collective basis of fashion
design, Emmie’s retort is that “[the original accessible luxury brand] probably got it from
my inspiration.” She laughs a bit cynically and moves on. “Have you done this guy for
anyone?” Emmie then asks of another prototype, deciding if she wants to pursue it.
Amrita warily discloses that she developed it for a trendy bridge brand, but Emmie, with
a sniffed laugh, adds it to her selections on the condition that it will be tweaked. This
exchange encapsulates what I call the “double myth of fashion design.” The social
representation of an autonomous, individual designer is one myth, but the location-based
denial of supply-side design work is simultaneously active.
One wonders, amidst these myths and denials and attributions, how Indian
designers feel about their contributions or recognitions. A focused interview study or
survey would be a more effective research technique than my ethnographic work, which
is only suggestive. I found that pride or anger were decidedly peripheral compared to the
pragmatic engagements of work. Amrita, perhaps emboldened by her status and role, was
the most aggrieved. “How much of the design process,” I ask her, “can you take credit for
here as compared to the New York designers?” “70%,” she answers. “We do everything
here. We transform pictures of rocks into grey tie-dye dresses. But all we get is a ‘Madein-India’ label… we do all the really hard work here.” On another occasion after a buyer
presentation, she points out to me her cynical take on a bridge brand:
[They] copy a lot of designs, actually. Did you notice that they didn’t do any
design changes? She just took everything as is. People think, ‘Oh, these [brand]
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An intellectual genealogy of this concept would be extremely valuable, as there are
many names for a similar and extremely common social-psychological phenomenon.
When located within the minimal group paradigm of social identity theory (Ashforth and
Mael 1989, Haney, Banks and Zimbardo 1973, Tajfel 1982), psychological social
psychologists call this the “outgroup homogeneity effect” or “meta-contrast effect”
(Campbell 1956, Hogg 2006, Mullen and Hu 1989). Behavioral economists publishing in
psychology journals draw on the “law of small numbers” (Quattrone and Jones 1980,
Tversky and Kahneman 1971). On the sociological side, Simmel (1904) and Sumner
(1904/1940 §15-27) are sometimes cited as classical foundations, though Durkheim’s
contributions to epistemology and the horror of sociological objection should also be
noted (Durkheim 1895/1982:46, 1912/1995). Snow and Anderson (1987) refer to
“categorical distancing” that is consonant with social identity theory. Another perspective
turns to attributions, with non-intersecting proponents in both psychology (Markus and
Kitayama 1991, Ross and Nisbett [1991] 2011, Ross, Greene and House 1977) and
sociology (Fuchs 2001a, b, Meyer and Jepperson 2000, Meyer 2010). When these
different theoretical perspectives are collated and brought into direct contrast, the results
may yield theoretical advances for wider debates on agency and the self. They may also
reinvigorate collective behavior as a subdiscipline no longer constrained by the political
limitations of social movement research.
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designers are so glamorous, they are doing these beautiful things… [In reality],
they chase the runway and they take our [supply-side] designs.
Priyanka, meanwhile, adopts a moderate position consistent with her personality:
While the foreign designer cannot claim that they made the garment, actually we
cannot claim it either. Because we have to go to them for their approval, we get
part of our designs from them. The runway designers, actually they are the real
designers, because we are looking to them for inspiration, to WGSN.
Lakshit, like Rahul, appears unaffected by lacking attributions and recognition. “Let
them,” he says. “What is it worth to me? I know in my heart that I have made this design.
I don’t need anyone to tell me that, because I know I have done it.”
The general manager of marketing at MEI adds a perspective deepened by almost
20 years of experience. Riya notes of buyer presentations,
See, 20 years back these [marketing] interactions were very limited. We didn’t
have the design team or the design talent pool in India, but currently there is the
best design talent. So most of the innovations are going from here to there. We
know what is new in the market, what is new in the fabric, what it is new in the
trim. It is not that—earlier it used to be from customer to us. Nowadays, we give
to them, what is the trend, what is new in the market… No one from Europe has
to tell us. We go to the showrooms and we know what is happening in Europe. So
even before the customer comes, we tell them: this is what is in your showrooms,
this is what is in your runway, this is what is in your fashion show.
Riya’s statement should be interpreted with some caution. At another point in our
interview she abdicated knowledge of specific trends to the designers working alongside
her. Her perspective on design talent stakes an outlier position as well (cf. Godart 2014a).
What is important, however, is how quickly and how much Indian design talent has
evolved. As mentioned earlier, fashion schools in India and China hardly existed before
the 1980s. This small dose of history helps to make sense of the ambivalence of
designers.
As in Skov’s analysis of Hong Kong designers (2002), the most consistent
position among the supply-side designers I studied is that they seem to have adjusted
their desires to their occupation and location within the apparel GVC. Habitus is thus a
suggestive possibility, though there are few, if any, meaningful measures of habitus that
are not longitudinal in both individual personality and environmental conditions (see
Desmond 2006 for a rare successful application). Another possibility is a simpler
pragmatic resolution favoring the institutional logic of responsiveness (Pedroni and
Volonté 2014): “If it’s not sitting in a store,” Amrita says, “it’s useless.” Supply-side
designers are compensated for their work indirectly, at least—ACE and MEI pay their
salaries as part of factory overhead. And buyers feel they are generous in their pricing.
Now, I certainly believe that uncovering the basis and principles of moral authority,
including artistic license, is a fundamental goal of sociology (Durkheim
1912/1995:210n6). My research suggests, however, that the aesthetic and socialpsychological tensions of fashion and design are of low intensity in India and would be
stronger in a highly individualistic society like the United States. A different way to
resolve buyer-side and supply-side tensions is economic, not psychological. Negotiation
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over unit prices—the process of costing—makes competitive institutional demands
clearer.
The ethics of design outsourcing can be interpreted by referencing laws and
norms. Intellectual property protections in the fashion industry are weak, usually
restricted to brand trademarks. As in cuisine, “don’t copy exactly” is a normative
regulation that surfaces in the practice of tweaking. Failed tweaks need not be exacting
replications to be deemed “copying.” Neither buyers nor suppliers occupy a moral high
ground at the level of social psychology. Suppliers sometimes steal or copy from other
suppliers, but they are often abetted by buyers in this practice. The most transparent form
of tweaking in practice involves disclosing the immediately preceding buyer.
Transparency improves trustworthiness by invoking complicity. The outgroup
homogeneity effect is visible in critiques of conformity by other buyers and designers but
a refusal to recognize similar conduct among themselves. Indian designers in the apparel
GVC appear to have mixed evaluations about the relative justice of unequal recognition.
Work practice and order prices are more salient in ethnographic context.
Unit Costing
The frontstage story of unit costing is presented here in four sections:
components, order size, negotiations, and price pressure. The backstage story,
coordinated through a centralized industrial engineering team, is significantly more
complicated; the details of why exactly larger orders are cheaper to produce are intricate.
Because the work of planning and industrial engineering departments is closer to
operations rather than product development, I will explain the unit cost breakdown in
more detail later. Here I focus on freight-on-board (FOB) prices, or the single number
that buyers will pay suppliers.126 Buyers and suppliers negotiate FOB costs based on a
variety of inputs. I begin by introducing the basic cost components, including the
difference between FOB and retailer (MSRP) prices and the supplier pricing model of
“open” costing. Order sizes, by increasing or decreasing efficiency, also affect FOB
costs. Each order is negotiated—sometimes accepted and sometimes rejected by
suppliers. There is longitudinal movement toward sharper prices, partially driven by the
hidden costs of extended full-package manufacturing. This sometimes encourages
suppliers to accept orders “at cost,” though such acceptances are uncommon at the
suppliers I studied.
Basic Cost Components
Four major components contribute to FOB prices: materials, assembly labor,
overheads, and profit. FOB prices are the focal point of negotiations and will dominate
my analysis of costing. They exclude a wide range of costs borne by retailers, including
126

There is variation in how far supplier responsibility reaches into the value chain (see
Chapter 9), but FOB is the most common at the suppliers I studied.
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shipping, distribution, property management, marketing, overheads, and profits (among
others). At a superficial level it is enough to take FOB costs as a given and divide them
into component percentages. Fabric, discussed extensively in Chapter 5, constitutes
between 40 and 70% of FOB price. The highest estimate is generated by a fabric
inspection manager at MEI. Vaasu reports that materials cost was as high as 60% of FOB
“in the early days,” but is now going down, in part thanks to government subsidies. A
conscientious general manager of marketing at ACE continues to report 60%. Vijay
Mathur, the additional secretary general of AEPC, suggests 50% nationally. Another
authoritative number, 40%, comes from exact data by Radhika, the general manager of
accounting at one division of MEI. Estimates for labor costs127 range from 10-40%.
Mathur suggests an average of 20% nationally while Radhika cites 30% at MEI. The
general manager of human resources at MEI is the only participant to claim labor as more
expensive than materials. Labor costs rise with special processes, adding 4-5% to the
labor component. Major special processes include embroidery (hand or computer),
printing (knits), and washing (denim). Labor costs also vary significantly over the course
of peak and low seasons.
Fabric and labor are the biggest cost components, but costs of overheads or trims
(e.g., zippers, but including secondary fabrics like linings) can also reach high
percentages. Overheads include staff salaries, utilities, property management, audits, and
quality control costs (among others). Vaasu reports that the operational cost of machinery
was 27% of ACE’s budget in the previous year, prompting him to experiment with solar
power and LED lighting. He believes that reducing overheads by decreasing throughput
time is his most important job as a factory executive. MEI has lower overhead costs
(12%) because of economies of scale and less dependence on computer embroidery than
ACE. Trims range from 10-30% of FOB cost; Radhika reports 10% on average across
MEI. Profits again range considerably, from 1-10%, averaging 5-6% at MEI. They are
subject to negotiation in a way that labor costs are not, as I show in a later section.
A range of estimates from over the past century128 suggests surprisingly small
standard deviations in the material and labor component breakdown. Before WWI, the
average production cost of menswear was 49% materials, 27% direct labor, 8% selling,
and other smaller costs (Fairchild's 1920:518). Data from a 1935 UK Census of
Production (cited in Hague and Newman 1952:35-36) shows 50% cost for materials, 25%
for wages, and 20-25% for overheads. Excluding shipping, selling, administration, and
subcontracting, the American industry average in 1963 was 40% materials, 27% payroll,
An efficient way to discuss labor is under the heading of “process cost,” but CMT is
the most common acronym. Accounting and naming practices vary, but participants agree
that process cost includes cut, make, trim/finish, and pack (CM, CMT, CMTP). Good
accounting will also include washing costs, including fabric shrinkage. MEI does time
studies for CMTP+.
128
Fabric was extremely expensive before mass manufacturing of textiles. Leed (2006)
shows that garments were important items in Renaissance wills and could be sold to pay
debts or provide church donations. She gives the example of a 1593 doublet and hose
(made for a knight) in which materials were five times the cost of labor.
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and 6% profit (Priestland 1969:9). A 1980s sample of 15,000 US establishments again
shows labor at 27% of production costs (Sassen 1988:165).
Supplier Versus Retailer Prices (FOB Versus MSRP)
The average import price (FOB) from India to the US was $3.64 in 2012 (AAFA
2013:13). The average export price (FOB) in India was $4.84 in 2017, according to the
Additional Secretary General of AEPC. Of course I want to see how MEI compares, so I
ask Kartik, the assistant manager of accounting. He frowns pensively at the first number:
“$3.64 is too less, too less… I don’t know how it can be profitable...” Neither he nor I
was aware at the time of an order for four million sleepwear pieces recently placed by a
mid-tier brand, priced at $3 each. However, Mr. Mathur notes that huge quantities of
basic items create a “product-based skew” that can be usefully disaggregated. According
to Radhika, the least expensive items at MEI are knits, which in 2016 averaged $4.05
FOB cost. Men’s items are averaged at $6.65 and ladies’ items at $7. When I calculate
these prices while referencing the percent of sales in each division I find that the MEI
average FOB is $6.18, significantly higher than the average export price. Amrita
estimates the ACE average FOB at $7.50, higher than MEI probably because of
production restricted to ladieswear129 and because of smaller order sizes.
On the retail end, Amrita’s rule of thumb is to multiply the FOB price by five to
arrive at the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP), a 400% markup (matching
Appelbaum and Gereffi 1994:52, Cheng and Gereffi 1994:70).130 The same easy
mathematical strategy is found in Lardner (1988b:44). Actual examples from my
fieldwork include a value brand order produced for $5 that will retail at $30 and an
accessible luxury order produced for $23.70 that will retail at $88. Another way of
analyzing the cost breakdown is through so-called “transparency pricing.” There has been
modest movement in the retail world to disclose major component costs and profits to
consumers. One journalistic example is provided by the program director of global
sourcing and manufacturing at Nike (cited in Kish 2014). Of shoes priced at $100, 50%
of the cost is added in retail. The other value is split into $25 for FOB, $15 for overheads,
$4.50 for profit, $2.50 for customs duties, $2 for taxes, and $1 for shipping and
insurance. Elizabeth Suzann is a retailer which uses transparency pricing at the consumer
level. They openly charge $185, for example, for a wool crepe tunic that costs $63.13 to
produce (Pape 2017). Probably most common in the accessible luxury segment and more
common among US domestic retailers, one reporter argues that transparency pricing is
used strategically to justify prices that are higher than expected (Stevenson 2017). Pape,
ACE also does some kid’s sales, but childrenswear has the lowest margins of any
market category (Lardner 1988b:58).
130
Appelbaum and Gereffi note a typical markup of 55-60%, reaching as low as 30% for
bulk orders (>30k). It seems probable that these lower numbers refer to the retail markup.
Markups under majority-American manufacturing were smaller, about 125%, probably
because of higher labor costs (AAMA 1987:4).
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for her part, criticizes a similar $1,695 garment made by high-end luxury brand Chloé. As
of this writing transparency pricing is a niche model.
Open Costing
Supplier profit margins, by the experienced estimates of Niharika and Sanjana,
are typically around 3%. There is substantial variation among buyers, marketing staff,
styles, order sizes, and seasons: the range I observed directly is 0-35%. I do also hear a
few anecdotes of smaller factories taking orders at a loss (see below). Big buyers use
open costing rather than closed costing; Amrita estimates that 90% of ACE’s clients
require it contractually. In practice, open costing can follow the interpersonal
negotiations detailed above (see also “profit margins” below). Open costing means
disclosure of each input cost (though micro-requirements vary). Nikita, a senior product
manager at ACE, finds the disclosure requirements for one accessible luxury brand
especially miserly. Because other accounts allow higher margins or at least ask for larger
orders, she believes ACE will drop its relationship with the buyer in question if costing
requirements do not change. Closed costing is only disclosed to the retailer as a single
FOB cost. It allows for higher supplier margins, partially because product managers
itemize in rupees rather than stronger foreign currencies. Closed costing is more common
for buyers that are small, European, and in the accessible luxury segment. These buyers
either prefer the simplicity of closed costing—they may not have the resources to
challenge open costing if they are small—or want to encourage premium designs and
quality unburdened by expenditure monitoring. Buyers, for their part, engage in several
techniques to alter FOB costs. They can change designs to make them more “productionfriendly,” a process explained in Chapter 3. They can also adjust order sizes, a powerful
technique for mass retailers.
Order Sizes
Order begin with a minimum order quantity (MOQ) determined by the supplier.
IFS has an MOQ of 500 pieces for new customers, though it continues to produce smaller
orders for long-time clients. There is no official MOQ at ACE or MEI, but it is rare to see
orders smaller than 400 or 500 pieces. The smallest order I observe directly is 250 pieces
for an accessible luxury brand, priced at $18.80 per unit and yielding $4700 for ACE.
Although I was unable to obtain an exact median, ACE product managers describe a
“normal” order as one between five and 25k pieces. MOQs at MEI, according to division
product manager Ajith, are usually around 2k. A junior product manager working under
Ajith says that working on orders of 10k is “very less,” while 25-30k is “ok.” Both the
assistant manager of accounting and a senior production manager cite 20k as the average
order size. At any rate, orders larger than 500k unquestionably breach the normal range
and are only handled by senior managers like Ajith. For the past five years, he says, he
has worked on annual yearly orders between 3.8 and 5 million pieces.
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Large orders have lower unit costs because of design differences and economies
of scale. The largest order that I see in progress with Ajith is for four million pieces for a
mid-tier brand, simply a “soft PJ. Four parts: fabric, elastic waistband, eyelet,
drawstring.” A product manager at ACE confirms that larger quantities within the same
brand tend to be “more casual.” Although there is an inverse relationship between design
complexity and order quantity, Ajith says that giant orders go through the same quality
processes as any other, including rounds of costing, sourcing, sampling, etc.131 Larger
orders amortize overheads like staff salaries; they also increase efficiency through Fordist
principles (Chapter 6). Small orders, on the other hand, face special difficulties because
of upstream MOQs at fabric mills (e.g., 3k meters). A few small European brands are
willing to suffer upcharges for small fabric quantities even though they can add up to
175% of the same order cost at the MOQ.
While MEI prefers larger orders, marketing managers at ACE are indifferent to
order sizes under 100-200k. Arjun explains that small orders (500-2k) are typically more
design-intensive, with FOBs often reaching $18-20 per unit. Large buyers “compromise
on design” for prices of $5-6, but contribute similar net profits to suppliers because of
higher quantities. ACE calculates labor time according to order size brackets, with costs
diminishing in increments of 10-20k (updated quarterly). Marketing managers like
Aishwarya, however, have some discretion regarding price brackets. When an accessible
luxury brand orders 10k pieces in “master navy” and another 10k in “snow white,” but
after a few days requests an add-on of 950 pieces in each color,132 Aishwarya retains the
20k price bracket. At 24k instead of the current 21,900, she claims she would have
changed the unit price to reflect the higher bracket. Aishwarya also notes that the buyer
would be more likely to ask for the downcharge. Some buyers are more aggressive than
others: this brand, Aishwarya tells Amrita, routinely asks for undersized orders to be
costed in higher-volume brackets. “A lot of things I can do,” Amrita responds, “but this is
too much to ask.” Buyers undoubtedly have outsized power in negotiations with
suppliers, but first-tier suppliers do have some costing leverage built on value-added
services and production capabilities.
Negotiations
Buyer presentations are highly mobile: ACE employees come and go, designers
and buyers float around the room to look at samples, and assistant designers bring in
more garments on request. This relative mobility enhances the seriousness of costing,
which takes place with buyers and suppliers sitting on opposite sides of the table—a
position charged with the intensity of direct eye contact (Collins 2008:77-80). Costing
negotiations begin after selections have totally concluded, sometimes breaking for a
subdued lunch. When costing starts, the mood darkens and narrows. Buyers take over
emotional energy from designers and direct the focus of attention toward the bottom line.
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Giant orders are always tech packs, probably for liability reasons (see Chapter 6).
These 1900 pieces will be allocated to Indian stores, appearing on the same global “instore date.”
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The logic of accounting displaces the logic of creativity. Costing negotiations only
include garments selected during previous buyer presentations. These garments have
approved by top buyers and likely assigned a place within a final brand collection
(including styles from hundreds of other suppliers). At SFI marketing managers work on
50-80 costings per month, of which about 10 make it to purchase orders.
The least confrontational methods of negotiation involve “cost exercises” from a
potential client133 or prior cost estimates from buyers. Nikita, an ACE product manager,
works with an accessible luxury buyer well-known for its high-quality garments. “I could
be working with $25 [FOB] in my mind,” she explains, “but they could be thinking about
$15, so I cannot start the development until they have given me an idea of their range.
They will tell me $17.50, then I will go to the CAD department and tell them to create a
Schiffli [lace] for under $17.50.” High prices need to be accompanied by notifications or
“call-outs”; buyers are straightforward about their needs. “If anything is going to be
pricy, we need to know—for intelligence—so that when we’re putting the collection
together we know how to balance it,” Mick says. Lakshit’s expensive development in
Chapter 3—a potential waste of designer time and tailoring/embellishment labor—
provides another example that was sorted out through a supplier notification and
incremental reductions.
Marketing mangers arrive at cost estimates by considering the components
discussed above: materials, labor, etc., as well as order size brackets and skill in
negotiation (see Chapter 6 for accounting details in industrial engineering). Buyers
usually allow a week for suppliers to arrive at cost estimates but sometimes demand one
within 24 hours. The supply-side estimate is called an initial costing, base costing, or first
quotation. The buyer-side estimate is called a target. Buyers learn to estimate target
prices through experience. Buying agents often add valuable experience to buyer teams
because many have previously worked at suppliers. Estimates are facilitated by core
competencies—leading to a restricted range of FOB prices, usually $5-25—and the
accumulated experience with technical utility and taste that we may call “convention.”134
Both buyers and suppliers want the other side to go first (see Simon 1997:80 on the
instability of competitive negotiation strategy). If the buyer’s target is high, ACE can
capitalize on it by accepting. The buyer thereby misses a chance at a lower target. If
ACE’s target is too low the supplier misses a chance for higher profits. There are two
immediate solutions to the problem. One is to change the rules of the game by sending
tech packs or sample developments to multiple suppliers for estimates. According to a
quality controller from a value brand, each order is counter-costed with a minimum of
three suppliers. The practice incentivizes suppliers to bid low because negotiations are a
one-shot interaction. The other solution is a low-intensity moral consensus in the
interaction order (Rawls 1987, 2012). In production networks, White argues (2002:134),
“commitments can issue only on the basis of approximations that are spontaneously
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Prior to a cost estimate both sides screen each other for financial soundness and
reputation. See details from IFS below.
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See Becker (1982:40-67). Mears (2011b) takes on the fascinating case of pricing
beauty—the look of a model. Modeling is more complex because bodies are involved, so
valuations are influenced by identity characteristics.
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workable in the field.” Although the examples to follow utilize the methodological
conventions of ethnography rather than conversation analysis, after learning the basic
procedures of costing I attempted to follow the back-and-forth as closely as possible
without the aid of an audio recorder. Participants include Amrita and Ankur versus
Patricia (the buyer from a mid-tier European brand) and her lead buying agent Tonya.
Tonya is Indian but apparently close to Patricia, at the least a battle-tested ally.
The first negotiation is about a white top made with chemical lace. Amrita and
Ankur open with $12.03 as the initial costing, but immediately present another option for
a $9.60 version without chemical lace and with embroidery removed from the front and
back. Amrita also says that she has made some changes which “added volume, because
the other one looked flat. But we used your sample color, your sample sleeve, your
sample drape.” Patricia is pleased with this but upset that the lace eyelets are too large: “I
had asked for them to be made smaller,” she tells Ankur. Ankur says he has not received
the request. Tonya admits fault in not forwarding the request, so Patricia relaxes: “Just so
it’s not completely see-through.” Amrita wants to preserve some of the design, so they
agree to reduce the size of the big eyelets only, retaining the size of the smaller eyelets.
After this point is resolved, Ankur discloses that the original prototype cost was
$16.44 and that the first price (initial costing) of $12.03 was already a reduction. Patricia
offers a target price (for the $9.60 option) of $8.90. Amrita is disappointed with the gap:
“We worked so hard to get that down from $16…” Ankur and Tonya both quickly punch
numbers into their hand calculators and provide low-voiced advice to their respective
lead negotiator. Patricia attempts to compromise at $8.97, but Amrita is not satisfied with
this. She confers with Ankur before resolving, “My best best price is $9.15, down from
$9.60. Will that help?” Patricia is relieved: “Yes, that will help.” Amrita continues to
think as she looks over the garment to see what else could be done. She says to herself,
“What if we remove this? But it will not look nice, it will look crooked…” The buyer
now steps back into the negotiation by zooming out. “Let’s go back to the original
[$16.44] for a moment,” she proposes. “That was [based on] 6k units. What if we did
16k?” Amrita and Ankur drop the price to $13.15, but negotiation is tabled.
Patricia moves onto the next item by holding up a skirt to her own body to
imagine it. Ankur has already provided an estimate of $8.72 over e-mail but says, “that
was based on a proto which was not fit to a body. After fitting, the cost would be $9.20,
but we’ll give [the initial cost at] $8.90. Amrita also offers to remove the pockets to lower
the cost. Tonya steps in to play with quantity: “Your costing was based on 9k [pieces].
What if we do 13k? I know your [price] brackets quite well!” she laughs. Amrita and
Ankur come back with $8.60. Patricia, by this point, wants to be done with it: “Can we
do $8.50 if we close it today?” Amrita agrees: “Yes, because I want some excitement.”
There are excited golf claps for the first deal of the day as Amrita laughs, “Don’t tell
Vaasu [who is on holiday] that I gave you this deal!”
After tasting success the buyer remains interested in the first garment with
chemical lace and Schiffli. “Let’s go back to the original. How many units was the first
costing for? 6k? For 16k, what’s your best best price?” Ankur jokes, “You keep
increasing the quantity… just make it 100k and we’ll make it free!” Everyone laughs.
From the original $16.44, Amrita and Ankur go down to $13.15. This still doesn’t work
for Patricia, so Amrita agrees to rework the prototype to remove some of the Schiffli.
136

Tonya is saddened: “Make it pretty, though…” she pines. Amrita laughs, “I push on
pretty things, don’t worry about that.” Now addressing Patricia, she says, “We’ll remove
Schiffli without you even knowing it.” Patricia adopts an intelligent smile: “Invisible
changes, we like those.” After further negotiations which proceed in a similar manner—I
remove myself to write fieldnotes—ACE and the buyer lock down prices for four styles.
This excerpt is closely linked to insights introduced earlier in this chapter and in
Chapter 3. Cost reduction is clearly an important goal, for example, which I claim (along
with technical utility) as the goal of product development. It does not override aesthetics,
however, partly because fashion is not a commodity. Buyers want consumers to be
excited about shopping and buying from one brand’s product assortment rather those of
retail competitors. Even within a new relationship that could easily slink into arms-length
negotiations (aided by the depersonalized medium of e-mail, for example), the economic
totems of prices punctuate negotiations amidst aesthetics and humor. The mood (indexed
by physical positions, for example) is more severe than during selections. Nonetheless, it
is relieved by social lubricants.
Mistakes and Adjustments
ACE marketing managers like Ankur keep detailed costing records which I am
allowed to examine in full. The target price, I discover, is nearly always lower than the
initial costing, usually by about $5 (less in cheaper orders). A $12.30 initial costing, for
example, is matched against a $7.25 target. Occasionally they are quite close, sometimes
within 20 cents. Ankur facilitates target matching by asking his assistants to track down
retail prices of garments ordered last season compared to the FOB price. If a buyer
chances to provide a high target price quickly met by a marketing manager, the buyer
learns that she has made a mistake. Mistakes happen on both sides, both conventionally
and mathematically. Sneha, a marketing manager, shows me an example of a buyer
mistake from an accessible luxury brand where the target price for a dress was $13.
Dresses are technically complex, though, and Sneha’s first quotation was $23.60. She is
experienced enough not to lower her offer. She spits, “Their target price is wrong. We
cannot do a long dress for $13.” In a different case CAD once internally quoted a price to
Sneha per meter of cloth, not the two meters required for a skirt. She did not cross-check
the CAD price: “I don’t have enough time, first thing, and it’s generally not important
enough.” She was likely criticized, for as Sanjana tells me, “in an [internal] costing
mistake, there is a zero percent tolerance.”
First-tier suppliers, even small ones, try hard but do not simply capitulate in
negotiations. Amrita tells me that “if the buyer doesn’t get the right price, there is a last
offer [from us]. Otherwise buyer goes to another manufacturer.” I witnessed multiple
cases of suppliers declining orders; I provide examples in a later section about profit
margins. At SFI marketing agents bring their costings to Niharika, the general product
manager, when they are struggling. Niharika works to “squeeze” costs out “to meet the
buyer target.” However, she also claims that “we are a value-for-money supplier.” She
invokes a hypothetical example, explaining that “we will offer a ₹10 price for ₹10
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quality, not a ₹7 price for ₹5 quality.” In her framing, although initial SFI prices are
slightly higher than competitor prices, quality and fairness accompany the offers. Firsttier suppliers or buying agencies may also squeeze subcontractors to preserve margins for
themselves. Paaus, a buying agency executive, argues that where other agencies simply
perform “costing,” his agency performs “cost optimization” or “cost re-engineering.”
(These terms come from the accounting world.) As an example of being “aggressive,”
Paaus pumps his fist and stares intently: “We will go all the way to the mill. If they are
giving us 65 cents, we will challenge them for 50 cents. We will challenge everything:
cost of petroleum…” he lists four or five similar variables too quickly for me to jot them
down, but the point is clear. Cost optimization “allows us to create new opportunities
where people think it cannot be done.” One more trick that Amrita uses for a “bad
paymaster” is to restrict a buyer to off-season production. Readers will learn more about
such moves in later discussions of account management and factory planning (Chapter 6).
Costing is often done in person (sometimes through buying agencies), but e-mail
is also functional. A senior marketing manager at ACE informs me that costing typically
takes four or five rounds for one mid-tier brand costing by e-mail. I ask Nikita to walk me
through an example. She brings up an e-mail chain from a domestic value brand where
the initial cost is ₹399 ($6.25). The buyer replies that she needs a price under ₹300. For a
second costing Nikita removes paneling and lace trim on the back for an estimate of
₹285. Here I interrupt her explanation: “If they just need to get it under ₹300, why not
charge ₹299 and keep the rest for ACE?” Nikita takes this in stride by reminding me that
the buyer is domestic (see the difference below):
My first priority is to utilize the stock fabric. Second, we are doing four [similar]
styles for them, so they can compare. If one style is ₹285 and one is ₹299, they
will ask why the one is ₹299. Third, if my prices are too high, they will go
somewhere else. And I don’t want to lose this order, so I will give them a good
price.
The order uses stock fabric in six colors to produce 300 pieces in each of 29 styles,
bringing the total to 8700 pieces. The FOB price of ₹285 will retail for ₹1149, leaving a
smaller retailer margin than that of most exports.
Price Pressure
Components, order sizes, and negotiations differ for each purchase order. Price
pressures, on the other hand, capture macro-historical tendencies and the effects of social
movement activism. There are three approaches which provide background for the data to
follow: trade deals and the governance structure of GVCs, social movements and
mobilizations, and retail marketing. Although microeconomic studies set the tone for
policy debates (Fourcade 2006), I begin with the broader perspective led by GVC
analysis. The latter’s focus on governance is a typical sociological critique of a
developmental economics literature that has divorced micro from macro theory
(Henderson, Dicken, Hess et al. 2002:436-37, see also White 1993 p. 165n8).
138

Trade policy, foreign direct investment, and currency fluctuations can have
dramatic effects on the resilience of suppliers and their prices (Schrank 2004, Tokatli and
Eldener 2004). Policy changes appear to have the most rapid effects on “captive”
production markets135 like Nicaragua. Ninety-six percent of Nicaraguan apparel exports
are to the US (Frederick, Bair and Gereffi 2015:7). With similar situations in Mexico and
across Central America, suppliers quickly lost market share to China at the end of the
Multi-Fiber Agreement.136 Because India, China, and Turkey have diversified export
markets (see “account management” below), they do not face the problems of captive
production markets to the same extent. The US, meanwhile, has witnessed the decline of
protectionism and the rise of outsourcing as a form of labor discipline: fear has stimulated
the acceptance of declining wages and worker rights. Though resistance is visible, local
efforts appear no match for transnational corporate power (e.g., Broughton 2015, Collins
2002).
Anti-sweatshop activism seems to affect prices in a much more concentrated
fashion. Because brand reputations are so important, activist campaigns often target
brands directly (Klein 2002a). Shame may be more powerful than positive ethical labels.
Harrison and Scorse (2010), in an important article, show that significantly higher wages
followed anti-sweatshop campaigns directed at foreign-owned firms in Indonesia.137
Pressure from university students, human rights groups, and the US governement did not
mean that brands paid workers more—just that suppliers were forced to accept lower
profit margins. Harrison and Scorse gloss over the role of buyers as chain drivers with
compliance responsibilities, a common economic oversight that could be avoided with
GVC analysis. Still, they provide a well-documented study of the trickle-down effects of
activism.
A final background consideration is relevant for retail marketing. Liberal
economists regularly contend that raising retail prices by a small amount (1-6%) is a
viable means of financing worker pay raises (Deloitte Access Economics 2017, Elliott
and Freeman 2007, Pollin, Burns and Heintz 2004). These studies try to consider the
governance architecture of GVCs seriously. The agenda also compares favorably with the
neo-classical argument for sweatshops. However, these studies express methodological
flaws as they systematically undervalue social desirability bias. Further, they express
deeper theoretical oversight by failing to question the role of firms in shaping income
inequality (Cobb 2015). As Berkeley economist Sylvia Allegretto has analyzed (2014),
the wealth of the Walton family alone—$145 billion—is equal to the combined wealth of
the bottom 43% of Americans. In 2016 “the company bought back $8.3 billion of their
stock which could have given their hard-pressed employees, many of whom are on
135

See Gereffi et al. (2005) on varieties of governance structures. The framework can be
operationalized at multiple levels.
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Such shifts seem difficult to anticipate if analysis is limited to the city or regional
level. See Uzzi (1996, 1997) on New York City and Collins (2003) on Mexico.
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Most of the wage growth is attributable to increased compliance with minimum wage
laws (2010:248). The country still has a high non-compliance rates (39%) but performs
better than India (51%) or the Philippines (54%). See Cowgill and Huynh (2016).
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welfare, a several thousand dollar raise” (Nader 2017).138 Is raising consumer prices
really the most appropriate tactic for Walmart to pay their (production) workers a living
wage? With this skeptical point at hand, let us turn to the ethnographic data on price
pressure at first-tier Indian suppliers.
Upward Allowance
Marketing managers are incentivized to seek high margins through commission
earnings and bonuses; SFI and IFS product managers attempt 15% profit with new or
liberal buyers. There is no single variable leading to high profits that brokers consensus
across managerial hierarchies or departments. Working with buyers in higher-end retail
segments, however, is the most consistent path to higher profit margins that I uncover.
Suppliers capitalize on small order quantities with these buyers, surely. Staff motivation,
though, is improved by respect for buyers—a respect connected to marginal allowances
by the logic of administrative exceptionalism. Although upward allowances may be
viewed as waste, my evidence suggests that they promote higher quality production.
Assistant product manager Aman at IFS contrasts competing mid-tier buyers with
different tolerances for supplier margins. Beyond net FOB prices, she claims that higher
profit tolerances (6-8%) earn buyers higher quality and better design. A buyer in the same
segment who is stricter (2-3%) will receive a similar look but “of a different variety,” a
euphemism for “cheaper.” Such differences are more pronounced when product
managers are not forced to use mills nominated by buyers (Chapter 5). “If [the buyer]
will not allow [us higher] margins [and] if we can choose, obviously we will look for a
cheaper option,” Aman explains. Through various accounting tricks like adding a higher
“profit” that actually reflects component costs (see below), product managers working
with more liberal buyers are willing to splurge for fabric that will have higher wastage
(viscose, for example) rather than substituting an inferior option. Managers do not agree
that working exclusively with higher-tier brands is ultimately more profitable (see the
account management section below). Still, assessments of quality are directly connected
to component costs. At IFS, when business with an accessible luxury client was at its
peak, the factory owner sponsored a company-wide party. Such occasions provide brief
respites from consistent downward pressure.
Downward Pressure
“The number one issue is price pressure from the buyer,” says Gokul, the owner
of SFI, in response to a question about the biggest challenge of business. Such analysis is
common; infrastructure and lean management are the only other competing executive
responses. Top managers at all four suppliers I studied increasingly feel that “nowadays
every buyer is reducing their target prices” and that “you have to offer a very sharp price
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On the working conditions of US fashion retail workers see Ehrenreich (2001) as well
as Williams and Connell (2010).
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to the buyer, the lowest price.” Even one accessible luxury brand “always emphasizes
cost, even with high quality design,” according to a marketing manager at ACE.
Maintaining low prices thus occupies a large portion of management attention. Above
and beyond strategic positioning, pressure from lean retailing is impactful. Lean retailing
relies on electronic data interchange (EDI) to capture and forecast inventory levels on a
weekly or real-time basis (Abernathy et al. 1999). It is the foundation for fast fashion,
supporting a vastly expanded product assortment with rapid replenishment. Beginning in
the 1970s and 1980s with supermarkets, big buyers like Walmart were the first movers in
the apparel industry. Because apparel is a buyer-driven GVC, lean retailing consequently
requires lean manufacturing from suppliers. An Oxfam report (2004) argues that in lean
manufacturing, “it’s the workers who get leaned on.” While the critique lacks nuance and
ignores first-tier suppliers, even those that I studied agree that buyers are tightening their
prices along with their expectations.
Gokul blames US retailers for pushing down consumer expectations for prices.
“What does a shirt cost at Walmart? $6?” (When I check the first hit online in June 2015,
the answer is $3.58.) “[Discount] stores like Marshalls are doing the same thing,” he
continues. “And what does a burger cost? A burger costs more than a shirt.” Changes
toward lean retailing and lean manufacturing may be easier to accommodate in earlier
stages of market and firm evolution when there is more organizational slack (but see
Cyert and March 1992). Amrita says that 20 years ago when the export sector in India
was unorganized, ACE could earn much large profits from each order. “Profit leads to
inefficiency,” Vaasu once tells me, meaning “when business is flourishing, you overlook
everything” that could be improved.
Hidden costs of extended full-package manufacturing
Chandana, a general product manager at ACE, started her job in 1999. She now
works exclusively with a mid-tier client that once accounted for 50% of ACE’s revenues
(see account management below). Since around 2010, price has become her single largest
source of stress. She sharpens her face and allows a combination of acidity and respect
into her voice as she proclaims that “From that year, [the buyer] is fighting for the
prices… [the] buyer is very, very smart.” They are using more aggressive strategies to
trim expenses. While previous agreements specified that the buyer would apply a 5%
discount when receiving orders at their US warehouse within 45 days, they now apply a
discount of just 2.5% and delay payments to suppliers (supporting interest accrual). They
ask for re-orders at a lower cost, meaning if the first order was for $7 per garment, they
will ask for $6.50. I verify such details by viewing purchase orders with a marketing
manager. He and his assistant agree with Chandana’s assessment: “now they are smart
enough to check that yardage [ordered] is actually being used,” he adds.
While on the one hand the buyer asks for lower prices on re-orders because preproduction activities are no longer required, on the other hand “we think that hidden costs
are rising,” Chandana says. Buyers are asking for more and more work out of suppliers
for what I call extended full-package manufacturing. There are new and higher
expectations for design, tailoring, testing, and compliance protocols. This requires ACE
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to hire more employees: Chandana points the CAD department next to her office and says
she has hired three people within the last year.139 On top of this, labor costs for
production workers are always rising. Chandana’s strategy for a recent re-order was to
maintain the $7 price and accept a diminished profit margin.
Producing at cost
Although there are a few accounting techniques (e.g., playing with currency
fluctuations) to cut corners, suppliers are sometimes forced to produce “at cost” or even
“below cost.” Orders with a potential 1% or 0% profit that would be rejected during peak
seasons may be accepted during lean seasons; Vaasu does this to avoid firing workers and
to avoid losses on machinery-based overheads.140 I also ask Furkan, from product
development, why a supplier might accept an order with negligible profits. Echoing the
principles of Vaasu, Amrita, and Ankur, he begins by telling me that he refuses orders at
or below cost:
A few weeks ago, buyer came to me, he ask me for a price on one jeans. Wash
process was not easy, so many things were there. So ok, I priced it out, I told him,
‘We can do this for $2.20.’ He say to me, ‘I have one supplier who will give me
90 cents.’ 90 cents! Who can do that! I tell him, ‘Fine! Other guy will do it for 90
cents, go let him do it.’ That is too less…
First-tier suppliers have more leverage than scholars sometimes acknowledge; orders are
negotiated or sometimes refused rather than simply accepted. Furkan continues his story,
now reaching further into the past, to explain the logic of accepting orders at cost:
10 years ago, there was no knowledge of how to do [denim] whisker by hand
sand. Few people only knew how to do it, so they could do for $1, very good
profit. Then some other guys learn, they leave, they offer to same buyer, ‘Ok, I
can do for 90 cents.’ That’s fine, still pretty good profit is there. Another guy
says, ‘I can do for 80 cents.’ And it goes down and down, everyone learns how to
do it. Now? 30 cents. 30 cents is cost… Price should be going up each year.
Energy cost is up. Workers, have to pay them more, each thing up, up. But price,
year, every year, $1.50, $1.50, $1.50.
This example is clearly connected to Chandana’s concerns about re-orders and the hidden
costs of extended full-package manufacturing. It is echoed by Vijay Mathur of AEPC,
who argues that “productivity gains cannot keep up with falling or flat prices;” while
productivity gains were appropriately expected 10 years ago, now they are “beyond the
scope” of most manufacturers. The implications of accepting lower margins reach beyond
individual orders. In fact, some participants view it as a mechanism by which Asian
brands will overtake American ones.
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Chandana says of her visits to buyer headquarters over the last 15 years that buyerside technicians used to consist of “so many people.” Their numbers are now significantly
diminished.
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The owners of SFI and IFS let go of up to half of their workforce during lean seasons.
Half-pay is another option. See Chapter 9.
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Only one study participant remains unphased by buyer pressure toward cost
reductions. RC Kesar, Director General of the Okhla Garment and Textile Cluster,
furrows his brows unsympathetically:
There is oversupply in capacity… You see, [suppliers] got used to the quota
system.141 They could sell more often at the prices they offered… These
companies have been crying for the last 10 years, but still they are surviving. Still
they are making a profit… The churning [of failure and growth] will continue, but
the industry is growing.
Mr. Kesar also believes that fashion itself has shifted with the advent of lean retailing. “I
already have 10 shirts,” he says, tugging on his own dress shirt to demonstrate. “But now
I see your shirt (he points), now I want that. Fashion is aspirational today, we don’t need
it. So you have to convince the customer. And how do you convince the customer? The
number one thing is cost.” The actual behavior of institutional buyers—in contrast to
marketing surveys that fail to acknowledge social desirability bias—supports Mr. Kesar’s
opinion. In the US, where apparel prices demanded 15% of annual income in 1874
(Fairchild's 1920:496), today they account less than 4% of personal consumption
expenditure (AAFA 2009:2).142 Mr. Kesar’s critique is a reminder about the demographic
realities of population ecology (Hannan and Freeman 1977) and the limitations of
ethnographic embeddedness.
Unit costing is driven by basic cost components, order sizes, negotiations, and
price pressures. These factors are tied together by marketing managers and product
managers in fairly complex ways, as when product managers dip into higher profit
margins to secure high-quality fabric for a buyer. FOB prices are, by a rule of thumb,
about 20% of MSRP. Buyers placing large orders can gain access to lower price brackets,
a strategy frequently used in negotiations. Interpersonal costing negotiations are
exchanges punctuated with emotional dynamics rather than pervaded by them. They can
be analytically bracketed from longitudinal price pressures which have a special impact
on supplier profit margins. Higher-tier buyers tend to be more generous with their
allowances, presumably because they believe, like supply-side staff, that it results in
higher-quality products. Downward pressure is far more pervasive, however, and
occupies a disproportionate amount of managerial attention. Managers believe they must
be responsive to the demands of buyers, but not so much that they are willing to accept
orders below cost. The hidden costs of extended full-package manufacturing create
tension between buyers and suppliers. First-tier suppliers, probably more than lower-tier
suppliers, have other methods of coping with the tensions of hidden costs. Account
management, covered in the next section, has large impacts on business potential.

Recall Vaasu’s maxim that “profit leads to inefficiency.”
Improvements in technology, production techniques, and global sourcing account for
the drop. See Abernathy et al. (1999:241) on personal consumption expenditure, Anner et
al. (2012:6-8) on import prices and worker rights, and MacDonald (2006:23) on import
prices and quantities.
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Chapter Summary
I have taken an expansive view of marketing activities in this chapter, arguing that
marketing follows an institutional logic of responsiveness. From the very beginning, the
departmental division of labor is personalized according to clients. Major buyers have
dedicated supply-side designers at MEI, sometimes even separate designers for American
and European or retail and wholesale divisions. Based on the argument that contemporary
fashion is organized by brands, I introduced a general model of retail segmentation which
includes haute couture, high-end luxury, accessible luxury, bridge, mid-tier, value, and
discount retailers. Excepting haute couture, all other segments engage in sourcing from
semi-peripheral countries like India, China, and Turkey. My observations include a
roughly normal distribution of client segments with mid-tier brands as the mode.
Buyers and suppliers have different travel regimes for buyer selections; my
observations are limited to Indian showrooms and ethnographic interviews that confirm
similar activities at buyer-side showrooms. On the Indian side the showroom assortment
changes in preparation for each buyer. It is based on an initial sorting by mood board
themes and a secondary thinning (curating). Through symbolic interaction, preparation is
intimately intertwined with selections. Buyer selections themselves are a massive
production, an interaction ritual filled with emotional energy. Selections have multiple
facets of acceptance, criticism, tweaking, and winnowing. Tweaking is an important
mechanism in the selection process which affects about half of first-round selections.
Tweaking references the ideal customer image, buyer habitus, and technical
considerations. The likelihood of tweaking is reduced by supplier anticipation. Selections
are eventually finalized as order conversions and purchase orders, measurable by a “hit
rate” significantly reduced from initial selections.
Supply-side designers, believing that new styles are the most fashionable,
constantly consign old items to the design archive and introduce new content. Ethics are
discussed through laws and norms; both suppliers and buyers must take precautions to
avoid violations. Such precautions are largely automatic at the first-tier suppliers I
studied, though senior personnel still sharply remember errors from earlier experiments.
Social-psychological attributions follow the “outgroup homogeneity effect,” whereby
designers believe that other designers are more imitative than themselves. This effect is
fundamental to fashion as a social-psychological phenomenon, which I define as dynamic
conformity to the modal representation of taste.
Unit costing follows selections. Buyers take center stage from designers, a change
that signals a shift toward the logic of accounting. Our discussion of basic cost
components references supplier versus retailer prices—FOB versus MSRP—and
mentions the practice of open costing. Open costing does not ensure full transparency,
but this is condoned by both buyers and suppliers in favor of negotiation. Negotiation
tactics for big buyers feature adjustments to order size. Both sides can make mistakes and
suppliers can reject buyer offers. Upward costing allowances are allowed in some
circumstances; firms need to offer value-added garments to their customers, including
value from design and technical quality. Downward pressure is much more salient,
however, which we have discussed through the “hidden costs” of what I call extended
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full-package manufacturing. Producing at cost is a potential strategy for lean seasons but
one which is not ordinarily permitted under the accounting standards at ACE or MEI.
Account management, finally, is a method for dealing with growth and risk. Firsttier suppliers are, through strategic behavior, avoiding the pitfalls of captive supply and
overexposure. Regional exposure to European, American, and Indian buyers offers
tradeoffs including creativity, standardization (security and efficiency), and surplus
absorption. Growth is not a unilinear project. MEI seeks to meet the needs of big buyers
by offering extended contracts and accommodating extremely large order sizes. ACE, on
the other hand, is backing away from growth for growth’s sake, focusing instead on
matching its core competence to a productive niche among mid-tier, bridge, and
accessible luxury buyers. Executive attention at IFS is focused on financial solvency and
the improved assessment of buyer reputation. SFI, lastly, has embarked on a project of
original brand manufacturing. Driven by anger toward Western buyers, a strategic shift
up the value chain, and the embrace of India’s demographic and consumer potential,
executives are gradually replacing orders from Western brands with orders for its own
branded merchandise.
The work of design and marketing is carried out with buyers as the primary
reference group. As orders progress through the process flow, the logics of creativity and
responsiveness will still be active; however, they take other forms and are of distinctly
less importance. Creativity will be applied in technical fixes—a hook-and-eye fastener
rather than a button, for instance—but “personal touches” by product management staff
or assembly-lines workers are actively discouraged. Likewise, though buyer relationships
are still very important in the product management department, the next “clients” of
product management include the internal departments of industrial engineering, planning,
and operations. The vice president of operations (COO), in particular, holds power
approximate to the vice president of marketing. The duty of smoothing multitudinous
tensions among these stakeholders falls to product managers, the subject of the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5: PRODUCT MANAGEMENT
The consummation of design and marketing ends in a purchase order, whereupon
administration is transferred to the product management department. But for at least my
first two weeks in product management departments, I do not actually understand what it
is that a “merchandiser” does.143 From junior product managers I hear vague explanations
like “our responsibility is everything that the customer wants.” When I sit down for a
meeting with Sanjana, the assistant general product manager at ACE, I start looking for
metaphors or similar occupations. Perhaps secretaries and travel agents are similarly
occupied by arranging details for all parties and conscientiously ensuring that they are
carried through? The only response this earns is list of duties including product life cycle
management, procurement, buyer communication, and multiple rounds of testing and
approvals. When I suggest a similarity between to auditors, she balks: “They just check
on what has already been done. We have to go after things. We give a weekly status
update to the buyers, follow up on every request…” I lose track of the rest of her sentence
and simply bracket it in my jottings as “must badger the customer.”
Certainly the communicative focus of product managers is intense, as ACE senior
product manager Nikita makes clear to me:
We must know the answers to all the questions before we send anything to anyone
else… We are not like a postmaster. We do not just do deliveries. We have the
responsibility to make sure we know the answers to every question; without us
none of this (waves hand in a circle to indicate premises) would work.
Apart from executives (perhaps), product managers have the widest network connections
at a factory. In addition to brand managers and designers, they communicate with fabric
and trims suppliers, technicians, buying agents, planners, factory managers, embroidery
managers, and forwarders (in shipping). I get the best physical exercise here, by a casual
estimate making about 20 trips to other departments per day. A product manager is at any
time subject to incoming communication by in-person visit, e-mail, phone call, cell
phone, or text.144
For any particular style, Avi (the training manager of IFS) tells me, a product
manager “knows the whole story, right from the beginning. They can change the order to
make it more production-friendly, they can handle delivery issues…” Although no one
used the occupational description of product management, it is accurate. The jurisdiction
is weak. Signals include not only different names for departments at different suppliers
(including “customer service”), but also frequent changes in organizational routines and
design. In contrast to production, says Niharika, the general product manager at SFI,

Product managers are called “merchandisers” in the Indian context. Their artistic
license is more restricted than brand retail or visual merchandisers. Commercialism
remains important for each specialization, with Mickey Drexler (Gap, J. Crew) as the
most famous merchant CEO in recent times (cf. Appadurai 2013:259, Mora 2006,
Pedroni and Volonté 2014).
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“every two to three years we are changing the system, the procedures— not changing…
updating.”
The cardinal qualities of product managers are conscientiousness and persistence.
Sanjana, for example, brackets creativity from her role and assigns it to designers and
marketing staff instead. Joking with an ACE senior product manager (whom I found to be
rather bright) about the intelligence one must need of keep track of everything, she
disagreed: “You don’t need to be smart. The job is not theoretical, like that. You just
need to be really organized.” Finally, product manager definitions of quality are
operationalized as “customer satisfaction,” “freedom from deficiency,” and “commitment
to match the parameters agreed upon.” Of course contracts are not just agreements about
price, but commitments to exchange of information (Simon 1991:41). These
commitments sometimes create problems rather than solve them, as I will show, but they
define the occupational culture.
Readers should note two themes percolating through the chapter. The first is the
consequences of fast fashion throughout the value chain. Because product managers are
responsible for creating and managing deadlines, the temporal pressures are probably
more visible here than in any other department. Buyers and supplier executives generally
favor faster cycle times, but it is up to product managers to make them happen
(stakeholder acrimony included). Second, minute details in component sourcing and fit
standards provide firm evidence of quality differences among brand tiers. There are a
host of arguments about whether a t-shirt from Hugo Boss is any different than a t-shirt
from Walmart—even among my participants, many deny that there is a difference apart
from price and branding. However, quality differences do range from cotton quality and
sorting to fit standards. I will fully develop this argument in a separate article with data
throughout the value chain (invoking social psychology and sociology of knowledge), but
it will require more a detailed analysis which is only begun here.
Department Structure
There is more variation in the location and organizational design of product
management than in any other department. At MEI, it is located in the middle of design,
marketing, and sourcing to account for the fact that product managers “will talk to
everyone.” Most of the ACE product managers are at headquarters, but I also spend time
in an ancillary location where the general product manager, Chandana, is based. She
welcomes me with an embarrassed laugh, cuing me to the status difference between
design and production: “This is a bit congested. That is the headquarters [where you were
before]; this is the factory.” Indeed, there are eight product managers cramped into a
small room. Rakesh, a senior product manager who drives me to work and teaches me his
routines, repeatedly tries to honor me with his own seat because there is not enough room
for more chairs. (I accept only a stool.) At SFI, Niharika supervises product management
in addition to design.
Almost all of the product managers I spend time with have degrees from a fashion
institute in design, textiles, or garment manufacturing technology. Most senior product
managers were previously employed at smaller factories or buying agencies (Chapter 2),
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moving back and forth for promotions. Sanjana, who received her education from a
master tailor at ACE, relates with some pride that she became the first dedicated product
manager at the company, breaking out from production management. As the business
expanded, “clients demanded merchandisers,” which means that clients demanded more
efficient handling of sourcing, approvals, and associated tasks. As Archana Gandhi puts
it, “the ability to ship a decent garment, on time every time and [at] a competitive price, is
no longer an asset. It has become an entry-level requirement” (2011:22).
More than 90% of product managers at the firms I studied are women. When I ask
a senior product manager at IFS about the all-female gender composition in her
department, she laughs: “I think females are more sincere in their work,” she says. “Boys
are not so focused. The planning department, they have more boys over there. They are
dealing [with coordination] internally.” Avi also relates his belief that softer women are
better suited to satisfy the requests of buyers, while tougher men in industrial engineering
can push the production department harder. At SFI too, Niharika acknowledges that “it’s
mostly girls here, you must have noticed. We want them to go home to their families”
rather than working overtime on assembly lines. At ACE, where I had a product
management desk near the only man in the department, Vivek attributes the gender
composition to Sanjana’s rather soft personality and her hiring preference for
“cooperative” women rather than “aggressive” men.
There are between three and nine levels in the product management hierarchy:
vice president, general manager, assistant or division product managers,
senior/standard/junior product manager, and trainee. There are 10 division product
managers at the MEI unit where I spend the most time—these are the organization men
and women who keep the motors running (Jackall 1988, Whyte 1956). They handle three
to five accounts each, reporting to a GM who is responsible for about 20.145 According to
Sanjana, there is no purposeful account assignment according to client status or order
size. Instead the work is simply divided according to longevity and management capacity.
It generally takes about five years to advance to division product manager status and 15
or more years to advance further. Division product managers generally have two or three
assistants who begin with a single account. As accounts grow and the span of control
becomes less manageable (Urwick 1956), division product managers gradually unload
responsibilities to assistants.
Among the suppliers I studied, I found two models of apprenticeship and the
division of labor. Favoring efficiency and control, some division product managers divide
responsibilities according to experience. Because Shivangi’s first assistant was directly
responsible for fitting at her old job, the assistant is responsible for those approvals, buyer
communications, and revisions to the production timeline. Shivangi’s second assistant,
meanwhile, is only responsible for sample and trim approvals and is required to “run
everything by” Shivangi, who cannot afford to make mistakes: “If any single label or any
single tag gets rejected, it will be hard to meet the deadline. If there is a wash care label
and you have ordered a wrong instruction, you have to stop the production. If you have
Where designers are responsive to “brands” as buyers, marketing and project
managers respond to relatively impersonal “accounts” representing lines of business (cf.
Goffman 1959, Merton 1940).
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ordered a trim in the wrong size or maybe the wrong color, you have to stop the
production.” Shivangi herself, meanwhile, takes care of “the most critical” tasks of
costing and fabric sourcing.
The second model of dividing tasks conveys “fuller training” and promotes
“competency,” according to Abhi (who works next to Shivangi). He manages multiple
product divisions of a large mid-tier supplier (e.g., adults, kids, infants) but has also
recently been assigned another large account. Abhi gives two of his assistants “full
authority” to place orders and communicate with buying agents, checking in every other
day. Meanwhile, he goes to each meeting with the new client alone, returning to
supervise his third “fresher” assistant. After six months he will begin to hand over
responsibilities and repeat the process with another new buyer. Abhi’s second assistant
tells me that in the beginning Abhi had to teach her everything she knows, “like a baby!
But now even I know things about [the account] that he doesn’t.”
While the second model is what any liberal pragmatist would hope for (e.g., Mead
1908), the lack of control can also create problems. Before coming to work as the
assistant GM of planning at MEI, Nitin created a managerial role at a smaller company,
forming “a single line of communication” as the new department head. He found that
product managers were “doing the work of accounting, finance, and sourcing by
themselves.”146 They felt “overwhelmed” and possibilities for error increased: “Among
all these things, you see, she will forget something: to sign for a courier, to follow up on
fabric…” His solution was to create new departments with narrower functions, which he
says improved morale and decreased attrition.
Alternative Structures and Deliberate Redundancy
As smaller companies, product managers at SFI and IFS have broader
responsibilities and more a more casual occupational culture. At SFI, Niharika does not
believe that consistent organizational design is optimal; instead she has designed
management for each account with a different format “according to the buyer
requirement.”147 In practice, this results in overlapping hierarchies and redundant
responsibilities. I find that even for relatively simple comparative questions, a junior
product manager might gather four people to try to figure out the answer. It is simply not
pragmatic for me to ask comparative questions (as I can at ACE and MEI); probably
following Niharika’s lead, product managers seem locked into a non-answer of “as per
buyer requirement.”148 When I ask Niharika about the potential for inefficiency or lack of
accountability, she tells me that that redundancy can avoid mistakes if there is a smaller
stock of knowledge. “Sometimes it does mean that no one takes responsibility,” she
He also noted that “if a company doesn’t pay, the merchandiser has to chase after
them herself [for the paycheck], but that is not her job.”
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admits, and “each person says that it is the other person’s fault. But it also means that
sometimes one person catches the mistake of the other.” As long as there is a cooperative
spirit, she suggests, the most important thing is to recognize and rectify errors.
At IFS, the owner believes that he has organized two sets of product managers,
both of whom will track orders from conception to shipping. An externally-oriented team
should maintain consistent communication with buyers, providing them with a single
point of contact, while an internally-oriented team should supervise production.149 When
I look through e-mails with a division product manager, however, I notice that some
comments are sent from the external team while others come from the internal team.
Among themselves this is described simply as “teamwork.” When I end my time at IFS, I
ask the owner Sanchit (in diplomatic terms) if redundancy is deliberate. “Ah, we are
aware of this, actually,” he responds. “The problem in the past has been language and
communication skills among the production product managers. They may say something
to confuse the buyer, which means that we lose a day. And to bring on a merchandiser
with more skills… they tend to be rather footloose in this industry…” He makes a flying
bird motion upward with his hand. In essence, his organizational design favoring
redundancy is a (perhaps vestigial) result of poor command of English and a backup for
attrition. Assigning two product managers to more or less the same tasks for the same
clients, all the way through from conception to shipping, is an expensive defensive
strategy.
When I return to ACE with some knowledge of alternative arrangements, I find
both criticism and support from managers and executives. On the one hand, Sanjana is
expressly shocked that there is not a clear hierarchy.150 Her concern is that in the case of
separate teams, each will blame the other for mistakes and no one can be held
accountable. She contrasts her own accountability to the owner: “Here, even if a
merchandiser [in my department] has done the whole order herself, I am still responsible
for that order.”
On the other hand, a senior product manager at ACE stresses the organic
solidarity of apparel manufacturing:
Our job is a collective job. If someone thinks I can do it alone, that is a big lie. We
will depend on the product development team [Chapter 3]; they will need to give
us all the correct details and they will even need to secure the order in the first
place. And correspondingly, if I am not advising the production people, they
cannot perform.
I also find one senior product manager at ACE, Nikita, who does product development,
costing, and product manager duties for two small clients. Sanjana has given Nikita
special permission for these few clients “because there is a minimal design input required
for the customer.” And indeed, Nikita prefers working on orders from start to finish
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I am shocked to find that neither knows the value of accounts they are responsible for,
something that even interns at MEI know. One reason that I spend more time with
executives at small firms relative to larger firms is simply to gather accurate information.
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because she “can think ahead to production approvals” and the “chances of a disconnect
are lesser.”
I also run this suggestion by Vaasu, the owner, who agrees with Nikita that there
is a possibility of a communication gap between separate design/product development
and product management teams. In short, there is not “one single team which knows the
whole history of the order. The product manager will not know, maybe there have been
two or three changes in product development.” Not being fully aware of these changes
slows down communication and may create errors in garment design or construction. He
goes on, however, to argue that smaller factories like SFI and IFS are more likely to
receive tech packs than to engage in design. So “when tech packs are coming and a lot of
creativity is not required, then no problem, the other factories have a better model. But
when creativity is required, then our model is better.” He adds that this is especially true
in peak seasons, when attention is intensely tied to shipping deadlines (see below);
separation insulates creative autonomy from technical, industrial, and logistical
considerations.
Given purchase orders, workers must prepare each style for production. Unity of
command appears less important for smaller factories with smaller stocks of knowledge
and competence. At larger suppliers where design skills are assumed, on the other hand,
product managers are excluded from aesthetic conception. They focus their efforts
instead on communication with buyers, quality assurance, and on-time delivery. They
begin by constructing a time and action plan of events and temporal expectations.
Time, Action, and Fast Fashion
Product managers begin their work by planning out completion dates for sourcing
and a hefty series of approvals. In contrast to the ethic of responsiveness favored in the
marketing department, product managers deliberately avoid special favors to efficiently
process a larger number of styles. Like social workers, they must maintain a disciplined
bureaucratic personality focused on technical compliance (Merton 1940). There are
issues of fabric, fit, and testing that arise with new variations in each style, each of which
are covered below. While there are consistent micro-strategies to move things forward,
the increased pace of fast fashion is bringing new general challenges. Not only are
timelines reduced, but designs themselves are more demanding because they involve
higher fashion content. I briefly consider the alternative of re-shoring to New York at the
end of this section. While New York lead times are shorter, it is not clear that
coordination is improved and even less clear that sourcing agents are willing to pay
higher prices for improvements in lead times alone.
Building a Time and Action Plan
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Trend forecasts are usually concerned with one or two years into the future.151
Planning a collection for a high-end luxury firm like Dior can take four to six months. A
full collection at ACE requires only about 60 days in pre-production: up to 30 to plan
themes and build mood boards, 20-30 for product development, and 1-10 to produce a
sample. Consistent with the relative autonomy of cultural production in design, efficiency
is informally managed (Amabile and Khaire 2008). Product managers are part of a
different occupational community that places a higher value on conscientiousness and
persistence. It is much more compatible with creating and observing deadlines.
On of the first thing a product manager does after receiving a purchase order is to
build a time and action plan (T&A, sometimes TNA) with around 40 discrete events (e.g.,
fit approval, planned [fabric] cut date, etc.). Product managers work backward from a
delivery date to establish internal deadlines for fabric arrival, cut date, ex-factory date,
etc. Each event has an original, expected, and actual completion date. The original date it
is a timetable which assumes that product managers can operate with 100% efficiency
and will never encounter contingencies. The expected date is set by product managers
themselves, so with buffer time added for each event, there can be up to five weeks
between original and expected dates.152 Even where ambiguity is expected, however, it is
discouraged. At IFS, for example, I witness a division product manager criticizing the email communication of her assistant: “I don’t like this ‘ASAP’—give the exact date.”
According to the owner of IFS and the GM of central planning at MEI, the
average lead time—the number of days it will take until a product is delivered—is 90
days. Half of the days are given to product management and the other half to production.
Lead times can be as short as 60 for fast fashion orders (see below) or as long as 180 if
heavy embroidery is required. Including delays between buyer meetings and purchase
orders, additional time for embellishment, fabric development or import, cargo loading
and unloading, warehouse storage, allocation, retail merchandising, and buffer time, a
number of the buyers I interview plan on 10-14 months between conception and store
display. Below (Figure 6) are the typical times I gather from ethnographic observation:
Figure 6: Time and Action Plan

•

151

60-120 days total lead time
o 45-60 days to reach fit and trim approvals
▪ 30-40 days for base fabric production, 45-60 for complex fabric
(e.g., Schiffli)
▪ 14-30 days for fabric imports from China (50 for technical fabrics)
▪ 15-20 days for trim sourcing
▪ 7-10 days for patternmaking and sample making
▪ 2-5 days for washing

According to the editor of Glamour (in a 2015 panel discussion), magazine editorial
themes are also planned a year in advance. This is because it is “important for advertisers
to know what to expect.”
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Comparing the expectations of factory planners and industrial engineers (Chapter 6) to
production managers provides a similar contrast.
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o 30-60 days for production (45-80 for embellishment)
▪ 14 days for inspection and packing
▪ 4 days buffer
Where marketing staff and product developers handle between two and fifteen
styles per season, product managers will work on 20-30 per season. This amounts to five
or six styles per week. A standard product manager will typically work on only one
account, so she will gain a great deal of familiarity with particular brand requirements for
approvals (see below). Again, conscientiousness is paramount. When I ask a MEI product
manager about her advice to a new colleague, she would tell them to adjust to the fact
that “everything is going on simultaneously, because otherwise we won’t have enough
time.” The assistant GM of marketing at MEI gives similar advice: “I always tell my
merchants, the time and action plan you have to have in here,” he says, pointing to his
head. “You should come in in the morning and know where you are at, what you have to
do for the day.”
The challenges of fast fashion contrast with the expectations of traditional
timelines, so I introduce the latter first. I find three reasons for slower responses:
nominated mills, weak buyer power, and strategic positioning. First, Nikita’s timelines
are slower (120-160 days) because some of the bridge segment buyers she works with
nominate their own mills (see below). (These are the same clients with “limited design
input.”) When fabric is imported from China (by sea), it adds 30 days. Buyers may also
have nominations for specific types of fabric; with linen, for example, a buyer has
approved only one Indian mill. Second, Nikita deliberately slows down orders for a
domestic buyer when a bigger client pushes them aside. (These decisions are made by
marketing and production managers.) “Maybe they will say, ‘ok, give us 100, 200 pieces
by the original delivery date,’ but this [domestic] buyer always accepts a delay.” She
waves her hand in carefree dismissal. Other Western brands “would have fought back
because they are big buyers,” she explains, “but this is a small company.”
A third reason has to do with corporate strategy and brand equity. One executive
explains the position of his company with a resigned scrunching of his nose:
The board [of our company] has agreed that fast fashion is not our market
position. Basically we are doing wardrobe items. They are stable. People are
comfortable with it. You could say [a small percentage] of our merchandise is fast
fashion, some summer blouse with a fashion print. But it is not what our brand is
about. We would have to change the format of all the stores, the entire business
model…
What he is arguing is for conservation as a deliberate defensive strategy (Porter
1985:482-512). These stances are relatively rare in fashion because it is such a dynamic
industry, but this executive is also pointing to the series of interrelated changes that
would have to be made with a full-force pivot to fast fashion (Porter 1996, Siggelkow
2001). A senior product manager at ACE similarly reports that because of high volumes,
some of her bridge segment buyers give orders in batches, sending out some requests 30
days ahead of a predictable schedule just to minimize moving parts.
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The Impact of Fast Fashion
Although there are some brands that accept slower lead times, the overwhelming
move is toward faster cycles. The basic reason for this is that as imports have increased
and prices have fallen, lean retailers have responded to demand uncertainty with
increased product variety.153 The increased prominence of retail merchandising vis a vis
design (where decisions are based on sales, not forecasting) is part of the same transition.
As I and others have argued elsewhere, it is also possible that outsourcing design to
suppliers is a strategic response to increasing consumer expectations for “designer”
apparel and other products (Hoppe 2019, Tokatli, Wrigley and Kizilgün 2008a, Tokatli
and Kızılgün 2009:154-56). It is clear that fast fashion is more profitable than traditional
retailing; growth among fast fashion retailers has outpaced the global industry average
since at least 2007 (Cachon and Swinney 2011, Euromonitor 2016a:9).154 Market
research also supports my findings in Chapter 2 that fast fashion is more developed in
Europe than in the U.S. (Euromonitor 2016b:6).
What exactly qualifies as fast fashion is a subject of some debate. Short retail
windows may be a valid criterion; a Zara manager whom I interview in Boston says his
store receives shipments every Monday and Thursday. This may be the result of diverse
allocation rather than small batches, however. According to Vijay Mathur, Additional
Secretary General of the Apparel Export Promotion Council, “Zara will order 40k pieces
[from a supplier]—they need to do that to get the order prices. But if they forecast 100,
they will order 98… and just give 10 pieces to each store. They want it to feel like you
have to buy it today, because if you come back next week it won’t be there.” Even the
Salvation Army and Goodwill change over selections in three to five weeks (Cline
2012:126).155
Some scholars do not seem to distinguish between quick response and rapid
replenishment (e.g., Appelbaum and Gereffi 1994:54, Tokatli 2008), the latter of which is
simply re-orders of established styles. Quick response, meanwhile, seems necessary but
not sufficient. A buying agency executive, Paaus, tells me that a rule of thumb for fast
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Retail prices dropped 15-20% from 2006-2011 (Gandhi 2011:129), but the 1970s are
generally recognized as the proximal point of departure for product variety (Abernathy et
al. 1999, Gereffi 1999, Pashigian 1988). How fast fashion will respond to increasing
sustainability efforts is unclear.
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The earlier iteration of lean retailing also demonstrated superior performance
(Abernathy et al. 1999:72-75, 256-57).
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Fast fashion is certainly associated with low quality; this criticism surfaced repeatedly
in my interviews with U.S. participants. It was also witnessed when department stores
first opened in Europe (Fredriksson 1997). Cline (2012:117) has published a response
that is indeed “a fascinating exercise in doublespeak” from H&M’s public relations team:
“We do not see ourselves as a fast-fashion company, we make modern designs of good
quality. We do not believe that low prices can be equated with a throwaway society,
because price and the life span of a garment are not related to each other…” The evidence
I present below certainly counters this narrative.
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fashion lead times is 60 days or fewer.156 “It used to be that 80% of orders were placed at
the beginning of the season at 20% during the season,” he says. “Now it’s 20% of the
orders upfront” and the rest to follow during the season itself.157 The difference between
quick response and fast fashion, he continues, is that the former has to be “fashion.” It
can’t depend on “core fabrics,” can’t be “basics from Old Navy,” or “can’t be a t-shirt
that will run for six months.”
The “fashion” criteria adds an important sociological twist to a definition of fast
fashion. As with status, value, quality, or skill, such designations reflect competitions of
honor. Whether it is runway style, self-serving brand narratives, or uncritical journalism,
we should remain skeptical of branded social representations (Hoppe and Nedzhvetskaya
manuscript; Gruys 2012, Tokatli 2015). In high-end luxury, as a sales manager tells me in
an interview, “the buyers want the [statement] yellows and they want one or two small
pieces, [but] they [also] put in the very sale-able colors that people can wear every day.
You’re not going to wear a yellow jacket every day, you’re going to go for a beige one.
You know?” Likewise, most of the profits at H&M are not from trendy items, but
“modern basics” like sweaters and socks (Lantz 2016:147, 55). Retailers like Zara or
ASOS may be capable of two-week lead times, but averages are longer, mostly because
Asian suppliers account for 80% of products at H&M and 30% at Zara (Weinswig
2017:4-5). The VP of marketing at MEI adds further skepticism: “When you say speed,
it’s not that all the retailers are into speed. Even if you look at the best of the speed for [a
fast fashion buyer], they just buy about 25%, 20-25% of their overall volume [with us] in
speed. The balance 75% is still regular to us.” From a demographic point of view, there
can be no doubt that buyers and suppliers are working toward shorter lead times. Still, the
process is a gradual one which is accomplished through organizational routines. It
includes successes, slippages, cooperation, and conflict.
Short Timelines and Fast Clearances
Timelines are reduced with reorders, smaller batches, tech packs, and nominated
mills or pre-booked fabric. Brand-owned liaison offices also give faster approvals than
third party buying agencies (see Chapter 2). Some brands place “fast track” orders of 60
days instead of 90, working with suppliers to hasten approvals. Samples are usually
shipped back and forth among mills and factory units, but as I discover during a week at
the MEI mill, staff can also temporarily relocate. I recognize a senior product manager
from another unit; he stays on site for a few days every two months or so to ensure
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Writing for the buying agency Li & Fung, industry expert Weinswig (2017:2) argues
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immediate modifications or approvals. Being on site can reduce mill lead time by 10
days. (The same logic applies to co-present approvals from a liaison office, buying
agency, or certified factory product manager.) Utilizing similar tactics, 10% of fast track
orders with a mid-tier buyer at MEI are finished within 45 days.
Of diminishing lead times, a minority of staff seem unphased—Rakesh says
things like “[the buyer] has given sufficient time for their order.” Older staff also
occasionally mention how “time-consuming” the approval process used to be when
samples in various stages of production were shipped back and forth between India and
Italy or New York. A MEI division product manager thus believes that faster cycles are
“good for the buyer, good for the vendor also.” Likewise, as Vaasu sees it, fast fashion
can increase the cycles of expenses and payments from four or five in a year to eight.
“Why would I not want to increase my income if orders go through more quickly?” he
questions. “It’s the same process each time.”158 Still, perhaps related to Vaasu’s
background in accounting and operations, “the same process each time” is much more
relevant to production than to marketing or planning. Because factories are a system with
limited capacity, not all orders can be pushed simultaneously. As with costing, product
managers typically start high and gradually decrease, perhaps beginning with 120 days
and going down to 95. Product managers depend on leverage from marketing or design
executives to promote some accounts over others.
It is common knowledge that brands including Benetton and American Apparel
use a “chase model” for colors, postponing the dyeing process until color demand can be
better established (see below). Some fast fashion companies have extended the model to
entire garment styles. One brand that sources from ACE, for example, secures prototypes
about 270 days ahead of a potential delivery schedule but prolongs purchase orders until
180 or 90 days out. They are by far the toughest negotiators on lead times that I
witnessed. Amrita handles the majority of such negotiations directly. At one meeting the
buyer floats a lead time of 60 days for a prototype, but Amrita quashes it as something
that is “out of the question” and “cannot be done.” The buyer pursues her lips and moves
on to a reorder. She tells Amrita that “it is selling very good, but my problem is that I
need to have them quick.” She is looking for 10,000 pieces of by the end of August (it is
now late June). Despite Amrita’s backstage acrimony toward this particular buyer, she
works hard to please the buyer in the meeting: “Tell me when you need it… I’m going to
challenge the factory right now [to get it done.]” It feels like senior product manager
Arjun pulls teeth to gain a single extra day for fabric sourcing, but the buyer agrees and
the re-order goes through after a downstream push from Amrita and Vaasu. With
diminished demand uncertainty for buyers versus increased flexibility for product
managers, instances like these illustrate the time-value of a single extra day.
One final case of fast clearances comes in the form of special occasions and the
accrual of goodwill. Ira, a senior product manager at ACE, formerly handled the account
of a celebrity label for value client.159 The styles regularly included “very highly
embellished dresses and tops, [prices] were very good.” When the buyer needed clothes
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within 90 days to dress contestants for a TV appearance and to land clothes in stores soon
after, “the approval process was very fast for them.” The buyer had made itself valuable
to ACE, and Ira was proud that she and Sanjana had taken this push to executives and
made it happen. Apart from flashes of success, however, most product managers feel that
their work has become increasingly stressful with the demands of fast fashion.
The Anxieties of Compressed Timelines
In addition to competitive advantage and reduced uncertainty with shorter lead
times, on-time delivery is important to brand managers for retail planning. Over the
course of two interviews with a trims sourcing manager for a high-end luxury brand,
Grace lays out three specific reasons why delivery matters. First, late deliveries mean a
diminished “selling window” with less exposure on the sales floor. The opportunity cost
is particularly painful for the Holiday (winter) and Resort (pre-Spring) seasons because
products could be on the floor for an extended period. Less time on the floor also means
less exposure at full price: “when you see something at 60% off, it probably means that
the style is actually being sold at cost.”160 Second, on-time deliveries matter for the
relationships between brands and wholesalers:
If we’re late on things, the stores won’t take it. Yeah. They’ll cancel their order
and then it goes back to inventory… They’ll have their floor arranged however
they want it to be arranged and if, let’s say that the red dress doesn’t ship with the
red, whatever [other product], then they’ll cancel us out. The store needs to kind
of look a certain way.
Visual merchandising is an occupational specialty in itself, but suffice to say that it
depends on timely deliveries. Third, brand managers want to avoid interpersonal blame:
“If something doesn’t happen right, [brand managers] will look for a scapegoat, really.
And if it’s trims they’ll blame me, if it’s fabric they’ll blame fabric, whatever it is… so
that we get things in store early enough and that ultimately we get paid.”
Noting that “it’s a very high-pressure environment,” Grace tells me that she has
“certainly learned to become more, like, um… I kind of push people more than, like, I
kind of used to, when, like when I was younger I would be nice and be like (gentle
voice), ‘Oh, it’s ok if you can’t get it done.’” Here she changes to an assertive and
unsympathetic voice: “Whereas now I’m like, ‘Well why didn’t you get it done, you
should have got it done, whatever…’ It’s pushing people every day, like being on top of
them, making sure that they ship… on time.” A division product manager at a buying
agency likewise teaches his subordinates to maintain a sense of urgency. Factory checkins, he says, cannot be based on memory, trust, or “a reminder from the customer only.”
Instead, he drives home the need for “daily factory updates based on the time and action
plan. We do not wait to hear from the factory if the fabric has arrived. We say, ‘the fabric
should come today, thread dyeing should be done tomorrow, where are the suppliers on
our timeline?’” He believes the job of a buying agent should be to “interrupt in between
each and every process” to ensure that each step is completed on time and with high
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quality. Production product managers, not surprisingly, find this annoying, but have little
leverage with clients.
Most of the product management and production staff I spend time with seem
relieved by opportunities to vent about keeping up their pace of work. At one point
Mohit, a senior production manager at MEI whom I spend a large amount of time with,
bangs his fist on the table (highly unusual for this gentleman): “At times buyer does not
give approval” on schedule, which creates additional pressure to meet delivery dates.
Niharika likewise tells me over lunch that she spends a significant amount of time
helping designers and product managers handle the pressure of tight deadlines: “I help
them sort through which priorities should come first, and which can wait. If I need to I
might step in to talk with the [brand] merchandiser, but it is hard.” An ACE senior
product manager complains that shortening timelines from 120 to 90 days means that she
not only has to push planning and assembly, but fit technicians and the liaison agent as
well. Others just tell me that they need to constantly remind themselves about what is
“realistic.” As an ACE senior product manager puts it, “if the actual time that it should
take is 110 days, we can probably take off 10 or 15 days from that; we take five from
fabrics, five from merchandising… but if we have an account who is asking for 85, we
just can’t do that.” Vaasu echoes this sentiment by saying, “normally it takes 30 days to
get fabric, but a buyer once told me, ‘I need it in nine days.’ We can get it down to 25,
maybe 20 if we work really hard, but we can’t do nine days!”
As with the appropriations of design and product development, supplier staff
assure me that there are no buyer premiums for faster lead times. Isha, a division product
manager at MEI who works with a fast fashion brand, has much to say on the subject.
Her client works on 70-90 day lead times (lower than average but not extreme). Echoing
Paaus’ fast fashion criteria, Isha stresses that what makes it fast is the complexity of the
orders: the brand “will not order your basic 5-pocket [jeans]. The customer is sitting in
Europe, they will add some embellishment. Their washes are pretty complex… [they]
really use a lot of our design resources.” On top of this, final quality inspection rests with
MEI, so “we have a lot of responsibilities.” The same brand works with Arjun at ACE,
who says the orders are generally small in quantity and low on price; ACE is holding
onto the relationship mostly to fill factory capacity in the off-season (Chapter 6). Buyers
at this brand believe they are relatively generous. They say that their competitors are
“heavy with prices, more heavy than us,” and that “the lead times, they are very sharp.”
From Arjun’s position, however, both brands “are pushing everyone down” with
simultaneously shorter lead times and lower prices.
As the VP of marketing, Mahesh has the most developed perspective on the longterm consequences of any participant I interviewed. When I ask about the changes he
expects to see over the next 5-10 years, he notes “the buying patterns are changing
because the Millenials are changing.” (Here I interject with “that’s me!” and laugh.) He
continues:
That’s you guys! That’s the problem, is that you have so much of option to choose
today that, you know, it is becoming very difficult. Because it’s becoming a very
fickle-minded business… So the fashion is squeezed out… across the value
chain… it’s not always for the good. It means that you’re squeezing the
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production time… when you start building pressures across the system, there’s
only to a certain extent, what the system can take the pressure. After that it cracks.
Cracks may be figurative or literal—the collapse of Rana Plaza is a prime example of the
latter (Raworth and Kidder 2009). They may also change governance responsibilities and
relations; Mahesh raises the possibility, for example, of direct delivery to stores (see
Appelbaum 2008). A third possibility involves altering strategic fit. This is of course the
core activity of marketing: “we need to adapt to the market for it to survive.” All three
paths may intersect if broader pushes for sustainability provide the resources for social
upgrading. In the meantime we may briefly consider a fourth exogenous path of reshoring.
The Alternative of Re-shoring
I have provided a detailed critique of the literature on re-shoring elsewhere
(Hoppe, Asian Route manuscript), so I will restrict comments to the topic of reduced
timelines. As noted above, it is clear that approvals are faster when design and
manufacturing are co-located. Grace, who works with an accessible luxury brand with
substantial production in New York, emphasizes the excitement and stress of preparing
for runway shows, saying “basically I would just run to the domestic factories. Like,
literally run back and forth down the street, picking up samples, showing [the designer],
and then that was that.” As production from the Garment District trickles out from
Manhattan even to nearby Brooklyn or Queens, however, co-present visits seem to drop
off dramatically. “Who has time” to go out to Brooklyn, a designer asked a panel
audience. Similarly, although Andrew Rosen (former CEO of accessible luxury brand
Theory) supports the move, he also reports that “there is no investment going on in the
manufacturing industry in New York City.” In London too, McRobbie finds that “none of
the designers themselves professed to having visited a factory or workshop where their
designs were made up… even when it was clear that their orders were being produced
barely a couple of miles away” (1998:122).
Very few firms have survived the Garment District exodus, and exceptions seem
to prove the rule. Samantha, a product developer for a New York intermediary, lays out
the scenario in an interview:
We’re in a good position [for survival] only because we could do things fast, uh,
where the lead time overseas is, I mean 12 weeks for a style, and for us we can do
it in four weeks. And if they’re chasing a new trend or it’s high enough, or they
didn’t buy enough, or if they have open money, or it’s Chinese New Year [when
factories are closed], no one will get anything and they come to us. And that’s
really why we can stay in business, is service. Like, that’s the majority of our
business is like chasing things… It’s stuff we need to do right now because we
have a new style… every half a day counts.
Short lead times promote survival for Samantha’s firm, one which serves a niche market
(Doeringer and Crean 2006). Because there are so few firms left, though, “we do business
completely differently than everyone else… Like when new people start [sourcing from
us], they have to learn how to do business with a domestic vendor because that’s how
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different it is.” Although “they’re like shocked at how quickly we can do things,” cost is
a constant challenge. Rather than locality increasing efficiency—as we might expect—
smaller firms lose in standardized communication what they gain in agility. They do not
use the product management software, for example, that is common to foreign first-tier
suppliers (see below).
As the secular decline of domestic manufacturing makes clear, shorter lead times
are not enough to sustain local sourcing. Sourcing agents must balance lead times along
with cost, capabilities, and compliance. Asian firms cannot compete with optimal lead
times to the U.S. or Europe, but they know this. From a semi-peripheral position, lead
times just need to be good enough rather than the best (see also Hoppe 2020b). At an
ACE buyer presentation with a fast fashion client, for example, a buyer lets off steam,
saying she is receiving managerial pressure to source from North Africa and Eastern
Europe instead of China and India. If the fabric is already sourced and delivered—a
major caveat, as I show below—near-shore suppliers can fulfill cut-make-trim orders in
just 21 days. The buyer’s response to her managers is instead that “we can do it from
Asia. We put it on a fast boat, we do it like this [meeting today].” While suppliers like
ACE and MEI are lowering lead times, their competitive advantage primarily derives
from other factors like design services, full-package sourcing, and lower costs.
The activities of product managers begin with time and action plans. Product
managers must be more bureaucratic than workers in design and marketing. Typical lead
times range from 90-120 days, with fabric nominations slowing or speeding the process
depending on buyer coordination. Brand narratives of fast fashion may contrast with the
realities of geographical sourcing. However, driven by consumer demands for designintensive garments, a subset of fast fashion brands is driving changes for efficiency for all
retailers. Meaningful value chain changes follow a combination of quick response and
higher expectations of design and trims. While some orders can be easily fast-tracked by
suppliers, managers generally feel squeezed by enlarged production responsibilities and
simultaneously tighter timelines. Finally, while re-shoring or near-shoring can achieve
shorter lead times, the extent to which these can be managed by intermediaries is unclear.
Lead times are one criteria favoring re-shoring, but they must be balanced against a much
wider set.
Component Sourcing
Changes in information and communication technology have helped to drive and
extend full-package manufacturing in apparel. The suppliers I studied use domestically or
even internally developed enterprise resource planning software to track sourcing and
approvals throughout pre-production, production, and delivery. Because of long
development times, fabric needs to be ordered almost immediately after orders are
transferred to product managers. Sample fabric and trims sourcing comes in small
quantities and is almost always domestic, while bulk fabric orders can be sourced
vertically, domestically, or from China. Some buyers control sourcing through
nominations, but most ask suppliers to arrange it as part of full-package manufacturing.
Product managers can be tempted to push orders into vertically owned mills, but quality
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concerns militate against it. Quality differences among buyer tiers continue to manifest in
processes like cotton combing, while conflicts among buyers, product managers, and
mills take the form of competing expectations for quality assurance.
Enterprise Resource Planning Software
All of the suppliers I studied use enterprise resource planning (ERP) software to
facilitate real-time updating and tracking of orders from sourcing to shipping.161 Large
factories are digitally committed, although SFI has not yet fully transitioned.162 There
does not appear to be a single dominant package. A few mid-tier brands, for example,
require suppliers to use software developed in Europe. These special arrangements do not
seem to cause noticeable problems, perhaps because accounts are siphoned to a single
division product manager who will commit to it. Most of the suppliers I studied instead
use domestically-developed software. ACE experimented with two other options, but
Vaasu says “we didn’t feel they were value for money,” so the firm expanded its own
information technology department to a full company division to build source code.163
According to Sanjay, a division product manager at ACE, most programs have been
developed within the last 10 years.
Although product managers sometimes grow frustrated with crashes or delayed
loading, digital records are almost universally preferred to the old method (Nitin
theatrically waves a piece of paper around to indicate the alternative). ERP has facilitated
two major changes in the work of product managers. The first is an overhaul of
monitoring and accountability. Aadesh, a product manager, has worked at IFS for the past
10 years:
Before when it was on paper, if you have to get signatures you have to deliver this
paper and chase everyone around. Now everyone can see the progress at the same
time… Otherwise actually it is so much more stress to figure where the problem is
(shakes head) and what is holding up the progress… And if tomorrow I am
absent, my team members can help.
Deepak, the assistant GM of marketing at MEI, takes it a step further to argue that “if a
merchandiser leaves the company [tomorrow], the order status will remain in the system,
he will not take it with him.” One software package includes profile pictures for each
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Americans whom I interviewed are more familiar with product life-cycle management
(PLM) software. As I understand it, the difference between PLM and ERP is that the
former is concerned with the formulation of strategic planning where the latter is focused
on operational execution. See for example McDermott and Enderwick (2018).
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Vaasu says other small firms have tried to implement a digital ERP system but failed.
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Tsan-Ming reports that information systems projects are risky for small companies
because they are “notorious for over-budgeting and expensive over-run problems”
(2014:83-84); it is possible that internalization avoided some of these issues. Other
information technology work for fashion brands is outsourced to companies like Infosys.
In addition to managing supply chain logistics, they may also manage support for online
orders. See the excellent article by Nadeem (2009).
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employee—presumably increasing accountability—and gives encouraging green checks
when a step has been completed.
The second benefit of digitalization is increased specificity in communication
(important for the approval conflicts discussed below.) Deepak waxes gloriously on the
benefits of systematization: “We capture everything. There are no hidden expenses…”
Chickpeas proudly agrees, “every piece of fabric and trim is counted, even if it shows up
as wastage.” Communication with buyers is not thick, but direct (e.g., numbered lists and
myriad abbreviations). When I comment on this to Nikita she laughs: “we never ask,
‘how are you doing?’” Finally, Paaus gloats about the standard operating procedures that
his agency has programmed into their ERP system, claiming that they are “better than
any business in the world. Really, I mean that… If they can pass by us, they can pass
with any brand.”
The downside of monitoring is micromanagement. Product managers at ACE can
access only the ERP (for which they must be on-site) and a few retail websites; the rest of
the internet is blocked.164 Chickpeas is occasionally annoyed that orders cannot proceed
until every step is accounted for, even if it is marginally important for a specific style.
The procedures for Paaus’ agency are by far the most detailed, but when I ask him about
micromanagement, like any good marketing executive he reframes the software as
something which provides “tools” and “support” to avoid micromanaging, ensuring that
protocols are followed on account of the product manager’s “own responsibility.” He
performs the same move with performance appraisals, which he calls “performance
development appraisals: if you talk about them like development, employees will be more
open to them.” Because Paaus has previous managerial experience in Western Fortune
500 companies, it seems likely that he has imported some of the rhetoric of
entrepreneurial labor discipline from Silicon Valley and similar circles (Grey 1994,
Kunda and van Maanen 1999, Leidner 1993).
Fabric Production and Sourcing
An increasing percentage of fabric is no longer nominated by buyers, but instead
sourced through product managers at first-tier suppliers. Indian product managers have an
advantage in sourcing risky fashion fabrics through an abundance of local suppliers
(though synthetic fabric production is weaker than in China). In sourcing fabric and
trims, product managers once again must balance price, quality, and on-time delivery.
With these criteria at the center, conflicts ricochet among buyers, product managers, and
mills. From cotton sourcing and processing through to dyeing and inspection, product
managers, and fabric teams move through organizational routines to establish acceptable
parameters and line up materials for assembly line production.
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Employees do covertly check Facebook and shopping sites on their phones, but there
is little downtime.
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Sample Fabric Sourcing
Once the bill of materials arrives from the marketing department, product
managers continue the work by transforming it into a “bible” with sample materials. All
of the information is entered into the ERP system, but the physical “bible” binder, with
its fabric swatches and trim sample clipped in, becomes the master source of information.
After a reference swatch (a small rectangle of fabric, sometimes called a header) or
sample prototype has been approved by a buyer, suppliers need to secure enough sample
fabric yardage to create a pre-production sample. If fabric has already been nominated by
a buyer, the mill will ship an initial 20-50 yards (sometimes called pilot yardage) 15-20
days before releasing the full shipment.165
Without nominated mills—most are not nominated—the process of locating
sample fabric is somewhat more complicated. At both ACE and MEI there is a sample
fabric department of at least five men. Jaweed, my point of contact, brokers between
product managers and fabric technicians. He is surprised that I ask about gender,
narrowing his eyebrows and responding that “fabric technology is for men.” When my
initial tour moves into the sample fabric library, Jaweed lowers his voice to match the
noise level of the room. It is quite serene in this dense little cube of fabric. Quantities are
small (five to 25 yards) and only viable for sample production. Sometimes they are used
only to demonstrate a pattern, design feature, or fit to a buyer, so long as the quality of
the fabric is the same (e.g., 60s [thickness] cambric). There are written records available,
but designers and fabric technicians use their mental reference libraries first: “I remember
that we did this one for a beachwear collection…” If sample fabric is not nominated and
cannot be located in the sample fabric department, designers and product managers can
develop their own or source from local vendors.
According to the general manager of PD at a MEI fabric mill, an impressive 38%
percent of the base fabrics at the mill are internal developments. However, it can take up
to an additional 10 days to create fabric samples. Further, mills use different production
processes for pilot versus bulk yardages, so this affects color and quality and is a source
of tension down the line. Although some colors are easily sourced—most buyers use the
Pantone color system—some buyers have their own palettes. For these accounts a mill
fabric technician will develop four or five options in coordination with a brand colorist.
Reference swatches are then air-mailed for approval.
A final option, as I discover on my trips to the local market of Nehru Place, is
basically a treasure hunt for similarity. Assistant designers at ACE and SFI, accompanied
by a “runner” assistant with purchasing power, visit the market about once a month. In
today’s case, our primary mission is locating a fabric similar to a prototype which has
been approved by a buyer. Priyanka explains that “the initial sourcing [for design] is
ok—you just match it to your imagination.” But matching an approved swatch is harder;
the assistant designer has now lost creative control. She must find something old instead
of creating something new, all the while facing the possibility that an original purchase
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Imported sample fabric takes longer, but if total shipments are smaller than 2,000
yards it will all be released at once.
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from months back has sold out. Fabric stores only maintain small inventories to avoid
warehousing costs, hoping instead for quick turnovers. Rather like a neighborhood
grocer, they always stock the basics—say, 300 yards of white and black solids—but they
earn better margins on risky “fashion fabrics” in smaller quantities of 25 or 50 yards.
Fashion fabrics include prints, laces, and special treatments. Still, at this stage fabric
remains a profane, unworked material, with heavy rolls thrown onto the dusty ground.
When fabric that has already been approved for a prototype is sold out or cannot
be located, suppliers try to identify a similar product. With the search of a few hours,
today’s trip yields only two of seven styles, so we split up. (I am no help at all and
probably slow things down with my questions.) I go with the runner, where I learn that
without a design background, he has much lower standards of similarity. Although this
annoys Priyanka, his greater willingness to compromise moves orders closer to the
assembly line. We pick up about 15 swatches with a few options to replace each original.
Trims must also be sourced, though because they are smaller, there is less dependence on
local markets.
Trims Sourcing
Trims are integrated accessories. Grace, who sourced fabric before moving into
trims, explains the job in the following way:
It’s kind of like a little niche, and honestly I feel like people don’t really go into it,
so it has at least brought me opportunities. Like, [this brand]? I probably would
have never worked [here as a designer]… Everybody wants to [go to school for]
design and there’s not that many jobs out there in design?
Although trims buying is less competitive, Grace describes it as “a little bit more select.”
At MEI there is a centralized trim store in the basement as well as sub-stores on each
production floor. At ACE, surprisingly, most of the trims on hand are ordered only to
keep up with new styles. Some of them are very easy to find; threads, for example, are
ordered domestically and dyed to match the fabric color. IFS orders every single zipper
from the Japanese YKK, which produces half of all zippers in the world (Stevenson
2012). Some trims made in-house, like sequins, which are created when a plastic film is
cut into strips, attached to a reel, run through a machine that punches a hole in the middle,
and finally cut from the strips by hand. Every single trim, as with every fabric sample,
must be approved by the product manager.
India, China (especially Hong Kong), and Turkey are the only trims source
countries mentioned at the suppliers I studied. However, the product manager at IFS
provides the following assessment of domestic trims sourcing: “The strongest part of the
company is that we can do any kind of embellishment, any kind of embroidery… The
weakest is… (he pauses for what seems like a full minute to think) limited sourcing of
materials. We can provide a basic shell [bead]. That is no problem. But it is very difficult
if the buyer requests a very specific color or shape. Do you see this?” He points to an
indigo t-shirt with small silver studs on the wall behind us. “For this garment, I have
spent 15 days to find these exact studs. We are working a little to improve this now, but if
we had more options for sourcing, something like this should take two days.” Though
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souring in the footwear industry is different for technical reasons, the managing director
of a supplier I visit also agrees that “the components industry in India is in its infancy.”
Despite these limitations, the assistant manager of the trims department at IFS tells me
that nominations for trims are not as strict as they are for fabric. Buyers may nominate a
few trims suppliers and allow ISF to choose among them, using their own judgements of
quality and costs. Unlike nominated fabric mills (with prices negotiated directly by
brands), product managers are encouraged to “balance price” with trims suppliers by
“pushing each part down.” Once again, all trims will have to be approved by brands.
External Bulk Fabric Sourcing
More than any other component, fabric can make or break on-time delivery.
When I ask a division product manager at MEI about the most difficult part of his job, he
laughs: “Fabric is there… You can say one percent is everything else. If fabric is in
control… 99% of the problems are from there only.” His assistant Natasha relates that
“mostly fabric is booked on [same] day of booking, that’s the rule.” Her call to the fabric
sourcing department yields an estimate of 60-85 days for delivery of normal cotton
fabrics, with 30-45 days allocated to production and another 30 for shipping. (Even for
imports, shipping times can be reduced by half with air freight.) Buyers are well-aware
that fabrics take a long time to source. When I ask about timelines, Grace sighs:
Literally we just finished Resort [in May] and they’re already starting work [for]
the show in September. Um, so they have to pick their colors and fabrics now in
order to have it ready. Because fabrics usually take about six to eight weeks to
make… With cheaper quality… it’ll be maybe four weeks. But they can’t do
better than four weeks.
Buyers give different weight to price, quality, compliance and lead times, creating
options between nominations or subcontracted fabric souring.
Nominations facilitate control in price, quality, compliance, and lead times, but
only if there is leverage with consistently high volumes. While for basic items, Grace
says, “I would just tell them to do it,” she usually prefers direct contracts because “it’s
more control”:
It does make sense usually for us to source for [suppliers] because you at least get
the quality the way you want it to be. Sometimes the factories will literally just
give you whatever they find in there? Uh, or you [as a buyer] find something and
it needs to be distributed to different factories [for assembly], so you wouldn’t
have like each factory source around for that kind of quality… But it’s more work
on your end.
For very large orders, a buyer may even split fabric nominations among multiple mills
(e.g., half in China and half in India). From the supplier side, a sourcing manager at MEI
feels that “in some cases it is advantageous” to depend on nominations: “there are no
negotiations on price, or on quality, or on delivery.” In fact, because of contractual
agreements, negotiation is not allowed. Pre-booking fabric without an intermediary can
also lower lead times and smooth the approval process. Finally, nominations may help to
ensure labor standards.
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Other than volume, whatever signals are available to predict nominations versus
subcontracts are subtle. Even when a buyer puts in a high percentage of nominations
through some suppliers, for example, other suppliers with longer relationships (up to 30
years for one bridge brand) are allowed more leeway. Home offices in Europe seem to
prefer nominations with Chinese mills, but their own liaison agents are more likely to
source from India; others buyers who lean toward China allow suppliers to substitute
Indian fabrics if they can be matched and approved on quality and price. An import
logistics manager at MEI says that while synthetic fabrics are often sourced from China,
only half of synthetic imports are nominated by buyers.
Most buyers allow suppliers to source fabric. Although ISF is a relatively small
supplier, for example, the fabric manager reports that only one out of approximately 20
buyers in the past two years regularly requires nominated mills. MEI regularly sources
from 50 different mills, while ACE and ISF source from about 25 each. With the
exception of synthetics, supplier sourcing agents believe that domestic fabrics are of
higher quality; they constitute 75-85% of purchases. Regional familiarity surely plays a
role in this assessment (e.g., “Lucknow work”). In the North, hand-printed textiles can be
easily located at markets. They are distinguished by “irregularity” and are prized for
“authenticity,” in Priyanka’s words. However, because hand prints are cut in small
quantities, they are more expensive. Looking at samples of tie-dye shirts done by hand,
one bridge brand designer asks ACE during a buyer presentation for a sample done with
machine dyeing. “If the machine dye looks authentic,” he says, “we will go ahead with it.
Otherwise we’ll go back to hand dye.” When fabric technicians themselves need
recommendations, they can go to Vaasu, who can often name a specific mill where a
particular fabric has been produced.
Weakness in synthetics and heavier fabrics is a domestic liability. While India is
“on scene” for lightweight cotton 60s, Amrita says, China is better at heavier 40s and 50s.
This specifically limits the production of outerwear and winter garments, shortening
seasonal productivity. From the perspective of Vijay Mathur at the Apparel Export
Promotion Council, “China is a huge producer of fabric, but still they are getting imports
from Japan, from Korea, from U.S.! We need to be bringing in more imports” to stay
competitive. I also hear this from the fabric manager at ACE, who visited Korean mills a
few years ago. Taking their swatches back to even the top Indian mills, they told him the
techniques are too advanced to replicate: “Sir, we cannot develop that. We need
chemicals, we need machines…” As it stands, the alternative is internal production that is
limited to more basic fabrics.
Internal Bulk Fabric Sourcing
Vertically owned mills at ACE and MEI produce 20-35% of all fabric orders. Of
wovens, 70% are solids or prints—“that’s our bread and butter”—says a MEI fabric
manager. The rest are yarn dyes, denim, or other fabrics. Vertically integrated mills rarely
sell fabric to other firms. According to the ACE mill GM, textile engineers can analyze
the fabric, weight, count construction, etc., of a woven swatch and to produce a large
quantity with similar results. Their mill sometimes functions as a safety valve for product
166

managers if a prior outsourced development attempt fails. However, the mill is rarely
used to solve the treasure hunt problem of sample fabric replication. Quality challenges,
long sampling times, high development costs, and limited capacity make frequent orders
prohibitively expensive.
Executives play up the capacities of vertically integrated mills in buyer meetings,
but backstage product managers swiftly acknowledge that they cannot achieve the same
quality as many of their competitors. On the one hand, the general manager of fabric
sourcing at MEI says he will “receive much happiness” from vertical sourcing.
Transactions costs and delays can be minimized: “If you have your own family, or you
have a third party, who can you depend on more? I will always choose the family… It
goes to the same pocket.” On the other hand, although Chickpeas agrees that lead times
can be lowered (if capacity is available—see Chapter 6), “there is a chance of the buyer
dropping the order” because of low quality. He gives a current example of a “basic
garment, 40s poplin, which any mill can do. But even there, our own sourcing department
is advising us that there will be problems: there will be streaks, uneven dyeing. And we
cannot deliver less than quality product to our customers.” A division product manager at
MEI is even more skeptical, cautioning that “when we have defects, that will also
increase the lead time [because of rework]! And defects will be there in our mill.”
Upstream at the MEI textile mill, the general manager of spinning, Abhinav, says
that most buyer concerns do not penetrate down the level of fabric production. Product
managers, too, confirm that buyers are less concerned with particular inputs than the
qualities of the fabric after production (see below). However, even cotton variation can
be substantial. Ninety five percent of bales are sourced from eight local stations, but
Abhinav explains that “quality depends on the station, the weather; each thing will be
different one year to the next.” If there are problems of drought, he will source from
another region, but dismisses the possibility of China. “Why should we go anywhere
else?” Only in rare cases are there reasons to source elsewhere. One mid-tier brand
prefers bales from Australia, strong in contaminant-free cotton; another accessible luxury
brand requires high-quality and expensive American cotton.166 The cotton storage area
smells pleasant, light, and earthy, reminding me of my relatives’ farms in the Midwest.
Bales are tested and sorted into lots. Formerly this was done according to cotton variety,
but now it is done by specific station, season, and testing parameters; only bales with
similar average parameters can be blended into overlapping lots.167
Every bale that arrives at the mill goes through hand sorting, referred to as
“manual segregation,” as well as machine segregation. An internal lab tests cotton fibers
for color (the most common defect), length, strength, moisture, and other parameters.
Contamination from stone or iron bits is very problematic, as it can start a fire. If this is
detected in machine segregation, the tubes which carry cotton through them automatically
reroute fire outside the factory (Swiss technology). Organic cotton is rare; at least 90% is
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See Quark (2013) on conflicts in international cotton standards, Ramamurthy (2004)
on Indian production, and Rivoli (2005) on U.S. production.
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Incidentally, a senior production manager at MEI estimates that fewer than 50% of
orders are 100% cotton. Most are blends with a small percentage of synthetic content
because “you can’t get luster or draping effects” from natural fibers.
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genetically modified “bunny” cotton.168 There are clear differences in quality standards as
one moves up the brand spectrum. Value brands ask for normal combing, which removes
13-14% of short and weak cotton fibers as waste (perhaps sold to a third party for
towels). Bridge brands typically ask for fine combing (15-16%), while accessible luxury
brands and Japanese clients require superfine combing (17-18%). Because fabric
produced with superfine combing is less likely to tear, higher quality at this stage also
reduces defects in downstream assembly.
Fabric Dyeing
Joy, the fabric manager of IFS, reminds me of Amrita. She wears a ring on almost
every finger (like Alessandro Michele at Gucci) and beetle-wing green bangles on each
wrist (signifying marriage and good luck). She has spent 13 years at here, mostly as a
product manager. She eventually grew tired of the work, which she describes as “constant
chasing,” and appreciates the new “concentration” required of being a fabric manager.
Joy explains that the sorting of cotton lots is very important for dyeing large orders. One
lot usually provides for 500-1000 meters of fabric; the maximum is 2500 meters.
Theoretically, this could mean that 25k yards could be dyed in 10 lots. However, color
variation rises proportionately to the size of the lot. In practice, then, mills create 20-25
lots for an order of 25k yards. For most clients, mills dye everything at the time of the
order, then send two or three swatches which IFS passes on to the buyer. For “very strict
clients,” a mill sends one swatch for every lot. If they fail to match a lab dip test to the
color standard provided by a buyer, the mill will send each lot through the dyeing process
again.169
Because large dye orders must be done in multiple batches, panels from each
batch are likely to have different coloration. As order size increases, so does the
likelihood of problems and defects. “It can be controlled,” states an IFS product manager
with a degree in fabric technology, “but not eliminated.” Joy also acknowledges the
challenge: “The bulk fabric never matches with the lab dip [test]. You can just copy/paste
the recipe, use the same chemicals, but it’s a different process” for large quantities.
Sanjana further argues that changes in temperature and humidity can cause color changes
in the 30-60 days (e.g., June versus August) between the lab dip and bulk orders. Indeed,
dyeing and color matching is a general and recurrent source of conflict among buyers
(especially McDonaldized Americans), product managers, and mills. Some fabrics can be
re-dyed without consequence: “poly[ester] can go through the process again and again
and again because poly is poly,” Joy laughs. Cotton can go through a few times, but takes
color relatively easily. Finally, “you cannot reprocess viscose [or linen]; it’s too thin and
it will tear. In case of viscose we try to convince the buyer, ‘this is our mistake, please
accept [the fabric as is].’” In the same way that IFS tries to please the buyer, the mill’s
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Downstream in the fabric department, organic and conventional cotton are considered
equivalent from material and aesthetic perspectives.
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Heavy dyeing and tie-dyeing is outsourced, according to Joy and Vaasu, because of
environmental regulations.
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end customer is IFS. When lots are imperfectly dyed, mills attempt to convince IFS to
accept the fabric.
When worse comes to worst, there are two options. When Joy once assumed a reorder from a buyer instead of a new style, IFS wound up with 900 kilograms of extra
fabric. “For [cotton] mistakes,” she says, “I try to make it no problem. We can always
save it and use it for black later. You can dye anything to black.” Imperfect fabric can
also be accepted and run in production, although this will create its own problems. In the
U.S., a factory manager and technician tell me the story of how they “fired” an accessible
luxury brand:
Margaret: They kept sending over-dyed fabric... So basically it comes like this
(holds up
her napkin and rips it); it just tears. We were switching needles like crazy because they
were seeing needle holes. And we were down to needles that are so micro-fine that I’m
like (shrugs shoulders and arms)…
Ralph: You’re going to love this. They told us, ‘we want all the product back,
we’re going to charge you for the product and the re-cut, and we’re not going to pay you
for the embroidery.’
Margaret: I was like, ‘get this shit out of here.’
Ralph: And, you know, me being in the industry, I sent samples down to a textile
lab—because I knew the chair—and I sent them out to an independent lab. And they both
came back the same: over-processed.
Margaret: And we knew it: you could see it, you could feel it. It was just like
(farting noise).
Ralph: So it was like the day before court—because they were suing us. And my
ex-wife was—
Margaret: She was like, ‘it’s [a prestigious brand]!’ (Mock sobbing.) I was like,
‘it’s garbage.’
Ralph: I faxed over the reports to their attorney, and I go, ‘we’re not going to be
there.’ (Laughs.)
The brand dropped the case, but they lost a supplier. From cotton varieties to
carding, combing, sorting, and dyeing, each of these processes has downstream impacts
for assembly lines and ultimately, of course, consumer experience.
Fabric Inspection
All bulk fabric from the mills goes to a centralized ACE warehouse for inspection
before being shipped out to a factory unit for assembly. The warehouse has four floors
and 70-80 workers. The larger MEI warehouse has undergone a transformation from
“horizontal” to “vertical” storage in the last couple of years. Fabric was previously stored
on pallets on the ground. Fabric rolls (now wrapped in plastic to prevent the
accumulation of dust) are stacked on pallets and lifted with a small forklift to heights of
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up to 25 feet (7.5 meters).170 At both ACE and MEI—as in the sample fabric libraries—
the volume and tempo of work are distinctly subdued.171 The hustle and bustle carried in
by product managers seems like it gets absorbed by the dense quietude of so much fabric.
I see only one woman in the space (a secretary), but the “technology” explanation of
gender segregation in the fabric library is now casually accounted for by the “physical
work of lifting” (despite forklifts).172
Kumar, the head of fabric auditing at MEI, has built on a degree in textile
engineering with 18 years of experience. Using 30 inspection tables and an assortment of
semi-automated machines, his department of 14 employees is usually granted about a
week to complete inspection and lot sorting. Any auditor can inspect any kind of fabric;
they undergo periodic re-training based on the most common recently identified defects.
Different suppliers use slightly different criteria, but MEI uses a quality management
system with points awarded for 50 types of defects. A hole is an automatic four points:
“in garment, holes, nobody purchase that.” Generally, cotton must receive fewer than 20
points per 100 square yards for approval. Linen can have up to 30 points and handloom
fabrics up to 40. Mills are not paid until after inspection is complete. Fabric is then
segregated according to tone and shade; if different batches are different shades, swatches
of each must be sent to the buyer for approval. The percentage of fabric that is inspected
decreases with the size of the lot (20% for 2,500 yards but 6% for 30,000 yards). Because
higher-tier brands order smaller quantities, this is yet another parameter of quality
difference between luxury and discount brands.
When defect tolerance is surpassed and “proven,” mills are contractually
obligated to produce more fabric “free of cost basis.” In practice, however, terms are
negotiated. Product managers may ask for (a) an entirely new shipment from the mill
(risking late delivery to the buyer), (b) a partial shipment (with one on-time delivery and
one potentially late delivery at a reduced price), or (c) full rejection and compensation
(and a rushed order through a different mill). Product managers try to avoid any of these
options by systematically ordering an extra one to five percent fabric and trims.173
Internal planning can also be realigned (Chapter 6), but the general manager of fabric
sourcing cites such requests as a “major issue”: “if we are given 60 days to [the planned
cut date], and merchandising now says, ‘we need it in 45,’ how will we complete that?
They ask for things at the last minute, and we cannot do that… there are too many
variables” in fabric processing to avoid significant conflict.
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A senior production manager notes that the forklift is safer than the previous practice
of climbing ladders.
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Driving me to a mill, the driver and fabric technician actually stopped at a roadside
restaurant and sat down for lunch. This would simply be out of the question for project
managers, who can be docked a half day’s pay for being 10 minutes late. See Chapter 9
for details on human resources.
172
See Salzinger (2003) for detailed discussion on the adaptability of gender categories in
production.
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As I learned at the mill, one reason that defects are expected is that textile machinery
moves too fast to make concomitant inspection possible. On average, one person loads
and tends three machines.
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Taking scarce resources as a given, quality and defect fights among buyers,
product managers, and mills take the form of competing expectations in fabric defects.
The owner of a factory similar to ACE whom I interview, Rutresh, is locally famous for
his tough negotiation. This includes the expectation of replacing tiny quantities (e.g., 10
meters) to achieve net zero defects. It is backed up by the threat of withholding future
orders. Because these demands are channeled through product managers, so are his
complaints: “[my] pre-production teams are half the business, but they are getting away
with murder! When they complain to me that the fabric or some trims have arrived with
defects, I say, ‘are you an idiot? This is not my problem!’” I hear similar deflections at
MEI. When a merchandiser takes a defect problem to her division product manager, she
is waved away: “This is your job to go and fight with the mill.”
Product managers push mills hard, of course, because they want to achieve buyer
satisfaction (and ultimately consumer satisfaction). There are approval conflicts between
buyers and suppliers on multiple grounds (see below), but after hearing so much about
fabric from product managers I seek a “big picture” response from the executives and
managers of fabric sourcing and inspection. Aneesh, an inspection manager at MEI,
responds defensively: “70% of the [factory garment] cost is fabric… Is there any costing
for fabric inspection? Even one rupee?”174 He then goes into a very thorough explanation,
at times repeating himself, for what is nonetheless a relatively simple explanation,
condensed here:
The supplier has a tolerance for fabric. We have explained you this system, no?
20 points, 30 points? He cannot supply zero defect for a good price. But buyer
expects zero defect… Now, supplier can give zero defect—no problem—but it
will cost… Let’s say for some unit, normal fabric is 160 rupees. Zero defect will
cost 180. If we do 180, management will come, saying, ‘Why have you paid 180
instead of 160?’ So you see, it is balance between cost and quality. And we can
manage quality.
He closes, basically justifying the department’s work, by saying that “we provide indirect
efficiency. We give assurance to rest of process. Our client [the next handler] is cutting
department. If there is any problem, we will find it here, instead of cutting department
finding problem, or sewing.” Identifying problems early helps to reduce lead times and
avoid problems down the line.
In contrast to Aneesh, John (the fabric sourcing GM at MEI) vigorously disagrees
that zero defect is possible, even with increased cost: “This is why we have the scientific
[acceptable quality level]! Scientists use their brain, their life for this.” Another sourcing
manager agrees that there is “fundamentally no zero-defect fabric. It’s a natural
process… With carding, spinning, weaving, dyeing processes, each and every step is
risk.” The most sensible position, it seems, is to consider zero defects as a rhetorical
exaggeration that signals “premium” quality. I come to this judgment after reviewing a
series of charts at MEI for every supplier that contributes at least one percent of fabric on
a quarterly basis. The top 15 mills routinely deliver minimal defects—2-3% compared to
the industry standard of 5%—but even the best performer stands at 2%. Keeping in mind
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70% is a high estimate; the general manager of marketing reports around 40%.
Inspection costs are covered in overheads. See Chapters 7 and 9 for more discussion.
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that tolerances can reach up to 40% for specialty fabrics, it is hard to imagine that zero
defects can correspond to anything more than an asymptotic ideal.
Facilitated by developments in information and communication technology,
product managers use enterprise resource planning software to track sourcing and
approvals. Because development times are so long, getting fabric ordered and approved is
a major task. Balancing price, quality, and on-time delivery, product managers choose
among internal, domestic, and Chinese mills. They mediate quality expectations between
buyers and mills. After starting the flow of the sourcing pipeline, product managers turn
their attention toward fit standards, garment testing, and a series of pre-production
approvals (and their accompanying conflicts). Sample tailors are the primary partners in
achieving quality and fit standards.
Sample Tailoring
The organizational routines of product managers and sample tailors ensure that
flat concepts take shape for a range of bodies. Major tasks include fit and testing. The
department includes pattern makers and a high percentage of master tailors (all men) who
supervise rather than assemble. Master tailors can be mobilized to fulfill orders, but their
main function is to demonstrate techniques and supervise sample production. At MEI,
sample floor managers carry iPads with exact details of order history and parameters.
ACE has several small units with about 25 machines each, while MEI utilizes fewer but
larger spaces to fit 250 machines. Following the alternative departmental design
explained above, product managers at IFS perform some tailoring functions (e.g.,
measurements), while SFI employs a skilled quality analysis manager who assumes direct
responsibility.
The measuring tape is to the tailor what the phone is to the product manager and
the calculator is to the planner—the first potential solution to any given problem and the
most authoritative tool. At ACE, supervision is split between Sanjana and Vinay, the
quality assurance manager and fit technician. Vinay technically reports to Sanjana, but he
trained her, so he retains substantial authority in practice. He is sparing with words, but
his glares and shouts can be fierce with errors or a perception that someone is slacking
off. He occasionally marches down the rows to a particular tailor, berating him in front of
the room. Both Vinay and Sanjana enjoy the technical challenges of work, including
offering options to buyers that have not been included in tech packs (e.g., different
fastenings or running stitches). Both sport a reserved style in personal attire, but after
spending a number of weeks with them I begin to wonder how they are ever willing to
buy clothes through the consumer market. Sanjana gives me a controlled smile: “I can
always find something wrong. Even here (she points to a button on her shirt sleeve), this
button is chipping. I have to compromise. That’s the only way that I will actually buy
clothes.” My own clothes are gradually subjected to the same level of scrutiny from
Sanjana and Vinay, with praise for chain stitching on the cuffs, criticism for the single
lock stitch in the center of my shirt, and hems turned inside out for further investigation.
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Size and Fit
As I watch Vinay decode buyer criticism and offer corrections around the
department, the two tasks that emerge from observation can be grouped into
achievements of (a) technical standards and (b) fits. Technical standards are relatively
simple because they are relatively universal. If side seams are not aligned correctly, the
front and back of a garment may be unintentionally different lengths. If a collar flips
forward instead of lying flat, cotton fusing may need to be cut down to size. Fit, however,
is much more complicated. On the most abstract level, shape, silhouette, or fit is the most
common criteria marking the beginning of fashion in the Western world.175 The short
men’s doublet of the mid-14th century, which “marked a radical difference between the
masculine sphere and the feminine [and thereby] sexualized appearance as never before,”
was not possible without significant developments in cutting and the division of labor
(Lipovetsky 1994:40, 52).
Garment shape is based in a pattern design. Patternmakers have relatively high
status compared to tailors and cutting masters, probably because their work is more
abstract (following Abbott 1988b). Good quality patterns, like good cutting, cannot be
constructed with formulaic measurements; prints and embroidery will break unevenly in
different sizes. Patternmakers today work largely with computer-aided designs and digital
sketches. Sanjana looks over sketches and patterns in the cursory way that Amrita eyes an
assistant designer’s pencil sketch, teaching product managers how to visualize potential
issues that can arise in production. Nevertheless, errors can be produced through
miscommunication or time pressure.
Domenica, a U.S. technical designer with 20 years of experience, reports
receiving “some crazy stuff” with the outsourcing of patternmaking, “where it’s just like,
how the heck did they even think that?” Part of the reason for this is that “a lot of times
they’ll be under the gun timing-wise.” Preferring to avoid delays that can “go back and
forth, back and forth,” some first-tier suppliers began making their own intuitive
decisions with samples. Indeed, Domenica now reports “executing better with the fewer
[specifications]”:
Other times you’d look at the [buyer] tech pack later and you’d think (shudders),
‘woah, what was I drinking that day?’ Because it makes no sense, and then they’d
send something that they just thought looked right... So that way they could use
their expertise and, you know, not get hung up on like some crazy measurement
that’s going to throw the whole garment off… We had some… garments get
approved pretty quickly, because people weren’t making silly mistakes. And
they’re more familiar with the fabric, so they’ll know how the fabric is going to
react.
There is some room for tolerance (the margin of error), perhaps allow a quarter-inch
deviation for 12-inch measurement, but higher-tier buyers tend to be stricter than value
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buyers. Mathematical ratios can create uncomfortable fits if they are not attuned to the
shapes of dress forms and human bodies.
Fits are the product of matching patterns to body shapes and sizes. There is some
industry confusion and frustration about different fit standards. Participants offer three
explanations. First, some measurements just seem to be errors. This is clearest in the case
of men’s pants with numerical waist/length measurements. Domenica (who shops for her
husband) reports that “a 38 [waist] over here looks like a 36 there. And in this other brand
it’s a 40.’ And that’s outside of manufacturing tolerance!” She laughs, but some
frustration remains. Second, there are different demographic reference groups which
influence the realistic constitution of bodies. The sampling manager at MEI, for example,
states that sizing is the smallest in Japan, tallest in Europe, and widest in the U.S.
Domenica explains different size expectations in the following way:
I think especially in Asia, people are shaped differently! They’re like more
petite... So just what they’re used to seeing isn’t the same body type, body shape
that we’re used to seeing… We’ve had vendors come and they come in real life
and [before] they see our [fit] model they think, ‘these measurements are huge!’
But then they see her and they say, ‘oh, now we understand.’ You know, like, just
seeing the [bodily] distribution of how people are developed.
Sociological theorists can frame differences in expected fit through reference groups,
social representations, or social phenomenology, but in each case the legacies of German
Idealism bracket out the broader environment of capitalist competition.
When brands are considered as central actors, on the other hand, it becomes
clear—as a third explanation—that fits offer differentiation and ultimately a source of
competitive advantage. This is ironically clear in men’s clothing, where many styles are
“evergreens: a guy will buy a pair of pants and wear them for 10 years,” says a financial
strategist at a bridge brand. Offering “ideal fit through smaller permutation in the size
set”—the rare combination of 29x34 pants, for example—is a strategy to “build brand
loyalty.” Domenica also provides some support for strategic differentiation, this time
through the lens of social representations:
[Consider] how each company defines their core customer… If they skew
younger, maybe your [size] medium will be like a little bit smaller versus, like, if
your customer—like [a value brand]. Their clothes [are] cut very more relaxed,
like generously. I think they consider she’s like 45, like Middle America, you
know, not going to the gym too often (laughs), mother of three (laughs). Versus
like [an accessible luxury brand]… it’s still, like, tiny. Like, you go back to like,
the 60s with that really small waist measurement.
Bringing in customer analysis and an ideal-typical consumer, as Domenica does,
connects competitive advantage in fashion retailing to wider patterns of class and status
stratification. Women’s body size—and garment size—continues to be a significant
phenomenological object of distinction or stigma.176 Indeed, I find that while value
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brands ask for the same number of each size across a spectrum from 0-18 (e.g., 25 of
each), accessible luxury brands systematically order the highest distribution of XS
garments and the lowest distribution of XL and larger. This allocation difference stands
in addition to vanity sizing, which is least evident at higher-tier brands and most
pronounced at mid-tier brands (Franz 2017). Thus there is not only a greater assortment
of size S garments at a brand like Ralph Lauren compared to Gap, but Ralph Lauren’s
“small” is actually sized for more petite bodies.
Fitting takes 7-14 days. Buyers and suppliers agree that this timeline will be
reduced with three-dimensional body scanning technology, but I did not encounter any
plans for scanner adoption.177 In the current organizational routine, the first round takes
place on a dress form (usually called “dummies” in India, or occasionally dress “stands”).
Even here, buyers nominate different dress forms. The most common base/sample size is
a medium (size 6 for women), although Vivek jokes that America dress form nominations
are “fatter” than “slim” European ones.178 A fit sample is then sent to the buyer for
approval. Vinay tries to achieve approval with the first attempt, but most fit samples
require two or three sets of modifications. When I ask which buyers are the most difficult
to satisfy, Vinay scrunches his face into a tight frown and turns to the bridge brand
garment now on the dress form: “This one for [the buyer], this is [attempt] number four.
[The buyer] is strict, hard.” Lower-tier brands have less rigorous standards; Chandana
says that for most value and mid-tier buyers, fitting is done in “maximum one round.” If
only small changes are required, the next set of samples can proceed with good faith that
modifications will be incorporated.
The use of human fit models (people who conform to desired measurements, not
necessarily athletic) is a major source of difference between buyers and suppliers. Social
representations extend not just to bodies, but to garment standards of fit and silhouette.
Fashion is dynamic conformity to a modal representation of taste. On the dimension of
fit, I find that export managers and buying agents satisfice more eagerly than brand
designers and buyers. The use of human fit models, for example, is more common among
buyers. Domenica explains that with dress forms, “even though they’ve come such a long
way and they have more, like, squishy bodies now, you still can’t get any feedback… so
primarily garments are still fit on the live model.” A fit model from the U.S. adds, “you
have to check the mobility, you know, how tight something is, or if you can move to the
side, or if the stays are sticking into your waist or anything like that.” I am surprised that
Vinay ignores these empirical considerations. He points to the dress form he is working
on—“chest, 38 [inches]”—then the brand approval form with a picture of a fit model—
“chest, 38.” For him, this rational answer is simply the end of the conversation.
(1899/20072007:97-99), Bourdieu (1984b:373-81), Mears (2010), Gruys (2012), and
Czerniawski (2015).
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In centuries past, royal buyers like Queen Antoinette have ensured premium fits
though personalized dress forms (Varron 1939:898-99). On the history of mannequins see
d’Aulaire and d’Aulaire (1991).
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Macy’s has insisted that foreign suppliers use American dress forms since at least the
1950s (Shalit 1959). The chain of plus size fashion stores studied by Gruys uses plus size
mannequins in retail merchandising displays as well (2012:487).
175

Fit models are not alone in providing feedback; as Domenica validates, there are
“a lot of people in there yammering all sorts of information at the same time.” ACE
brings a product manager, computer-aided designer, pattern cutter, and line supervisor (to
ensure production feasibility) to its weekly meetings with buying agents. Unlike design
presentations, there is a technical focus and few microsociological signals of shared
mood. Buying agents make their own measurements and ask for changes (which usually
take a day) before sending the fit sample directly to the buyer. “If there is really a
problem” with fit, a size M assistant product manager acts as a fit model, though under
negligible pretense of bodily surveillance (cf. Czerniawski 2015, Entwistle 2006:711-13,
Mears 2011b).
The last step of fitting is size grading. Measurements for other sizes are derived
from the base medium. Building on the competitive advantage of fit, most brands develop
their own grades, though suppliers use internal capacity for a minority of clients.
According to a senior production manager, most brands use algorithms to save time and
increase accuracy. A typical size set includes S, M, L, and XL; for orders of a large
quantity, a size set sample will include 10 pieces of each. As body sizes expand
(particularly in the U.S., with vanity sizing introduced in the 1980s) and with niche
markets (e.g., maternity retailers), buyers are increasingly asking for a separate size set in
the plus size range. When a size “stray[s] too far from that base pattern,” Domenica
cautions as follows:
The shapes can get a little funky if you have a [pattern] grader that doesn’t know
what they’re doing… If you’re going from S to XXXL, it’s not going to look
right. You have to take a break at some point and kind of like, think about it…
There’s different increments in the bust and waist and cross-shoulder, and the
relationships between them are interesting too, especially once you get into the
larger geometry.
The current ideal fit, at least from the pattern maker’s perspective, should correspond to
bodily proportions rather than geometric ideals. All the while, models and other
consumers do their own body work to fit into “normal” patterns. Breast augmentation or
other cosmetic surgery to fit feminine dresses or lingerie is a provocative example
(Gimlin 2000:92-93).
As we consider the balance between empiricism and rationalism in fit, we might
keep two things in mind. On the one hand, of course, changes in ideal shapes (eroticized
or otherwise) are a constant feature of fashion history (e.g., Flügel 1930/1969). Symbolic
interactionism and its theoretical relatives do well to cover this territory, but it always
foregrounds consumer demand (i.e., marketing) and collective behavior. Producers have
almost no role. On the other hand, like markets themselves, sizes and fits are periodically
rationalized and standardized. Whether it is economies of scale or Weberian status
stratification, rationalization serves a basically economic function. Now, it is true that the
contemporary cycle of product differentiation (beginning in the 1970s) continues toward
niche multiplication, personal customization, and increasing exposure of bodily contours
(Featherstone 1999:3). My only caution is not to see this an inexorable development. On
the symbolic interactionist front, fits can be deliberately overturned through anti-fashion,
as in the famous case of the zoot suit or more recently, “biggie” parkas (Lane 2018, Peiss
2011). On the Weberian front, mid-tier brands like Gap and Uniqlo offer somewhat ironic
176

status through Fordist functionality and decidedly conservative fits (Tokatli 2018). Fit is
arguably the single most defining feature of Western fashion history, enhanced by the
internalization of corsetry179 and the identity-based discourses of existentialism and
humanism. Observation of transnational organizational routines and the adoption of
technology may provide early signals of broader changes in consumer behavior and
industrial engineering.
Testing
Although we have seen many ways in which lower-tier brands satisfice in quality,
testing is not one of them. The largest buyers at ACE and MEI are in the mid-tier, value,
and discount segments, regularly placing orders of 100,000 pieces and ranging up to four
million. With so many units on the line, there is heavy pressure to avoid defects. Buyers
and product managers agree, in Domenica’s words, that these clients are known for
rigorous testing:
[They keep] their vendors to really high standards. Because they know they
customer is expecting value… That like, woman that shops there with her eight
kids and whatever, she’s spending her money, like, very wisely, and if it doesn’t
perform, like, she’s going to take it back. So. They want to like, keep
everybody… happy.
She gives a small laugh. Some of the tests are conducted internally, at supplier labs
certified by brands, while others are sent to local third party testing companies. IFS has a
number of certifications from major brands, although the owner is neutral about their use.
He shrugs, saying “there is a degree of insurance that the factory has when a third party
has inspected goods.”
Garment package testing (GPT) is a battery with 15-20 items.180 For most brands,
until GPT approval, even if the shipping deadline will pass, a senior product manager
says, “we cannot ship the goods.” Buyers require testing not only for consumer
satisfaction, but legal compliance: if there is a death related to flammability, for example,
penalties can reach $500,000 for a single instance and up to $15 million for a series of
violations (Clark-Esposito 2018:85). The two test categories that receive the most
attention from product managers are color and seam slippage.
Suppliers begin color testing already in mills; MEI has recently hired a dedicated
colorist to fulfill buyer requirements. Once fabric reaches product managers, they need to
examine color using a light box (also called a color box) in the fabric department. The
open-faced box has settings for daylight, American retail lighting, European retail
lighting, and UV. As he inspects the fabric, Vivek says that that “there might be only a
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Trims also go through testing. Tags may be misprinted, beads may come in uneven
sizes or with color variation, and sharp edges can damage fabric or the body. During a
tour at IFS there are six people sitting on the floor of the cutting department, cutting
sharp edges from black teardrop-shaped beads.
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tiny difference in normal light, but it will really show up here.” Additional tests cover
color fastness and crocking (resistance to fading), as well as the application of chemical
solutions and a pH test to demonstrate that garments can withstand deposits of bodily
fluids like perspiration or saliva. On the multiplication of tests, the director of MEI’s lab
complains that “no customer will check the color so much as the buyers are doing... Now
buyers are asking for the impossible: the same color shade in daylight, showroom light,
and [fluorescent] tube light. This is ridiculous! It cannot be done.”
Seam slippage tests ensure that seams will not “rupture out.” A few accessible
luxury brands ask for French seams (strong, with a clean finish on the inside), but most
buyers use a four- or five-thread overlock (fewer seams are weaker). Clothes for children
and babies must pass additional pull tests to ensure, in one case, that embroidered
flamingos cannot be torn off with a baby’s force of 70-90 newtons. I repeatedly hear
about one mid-tier brand’s obsession for no seam slippage at every stage of testing (even
design prototypes), as well as criticism that their cotton test parameters apply to lighter
fabrics which can rip before the seams split. For challenging cases, industrial engineers at
ACE develop modifications of seam types or customize machinery to fulfill buyer
requirements.
Buyers allow testing exceptions if failed components have “no impact to the
customer,” in the phrase of a senior product manager at ACE (e.g., warp strength is ok
but weft is not). Indeed, making too many modifications can damage the quality of the
overall product: each time that fabric is softened, its tensile strength decreases, so the
garment loses structural integrity. Suppliers need waivers for “special issues,” usually
through “call outs.” Call outs are basically pre-alerts communicated to buyers. As ACE
senior product manager Rina lays out, “we discuss with production about what kind of
problems you will face with this style… You have to do this early so that when there is
an issue the buyer will understand.” A denim shirt on Rina’s desk provides a handy
example: “we don’t have such big machines that we can wash 3,000 yards.” Stone
washing will have to be done by hand with this style, so color variation should be
expected. This may also result in larger color differences between denim and the zippers.
European buyers typically accept such variations without issue, while American buyers
go to larger firms like MEI who have specific washing machines.
Other Approval Conflicts
Above and beyond the challenges of language, compressed timelines, and
coordination along the value chain, there are general challenges related to industrial
experience and transparency. Abhi is a division product manager with 22 years of
experience shared between ACE and MEI. He is sour about working with new product
managers at the liaison office (a vertically integrated buying agency) of a mid-tier buyer.
They are “young and not practical,” having “only come out from the degree course.” He
brings out an example garment with slightly different shades of grey between the lab dip
test and bulk fabric, a common issue (see above) with a difference that he believes
“should be acceptable. If I redo [the dyeing], I am not sure that I will get the same color.
It is better to accept the current fabric as is, otherwise it could be a disaster.” The broader
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challenge is a “generational issue” that he has come to understand while training assistant
product managers. He clarifies that “if I will work here another 10 years, the same thing
will happen again, like a cycle.” I thank him for his patience in explaining things to me—
yet another student—and this time he smiles.
Given the delays in communication and approvals among mills, buying agents,
and buyers, product managers have to make constant decisions about what is or is not
worthy of communication. Each approval takes seven to 10 days, so revisions are costly.
On the one hand, a footwear factory manager reports buyer frustration with product
managers about issues they should solve independently. Abhi provides a pragmatic
example of product manager discretion when his worried assistant brings him a pink trim
band which is slightly lighter than what the buyer has approved. The trim will be
covered, however, by garment fabric. Abhi instructs her to make a mock-up sample first,
just to get in the practice of due diligence. After she leaves, however, he discloses to me
that he will approve the lighter trim without going back to the buyer, preferring to
communicate only “major issues.”
On the other hand, and more often, buyers could benefit from increased
transparency. In a style that I follow closely, Abhi notices a flaw which was overlooked
through multiple buyer approvals at previous stages. The design asks for pleats on the
lining of a skirt, which is rather senseless because they will not be visible. After a cost
inquiry to the industrial engineering department (Chapter 6), Abhi decides not to make
any changes. Although the buyers will receive a slightly flawed product, design
modifications would require further rounds of buyer approvals and risk late delivery.
Absorbing the extra labor and materials cost is far cheaper than a possible air shipment
and the attendant management scrutiny. In such a case, the “factory [management] will
put gun [to] my shoulder and the management will ask why this [change to an approved
design] has been done.”
The broader tension here is between transparency on the one hand, autonomy and
efficiency on the other. Too little transparency can mean, as a factory manager accused of
other companies, “they hide and move on, hide and move on.” Too little autonomy
causes delays. With these examples we can see how broader management pressure for
compressed timelines and on-time delivery can result in elided communication and
superficial resolution.181 Whether this is optimal is not simply an issue for the product
management department; it must be constantly adjusted in strategic responses across the
entire global value chain and implemented through changes in organizational routines.
The series of approvals that pass through the project management department
ends in a pre-production sample. This sample and its size set are “considered to be exact
replicas of what those production pieces will be like,” according to Mohit. In theory,
Niharika adds, “once the sew-by sample is approved, the changes are freezed.”182 If a
supplier does not make the pre-production sample deadline, buyers can legally cancel
orders without penalty, though I did not find evidence of any cancellations for this
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In another domain, the cognitive-behavioral reaction to depth psychology essentially
achieved the same result (e.g., Ellis and Ellis 2019).
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All the suppliers I studied noted occasional alteration requests after pre-production
sample approval. Such requests came only from fast fashion companies.
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reason. Sometimes called the “sew by” sample, this pre-production garment will hang
above the production line to be referenced for queries during line setting and sewing.
After production, the quality assurance manager at IFS continues to store the preproduction sample in-house for six months so that “in case [the buyer] comes back and
says there have been some problems, I can go back and point to what has been
approved.” Table 4 shows processes up to the pre-production sample.
Table 4: Pre-production Sample

Sample
Initial bulk (fabric)
Bulk (fabric)

Trims
Fit

Size Set
Pre-production

Also Known As
Sample fabric
Lab dip, strike off, hand
loom, desk loom
(depending on fabric type)
Accessory
Base size, first sample,
sampling intent
Pre-bulk inspection
Contract seal, sealer, sew
by, gold/green/blue
seal/tag, showroom (for
buyer)

Department
Product management, fabric
Product management, fabric

Product management, trims
Product management,
patternmaking, tailoring, cutting,
production
Patternmaking, tailoring
Product management, tailoring,
industrial engineering, cutting,
production

Project managers work closely with the sample tailoring department to develop
size and fit. More so than in design and marketing, technical details come to the fore.
Most buyers limit artistic license by imposing fit measurements, which are a source of
competitive advantage for brands. Higher-tier brands are more demanding with fit
standards. Not only are patterns more complex and carefully designed, but approvals are
more rigorously monitored (e.g., four rounds to achieve base fit approval instead of one).
Both buyers and suppliers make mistakes in fit, partly because body shapes and sizes
differ across regions and partly because suppliers—at least those I studied—are not as
committed to the use of human fit models. As the capabilities of first-tier suppliers
improve, however, some buyers are promoting more discretion and sending patterns with
fewer specifications. Unlike fit, testing standards are diligently enforced by mid-tier and
lower-tier brands as well. Matching color standards and preventing seam slippage are the
most frequently referenced testing protocols. Finally, there are some overarching
approval conflicts about transparency versus efficiency. I was not able to discern a steady
trend in either direction, but future investigation could provide a signal of the relative
power of buyers or suppliers with implications for value chain governance.
Chapter Summary
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With conscientiousness and persistence, project managers focus on the technical
and temporal details of preparing styles for production. Increasing competence, driven by
buyer demands, is demonstrable in the prevalence of university degrees. Collaboration
and communication are highly valued by managers who favor women. Time and action
plans create timelines for about 40 discrete events, though project managers must
constantly adjust to the contingencies of inputs and approvals. The trend toward shorter
cycle times is driven by fast fashion brands, who in turn are motivated by higher profits
and consumer expectations. Compressed timelines create anxiety not just because of
quick response or rapid replenishment, but the complexity of style. Export suppliers
cannot compete with U.S. vendors on time, but neither can U.S. vendors compete on
price or an integrated supply chain.
Component sourcing is managed through enterprise resource planning software.
Because of long lead times and the paramount importance of on-time delivery, fabric
sourcing begins on day one. Buyers may nominate mills to increase control and price
advantage, but they lose the flexibility of local supplier knowledge and competition.
There are continued conflicts about fabric dyeing, inspection, and the expectation of zero
defects. As sample tailors pick up with patterns and fits, managers and buyers are trained
to identify problems and can always find something that is wrong. Higher-tier brands
expect smaller sizes and more exacting fits than lower-tier brands. The development of
synthetics, informalization, and sexualization (especially since the 1970s) has generally
pushed fit toward correspondence with the body, though it is safer to conceptualize this
with the frame of symbolic interaction rather than rationalization. Testing focuses on the
basic parameters of color and seam slippage. There is a tradeoff in communication
between autonomy and efficiency on the one hand, and transparency (and buyer control)
on the other. More communication is not always better; the hidden cost is time.
Project managers and their production-side cousins in industrial engineering—the
subjects of the next chapter—try to obviate as many issues as possible, measuring and
detailing and preparing. As time horizons narrow and the demand for efficiency grows,
the logic of engineering and coercive administration grows stronger.
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CHAPTER 6: PLANNING AND INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING

Standardizing Labor Time in the History of Management
Industrial engineering is the apex of scientific management, of which the first
principle is that “the management must take over and perform much of the work which is
now left to the men; almost every act of the workman should be preceded by one or more
preparatory acts of the management which enable him to do his work better and quicker
than her otherwise could” (1911:26). These preparatory acts, invented not by assembly
line operators but by “the man who is mentally alert and intelligent” (1911:59), are the
focus of this chapter. Although Taylor is most famous for his experiments at Bethlehem
Steel, it is interesting to point out that he served his apprenticeship as none other than a
patternmaker and machinist (Braverman 1974:91).
Following some forays by Mandeville, Adam Smith was the first to bring the
division of labor into sustained analytical attention with his example of pin-making. He
already notes how much more complex the division of labor is in textiles and
apparel183—and indeed the historical context of the nascent textile industry is highly
relevant. For one thing, the Industrial Revolution displaced unorganized agriculture with
the scientific applications of labor reduction; it is a cotton spinning machine in 1735
which Marx uses to signal the advent of the Industrial Revolution (Marx [1867]
1977:493-508, Smith [1776] 1976:9-10). Labor productivity grew by 370% between
Indian hand spinners in the 18th century and Robert’s automatic mules circa 1825
(Chapman 1972:20). With the textile industry as a key driver, labor was increasingly
commodified and internalized. Objectively, Giddens writes, “the buying and selling of
time—as labour time—is surely one of the most distinctive features of modern
capitalism” (1985:294). Subjectively, meanwhile, Smith’s contemporaries argued about
debt, famine, and a new social-psychological regimentation that was increasingly
required in order to avoid it (cf. Franklin [1793] 1944, Goethe [1774] 2004:12).184 Textile
mills—often training children to work 10- to 14-hour days in them—were sites of intense
time-discipline and conflict (Braverman 1974:65-67, Hareven 1982, Thompson
1967a:84ff). Centralization also foreshadowed the local control of company towns.
In the 19th century Babbage, a mathematician and mechanical engineer, began to
conduct experiments and gather data on the efficiency of time and motion ([1835] 1963).
His analyses breeze through multiple industries but include the micro-movements we will
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There was a division of labor for separate parts of clothing by the mid-17th century
(Varron 1939:878-79), hindering professionalization via anonymity.
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There are of course earlier changes in the intellectual culture of time-discipline, with
monks as the first group to live according to a “differentiated notion of time” through
church bells (Weber [1905] 2002:105n19). “But for capital markets to evolve, the
bourgeoisie had to replace the cosmology of the Latin church, which held that time
belonged to God, not man, and thus prevented a good Christian from selling it”
(Friedland and Boden 1994:8).
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see below. Both he and Smith lobbied to reduce movements in order to save time, energy,
and capital. A
pragmatic form of worker craftsmanship is still relevant in the historical development of
engineering. Familiarity with tools, for example, is still valued as a basis of efficiency
and innovation (Babbage [1835] 1963:172-74, Smith [1776] 1976:13-14).185 Later
positive craft assessments include recognizing machines as tools or work-aids (not human
replacements) and the possibility of diminishing muscular strain (Marshall
1920/1961:261-64, Mead 1908:373).
Management, mechanical engineering, and industrial design begin professional
jurisdiction projects in the 1870s or 1880s. We see a transformation of personalized and
aristocratic management practices once based on craft; with line-and staff arrangements
there is a new bureaucratic ethos legitimated by a rising commercial bourgeoisie and the
philosophy of utilitarianism (Pollard 1963, Stinchcombe 1959, Veblen [1904] 1921,
Wilson 1887). A major consequence of these shifts is that moral divisions in the division
of labor become institutionalized.186 Compare Taylor’s (1911:59) assessment of the ideal
worker to that of Smith or Babbage: “Now one of the very first requirements for a man
who is fit to handle pig iron as a regular occupation is that he shall be so stupid and so
phlegmatic that he more nearly resembles an ox than any other type.” For Taylor’s
workers there is no skill, no “why” or even “what”: there is only task-based method of
“how” (Drucker 1999:137-46). Braverman (1974:126) goes so far as to argue that the
Taylorist “separation of hand and brain is the most decisive single step in the division of
labor taken by the capitalist mode of production.”
Factory discipline or regularity is the other major source of efficient time and
motion. Apart from the empirical historical examples mentioned above, general
statements on rigidity in the industrial division of labor tend to fall into three camps.
Proponents, perhaps beginning with Diderot, note how the regularity of work can create a
feeling of social cohesion and recognition for the value of one’s own labor (Durkheim
[1893] 1997:323-28, Fine 1984, Hareven 1982:69-84, Lee 1998, Sennett 1998).187
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Ure, an early opponent of Smith, argued that the division of labor should remove craft
from the “cunning workman, who is prone to irregularities of many kinds, and… [replace
it with] a peculiar [automated] mechanism, so self-regulating, that a child may supervise
it” (1835:19). He used his status as a physician to lend vigorous support to both the
factory system and use of child labor, although this was before the professionalization of
medicine (see for example Starr 1982:82-83).
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Marx, writing well before jurisdictional developments, was either unable or unwilling
to address these moral parameters. On the one hand he argues that the distinction between
higher and lower labor is only a factor of time. Elsewhere he notes that engineers and
joiners [auxiliary workers], because their work is “purely technical,” stand apart from
factory workers ([1867] 1977:305, 545-46). Industrial sociologists in the next century,
partly spurred by the horror of an atomic bombing, assaulted the “value-neutral” stance of
engineering as an obvious capitulation to management against labor (Merton 1947,
Moore 1947).
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In future work we will see how some women operators appreciate predictable hours
that aid with planning for childcare.
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Opponents argue that rigid divisions of labor dull the minds and bodies of workers and
prevent them from becoming totally developed individuals. “What is one to expect from a
man who has spent twenty years of his life making heads for pins?” de Tocqueville asks
(1840/1966:555, building on Smith [1776] 1976:302-04). Utopian socialists helped to
develop the ideal of separating work from identity, as did Marxists (Engels [1878] 1978,
Marx [1867] 1977:482-85, Marx and Engels [1846] 1978). Theorists of modernization
and mass culture (e.g., the Frankfurt School) are also critical of the regulated rhythms of
industrial life and service work (Appadurai 1996:6, Mills 1951, Weber [1922] 1946).
There are also, of course, a variety of creative syntheses recognizing the ambivalence of
bureaucratic control (e.g., Adler 2012, Leidner 1993, Veblen [1904] 1921:308-13).
Perhaps the most interesting conclusion to draw from this sizeable set of literature is the
widespread recognition of psychological class warfare between managers/engineers and
workers. For better or for worse, it is engineers who make decisions and workers who are
deliberately voided of this responsibility.
At the suppliers I studied there is some presence of industrial engineering
management on the shop floor. The most important “preparatory acts,” however, are
physically separate from workers. This was perhaps a new development in Taylor’s time
(1911:38ff); it is now institutionalized. At the suppliers I studied, the planning and
engineering departments are usually located away from production floors in basements or
office cubicles (with more insulated cubicle designs compared to product management
spaces). Some of the larger factories do rely on what are essentially control rooms to
monitor production in real time, as we will see later in the chapter, but even these are still
walled off from the production floor.
Central Planning
After the whizzing networking of design and product management, one of the first
things I notice in the central planning department is the slower pace of talking and even
walking. Planners rarely use ambiguous verbal hedges (e.g., perhaps), instead pausing to
think before they talk. Compared to designers and product managers, planners have
longer attention spans, smaller vocabularies, and more staid personalities. Departments
are spatially situated near industrial engineering, usually occupying corners or basements.
At MEI a bank of 10 cubicles serves as home to 14 planners, 13 of whom are women.
The gender imbalance is similar at ACE and probably represents the patriarchal
occupational culture of engineering (e.g., Hacker 1981). The air is stale. The sense of
direction is not.
Planners are essentially playing a giant game of 3-D Tetris with ice blocks. They
seek to fill and “freeze” every space, re-arranging the entire grid when necessary. Factory
unit and line allocations are the basic building blocks which we will consider. They start
to melt in peak seasons, however, and negotiations introduce substantial complications.
Buyers and buying agencies can push planners toward “dangerously” short timelines.
Although the effects of governance relations in the technical core of production are more
insulated than they are in the product management department, planners still spend a lot
of time fighting fires.
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Team Structure and Scope
Following the two weeks that an order will spend in central engineering, the
central planning department usually spends about 10 days with an order before passing it
along to production. Major tasks include unit allocation (i.e., which styles will be sent to
which factory units), assembly floor/line planning, embroidery, and machine acquisition.
The department also assists with line implementation and line balancing (see below).
Nishant, the general manager of planning at MEI, directs a substantial portion of his
attention to closing or “freezing” production plans—preferably one at a time. As senior
planner Abdul puts it, “if we have seven orders to plan, then if we close one, we can at
least we can get it down to six.” This linear method of problem-solving strongly contrasts
with the inspirational ethos of design.
Indeed, arriving in planning means that neither the individual analysis of scientific
management nor the team-based focus of human relations is sufficient. Administrative
theory proper is more suitable, especially the work of James Thompson and the Carnegie
School. For his part Thompson (1967b:14-25) argues that to continue operating as closed
system, organizations seek to protect and buffer their technical core (including planning
and production). We should also expect short time horizons, focused attention, and a low
tolerance for uncertainty (March and Simon 1958:154, Thompson 1967b:150). Both are
clear features of planning departments at the suppliers I studied. The latter set of
Carnegie School writings is valuable not only for its notions of truces and problemsolving, but for its programmatic style of modeling organizational routines (e.g., flow
charts) and its general mathematical flavor (especially Cyert and March 1992). By way of
illustration: where Amrita always has her sketchpad handy, Krishna’s weapon of choice,
as the general manager of planning at ACE, is his calculator. Where Amrita tests my
understanding of visual merchandising by asking me to hang samples in the showroom,
Krishna hands me his calculator across the desk to offer a mathematical path toward a
single optimal solution.188 This sense of deliberation and precision is an important guide
to problem-solving in the department.
On my first day in the planning department at MEI I meet a key informant by
accident. Nitin and I are both sitting at Nishant’s desk, waiting for him to return. It takes
an hour and a half for this to happen; fortunately the man I am sitting next to is the new
assistant general manager of planning—and it’s his first day at work! Nitin will
eventually take over planning for about half of Nishant’s current workload. With a
background in textile engineering, Nitin has worked at four competing suppliers over the
years, consulting and switching among departments. His goal in the next year or two is to
learn how to handle contingencies, using the example of recent floods in Chennai. Cotton
supplies were soaked and ruined. Some finished goods were rerouted to ports in
Mauritius, but remaining work had to be subcontracted (see below).
188

He and his employees frequently tap out competing operations when arguing amongst
themselves.
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When Nishant returns he provides an episodic overview of the department. I say
“episodic” because of innumerable interruptions over the course of three hours. Nishant
hired Nitin because he is overwhelmed; he feels he is handling emergencies and
“firefighting” all the time.189 As soon as he solves one issue, another is introduced—at
one time three or four planners line up near his desk. Whether by design or by accident,
when senior planners Abdul and Sunny line up with their own questions, they assist with
triage. They ward off junior planners by quizzing them about details which may be
necessary for problem-solving, encouraging them to bring documentation, charts, and a
calculator into every conversation.190 Where relationships are key for resolutions in the
marketing department, only mathematical and technical criteria are relevant here.
Throughout the afternoon, Nishant’s most common technique is to discern the
mathematical logic in a given planning decision. At one point, for example, he
complains, “[Only] 1,000 pieces, [yet] we are giving [a full] 30 days? There has to be a
logic to it.” Fitting production into blocks is a puzzle with necessary compromises but
only one optimal answer.
Factory Unit Allocations
Planners need to lock down their claims to specific assembly lines in specific
factory units well before the production start date. The time horizon for capacity blocking
at SFI is six months. MEI uses a more complex formula with 12 months of visibility that
includes prior utilization, capacity estimates, and sales projections. They use four stages
of planning: The first is “advanced,” used for long-run planning with multiple deliveries
for large orders. The second stage is “safe” and the third—within three months of the
production start date—is “critical.” The final stage identifies “danger” or “high alert,” in
which the probability of missing the production start date is high. Planners want to avoid
not only a late shipment, but the expense of a last-minute air shipment (Chapter 5).
“Capacity blocking” is, more specifically, the process of allocating minutes of
production time to factory units according to formulas including machine availability,
available labor time (e.g., eight hours per day), and standard allocated minutes for each
style (see below). Planners use slightly different formulas, beginning with either available
machines or minutes, but Niharika’s hypothetical example is good enough for an
introductory understanding: If each machine can produce 20 pieces per day, with 40
machines in each assembly line and five lines total, 20 x 40 x 5 = 4k pieces per day.191
With an order of 20k pieces, planners will thus allocate five days for production.
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Given that Nishant clearly targets Nitin with his explanations, the interruptions are
methodologically beneficial. Many things go over my head, but I simply ask Nitin for
explanations in the interim. We develop a deep technical bond from day one.
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Bosk (2003:71-110) identifies a similar pattern of “competence tests” among new
medical residents.
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A floor supervisor at ACE reports an actual average output of 300-400 pieces per line
per day, with up to 700 pieces for simple styles.
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In the sections below we will see that getting orders into factories is simplest
when buyers nominate specific units. Buyers and buying agencies gain leverage from
long-term relationships or large order sizes. Suppliers, meanwhile, flex their negotiating
muscles during peak seasons and slacken them during off-seasons. Overbooking is built
into the planning process during peak seasons, resulting in re-planning. A final option to
get orders into factories is subcontracting.
Nominations
Planners have between seven to 14 factory units to choose from when they
allocate orders. In addition to capacity (covered above) and utilization (below), they must
consider nominations and capabilities when siphoning allocations to particular factory
units. To do work for a mid-tier brand, a U.S. factory technician tells me, “they send you
paperwork that all your employees have to sign. And you can’t, you can’t send it out to
anybody else.” A liaison agency director concurs: “we had some problems with a factory,
10-12 years back, with some outsourcing. Once we found out, we couldn’t touch them.”
For now we can say that nominations are the easiest option for planners.
A spreadsheet at MEI identifies 26 buyers who require nominated (i.e., approved)
factory units. While the largest buyers have six factory units nominated, the average
buyer (among these 26) nominates only 2.7. Wouldn’t it make planning a lot easier, I ask
Nishant and Nitin, to have every unit nominated? From their perspective, there are two
reasons why this is either unnecessary or undesirable. First, each buyer has a limited
quantity of orders that can be safely estimated, with “nominated approvals taken purely
based on volume.” Unless a buyer is providing a marketing premium (Chapter 4), they do
not have the leverage for nominations. Second, Nishant and Nitin are both clear that
nominations “have a cost.” Like fabric mill nominations (Chapter 5), apparel factory
nominations entail compliance with special certifications and quality/labor/environmental
practices (e.g., ISO standards). Regional headquarters and urban “showcase” factories are
more likely to be compliant but also require higher overheads for staff and
infrastructure.192 Beyond this, nominations require third-party audit certifications which
cost between ₹100-300k ($1.5-3k) per factory with yearly renewals.
Negotiations Among Buyers, Suppliers, and Agencies
Based on distance from the technical core, there are competing assessments of
buyer power and supplier options. Planners and production staff are the most insulated
from differentiated buyer demands. Krishna, for his part, generally feels that “all the
clients are the same to us” by the time they get to the planning department. Nishant
agrees, claiming that “on-time delivery is the most important thing” regardless of the
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Some high-end and accessible luxury buyers, for example, avoid factory units with old
machines because they are more likely to introduce defects. From the central engineering
and planning perspective, old machines also reduce efficiency.
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buyer: “to meet the delivery, we can take it on priority, but our objective is to serve
equally.” Capacity utilization is generally encouraged—“my favorite merchandiser is the
one who brings me the most orders!” thunders Krishna. However, this is only true so long
as there are no threats of overbooking. “Don’t even think of taking this order,” Krishna
directs a product manager at one point. “We do not have capacity.” Sanjana similarly tells
me that “if we cannot deliver, we do not accept orders. That is ACE policy.” She will
offer an option of moving production to a later date, but otherwise will reject the order.193
Capacity blocking and even capacity notifications are a business of give and take.
Product managers can offer privileges of time and trust to buyers with special
connections. One example comes from long-term relationships. A decades-long
accessible luxury buyer places orders for 70k pieces with ACE every year. The planning
department is so trusting of the regularity, in fact, that they book production slots even
before the buyer places its order.194 In peak seasons with full capacity, reliable bookings
can make a real difference. Small orders from small buyers are turned down or forced
into later delivery dates, but with this accessible luxury buyer even larger orders from
brand conglomerates will not be able to “eat into” their planned capacity. Even in cases
where capacity is full, advance information can help buyers locate and block off capacity
at other suppliers. Such exchanges build trust and support continued exchanges. As we
will see, buying agencies also gain some negotiation advantages because they bring in a
steady stream of orders.
Kunal, a division manager at a large buying agency, reports that suppliers come to
his firm with estimates of available capacities. Buying agency managers then sit down
among themselves to allocate orders: “So they’ll say, ok, we’ll give 100k pieces to this
factory [with Kunal as the agent], 100k pieces for that factory” with another manager as
the agent. Given the advanced notice of available capacity, agencies might gain the time
to place one supplier on standby while they engage others in competitive costing (see
below). If the original supplier loses its bid before a given deadline,195 the agency can
“release” its hold on capacity without a financial penalty.
Marketing executives tell the most customer-centric story of capacity blocking.
Beyond the dichotomous criteria of available/non-available, Mahesh (the vice president
of marketing at MEI) considers “what is the kind of trouble-free customers we have. And
what is your strategic vision with that customer. That gives the call.” The possibility of
offering quick deliveries to preferred buyers is why some managers at well-capitalized
suppliers like MEI and ACE adopt utilization rates under 100%. The philosophy extends
upstream too. At a mill that I visit, Soham verifies that “the buyer is the motor.” In fact,
he tells me his goal is to keep only 70% of his machines running at any given time. There
193

A shoe factory I visited does not take any orders from the U.S. with the view that
order sizes would be overwhelming.
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The buyer provides “projections” and “agreements” three to four months ahead, but
the official contract (i.e., purchase order) usually arrives just two months prior to
delivery. The buyer would pay a liability if they drop the order, but a product manager
says “we have not faced such issues as yet” over many years of business. The brand
delaying payment is probably a strategic feature of financialization.
195
This is called the “cutoff date” or “drop date.”
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are a few minor reasons for this,196 but Soham says that the major reason “why we keep
some machines idle is that maybe we are expecting some order to come in. We do not
give these machines [over] to outside production; we give a preference for our own team.
We keep room” for orders that will come in from the marketing team and can thus be
fulfilled with short lead times. This kind of “strategic underutilization” is promoted by
fast fashion brands elsewhere, including regional sourcing directives by Zara (Denning
2012).
Other scholars in the tradition of new economic sociology have emphasized the
importance of trust and relational exchanges for firm performance, especially Uzzi (1996,
1997). We need to remember two things about similar studies as we continue with our
analysis. First, some of the examples that Uzzi and I provide are mere tokens of goodwill.
Because they are informal, they can be structurally, strategically, and contractually
exploited. In larger paradigms that consider trade and governance relations, relational
exchanges can be inconsequential (e.g., Porter 1990, Schrank 2004, Williamson 2008).
Second, these exchanges are negotiations that vary according to the occupational base of
general managers. Because they are insulated in the technical core of production, for
instance, general managers of planning are largely indifferent to brand relationships.
They maintain veto power against most orders above capacity. Customer-facing
executives in marketing, meanwhile, are willing to consider both a broader range of
planning factors and an extended timeline of consequences. A projected five-year brand
relationship can override some short-term planning decisions.
Buying agency conflicts
Buying agencies can complicate capacity blocking for better or for worse. For his
part, Paaus argues that suppliers should never turn down orders. “The factory should
follow the money!” he thunders. “Let me ask you: if [a small agency] can give you an
order for $2 million and I have a brand [through a large agency] that will give you an
order for eight million, who would you choose? [The supplier is] lying to you if they say
they would not take eight million, if they don’t want growth with the biggest customers!”
If a supplier doesn’t currently have enough capacity they should either subcontract
(taking some profits in the meantime) or expand capacity by using the strategies
discussed above. If there are quality concerns because a supplier “can’t manage [the
brand] expectations,” the supplier should hire consultants to upgrade its capabilities.
When I put this position to Anurag, he laughs with cynicism: “Of course the
buying house will tell you that. A buying house has only one goal—turnover. They will
always tell the factory to take more, but the factory is taking the risk! The factory is
making the investments, maintaining the labor force…” Vaasu and Sanchit express
similar concerns of finance and fluctuating orders (e.g., the 2008 recession). Soham, a
general manager of knitting at a mill I visit, points to two large-capacity machines,
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This is some concern for capacity issues, for example, and the prevention of
bottlenecks.
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purchased at buyer request, which are sitting idle now that the brand relationship has
ceased.
Fluctuating loyalty from the buyers behind large orders is also worth considering.
Riya’s preference for small buying agencies versus liaison agencies is an outlier, but it
hinges on a belief in loyalty: “A buyer who is going direct [with a liaison agency], they
will have an option to source globally. So we are maybe one in a thousand [suppliers].”
She names two value brands who source through liaison agencies, saying “they don’t
have any commitment.” Instead, she believes that “this is one business which works
totally on relationship and personal service. With a [small] buying agency at least you
can expect this partnership, because they also have [only] some few clients. So if they
have strategic vendors, they will not let anybody go [i.e., end the partnership] just like
that. They will ensure that some sort of business is going to their strategic vendors.”
When I take this position back to Paaus, he simply laughs coldly: “The agent has no
loyalty. The factory should be loyal to the agent!”
When relationships go sour, it often involves a combination of the issues covered
above. In the case of a bridge brand with orders through a small buying agency, Amrita
tells me that orders were gradually reduced, “not cut off like that” as she slices her hand
horizontally through the air. “Coordination with the agency was not super great.” Sanjana
adds that the agency complicated the planning process by being “too pushing” during the
peak season without providing additional capacity. She draws a diagram:
If you have nine [assembly] lines [and] you have six running for one client, that
means you can only have three open for another client. But what this buying
agency was doing is trying to take up some of the six lines that were already
running for the first client. But you cannot push [the lines], there is a maximum
capacity. You also cannot keep them empty to reserve them for a client. If you
want more lines… you have to feed [all of] them.
Requests to block capacity come with obligations.197 The product manager working with
the brand provides additional details, telling me that the agency is “very small and
disorganized… You can say it is a one-man show… We love to work with the buyer
actually, but because of the buying agent, that’s why—I think—we had to close it down
for now.” When I ask Vaasu for his summary assessment, he visibly prickles and chalks
it up to an “internal staffing issue” at the agency. He says (with a diplomatic mask) that
the account closure was reached with “mutual understanding,” but that he later
communicated to the buyer his willingness to restart orders if they were mediated by a
different buying agency.
Seasonal Variations
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Li and Fung takes a middle ground with the goal of blocking 30-70% of supplier
capacity. At a minimum, Victor Fung argues (2011), “it’s because we want to be one of
the largest buyers for a factory, so that we have influence with them. [Still], we don’t
want 100 percent, because once you have 100 percent you are morally obligated to keep
on feeding the factory.”
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Seasons affect planning in two ways: consumer demand and holidays. On the first
count, we might be reminded of Marx’s famous phrase about the “murderous,
meaningless caprices of fashion” ([1867] 1977:609). Although frequently misinterpreted,
this actually refers to the fact that the slowest season of production—winters in
England—creates uncertainty or unemployment for workers.198 In India, planning charts
show peaks in April/May and August/September.199 On the second count, planners must
consider holidays and worker availability. India slows down around Diwali; approvals
from the U.S. and Europe are delayed during Christmas and the American New Year.
Nitin also points to the difficulty of international coordination around the Chinese New
Year in January and February. This does not just affect buyers, who apparently must
source orders from other countries during this time, but Indian suppliers who source
fabric, trims, or machinery from China. Indian suppliers must plan ahead, placing their
orders by December 20 and stocking up for the month to come.
Indian executives also have seasonal strategies for orders and renovations during
“lean” periods. The underlying goal is to “keep the lines running,” according to a senior
product manager at ACE. Product managers are indeed given leeway to “sacrifice
margins” and to block off capacity for low-value brand relationships. An ACE product
manager gives the example of a bridge segment brand whose requests for small quantities
and low prices are rebuffed during peak periods but entertained during off-seasons. Her
colleague adds that ACE is also more likely to accept low-value orders from domestic
brands.200 Buying agencies are well-aware of seasonal opportunities for leverage. Paaus,
an executive at a buying agency, uses them to push for a “lean season discount. If we are
giving you capacity, you need to give us cost efficiency. When you do lean
[manufacturing], you have to think mean!” he exclaims with a grin. What about the
opportunity cost of deferring capital reinvestments or renovations? Does ACE ever refuse
low-margin orders to make this happen? Vaasu calmly tells me that “we don’t really need
to do that. Right now it is the slow season, so that’s why we can implement these [new
machinery] changes now. We do a big structural change every five to seven years, in a
cycle. It’s not specifically planned that way... But we do small changes all the time.”
Buyers gain negotiating power during lean seasons, but suppliers are not
powerless. They need not accept orders below cost and can force slower schedules on
low-value buyers. While small suppliers like SFI simply seek to maximize utilization
year-round, better-capitalized suppliers like ACE and MEI introduce special advantages
by keeping some capacity available.
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The challenges of seasonal production for steady employment were noted before the
advent of the factory system (Bellers 1699:9).
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Off-peak seasons are sometimes called “dull” or “slack.” Brands have their own
seasonal categorizations for suppliers. Chandana tells me that a mid-tier brand, for
example, classifies ACE as a spring/summer producer because of its specialization in
embroideries.
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Off-season challenges apply to factories and mills alike: while ACE sources 10-20%
of its fabric from its own mills in peak seasons, this can fall to less than five percent
otherwise. Dore’s study of Japanese textile mills discovered obligations not to exploit
bargaining superiority during recessions (1983:465).
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Overbooking and Re-planning
Planners need to re-plan 10-20% of total orders, meaning that these orders have
failed to reach the planned production start date on time.201 The major sources of
deviation include fabric or approval delays (Chapter 5) and the realities of human labor
versus idealized labor time. “This is a manpower-oriented industry,” Nitin emphasizes.
“You have to expect that contingency will be there. Attrition problem will be there,
electricity problem…” I witness a firefight emerge with a call from the cutting manager
at one unit, for example, informing Nishant with a production start date only six days
from now that cutting capacity is only 3.8k pieces per day, not the 5k that have been
planned. Delays are more likely than advances, as we will see, but either route is
possible.
Our discussion of contingencies begins with the optimism of two escape routes:
order cancellations and slow efficiency estimates from central planning. Order
cancellations, first, are surprisingly unhelpful. “Cancellations are not easy,” Abdul says
sternly. “Every order will be different” in regard to capacity, standard allocated minutes,
etc. Instead, planners have to defragment entire schedules, reorganizing fragmented
blocks into a continuous arrangement. Put simply, “we have to reshuffle the overall
plan.” Slow efficiency estimates, second, may also provide breathing room. Nitin uses the
metaphor of expecting a drive to take one hour but reaching the destination in 45 minutes.
This is possible, he proposes, when there is “eagerness” from factory workers and
management,202 or when operators are “well-equipped” or “well-versed.” We work
through a hypothetical example of a style targeted to run for 33 days at 600 pieces per
day. If the line can actually produce 800 pieces per day, however, production will take
only 25 days, creating “bonus” additional capacity of eight days.
When I relay Nitin’s “bonus” example to Seher, a general manager of central
engineering, he stops the tracks on his roller chair. He frowns and raises a deeply
skeptical eyebrow: “Who told you that? It is wrong.” He busily searches through files on
his computer and pulls up numbers from his most recent report. It shows a six-percentage
point gap between the average booking target efficiency (idealized) and achieved
efficiency (actual).203 “These are the data,” Seher says with the stamp of evidence. With
even further isolation in the technical core of central engineering, Seher simply cannot
tolerate Nitin’s ambitious hypothetical example. Nishant is similarly pessimistic,
encouraging planners to systematically book up to 110% of capacity.
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We should note that re-planning is extremely successful: the general manager of
accounting says that MEI achieves 98% of deliveries on time.
202
Classic experiments in group facilitation and observation by Triplett and the
Hawthorne researchers continue to be cited despite serious methodological flaws (Jones
1992, Moore 1947, Stroebe 2012).
203
The formula for achieved/line efficiency is output (pieces) x SAM / operators x
maximum available labor time. The rates here are in the average range of 61% versus
55%.
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Overbooking, meanwhile, creates its own problems. Nishant admits that in fact
“we are in a mess now” because a higher percent of orders are reaching the planned start
date on time—instead of late, as the planners had expected. In cases of overbooking,
there are at least four strategic options. None can be systematically privileged, as there
are simply too many variables to consider. (1) Product managers can seek compromises
on buyer deadlines. “We can explain to them that we are stuck in some process,” senior
production manager Mohit says. “If it is a genuine issue, sometimes they understand.”
Abdul gives a different example with a value buyer who wants three styles to be
assembled and shipped immediately. In exchange for the supplier pushing these three
styles, two others will be allowed to ship later. Negotiations for large orders are relatively
easy as long as the majority of the shipment is on time, especially at value-added
suppliers like ACE. (2) Planners can add capacity by temporarily redeploying manpower
“from other lines where we are comfortable on our delivery.” This is Mohit’s preferred
strategy. A related option is to redistribute work to different units. Swaps are only
possible, however, if another unit is nominated, has available capacity, and has suitable
capabilities. (3) Planners can increase short-term production by requesting/demanding
extra hours from factory staff and workers. I witnessed this strategy at IFS and Roy
(2009) reports that it is common among small and medium enterprises. Mohit stresses
that it is expensive, however, and less common at large firms: “budgeted OT [overtime]
is fixed per month. Working hours are fixed per month.” One final option, given high
land costs and operating expenses in Delhi, is to introduce 24-hour production with three
shifts per day.
Subcontracting
Subcontracting, either wholly or in part, is the final mode of increasing capacity.
Popular critiques suggest that subcontracting is always illegal, unaudited, unethical, and
pursued only in order to reduce costs (Cline 2012:150, Strom 1996). Large-scale events
identified as scandals capture the most media attention, like the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire,
Rana Plaza collapse, or the anti-sweatshop activism of the 1990s (e.g., Harrison and
Scorse 2010). Publicity is generally disruptive and transformative (Adut 2005), though
corporate social responsibility efforts are typically lagged. By contrast, insider acceptance
of outsourcing is common in both history and the present. Certainly the American apparel
production industry was built on the “jobber-contractor” system of middlemen and the
“sweating system” of subcontracting (Commons 1901).204 Large-scale analyses of these
practices in New York and Los Angeles continued well into the 1980s (Sassen 1988,
Waldinger 1986). My fieldwork, along with literature from many countries over the past
120 years, shows that principle incentives for subcontracting regularly include (1)
avoiding unionized suppliers, (2) specialization, and (3) coping with excess demand.
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A study from the 1930s estimates that this mode of production accounted for 75% of
total U.S. production at the time (Hardy 1935:155), but reliability is difficult to assess.
Other estimates range between 10 to 90% over a 10-year period (Commons 1901:322).
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(1) Avoiding unionization is a constant theme in American labor history. In India,
non-unionized “home work” or “sub-con” work is extremely common. Arrangements are
anthropologically diverse (Mezzadri 2016) but include, in the words of a buying agency
director, “cottage industry” production from “I don’t know what you call them,
villagers?” Embroidery and beading are labor-intensive and difficult to monitor in terms
of standard allocated minutes. Piece rates (i.e., pay per piece) are a common alternative.
(2) Flexible specialization helps to explain the prevalence of subcontracting for
certain types of work.205 This can include access to specialized machinery, labor
competencies, or physical space. Both Nishant and the printing manager at MEI offer
estimates of 50% for special process outsourcing (e.g., embroidery or digital printing); a
consultant estimates 80% at SFI. A footwear supplier, for example, sends out beading on
the leather of embellished sneakers after the rest of the sneaker is already completed.
Competence also matters. As the managing director, Anurag’s firm used to manufacture
shoe soles in-house, but when merchandise was repeatedly sent back for corrections, it
created “headaches” for him. Subcontracting soles to the “component guys” solved the
issue. Finally, Anurag tells me that as the number of orders has grown, factory space is
becoming increasingly important and component outsourcing is becoming increasingly
attractive.
Subcontracts can be offshored206 or they can take a hybrid form. On the account
of one executive, offshore sourcing criteria for subcontracts is similar to first-tier criteria.
Gokul asks the following questions when he outsources to Bangladesh: “What are their
price points, what is their capacity, what systems do they use, how do they ensure ontime delivery, how do they ensure quality?” ACE also maintains ties to factories in South
and Southeast Asia, through Amrita tells me this is mostly a stunt to entice buyers with
“flexibility.” Krishna is bullish on outsourcing to these factories: “Why should we say no
to the buyer if our [own] capacity is full?” Compliance and capacity issues (see below),
however, present potential liabilities that executives are not yet ready to pursue.
Subcontracting can also take a hybrid form. Five lines at a MEI factory unit, for
instance, involve subcontracted operators who work on “company premises.” These lines
will have the “same number of manpower, same process, same everything,” according to
Mohit, but will be staffed and managed with subcontracted workers. He is shy but clearly
excited about lower costs. On the other hand, his face falls when he tells me that “not all
buyers will allow such a practice.” Indeed, he guesses that hybrid subcontracts are
allowed in only five percent of MEI factory units.
(3) Relying on subcontracting to cope with excess demand may represent an error
in planning. This explanation is rather short-sighted, however. We have already seen that
contingencies are in fact a regularity of planning. They are influenced not only by the
micro and meso complications of formulating labor times, but by buyer-driven seasonal
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My critique of flexible specialization in Chapter 1 is focused on macro-level
applications. Because GVCs have grown in complexity—a point derived from
Durkheim’s Division of Labor ([1893] 1997)—functional mechanisms remain plausible
at lower levels of analysis.
206
Gereffi (1994:113-15) identified “triangle manufacturing” as early as the 1990s. An
example includes Taiwanese investment in China.
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variations (e.g., peak seasons) and the negotiations of buying agencies (see below). Time
and capacity pressures have no journalistic shock value, yet they are the height of
phenomenological realities.
Margaret, a former factory manager on the East Coast, tells me that
subcontracting is routine “if they get overwhelmed... We would subcontract out to get the
order done because all of a sudden something happened and the [assembly] line is
[slowed down]… so you’ve got to subcontract out. I’m like, ‘ok, I’ve got these orders
promised, I’ve got this machine tied up right now.’” Time pressures were an
underreported and buried motivation in the scandalous 1990s case of licensed designs
being produced by Honduran teenagers for the celebrity Kathie Lee Gifford. “Nobody
expected the huge demand there was for my line,” Gifford says in the middle of an
interview (Strom 1996). “Sales tripled Wal-Mart’s expectations, and suddenly it was like
‘Uh-oh, we need to get 50,000 more blouses and fast.’” Margaret remains angry about the
high profile of this case vis a vis industry practice, telling me that outsouring is simply
“what you do [in these situations]… it happens every single day, every single minute…
that’s just the nature of the beast.” The contingencies of time and capacity are papered
over by outraged responses to subcontracting.
Some suppliers feel obligated to accept occasionally large orders to demonstrate
capability (Tokatli et al. 2008b:275-76); others do not want to turn down growth
opportunities. Although this is not the norm at ACE, Abdul tells me that “if [a buyer]
comes to us [at MEI], we always want to take it.” Still, based on both U.S. interviews and
Indian fieldwork, I find that large buyers are the most likely to categorically prohibit
subcontracting. This is probably based on reputation as a feature of brand equity (Aaker
1996, Klein 2002b) and sometimes extends to large suppliers who want to protect major
contracts (Appelbaum 2008).207 Other researchers note that suppliers—and here I assume
small suppliers—don’t always inform buyers of subcontracting (Aspers 2010b:137,
Mezzadri 2016). Margaret is confident that this was the situation when Gifford “got
busted. She had no idea. She had absolutely no idea that the factory that she contracted to
was going to subcontract it out… Nobody else in the world is going to know except the
house that took the original order.” The Gifford case was exceptional in revealing all four
layers of subcontracting. Nike was the first major brand to make its supplier list public in
the 1990s (following scandal). Uniqlo, C&A, and M&S have only made their lists public
since 2015 or later. Formal transparency is the first step in a long journey toward
melioration.
The balance of power among buyers, product managers, and planners shifts
depending on long-term relationships, long-term potential for growth, and seasonal
oscillations (peak versus off-peak periods). Long-term relationships are instantiations of
pre-contractual solidarity, but performance implications cannot be inferred. In other
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Although it is a minority position in the current literature, Babbage ([1835] 1963:219)
made this argument long ago: “the merchant, in dealing with the great manufacturer, is
saved from the expense of verification, by knowing that the loss, or even the
impeachment, of the manufacturer’s character, would be attended with greater injury to
himself than any profit upon a single transaction could compensate.”
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words, good working relationships do not necessarily indicate a good strategy. Ten to
20% of orders at MEI will be replanned because of delays. This is anticipated by
allowing up to 110% booking capacity. When factories become overbooked in turn,
planners have recourse to a variety of options. During critical periods of “firefighting,”
suppliers can negotiate with buyers, increase available internal labor time, or subcontract.
Changes are not independent; instead, each change results in a substantial general
reconfiguration.
Line Allocations
We will cover two final aspects of planning in this section: capabilities and
structural optimization. Planners need factory units that are not simply available, but that
contain the right mix of machinery, line supervisors, and skilled/unskilled operators.
Planners thus have to balance optimization (i.e., quality) with economy and efficiency
(e.g., favoring assignments to cheaper and more readily available unskilled workers when
possible). They also deal with structural contingencies like old infrastructure. The goal
here is to utilize every space possible, playing Tetris with order sizes.
Capabilities
Tacking on the concept of capabilities builds on economies of experience,
machinery, and skill. We can consider economies of experience first. In some cases an
entire factory unit is dedicated to a single brand with large orders. Nishant prefers this
when possible: efficiency increases when factory management and operators grow
familiar with brand styles and quality requirements. Abdul also prefers this in a selfinterested way because “the math is easier” and he is more likely to “achieve the target.”
Most factories, however, run orders for about five different brands. The second thing to
consider is the right machinery for a particular style. This is the case with one of
Nishant’s firefights. A planner has assigned a zippered hooded sweatshirt to a particular
unit; she has come to Nishant for his signature. Nishant stops and frowns, however: “I
have never seen them producing jackets…” He immediately calls the factory manager,
who confirms that the unit can only produce the jacket if it does not have a zipper. The
planner can now either negotiate with her colleagues to find a different unit or she can
outsource the order.
Assembly line skill matters too. Variations in “line capability” are a minor issue
for central planners but a major one for production managers. When Anusha describes
how central engineering works with the factory manager and line supervisor to assign
assembly operations, she says that one must be careful to match the style to the skill of a
line as a whole: “we have one bicycle line [i.e., unskilled] and one rocket line [i.e.,
skilled]. If we have one rocket order, we cannot assign to bicycle line.” This is
operationalized according to line supervisors, some of whom are “more technical,” and
the percentage of A-grade operators per line (see below). One line at IFS is using delicate
fabric for an order of dresses; here production managers have to be careful to work for a
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minimal defect rate. The line is entirely stocked with A-grade operators “because we
cannot afford to reject any piece,” the floor manager tells me.
General managers have to choose between efficiency and flexibility (i.e., skill).
At one extreme (in a footwear factory), Anurag tells me how he purchases moccasins
from a Spanish factory that produces only moccasins. These will be sent all the way to
India (to be embroidered) before being distributed in the UK. As we tour the Indian
factory he repeatedly emphasizes the craft-based nature of non-athletic footwear
production (with athletic production dominated by China). At a number of operator
stations, he explains how that this or that task could be done more efficiently with
automation. Because of frequent style changes with short runs (average 400 pieces),
however, it is cheaper to continue using skilled labor rather than investing in specialized
machinery.
Structural Optimization
Planners work with factory managers to determine how many assembly lines will
be assigned to a particular style. Large factories may have 20 or 30 lines in total (spread
across multiple floors) to work with. On-time delivery always comes first, which may
require assigning two lines to produce 5k pieces each. In general, however, a single line
of 10k pieces will run more efficiently. I ask Mohit why this is so; he responds in two
parts. First, product managers or the cutting department may not have all the materials
ready for production at the same time; sourcing delays are to be expected. Second,
“wastage [of time and materials] increases when you add lines.” There are delays with
each line reset (see below), so “if the order continues for a month, we will have to keep
on changing.”208 A senior planner verifies that if delivery times are a long ways away,
planners will keep only one or two lines working on the style to avoid line resets.209
Assembly lines themselves can be adjusted by structural relocations or changing
the number of operators. The routes on one floor at ACE, for example, are limited by
concrete pillars, steam pipes along the walls (for ironing), and compliance regulations of
3.5 feet between aisles. Machine and table layouts are planned by the floor engineer. For
each changeover they will be lifted and carried around the floor as needed. While there
are some attempts to optimize changeovers (see below), because it is a one-time task it is
of secondary importance. Engineers themselves admit that hiring based on operator skill
or “grade availability” (see below) is more problematic than machine layouts. Average
lines at older and smaller factories typically include 15-30 operators; newer and larger
units range from 30-45.210
Very short lines with 7-15 operators are sometimes utilized for complicated
garments (e.g., jackets) with small order sizes or for special orders. When consumers
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It is unlikely that even exact re-orders would be placed in the original line; that line
would already be running another style.
209
Engineering-based optimization does not consider human relations factors like
operator boredom (see below).
210
Line work has higher fixed costs than individual work (Hague and Newman 1952:15).
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purchase garments in the high-end luxury segment, one of the qualities they pay for is
rarity—including the inability to accumulate economies of experience. A high-end luxury
buyer reports that the single most challenging part of her job is dealing with small
quantities:
[Our brand] is certainly… specialty-oriented… but it’s annoying for production.
Um, because we get all these stupid, like last-minute requests, and like, like,
‘well, can we just make this one unit with like a longer hemline?’ And it’s just,
like, it’s stupid for the factories, it’s kind of stupid for us, because then we just
have to buy like one piece of like, whatever it is. The factories are going to charge
more for it… [and] get annoyed [at] the little amounts.
Suppliers like ACE or IFS take these kinds of orders either (a) because of price premiums
that account for opportunity costs, (b) as favors to buyers that will be exchanged for other
privileges later, or (c) as an opportunity to continue utilizing small spaces in older and
less efficient factory units. Later in the chapter we will look at some of the financial
strategies that suppliers use to recoup the costs of small orders.
Planning Summary
We now have an excellent idea of the variables that planners work with in order
to optimize production schedules for particular styles. The problem-solving style is
formulaic, with calculators and flow charts as the tools of choice. Planners are a key
shock absorber of uncertainty. They begin with a six- to 12-month window of visibility,
seeking to “freeze” or lock orders into specific factory units. They allocate according to
buyer nominations, available capacity, and capabilities. The vagaries of seasons and
relationships affect capacity blocking, with 10-20% of orders being re-planned to ensure
on-time deliveries. Subcontracting provides an escape route, providing flexible
specialization and a way to cope to rapid excess demand.
We still see the power of marketing executives in certain cases, but there is
growing resistance as we approach the technical core of production. The veto option of
planning general managers is a startling new power. This hardening of planning and
production will become increasingly visible as time horizons shrink. We have already
seen why on-time delivery matters—it avoids expensive air shipments (Chapter 5)—but
we are now seeing how it matters.
The next section analyzes how time pressures are operationalized in central
engineering. Although the work of task design by industrial engineers is sequentially
ordered before the work of planning, it is operationally closer to the organizational
routines of assembly lines.
Central Engineering
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Engineering has two master concepts: quality and efficiency.211 Quality
proponents will come up occasionally as we analyze production processes, but they are
more prominent in the quality analysis department. Efficiency proponents, on the other
hand, are everywhere in production management. Some of them address end-to-end
processes like lean management. The task of central engineers, covered here, is more
limited. Their job is, very simply, to provide an efficient basis for time and motion. They
do not collaborate with regular operators in doing so. Instead, it is more appropriate to
envision central engineering as Taylor’s dreamworld. Physically separated from assembly
lines, central engineering is a space to optimize time and motion with minimal
interruptions from the complications and contingencies introduced by human bodies and
human desires.
In addition to some of the engineering literature, two sets of scholarship will help
us to understand the conceptual and methodological territory we are venturing into. First,
I draw deeply on the theories of the Carnegie School of administration to show how
rationality is both continually appealing and continually inadequate. On the one hand,
rationality is equated with a limited, focused, and computationally-driven model of reality
that deliberately collapses a holistic external reality in order to provide a sensible context
for decision-making (Barnard 1938/1960, March and Simon 1958:151).212 Rationality is
particularly effective for “exploitation” in the strategic sense of maximizing reliable,
short-term performance (March 1991). Assembly lines are a great example here. On the
other hand, organizations and individuals have limited resources. They satisfice rather
than optimize; they avoid, defer, and search for compromises or alternatives (Simon
1967, 1997:137). Always capable of learning, adaptation, and error, they introduce and
maintain organizational slack. This can be deliberate or accidental (Cohen, March and
Olsen 1972). In any case, the methodological prescription of the Carnegie School is to
stand ready to recognize both rationality and its limitations on both the objective terrain
of organizational structure and the subjective terrain of experience.
Second, the emotional insights of Simmel, Hughes, and the Chicago School
breathe ethnographic life into the dilemmas of planners and industrial engineers. The
industrial sociology of Donald Roy—a student of Hughes—is particularly notable. An
early study shows how managers introduce new rules in pursuit of efficiency. Because
they are not actually effective, however, workers dialectically introduce new evasions. He
concludes as follows: “If managerial directives are not the guides to efficient action that
they are claimed to be, then, perhaps, ‘logics of efficiency’ would be better designated as
‘sentiments of efficiency’” (1954:266, italics added).213 The engineers and other
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Psychology and economics sometimes distinguish principles of optimization versus
maximization.
212
Recent perspectives on quantification are less attentive to psychology (e.g., Espeland
and Stevens 2008).
213
Those familiar with organizational theory will recognize the possible alternative
conceptualizations of bureaucracy and neo-institutionalism. These approaches are linked
by a more abstract interest in social cognition (e.g., Dobbin 2009, Gouldner 1954, Meyer
and Rowan 1977).
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managers whom I analyze below likewise believe that they are pursuing efficiency
through logic, even as their subordinates continually introduce slack.
The work of central engineering operates across in principle across all the
production divisions (including planning, cutting, production, finishing, and shipping).
My observations are limited to assembly line preparation as the most involved and
changeable segment of the value chain. The following sections begin by introducing the
aristocratic and rational bases of engineering theory. We then proceed to a
microsociological investigation of the standardization of time and motion.
The View from Above
Top-down perspectives from executives and general managers are helpful in
setting the tone of engineering work. Their vision is essentially one of systems
rationalization (Barley and Kunda 1992:376-81, Cyert and March 1992): operations,
process theories, and objectives are central and they are linear; human resources are
secondary. I found that general managers of planning and engineering, bolstered by a
universal logic of rationalization, completely ignore the systemic risk that their relations
of authority and exploitation create.214 The aristocratic and even feudal basis of
management is thus worth noting upfront. Authority has long been derived not only from
the “status” of estates, but from interaction (i.e., leadership) and from abstract intellectual
sources like rationality (cf. Abbott 1988b, Fayol 1916/1949, Hughes 1956). The division
of labor is never merely technical—it is also moral.
At the suppliers I studied, executives and engineering managers believe that
efficiency in time and motion comes from deskilling. Deskilling is the creation of
systems and processes to remove the need for employee skill or discretion. Gokul’s
description, however, is far more interesting than any theoretical entanglement:
Here’s something I could sell for five or six million [dollars]. Here, here, I’ll
show you. (He opens up an Excel spreadsheet). Every six months, I go through
this spreadsheet. I look at every position in every department; we have maybe 16
or 17 departments. Here I have the position [on the left], name [in the middle] and
these codes [on the right]. The first one here is C—complex—then another C for
critical. S is for simple… I find the problems here. I want all of these C’s to turn
into S’s. I want each worker to be doing simple things instead of complex things.
So here we have this simple job which Poonem is doing, but Poonem is skilled. I
want this simple job to be done by a donkey. Sorry to put it like that, but it is a
donkey’s work. And you should never give a horse a donkey’s work.
If Gokul were a manager, Taylor would hire him immediately—maybe as much for his
attitude as for his process! The key is here: “I want each worker to be doing simple things
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Attrition, anti-union organizing, and the work of human resource managers will be
covered in future work. Wright (2002) provides an extremely interesting point of
departure on this point that cannot be considered in any detail here. For more on the
ambivalent productions of engineering within a bureaucratic global capitalism, see also
the arguments developed by Adler (e.g., 2007, 2012).
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instead of complex things.” To Gokul, this means fewer errors, easier hiring, and lower
wages. It also means fewer responsibilities. Indeed, he has assigned the task of
implementing this system to consultants, leaving him free to consider other higher-order
pursuits as a noble capitalist leader (Knight [1921] 1964).
Vishal, the general manager of engineering at ACE, carries forward the same
principles with a more polished vocabulary of systems rationalization. He pushes for each
and every process to be codified by standard operating procedures (SOPs) in order to
streamline inputs and outputs. “If the inputs are correct, it is [the worker’s] problem”
when there are errors. Garment manufacturing should be “procedure work” in which “we
don’t have to make decisions.” Abhishek, the general manager of product development at
MEI, is only slightly more liberal. When I ask for his philosophy on quality control, he
replies that “nobody is allowed to use their mind… They should follow what I have
written. If they want to have any influence, it can be at meetings [see below], but not
during the process.” As we move toward assembly lines we will see how this sense of
hierarchical entitlement trickles down to engineering managers and line supervisors.
Managers feel that the goal of a perfectly standardized product with a perfectly efficient
process requires minimal autonomy of both time and motion for assembly line operators.
Automation is perhaps the ultimate version of deskilling. Asked for his long-term
predictions for the future of the company, the general manager of human resources at
MEI replies with “automatization,” because we have this [problem of worker] attrition.”
Under the influence of Six Sigma (quality-based) and lean management (efficiencybased), Vishal’s ultimate goal is “to remove all unnecessary costs and processes,”
especially “non-value-added activity,” by “using machines instead of people.” As far as
he is concerned, anything that can be mechanized and standardized should be. At MEI,
ACE, and SFI, these processes clearly extend to managerial work. Initial studies of
assembly line balancing (see below) with tablets that offer software-driven “suggestions”
apparently show that the software can compensate for a lack of supervisor experience. As
we will also see later, radio-frequency identification (RFID) is being used to transfer
productivity monitoring duties from line supervisors to engineers (and yet again from
engineers to operators themselves). The goal here is very simply and very directly to
replace humans with machines. One way to think about the work that engineers are doing
in the short term is that they are playing an intellectual “game” to justify their own
existence.
As we move down from the heights of executive dreams to the practical world of
middle management, there is increasing skepticism about how long it will take to achieve
full automation. For one thing, the reason that machines could not replace workers 100
years ago remains the same today (e.g., Sew Bots): “the chief difficulty to be overcome is
that of getting the machinery to hold the material [fabric] firmly in exactly the position in
which the machine tool can be brought to bear on it in the right way, and without wasting
too much time in taking grip of it” (Marshall 1920/1961:254). Educational concerns may
also be relevant, as Mohit reports. Both he and the general manager of production
attended the National Institute of Fashion Technology (NIFT), but he says that there is a
diminishing interest in factory operations: “Nowadays NIFTians don’t want to go into

201

production. They want to go to a buying [agency], into marketing…” A similar sentiment
is echoed by Prabir Jana, a NIFT professor, at a conference lecture.215
Given the sustained realities of human workers, we can introduce the core
functions of central engineering. They include (1) streamlining movements for
“production-friendly” operations, (2) conducting efficiency-centered research and
development, and (3) introducing a series of buffers that account for human ontology.
The last task, in other words, is an operational recognition that quantification reduces
uncertainty but leaves a predictable remainder. It is a bias introduced by the logic and
sentiment of engineering. I will provide many examples to make the case that although
this organizational routine is not considered part of standard operating procedure, on-time
deliveries would not be possible without it.
Industrial Engineering as Benevolent Optimization
Anusha, my first point of contact for the engineering lab, conveys some of the
heady climate of scientific management. On the one hand she notes her lack of
experience as a “young kid” in her 20s, “very lucky to be working with [a technician]
with 35 years of experience.” She professes disdain for the “big egos” of managers. On
the other hand, her Taylorist idealism and ambition are barely suppressed. Anusha is
confident that engineering will create the “best method” of production and give the “best
analysis.” “We don’t even need language... What you need is smart work and smart
brain. Process will be the same in any country.” Instead, “the difficult challenge is to
work on human beings. If you are in the auto industry, there you just have to optimize
machines.216 But people are not robots… If robots could replace people, I would be
flying! But challenges would be very less interesting, you could say.” In some cases, the
engineering laboratory will make a request to a line supervisor to grant an employee one
or two days of training (for one particular operation). The same is true for mechanic
training. We may note here that there are also some mechanical interventions as part of
the department mission of “research and development for [assembly] line operations.”
Technicians at ACE, for example, are modifying Kansai-brand sewing machines to
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R. C. Kesar, the Director General of the OGTC (industry association), argues
otherwise in an interview with me. He says of the apparently declining cultural prestige
of manufacturing that “it has always been like that. Design, purchase [product
management], they are more glamorous. There has always been less interest in sterile
manufacturing.” Declining interest by second- and third-generation owners and workers
was common in the U.S. apparel industry and from my fieldwork appears similarly
challenged in India.
216
Indeed, Adler and his colleagues report the absence of an industrial engineering
department at Toyota (1999:51). Interactive service work is another fascinating example
of machine optimization. Leidner (1993:49) writes that to minimize motion, McDonald’s
relies on “specially designed ketchup dispensers [to] squirt exactly the right amount of
ketchup on each burger in the approved flower pattern.”
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perform one-of-a-kind operations. The greater part of the work, however, is focused on
the more variable human component of labor.
Unlike the smaller suppliers I studied, MEI has a dedicated physical laboratory
with permanently employed technicians, operators, and a handful of sewing machines.
They are given two weeks to prepare each order, including initial movement planning and
experimental leeway with video analysis. Beyond idealistic “movement coding,”
engineers are encouraged to experiment with different combinations. When Anusha asks
her supervisor about new ideas, “sometimes he will just tell us to try it.” Indeed, some
elements of Anusha’s philosophy of engineering are Progressive in the classical sense.217
She apologizes for the deadening human effects of mechanization and would agree with
Elton Mayo218 that supervisors should listen to workers instead of only “driving” them.
She would probably also, however, praise Walter Lippmann’s quest for harmonious and
“effective social conditioning” imposed by managers and social elites (Mayo 1930,
1939). Like most of her colleagues she feels there is a wide gulf between the capabilities
of line workers and the rest of the factory staff. “We have to plan the operations for
them,” she explains.219 “They are on the shop floor for eight hours a day. They will not
think how to make the movement more efficient.” She draws a line with her hand
connecting her with me: “We have BA [degrees], or MA, but they will have 10 or 12
years [of high school education] only.” Orienting workers as part of human relations is
presented as a win-win dynamic. Ergonomics, for instance, will make workers more
comfortable. At the same time, though, if a worker is not situated properly, “she will take
one week leave, two weeks leave. But in one manpower day, one operator will make 100
pieces per day. We cannot afford [to lose] that.” Training the micro-movements of
workers is good for the smooth functioning of assembly lines. While the extent of
research and intervention varies greatly across suppliers, there are standardized
measurements that are—in principle—used to calculate the labor time and cost of
garment production. Gone now are the whims of aesthetics—bring on the mathematics of
engineering!
Standardizing Time and Micro-Movement
Most work in political economy and global value chains takes standard minute
values for granted, beginning instead from a theoretical “process cost” that covers cutting
and assembly.220 At higher levels of analysis this is not necessarily problematic. It misses
out, however, on the detail, complexity, and skill of semi-peripheral management
practices. Macro-oriented qualitative works routinely gloss these differences (e.g.,
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Mead, for example, considers the role of the engineer as a benevolent planner,
accounting for the attitudes of everyone involved and designing the satisfaction that will
emerge from teamwork (1934:276-80).
218
Mayo’s early research (e.g., 1924) was conducted at a Philadelphia textile mill.
219
Braverman (1974:67) reports “manage,” from the Latin manus, “hand,” originally
meant training a horse in paces.
220
Some version of cut, make, trim, package (CM/CMT/CMTP).
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Collins 2003). Other macro-oriented ethnographers would surely capture them (e.g.,
Burawoy 1979), but the logic of the extended case method still runs the risk of ignoring
the detail, complexity, and skill of semi-peripheral management (identified in an
overlooked critique by Prechel 1994). These are by no means the only culprits, but
together these strands of Marxism contribute to a bias of unique capabilities in research
design and theoretical postulates (Chapter 1).
To be fair, analyzing the standardization of time and movement protocols was the
single most confusing experience of my fieldwork. There are differences in both
vocabulary and operationalization not only across countries, firms, and product divisions,
but even across the six departments within a single factory unit that relies on
standardizations of time and movement. Indeed, I found that different departments
sometimes used the same term in a fully contradictory way.221 I will spare the reader from
this methodological morass. Instead I will first introduce basic time and motion studies,
including an internationally “standard minute value” (SMV) that designates expected
labor time according to the method of scientific management. We will then proceed to
analyze a series of formal and informal buffers which allow on-time delivery despite
systematic measurement errors embedded in calculations of labor time.
Time and Motion Studies
Time and motion studies were developed by Gilbreth and Gantt, both followers of
Taylor (Braverman 1974:173-78). They began with simple efficiency imperatives and
later transformed into standard procedures. The New-England-based Amoskeag mill—at
one point the world’s largest—was using time and motion studies by 1911 (Hareven
1982:138). Motion studies in U.S. textile and apparel manufacturing increased from 32%
in 1935 to 66% by 1946 (Baron, Dobbin and Jennings 1986:356). A more sophisticated
version of methods-time measurement (MTM) was developed in the 1940s by analyzing
workers through frames from 16-mm film. Today time and motion studies are used for a
huge variety of tasks and industries, including housecleaning (Ehrenreich 2001:74).
In India, participants report that most suppliers do not conduct time or motion
studies because they require training and other resources.222 Sachin, the industrial
engineering manager at IFS, tells me that before he arrived the previous manager set
targets based on his experience, “but nobody checked. He would tell management, ‘100
pieces per day.’ Management says, ‘ok, 100 pieces per day.’” Today, IFS and SFI rely on
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The International Labor Organization (1992) claims to provide some guidance in a
500-page maze, but I do not find it helpful and heard only one reference to the ILO in the
field.
222
At the opposite end of the quality and resource spectrum is the high-end luxury
Hermès brand, with most or all products completed by a single craftsperson who is likely
unsupervised. A single Kelly handbag reportedly takes 18 hours to complete (Stein
2014).
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time studies to calculate efficiency targets.223 Sachin performs sample studies as we walk
around the floor. We stand next to operators with a stopwatch as they complete particular
operations; engineers take an average of three cycles. We will hear much more about
efficiency monitoring and incentives later, but for now it is probably enough to repeat a
retired U.S. factory technician who tells me that “the most hated person in the company
was… the engineer, when he’d come out there with his clipboard and his stopwatch.”
Many other industrial sociologists have observed the social, educational, and task
cleavages between engineers and operators (e.g., Merton 1947:81-82, Roy 1954).
Standard Minute Values
Standard minute value is the most basic component of costing—a necessary input
for a host of formulas extending to capacity blocking and line balancing. Standard minute
value is the number of minutes it takes, according to a time-study budget of labor for
cumulative assembly operations, to produce an individual garment. It excludes
consideration of order sizes, operation difficulty, or stoppage allowances. We can think
of it as the time it would a chef to bake a cake on a TV show—professional training
completed, ovens preheated, ingredients waiting on the counter. Standard minute values
are determined by adding the temporal unit values of assembly unit operations. A typical
garment at ACE ranges between 20 operations for a simple tank top to 70 operations for a
women’s top with lace.224
Aggregate operations are identified with numerical codes: operation #43903, for
example, is to “mark and attach label.” The individual operations or component parts are
sorted into 11 categories, e.g., D for dispose, M for machine, C for cut thread. Operation
D1 is “dispose with one hand”; D3 is “dispose by sliding.” (There are also sub-categories
for operation movements: the category for “eye movement” includes “eye focus” and
“eye travel time.”) Each operation is measured in (partial) minutes (e.g., .45 minute = 27
seconds). Times for each operation are pre-determined through a time study database (see
below). To calculate standard minute values, an engineer will first create a sequence of
operations by closely examining the pre-production sample (Chapter 5). She will then
import a software code for each operation. Marina, a senior engineer at ACE, reports that
she has memorized the timings for most operations in her five years on the job. She is
adamant about “perfection in coding” with each step “organized according to a precise
sequence.” “We can always improve the handling of the operator,” she argues. “Why is
he doing [operation] L2 here? He can do L3 instead. He can save .5 seconds every time
he does this movement.” When she rattles off a sample process of 10 steps, the rhythm at
which she relays it sounds like a Missy Elliott rap song. Her claims to memorization are
223

Special processes do not have pre-determined time codes; instead they are self-timed
by an experienced worker (e.g., 10 minutes for beading and five minutes for checking).
224
One reason that jackets and dresses are more expensive than other garments is that
they contain a higher number of operations. A jacket for a value brand, for example, has
95 operations. The average standard minute value for knits at MEI is 14 minutes, but
more complicated designs or garments (e.g., dresses) can take up to 50 minutes.
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entirely believable. Figure 7 provides an outline of how to determine standard minute
values.
Figure 7: How to Determine Standard Minute Value (SMV)

Methodology based on scientific management
• Micro-movements measured in seconds via time study
• Aggregate into movement sub-categories
• Aggregate into 11 categories of movement via methods-time measurement
(MTM)
• Establish predetermined motion time system (PMTS, PTS, etc.)
• Combine movements of PMTS to create operation codes
Factory-level central engineering
• Determine operations bulletin (number and sequence of operations)
• Purchase PMTS software (e.g., general sewing data from Coats Global Services)
and import operation codes
• Alternative: basic time-and-motion study
Many companies offer formulas and software for calculating standard minute
values, but easily the most prominent in my fieldwork is “general sewing data” (GSD).225
Because this data is internationally accessible, Seher emphasizes, MEI must give
estimates to buyers that are close to the numbers from general sewing data: “any engineer
can tell the individual piece cost.” Like Marina, however, he acknowledges that
“estimates will be a little different from person to person—my number may be slightly
different than your number.” He expects two to five percent variation. We go through
some examples from his own work; indeed they differ by only a few seconds with an
average standard minute value of 14 minutes.
There are, however, a number of important factors that standard minute values do
not account for. As mentioned, they do not apply to special processes like embroidery.
They do not account for fabric durability—dresses are relatively more expensive than
pants, for instance, because operators need to be more careful not to tear delicate fabrics.
Operator skill matters too. Raju shows me an example of a jacket he is working on now:
the straight line down the sleeve can be done by a novice operator, he explains, but an
elastic sleeve needs to be sewn on the inside while the fabric is being stretched, so this
will require an expert. Most importantly, however much Anusha and other engineers
might wish that operators could work as robots, people continue to be subject to human
ontology. Planners and engineers address these aberrations by continually improving
their models of productivity, “adjusting men to machines” as neatly as possible (Bell
1947). It is a journey forcing square pegs into round holes.
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Information on the methods or funding sources that established GSD seems to require
separate historical research. Coats, the historic UK thread manufacturer, acquired it in
2015.
206

Buffering Standardized Times: The “Atomic Swerve” of Operations
There are a variety of formal and informal techniques that planners, production
managers, and even other engineers use to introduce slack (i.e., to relax the standards
imposed by central engineers). These are called “buffers.” Buffers introduce
redundancies in exchange for resilience; they are a means of planning for inefficiency.
Production managers on every kind of assembly line want a smooth, uninterrupted flow
of operations. The worst scenarios include line stoppages in capital-intensive
manufacturing. In the automotive industry, for instance, stoppages can cost as much as
$9,000 in revenue per minute (Adler et al. 1999:59). Although both automobiles and
apparel have transitioned toward lean manufacturing strategies which trim redundancy,
some buffering remains acceptable in practice (Spear and Bowen 1999:104-06).
As we introduce a series of six buffers below, three things are important to
remember. First, almost all deliveries make it on time (98% at MEI). Executives, product
managers, planners, and production managers all spend more time in “firefighting” mode
than they would like, but they get it done.226 Second, in keeping with scientific
management, engineers rely on an emotional strategy of hyper-rationalism. Slack is
viewed as a technical problem with a technical solution. In particular, I will argue that
standards always seem rational according to those who construct them but impractical to
those who deploy them.
Third, a linear conception of process flow holds among planners, engineers, and
production managers. Unlike designers, production managers very much want to avoid
surprises. Tongue-in-cheek, “a factory manager is a man who wants to make the same
style for twelve years in a row.”227 The linear conception holds despite the repeated
introduction of buffers. In philosophical terms, buffering represents atomic swerve—an
apology for general linear reality (cf. Abbott 1988c, Lucretius 1995). I land on the
metaphor of atomic swerve after a conversation with Mohit. When I ask him an industrial
engineer’s question about why her “scientific” standard cannot be achieved in practice
(see below), Mohit sighs and sinks back into his chair. This is clearly not the first time he
has answered it, but he does so patiently: “Even in physics,” he says, “we know that
things will not always go smoothly. If you take a ball and roll it across the table
(imitating the motion with a slow gesture), it will not go exactly in a straight line. It will
slow down, there will be friction. There is the force of inertia…”228 Let us therefore look
at these sources of friction and inertia in empirical terms.
The following sections introduce micro buffers first and move toward factorylevel strategies. Because of the serial nature of organizational routines, most staff are not
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These pressures are exacerbated by the consumer-driven demands of fast fashion
(Chapter 5).
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“In this area he competes with the sales manager who wants to make a new style every
fifteen minutes” (Bernstein 1974:94).
228
Merton (1940) uses many of the same physical metaphors in his analysis of
bureaucratic structure and personality,
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aware that previous buffers have been introduced. They believe that their buffer—and
only their buffer—is rational, reasonable, and necessary. The emphasis on rationality
decreases slightly with each move away from task design and toward actual production,
but it is consistently reintroduced. We begin our analysis by revisiting productionfriendly modifications (Chapter 3) to show how they reduce labor time. We then examine
the formal buffer of standard allowed minutes, the technique of line balancing, and
further semi-formal buffers that are introduced by factory planners and justified by
accountants.
Production-Friendly Order Analysis
ACE runs only a miniature version of central engineering with three staff
members. Their primary function, according to Marina, is to determine “productionfriendly” options which will not compromise quality. As with designers and product
developers, there are minor conflicts between sample tailors (interested in quality) and
central engineers (interested in efficiency). While tailors claim greater technical
expertise, Marina claims that “it is their job only to finish off the samples… not to see
how it can be simplified for production. They do not do any R&D.” The central artifact
that this miniature department produces is a “style analysis report” which supplements
the tech pack (of buyer instructions) with production-friendly guidance. Central engineers
will determine the correct seams to use in a garment, if work-aids (machine attachments)
can be used, or if there are any critical assembly operations that will need special
attention. These reports are especially important for “high fashion garments” like a dress
of chiffon fabric or a skirt with pleats.
Raju, the general manager of central engineering at a MEI unit, reports that the
biggest challenge in his work is a lack of detail from buyers. While some buyers send
detailed tech packs or offer comprehensive construction manuals (Chapter 3), others
provide sparse details. “Sometimes they will just send a photo,” Raju says, or fail to
consider a garment lining. Raju works with his team to infer necessary operations based
on a bill of materials, manuals from competing brands, or similar prior styles. While a
first-round estimate of the standard minute value can be enough for the initial costing of a
buyer meeting, engineers modify operations and internal estimates when they have more
information. Knowing that it is in the best interest of production managers to reduce labor
time, engineers like Raju and his colleague Seher introduce revisions to “reduce
operations without affecting the design.” Although Seher sometimes proposes changes to
buyers, his modus operandi it that “if I can do [a shortcut] without his [buyer] notice, I
will do it… they will not concern themselves with it.” He shows me an example he is
working on—a small neck seam stitch can be eliminated. Across the suppliers I studied,
participants claim there are some things that cannot change when reducing standard
minute values: quality, safety standards for machine times, minimum aesthetic standards
set by designers, and special requirements of the buyer. This is yet another area where
brand status matters. An accessible luxury brand, for example, demands strong but timeconsuming French seams as a “special requirement” for every order. Marina similarly
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reports that an accessible luxury brand has the highest technical standards of any buyer at
ACE.
Operator Cycle Times
At MEI, central engineers are provided with the resources to build a “customized”
estimate of general sewing data called an “operator cycle time.” Operator cycle time
involves video analysis (taken with a smartphone and analyzed with computer software)
of actual operators repeating the operations bulletin five or six times in a row, simulating
the “continuous” reality of the assembly line. “They should do 10 garments [to be more
accurate],” Anusha adds, “but [management] won’t give us the fabric.” Industrial
engineers analyze the operations with as much detail as an ethnomethodologist. In the
trials that I observe in the laboratory, Anusha gives instructions to an operator; she tests
me to see if I can tell the difference between the first and second trials. I fail. Anusha says
that in the first trial, the operator used only one hand to pick up the garment when starting
the operation; in the second trial he used both. Two hands are more efficient because they
improve coordination: “you will use two hands when cooking also,” she adds.
Operator cycle times add some slack (i.e., qualitative reality) to GSD codes. Still,
the observations of these times are based on the speed of “multi-skilled” rather than
average or novice operators. Skilled operators, spatially segregated from the production
floor, are infused with training and authority; they are also saved from the drudgery of
performing the same one-minute operation for a month straight.229 They correspond to
the lonely one out of eight men who could handle the “scientific” optimums as
determined by Taylor (1911:61-62). Indeed, Taylor tried to deliberately break up the
solidarity of work groups to focus on individual performance (1911:62-73). Thus, it is
more likely that these skilled operators are prone to the efficiency-inducing effects of
“social facilitation”230 than the delay-oriented “output restriction” games of regular
operators (cf. Burawoy 1979, Roethlisberger, Dickson and Wright [1939] 1949:255-69).
Anusha and her supervisor retain a blind spot to these factors insofar as they believe that
all operators are fungible.
Standard Allowed Minutes
Industrial engineers believe that they make respectful and reasonable
“allowances” for human bodies and the contingencies of production. Categories include
machine allowances (e.g., for breakdowns or more delicate fabrics), a personal allowance
(“going for a drink of water” or “answering nature’s call”), a fatigue allowance (a literal
Roy’s study of “banana time” (1959) is a masterpiece that shows how workers cope
with boredom.
230
There are hundreds of studies of social facilitation in group dynamics. One basic
finding is that the presence of others improves competitive performance on easy or
routine tasks, but diminishes performance for complex tasks (Zajonc 1965).
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recognition from Marina that humans “are not machines, even though I wish they
were!”), and a contingency allowance. Coats—the owner of the general sewing
database—purports to already include allowances in their estimates of standard minute
values. Nearly everyone I spend time with at different suppliers, however—in every
factory and in every relevant department—believes that this claim ranges from extremely
unlikely to absurd. At best, says the central engineering manager at MEI, general sewing
data is like “miles per gallon testing on a race track,” potentially achievable in an ideal
environment “but not on the work floor.” Central engineers at MEI add a standard 15%
allowance as a kind of confidence interval, transforming standard minute values or
operator cycle times into standard allowed minutes (SAM = labor time with allowances).
This number represents the budgeted labor time of all production operations. It undergoes
a series of further downstream relaxations and optimizations.
Line Balancing
We will learn the major organizational routines of assembly lines later, but they
operate on the principle of serial obligations. Each worker’s ability to complete his or her
task is dependent on completion of the prior task. This means that “when complex
organizations are finely integrated, at least in the technical sense of task allocation, overperformance is as disruptive as under-performance” (Moore 1969:867). Engineers seek a
smooth, uninterrupted flow in assembly line production by assigning equal time to task
cycles. Line balancing can be accomplished with two techniques. The more complicated
strategy is only a cognitive buffer, but it is based on the idea of equalizing cycle times;
engineers in India use the terms “pitch” or “takt” time (apparently from the German
Taktzeit—time or rate). Madhav, the industrial engineering floor manager at ACE,
describes it as “the mean [average] needed to balance each workstation [task].” Figure 8
shows an average of 48-second pitch times. He writes out a hypothetical example in my
notebook with the formula of standard allocated minutes divided by number of operators.
If the standard allocated minute of a style is 20 minutes and there are 10 operators on a
line, the pitch time is two minutes per operator. If there is a one-minute operation (as
previously calculated by central engineers), it will be combined with another operation to
approximate the two-minute pitch time as closely as possible.231 Visual aids help to
identify outliers and, in Madhav’s words, “give scope for better utilization of operations,
[showing] which operator needs to be allocated.”
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Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine report an industry norm of 60-second work cycles in
automobile manufacturing (1999:53). Similar times and techniques are reported with the
Toyota Production System (Spear and Bowen 1999:98-100).
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Figure 8: Pitch Times

Smaller factories are less likely to design pitch times ex ante. Still, they retain the
basic option to “restore flexibility to the mass production method” by rearranging or
reassigning operators (Hague and Newman 1952:14). Mohit explains that when a “low
capacity” or “underutilized” operator hits his target and produces an approximate twohour buffer, “we make him do some other operation for two hours, then he will return to
his own operation.” This strategy is an informal buffer known only to production
managers and line supervisors.
One final line balancing buffer to consider is the ability of line supervisors to
implement the ideals of line engineers. Merton (1947:84) long ago recognized that
workers are not the only ones to acknowledge the human vicissitudes of line supervisors.
As I spend time on the production floor with Mohit, I realize how much of central
engineering goals depend on supervisors as well as workers. Shivam points to differences
in education: supervisors are usually promoted from within the ranks of operators and
without a technical education. Mohit adds the following:
If supervisor is not good in line balancing, he will not be able to achieve his target
per day… If he is not hitting target, it will not be solved by just putting pressure
on him. This failure is due to some reason: he will have to understand and work
upon it. We [production managers] need to see where his line is suffering. There
may be a quality issue, a machine issue... He may not be thinking about it in the
right way [italics added]. Supervisor may say there is no scope of improving the
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line, but from the manager point of view we have to hit a higher target for this
style.
Anusha, too, occasionally reveals a patronizing attitude toward the supervisor figure:
“Every day his mind is like fridge,” she says. “I should not give pressure to my family.
Pressure is [already] there to meet the delivery. So we can help him out, improve the
efficiency, make a happy workplace.” Production managers often have close relationships
with line supervisors, but when managers consider booking efficiency estimates (below),
supervisors become yet another key variable in a complex and ultimately imprecise
formula.
Line supervisors and operators, for their part, both express some resistance to
balancing through the calculations of pitch time. For the line supervisor, Mohit says, “I
will also have to impart to him this line balancing concept, make him understand the
figures. It is a tool, a reasoning tool, to help him achieve his target.” Likewise, Madhav
reports that for operators, “we have to convince them.” He uses charts “to push the
operator, show [her] the numbers and the scope of improving output,” and to show her
that there is “still improvement to be done.” Using pitch times is a fairly severe form of
regulating labor time that seems effective in rooting out “quota games” that workers
might try to “engineer” on their own account (e.g., Roy 1952). At the macroorganizational level, however, a researcher from the International Labor Organization
presents evidence showing that time studies and line balancing effectively reduce
overtime hours (Rossi 2013:228). In future work I will investigate such dilemmas of
control, monitoring, and incentives on the assembly lines and from the perspective of
human resources.
Booking Efficiency
At the factory level, planners relax estimates from central engineering by
introducing what they feel is a more reasonable estimate of “booking efficiency.” Alok, a
factory manager at ACE, rates overall >60% efficiency as “good,” 50-60% as “average,”
and <30% as “poor.” Planners start at 80% of the operator cycle time that is budgeted by
central engineering. When I tell Anusha that I will go to factory planning in my next
rotation, she brightens with frustration. Why, she wants to know, is the engineering
estimate not taken up directly by planners (at 100%)? Operator cycle time already
includes allowances, she claims—mirroring the earlier claims of standard minute value.
Anusha asks me, very intently, to report back when I find an answer to her question. A
variety of reasons are available from planners and the production staff.
Booking efficiency increases with larger factories (layout and economies of
scale), more experienced staff and operators, fewer line resets (i.e., longer production
runs), and simple, consistent styles. Shivam, the central engineering manager at MEI,
replies to the impossibility of 100% efficiency:
We do not have specialized operations. Some factories will make only trousers,
trousers, trousers… That is why, you will see, China can give efficiency of 80%,
India will be 40%. Many buyers [complain], ‘why you are giving us such a high
[time estimate]?’ But… we cannot give unrealistic [estimates]. It hampers morale
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of the operators and the supervisors because they cannot finish… With too fast
[estimates], we also may need to go for airline shipping and we could lose
profit…
Bangladesh, as noted in Chapter 2, is another example of a country that remains costcompetitive partly because of its reliance on the production of single styles.
Further, because of differences in design, technical quality, and buyer
expectations, booking efficiency rates vary inversely with buyer status. Abdul provides
me with a comparison. First he shows me a grey, unfitted, screen-printed t-shirt from a
mid-tier brand. This is a “core,” “basic” design with an estimated 70% efficiency. “You
can always hit higher efficiency with this,” he says. The printing manager verifies it as an
“easy print with a single color.” (One MEI unit produces only crewneck t-shirts: they
average 90% efficiency.) The comparison is a “fashion” garment—a kid’s jacket for a
bridge brand. It has two colors, a hood, pockets, a waistband and wrist cuffs, a zipper,
and an embroidered logo. Here, the efficiency will be only around 50%. Once again, we
see real labor time differences between higher-tier fashion brands with identities and
lower-tier apparel brands as commodities.
Planners also reduce efficiency estimates from central engineering based on
feedback from factory and production managers. Mohit, like Alok and Shivam,
emphasizes country and factory variations: “GSD [general sewing data] codes say they
are universal, but who says they are universal? Each operator will vary in his time. Each
country will definitely be different… even in the same region… two factories should be
the same, but they will not be.” The result is that although “central planning will give a
tight plan... we give it back to them with buffer. We will anticipate obstacles in the
process.” When I push Mohit to ask if he will ever opt for a faster timeline, he laughs:
“We will never squeeze from them, there is no room! And they are squeezed on their side
too.” He feels he is allowed to add some slack in his capacity as a production manager,
but in the end he must give a “direct report” and “obtain approval” from the general
manager of production—“if there is some extra time, I will need to explain why.”
Downstream from both the hyper-rationalism of engineering and the rationalism of
planning, production managers are especially aware of both the human and technical
contingencies that make linear estimates difficult. A final ex post buffer considers the
financial implications of varied efficiency estimates.
Accounting Strategies
On one of my revisits to the product management department I ask division
manager Shantay about Raju’s practice of sending transparent standard minute value
estimates to the buyers (i.e., labor times that do not include allowances). “We cannot do
that!” she exclaims. In addition to the reasons explained above, she says there are
regional differences in factory unit costs which are not factored into buyer purchase
orders. “Here’s what we will do,” Shantay says slyly as she wiggles in her chair:
If the marketing person [here] is a little smart, they can play around with the
buyer. They will know which buyers you can manipulate. So what we do is, you
take [urban factory units] here, they are the most expensive factories. Factory cost
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will be higher than some rural factories. If it is a big order, we will not do it here,
we will send it to the other factory which has [open] capacity. But for costing, we
will give them [urban] rates. Like that, it will balance out the other costs.
Now that we know the fundamentals of both planning allocations and booking
efficiencies, we can understand that when Shantay says “it will balance out other costs,”
she is alluding to the fact that although rural factories have cheaper labor costs, they also
run at lower efficiency rates. If a factory is only running at 50% efficiency, a garment
with a standard minute value of 20 minutes will have a standard allowed minute value of
40 minutes, with this latter value as the one that should be sent to the buyers for costing.
When I put this tactic to Mohit, he agrees with Shantay:
Of course [marketing] will give the highest number. One factory is ₹4 [rupees],
one is ₹4.5, they will give ₹5.8, ₹6 [cost estimates to the buyer]… There is good
business reason to do that, you should make a profit… And you should not have a
loss. If some factory is slower, maybe order is in a new factory [with
inexperienced operators]…
Neither Shantay nor Mohit are naively assured by abstract general sewing data that
everything on the assembly lines will run according to the plan of central engineers.
One final question remains at the intersection of planning, booking efficiency, and
accounting: order sizes. If efficiency peaks between 30-100k pieces, why do larger order
size efficiency brackets exist? There is no task-based reason that fits the logic of
scientific management; there is no planning-based reason that can be accounted for by
economies of experience. There is only a financial reason wherein overheads are
amortized (i.e., mathematically distributed or parceled) across a greater number of pieces.
Here we must also consider overhead costs.232 This is the average budgeted cost to run
one minute of factory time, all things considered, averaged across every factory unit in
every region. As we have already seen, however, there are different opinions about how
the backstage costing process for overhead costs should be managed among engineers,
planners, accountants, and marketing staff.
These differences extend to how often overheads and base factory efficiency rates
should be calculated. I learn this through triangulation with various parties who are all
knowledgeable and invested in such questions. From a planner at MEI, I hear that factory
unit efficiency rates are “frozen” once per year for costing purposes even while they are
internally revised every three to six months for planning purposes. The accounting
department, meanwhile, audits budgets and actual costs from an internal “history of the
shop floor” on a quarterly basis across all departments. Finally Vikas, a general manager
of central engineering, tells me that efficiency calculations are ultimately “correlated with
buyer demand.” In our final interview I seek to understand this mysterious phrase.
Not too many years ago, he explains, there was a base factory efficiency rate
calculated by engineers and based on order brackets alone. (ACE still uses this system.)
Marketing staff, meanwhile, “may give a lower quote [to the buyer] so that they can book
the order” based on less efficient rural factory costs. If the planning department
determines that speed or skill matters for on-time delivery, however, actual costs for
urban factories may exceed projected costs for rural factories (i.e., losing money). “I can
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Also called a “base/set/global/common” cost.
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always fill my capacity,” Chandana says at one point, “that will never be an issue. But I
cannot fill my capacity at a loss.” These tensions cannot be solved by routines, relations,
or mathematics alone. For certain orders, Vikas says, “a merchandiser will call me
personally, and say ‘Vikas, please update the [booking] efficiency [rate] from 75% to
80%.’ If he will ask, I will say no.” Vikas prefers rational planning and costing which is
evenly applied; it minimizes conflict among planners and engineers. Marketing
managers, meanwhile, are generally more concerned about client satisfaction. If a
marketing manager disagrees with Vikas’ refusal to alter the efficiency rates to achieve a
lower cost, “then it will go to higher-ups for a special approval. If [the owner] tells me to
do it, I will do it… But there might be conditions [imposed]—maybe we can only give
this efficiency if the order will only be done” for certain simple styles or according to a
certain structural arrangement of assembly lines. In the end marketing managers retain
significant internal bargaining power. They gain strategic leverage from both continued
buyer orders and financial leverage through sly surcharges. They cannot, however, ignore
the guardrails of engineering, planning, and accounting.
In the above sections I have identified half a dozen formal, semi-formal, and
informal buffers beyond standard minute values—the international calculation of labor
time which already purports to include allowances. The slack of “atomic swerve” begins
with supply-side order analysis that simplifies and optimizes operations bulletins. These
changes are designed to escape the notice of buyers and designers. Beyond this, engineers
at MEI feel that standard minute values are unattainable; they create ergonomic
movement patterns to shave off seconds or even partial seconds from standard minute
values. When they use video analysis to simulate continuous production, they believe
they are replacing an irrational standard with a rational one that is marginally
“individualized” and less formulaic. Still, the fact of employing multi-skilled operators
prone to social facilitation effects escapes them. Another layer is introduced with
standard allowed minutes, accounting in principle for machine, personal, fatigue, and
contingency allowances.
Given the serial organization of assembly line operations, these tasks lines require
yet another buffer. Engineers structure operator cycles according to pitch times, roughly
equalizing how long each operator will spend on their operations. Higher-order line
balancing depends on supervisor and worker understanding and engagement, constituting
yet another an informal buffer that will be discussed in other work. Planners, despite the
frustration of hyper-rational industrial engineers, create their own estimates of booking
efficiency. They feel that these estimates, in accounting for differences in factory size,
worker/supervisor skill, and (brand) styles, produce more reasonable expectations for
production. Even these estimates are walked back by factory and production managers,
who yet again argue that they do not account for the predictable contingencies of
sourcing delays, production bottlenecks, and operator attendance. On the back end,
marketing staff and accountants employ mathematical techniques to arbitrage rural and
urban factory costs with different booking efficiencies. There is some room to adjust
estimates of operating costs, but the buck stops (usually) if an order will be produced at a
loss.
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Central Engineering Summary
As much as owners and industrial engineers want operators to be robots, human
ontology is resilient. The major coping mechanism, from the management perspective, is
benevolent optimization, a win-win dynamic designed to make workers “happy” and to
reduce injuries and absenteeism. We will continue to develop this framing in other work.
The goal for engineers and production managers in the meantime is the smooth,
uninterrupted flow of assembly lines. It is accomplished by first standardizing time and
movement and then by buffering standardized times.
Time and motion studies were developed by Taylor’s followers and deployed
soon after in the textile and apparel industries. Although they are still not widely used
across Indian production, they are prevalent at suppliers that supervise workers within
large and medium-sized factory units. These suppliers begin with international estimates
of standard minute values in the form of general sewing data. Although standard minute
values purport to include allowances, no one in my fieldwork finds this plausible.
Recognizing the “atomic swerve” of production, managers and workers respond by
introducing slack. Within industrial engineering proper this includes (1) productionfriendly order analysis to simplify designs under the radar of buyers and designers, (2)
operator cycle times to introduce some qualitative reality to hyper-rational models of time
and motion, (3) allowances for bodies and machines, (4) line balancing techniques, (5)
booking efficiency estimates introduced by planners, and (6) accounting strategies that
allow some flexibility in costing while simultaneously establishing guardrails to avoid
operating at a loss.
The fact that each of these buffers is layered is particularly significant233—
participants are largely unaware that previous buffers have already been introduced. We
can draw two conclusions from these findings. Fist, they illustrate the stark difference
between estimates of labor time and cost that are derived from scientific management and
estimates that are derived from pragmatism. Taylor’s texts reveal his refusal to engage
with conventional sociality; he is a hero only for executives, engineers, and Ayn Rand.
His experiments severely limit scope conditions and ignore the fact that seven out of
eight workers could not meet scientific “standards.” Second, the layering of buffers
demonstrates a dialectic whereby standards always appear rational in the abstracted
moment of quantification and almost insulting to those responsible for moving those
standards toward praxis. My argument is not simply that standards appear the most
rational to those furthest from labor itself (cf. Attewell 1990, Black 2000, Fuchs 2001b).
It is that standards are re-imposed as rational and achievable across each layer of
buffering. Alternative explanations for this dynamic are available in theories of
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I am underestimating the layers involved because of limited data from supervisors and
operators. Some of this is covered in the next chapter; some was not methodologically
feasible to gather because of identity, language, and skill gaps (i.e., my failure in learning
how to sew). I still feel comfortable, however, imputing further buffers of social,
economic, and phenomenological slowdowns that have been documented over decades of
research in industrial sociology and industrial relations.
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bureaucracy or (neo)-institutionalism, among others. Methodological and theoretical
emergence, however, is the clearest when considering both the behavioral-economic
funnel of Carnegie administrative theory and the vitalism of Chicago-style ethnography.
Chapter Summary
The rise of the factory system, along with the professionalization of management
and engineering, displaced ideals of craftsmanship. Emboldened by philosophies like
scientific management, engineers removed the responsibility for task optimization from
workers, assigning it instead to planners isolated from the churn of routine operations.
There have long been competing assessments of how a rigid division of labor affects
managers and workers, but scholars from different traditions share an interest in ethical
contours in the organization of work. Hughes provides some of the most colorful and
compelling arguments that the division of labor is always a moral division of labor,
indirectly inspiring my study of the relationship between rationality and exploitation.
Central planning has a slow and careful pace matched only by the staff in
documentation. It is dominated by men who seek, using their flow charts and calculators,
to “freeze” orders through capacity blocking. They configure nominations, negotiate with
marketing staff and buying agencies, and adapt to seasonal variations. They re-plan 1020% of orders because of various contingencies (yet another form of slack). Planners
subcontract to cope with excess demand and to take advantage of flexible specialization;
this also offers the historical fringe benefit of curbing union agitation. Internal allocations
are based on capabilities and structural optimization.
Central engineering is primarily concerned with efficiency. Engineers begin in the
R&D lab, compromising between the Taylorist ideal of robots and the human relations
apology for embodiment. Planning for ergonomic movements improves efficiency—both
in raw times and by reducing injuries—and encourages the smooth functioning of
assembly lines. The measurement of standardized times and micro-movements can be
extremely detailed. It is always walked back from an experimental ideal of pure
“scientific” efficiency, however, by including allowances for machines and human needs.
A series of a layered buffers demonstrates the iterative failures of quantification and the
need to introduce an “atomic swerve” that logically preserves the linear expectations of
planners, engineers, production managers, and line supervisors. Research across multiple
paradigms of political economy ignores the pragmatic strategies involved in calculating
the “process costs” of labor time; it remains content with the abstractions of a simple
number that is basically imposed by powerful buyers. In many contexts this shorthand is
appropriate, but it cannot be extended to first-tier suppliers. Costing is not only an upfront
negotiation (Chapter 4), but a formula that is further subject to backstage slack and the
strategies of multiple supplier departments (e.g., accounting). Recognizing the strategies
and resources of first-tier suppliers provides a bulwark against the ideology of unique
capabilities.
As we move forward, we may note that planners and engineers are partly
responsible for a task design that encourages attrition. They have been “cleared” in the
moral division of labor, as Hughes, Merton, Abbott, and others have argued, on account
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of strong professional standards and an abstract logic of rationality. A more direct
argument, inspired by Jackall’s study of middle management (1988), is that they are
cleared because attrition, absenteeism, and motivation are someone else’s problem.
Future work will analyze the responsibilities, evasions, and compromises of other internal
and external stakeholders.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
This dissertation began with a call for multi-level analysis. Levels are analytical
constructions; there is no end to which ones we might continue to add. Perhaps it will be
useful to look back at a few of the levels I have employed, briefly noting their limitations
and questioning what should be pursued further.
Arguably the most important limitation of my analysis is its focus on a single
industry. This is not a unique problem for GVC analysis (Sturgeon 2009). Industries have
stubbornly varied characteristics, as the disciplines of international economics, strategy,
and economic sociology have long recognized. Fashion is the classic case of a demanddriven industry. There are low barriers to entry, including capital requirements and
technology. Indeed, many commentators argue that the introduction of the sewing
machine in the mid-1800s remains the core technological input. On its face, this stands in
stark contrast to the oil or automobile industries. Updating automotive assembly lines, for
example, can require hundreds of millions of dollars in annual investments; producers are
the ones making the big decisions.
One of the most promising new angles for identifying analytical similarities
among different industries begins with the sociological microfoundations of political
economy—especially of capitalism. Beckert (2013, 2016, 2020) names credit,
commodification, creativity, and competition as its pillars, building a more general
paradigm that attempts to explain the emergence of markets through meaning and
interaction. Oil, automobiles, apparel, and many other industries—extending to children’s
insurance, for example (Zelizer 1981)—are all intensely reliant on this system of
meanings and expectations about the future. If we could synthesize Beckert’s more
cognitive vision with research on organizational routines and Collins’ framework of
micro-to-macro interaction ritual chains, we might gain a stronger intellectual grip on the
durability and contingency of capitalist institutions. Each set of scholarship at least
begins with the premise that a better understanding of action will lead to a better
understanding of structure.
The challenge of scaling up is a long-term theoretical challenge which remains
relatively inefficient compared to a nested or multi-level analysis (Layder 2006).
Integration simply cannot be done with any empirical heft and avoidance of blind spots
unless there is prior substantive knowledge of particular phenomena at independent
levels. Time and collective effort are the only solutions; below we can consider a few
important targets for future research. Following Sturgeon, we might think of them as
modular or substantive “building blocks” toward the understanding of the apparel
industry first and, eventually, toward the modification of general action theory.
The comparative-institutionalist dimensions of Indian national policy and U.S.-led
import restrictions may be an important precursor for the rise of highly competent
suppliers like ACE and MEI. Some of this is covered in Chapter 2, but it would be
helpful to know more about both the historical context of export-oriented
industrialization and how quotas played out in practice. Unreported data, for example,
suggests that despite the fragmentation of textile and apparel firms supported by Nehru’s
policies, initial advantages in firm size were compounded through the extra-legal
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practices of selling quota allocation. The “markets as politics” framework (Fligstein
1996) may help to explain these initial advantages in a way that is compatible with the
promising sociological microfoundations that my research aligns with. Comparisons on
regional and national sourcing arrangements would also help to contextualize India
against its major competitors: Bangladesh, China, and Vietnam.
Corporate social responsibility is another large area which deserves further
analysis. This should include both methodologically positive and negative actions—i.e.,
enforceable criteria and evasions or noncompliance. Unreported data suggests that in
addition to learning sourcing and design practices, suppliers are learning from Western
brands about how to decouple policies from practices. Most Indian suppliers (like most
export brands) are fiercely anti-union. With increasing scrutiny from non-governmental
organizations and social movements, however, large suppliers are modifying their antiunion organizing tactics to present a more acceptable “front.” While stories of physical
abuse against campaigners remain common in India, the reputations of medium and large
factories are today becoming valuable intangible assets. Corruption continues, but we
should not underestimate the sophistication of supplier tactics, including the cooptation of
non-governmental organizations. Environmental sustainability compliance appears
similarly uneven, including the selective quantification of results from “showcase” units
and the exclusion of older units and subcontractors. Brand obsessions with quantification
are producing some socially conscious results, but they are also stimulating the dubious
“upgrading” of accounting practices at suppliers.
While my research on industrial engineering covers planning and task design, the
data presented here does not extend to assembly line workers. Additional unreported data
includes lengthy examples of further engineering, including assembly line setup, operator
grading, and efficiency monitoring and incentives. The academic framing for such data is
complicated by a split between labor process theory and worker resistance in sociological
journals, on the one hand, and human resource studies with dedicated “managerial
implications” in organizational journals. There are many reasons for insularity in both
camps, but it creates a blind spot for what Prechel (1994) calls the “managerial labor
process.” There are plenty of assumptions about managerial motivations and practices,
but critical empirical analysis is severely undernourished. Even if this requires a pseudopositivist “test” of Braverman’s deskilling hypothesis—Braverman of course used
Taylor’s writings on scientific management as a source of historical intellectual
evidence—it certainly seems worth pursuing. Perhaps the Carnegie School revival (e.g.,
Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal et al. 2012) will create theoretical space to ask new questions,
but the institutional divide between business schools and social science departments in
the U.S. looms large.234 As with my thesis of unique capabilities, I think the existing
theoretical climate promotes a bifurcated way of thinking about managerial work that
obscures behavioral analysis.
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They are decidedly less pronounced in Europe, motivated by (a) the anti-positivist
legacy of continental philosophy and (b) a reward system among business schools that
recognizes status differences among sociological journals (see generally Akerlof 2020,
Sauder and Espeland 2009).
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My own analysis is of course limited by a lack of data from assembly line
operators. I do not speak any of the dozens of regional languages that operators bring to
factory units; trial interviews through a translator were awkward and unproductive. While
some of the limitations of ethnographic positionality can be mitigated, the compounded
status differentials of U.S. citizenship, English language, white skin, and male privilege
methodologically challenging. I was also inept at learning how to sew; it took me three
days to completely abandon some initial hopes. Ethnographic investment also depends on
the goals of an ethnography—whether it is anthropologically “total” or sociologically
“analytic” (Bosk 2003). I of course set up a research design centering organizational
routines, most of which are extremely limited for operators. Because managerial tasks
contain more discretion—including task design itself—they are generally a better place to
study decision-making. They are a different, though certainly not a “better,” place to
study power. The home lives and resistance strategies of assembly line operators seem to
vary in myriad ways if one is willing to look for them (e.g., Attewell 1990, Lee 1998,
Salzinger 2003). How operators make their own choices about fashion is a particularly
interesting topic for future investigation. The contrast between highly controlled work
and expressions of personal identity is an intriguing point of departure for sociological
and anthropological investigations bridging work and identity (e.g., Crane 2000, Hareven
and Langenbach 1978, Hewamanne 2008). They extend to language distinctions as well
as questions of national and postcolonial identity in a varied of offshore industries (e.g.,
Nadeem 2009, Radhakrishnan 2007).
Consumption is clearly a separate project, but links through GVCs and political
economy are available. Whether we turn to trend forecasters, buying agencies, financial
institutions, retailers, interactive service workers, journalists, museum curators, or a host
of divisions among consumers, there is no shortage of possible connections. Coming full
circle with Durkheim, I will continue to argue that only by deep methodological
investment in the semi-peripheries of geography and theory can we understand how we
become more individualized even as we are increasingly and inextricably linked to
society.
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APPENDIX: FASHION RETAIL SEGMENTATION
Differentiation is an important cognitive and structural aspect of competition in
any industry. Full information is never operational, however (Simon 1997); markets and
firms are understood instead through their strategies, profiles, or productive niches
(White 2002). Common strategies, in Porter’s framework (1980), include cost leadership
(e.g., Walmart), product or service differentiation through a brand premium (e.g.,
Nordstrom), or focus on a specific product, feature, or client (e.g., specialty fits from
Bonobos). Segments or “strategic groups” follow a similar strategy within an industry.
An industry as a whole can have a concentrated or fragmented structure (measured by
relative concentration in market share). Apparel is fragmented. A large product
assortment, erratic sales, small economies of scale, and high “creative content” are some
of the structural reasons for fragmentation (Porter 1980:196-200, White 1981:539-40).
Fashion markets have historically been organized around different principles,
including patronage, professionalism, and retail structures (e.g., mail order versus
department stores). Since probably the 1960s, I argue that brands are the primary
mechanism of differentiation in the status market of fashion (Aspers 2008, 2010b:15-26,
Godart 2012:111-22).235 A status market is governed by consumers who rank brands and
products according to intangible identity criteria like reputation and status (e.g., Kapferer
2012). Status is useful when objective quality targets are obscure (Podolny 1993,
Voronov, De Clercq and Hinings 2013). The status market of fashion, echoing its
debatable origins in European courts (Parmal 2006), is usually represented as a pyramid
(Doeringer and Crean 2006:358). Conceptualizing fashion retail as a system of
hierarchical segments does not directly support or contradict models of fashion as
collective behavior; that is a separate topic.236 A status market is opposed to a standard
market, governed by business-to-business exchange, where supply-oriented participants
are sorted by commodity criteria like utility, price, or on-time delivery.
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Aspers and Godart (2013a) co-piloted the first Annual Review article on fashion. Both
are inspired by the work of Harrison White. Economists and management scholars will
also recognize the intellectual contribution of Spence (1973) in what follows.
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The classic “trickle-down” model of fashion, for example, applies to innovation and
diffusion as a phenomenon of consumption (cf. Blumer 1969a, Simmel 1904, Veblen
1899/20072007) rather than one of market structure. Brands in higher segments do have
a trickle-down influence, as I will show, but the segmentation used here is first and
foremost about perceptions of value. The relationship between buyers and customers is
also debatable and an interesting topic for future research (see Entwistle 2006:718-21),
but again, within the scope of this dissertation buyers serve as the chief representative of
a brand and the client (end customer) for most suppliers and agencies. My research
certainly challenges Bourdieu’s 1970s contention that production and consumption are
homologous.
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The Fashion Pyramid: A General Model of Retail Segmentation
Brand status is important for hundreds of decisions at dozens of steps along the
GVC. Indeed, a major “subplot” of this dissertation argues that brand status is indeed
correlated with quality. Figure 9 depicts a model of industry segments, built on reputation
and social representation. Non-exhaustive inputs include price, competitive positioning,
exclusivity, and (in the case of haute couture) French law. The model is constructed in
consultation with key informants in the US, Europe, and India, favoring the perspectives
of retail and customer analytics. I will use it throughout the dissertation to specify the
field position of buyer accounts. Table 5 names pyramid segments and offers alternative
segment titles and brand examples.
Figure 9: The Fashion Pyramid

Table 5: Industry Segments in the Fashion Retail Market

SEGMENT
Haute Couture (ultra luxury)
High-end (true) luxury
Accessible (affordable) luxury
Bridge (better, diffusion)
Mid-tier (specialty)

BRANDS AND CHANNELS
Armani Privé, Schiaparelli, Ralph &
Russo
Neimans, Saks, Selfridges, Gucci, Chanel,
Giorgio Armani
Nordstrom, Diesel, Emporio Armani,
Coach, Ralph Lauren, Alo
Macy’s, DKNY, Banana Republic, Zara,
A|X, Lululemon
M&S, Gap, Levi’s, Van Heusen, Uniqlo,
Hollister, Nike, Victoria’s Secret
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Value (mass market)
Discount (off-price)
Unorganized (independent, secondary,
tertiary)

Target, Kohls, JCPenney, Old Navy,
H&M, Liz Claiborne
Walmart, Ross, TJ Maxx, Burlington
Formal or informal street markets

There are a few specific issues to consider as I advance this model:
(1) The model includes retail channels as well as brands. This is because
department stores, as institutions with economies of scale, are more familiar to
consumers. While John Varvatos as a designer might not be familiar to consumers, John
Varvatos is sold at Nordstrom. By the same token I have excluded online-only retailers.
Zappos, ASOS, or Yoox Net-a-Porter will be familiar to fashionistas, but traditional
retailers who have moved into omni-channel retailing still dominate sales, page views,
and familiarity (see Bazilian 2017). Though 80% of apparel sales are still through brickand-mortar channels (Sporn and Tuttle 2018), Amazon’s entry into fashion suggests
disruption (see the section on private labels below). Scholarly updates will be required.
(2) Economists and economic sociologists typically consider fashion as a
positional or relational good that signals status distinctions (Bourdieu 1984b, Frank 2000,
Veblen 1899/20072007). The model offers homologous categorical distinctions based on
strategic and conventional market positioning, boundary maintenance by industry
tastemakers, and consumer lifestyle. Categories are ideal-typical; in practice they
constitute a spectrum. Both retailers and designer brands can cross segments through
corporate strategies including retail formats, allocation, diffusion lines and other moves
(e.g., Macy’s, discussed below). A department store sometimes represents a single
segment with clarity—Barney’s, for example, in high-end luxury.237 The typical customer
is described to me by Rosemary, a senior sales manager in the segment: “She’s spending
$50-60,000 a season on clothes. It’s the one percent. But… You can’t depend on the one
percent. You need, the two and the three percenters too, and they come in, uh, when we
go on sale and it’s 30 or 40% off.” Where to Rosemary the difference between the one
percent and the two percent is meaningful, a segmentation model like the one I employ is
designed to cover a fuller spectrum with parsimony.
(3) Department stores and brands can change segments over time, but segments
are useful. Segment positioning or critical acclaim (e.g., Lacroix) does not guarantee
survival. The status of channels and brands can move up, move down, expand in both
directions, restructure through mergers and acquisitions, go through bankruptcy, or be
resuscitated 50 years after death (e.g., Schiaparelli). Liz Claiborne, an early mover in
outsourcing at the bridge brand level (Collins 2003, Lardner 1988a, b), has repeatedly
moved into lower segments and today sells at JCPenney and on the television network
QVC (see also Siggelkow 2001). The model thus suggests durability without
permanence. It should change over time to reflect changes in industry conditions and
brand status, perhaps adding or removing some segments altogether.
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Attolini, a lesser-known Madison Avenue retailer of high-end luxury suits, is
reportedly sustained by 200 customers who spend about $8 million per year (Stein 2014).
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I must note upfront that many scholars and industry personnel, following the logic
of sociology or personal experience, do not believe that retail segments and brand
marketing reflects material differences or quality (e.g., Collins 2003:43). Definitions of
value, utility, quality, etc. are contested in fashion as in many other fields. These are
analytical concepts, of course, long debated in philosophy (e.g., Bentham 1823/2003,
Hume 1757/1995). They are useless, however, without content (Kant 1787/1965[1787]
1965:A51/B75). Sociologists usually evade independent judgments of quality, treating
social representations as the object of analysis. Sociology is often hostile to marketing or
public relations because their express purpose is the manipulation of public opinion
(Herman and Chomsky 1988, Jackall 1988:162-90). Failing to consider marketing as a
legitimate influence on social reality sometimes dismisses its influence altogether,
however, creating intellectual distortions in value, utility, and quality assessments that are
not shared by consumers. Stone (1954), Molotch (2003), and Benzecry (2008) avoid such
traps by seriously considering aesthetics and actual consumers.238
Alternative consumer-based models include demographic, behavioral, stylistic, or
ideal-type segmentations.239 Demographic segmentation typically considers gender, age,
income, region, etc. (e.g., Coresight Research 2018a). Behavioral segmentation, typically
measured through customer loyalty programs, tracks purchasing behaviors including
frequency and division exposure (e.g., purchases of both women’s and children’s
apparel). Stylistic segmentation is usually trend or collection-based. At the most basic
level, at any given time style categories will feature something romantic/retro/ethnic,
something tailored, something casual/basic, and something sporty/futurist (adapted from
Lantz 2016:92, 197). Trend forecasters and retailers can create complex stylistic “maps”
(similar to those which appear in musicology) which can then be “layered” onto
demographics and consumer behavior.240 Finally, buyers and designers construct social
representations of an ideal customer (Schulz 2008). For example, as a designer stops to
feel one last garment on the way out of an ACE buyer meeting he comments, “the thing I
don’t like about this is the texture, it’s very scratchy. She doesn’t like scratchy,” referring
to the ideal customer. Similar statements appear during the discussion of buyer selections
later in this chapter. After these preliminary considerations that promote classification but
caution against reification, we are now in a position to explore the content of individual
238

Escaping the manipulation of consciousness is pervasive even in pre-Parmenidean
philosophy; I seek to challenge endoxa in only in one small domain. Interested readers
are referred to Zukin and Maguire on the sociology of consumption (2004), Eyerman
(1981) on false consciousness in Marxist theory, and Bourdieu (1990) or Moscovici
(1984, 2001) on the contingent validity of personalist social representations within an
objective classificatory schema.
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There are also attempts to classify retailers as according to store format (e.g., big box
versus specialty) or as “lead firms” with specific regimes of production and distribution
(e.g., Clodfelter 2018:52-59, Gereffi 2005:171). These arrangements, however, are less
descriptive as suppliers improve and retailers hollow out their productive capabilities (see
also Gereffi 2014). They miss much of the variation that is offered by brands.
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For sketches see Aspers (2008:190) on fashion or Lena and Peterson (2008) on music.
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segments. Haute couture—the beginning of a designer-led system of fashion—is the
natural place to begin.
Haute Couture to Discount
Haute couture is a legal classification maintained by a French professional
group—the Chambre Syndicale—and the French Chamber of Commerce (see generally
Grumbach 2006, Kinmonth 2007). The occupational mandate for individualized
designers arose in the mid-19th century under an expanding aegis of artistic license.
Although the haute couture segment is sometimes called a super-luxury or ultra-luxury
segment, it is not simply a synonym for “luxury” or “designer” clothing (contra
Doeringer and Crean 2006:358). Instead, a maximum order quantity of one garment is
designed by the head of a couture house and fitted to an individual client. The allure of
haute couture is sustained by history, generally Parisian locality, and exclusivity. Godart
(2014a:41) estimates that there are fewer than 1,000 haute couture clients worldwide.
High-end luxury brands and retailers work hard to maintain their exclusivity
through pricing, distribution, and maintenance of intangibles, especially heritage and
provenance (Kapferer 2012). Because of an expanded audience, however, I argue that
marketing is more important for high-end luxury brands than those in haute couture. The
critical view of intangibles is that they are “false” sources of monopoly rent maintained
through structural and interpersonal closure (the logic of Bourdieu 1984b, Lamont 1992,
Lamont and Molnár 2002). From a brand perspective, however, boundary maintenance is
a strategic marketing imperative. When the CEO of Barney’s New York spoke at a
Wharton panel in 2014, he acknowledged Saks and Neiman’s s competitors but audibly
scoffed when an audience member suggested the inclusion of Bloomingdale’s. Rosemary,
a senior sales manager at a high-end luxury department store whom I interviewed, agrees
with the CEO. With the assurance of confidentiality, however, she complains about
extensive brand control of visual merchandising. One well-known high-end luxury firm
“is a very difficult company to do business with,” she says as she drops to a whisper.
“The stipulations are so, uh, written in stone. There’s no negotiation with them…” The
head of the design house has control over “every, single, thing, that he designs.” For this
reason, “the big retailers are careful to follow [the brand’s] expectations… If you’re not
going along with what they want… they can pull you in a minute, you know? They can
pull you in one minute.”241 High-end luxury department stores offer sales income to their
brands, however, and can legitimize a new designer brand in ways that few other retail
channels can do (see Entwistle 2006 for a study of buyers at Selfridges). A final note,
taking us back to the intangible of provenance, is due for production in this segment.
While some experts like Kapferer argue that production should resist offshoring or indeed
re-shore to Western fashion capitals, many Western firms have in fact moved a
241

There are exceptions. According to Rosemary, a different high-end luxury designer
“could give a damn, unless you have a boutique, where you put the merchandise as long
as you sell it.”
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significant proportion of production to China, Turkey, Egypt, or India (Galloni,
Rohwedder and Agins 2005). These shifts are 30 or 40 years behind value buyers, but
they are unlikely to change direction without significant changes in trade agreements.
The accessible luxury segment is dominated by “contemporary” design. Where
high-end luxury is often organized by conglomerates like Kering and LVMH, individual
investors and founders (e.g., Andrew Rosen or Vince Camuto) are currently prominent in
the accessible luxury segment. Accessible luxury brands capitalize on some of the same
strategies used by high-end luxury brands but spend less on product development and
production, concomitantly embracing lower price points. Diffusion can begin from the
top down: Prada, for example, owns lower-priced Prada Sport and Miu Miu. At the
accessible luxury level consumers can still expect a range to be designed by the head of a
design house (e.g., Emporio Armani). At the same time, lower-segment product selection
can be offered in high-end luxury stores, blurring strict segmentation; some Armani
stores carry EA-7, just as some Hugo Boss locations offer Boss Orange. From the lower
end as well, brands can add more exclusive lines to their product assortment, like Diesel’s
“Black Gold” or Ralph Lauren’s “Purple Label.” Such collections lift the prestige of main
brand lines.242
Bridge brands occupy a “bridge” between accessible luxury and mid-tier
offerings. “Better” or “better dress” has perhaps gone out of fashion as a segment label:
while it makes occasional appearances in earlier scholarly literature (Siggelkow 2001,
Uzzi 1996, 1997), none of my study participants understand what the word signifies. At
any rate, most participants view bridge brands as the home for diffusion labels which for
the first time are aimed at a mass audience. As with accessible luxury diffusions of highend luxury brands, bridge brand extensions seek to capitalize on the prestige of the main
designer line but produce garments at a lower price point. One marketing formula
continues to include designer names—Zak Zak Posen, Jill Jill Stuart, Marc Marc Jacobs.
Lower price points can lead to overexposure, however, which damages main brands in
higher segments (see Gehring 2015 on Tommy Hilfiger). Armani Exchange is now called
A|X for this reason (Godart 2012:118-19).243 What distinguishes the bridge segment from
mid-tier offerings is qualitative judgment about “aspiration,” in the words of a customer
analyst who works across segments. For Emily, the following is the way to think through
it:
[It is] the customer lens of like, to them is this, I mean I think of an Abercrombie
as more mid-tier. Just because the bridge customer is more that aspiring customer.
Like it’s their gateway to going up the scale. Because that’s kind of how we
would target things.
A label is also called a “range.” “Collection” sometimes refers to a product label,
especially in India, but Western industry participants more often use “collection” to refer
to a seasonally-timed release.
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The extent of consumer knowledge about designers, however, may be questioned.
DKNY, the bridge diffusion line of Donna Karan, generates 80% of the group’s revenue.
The chairman of LVMH (which formerly owned Donna Karan) reports that he “knows
for a fact that most people who buy DKNY did not even know it was [designed] by
Donna Karan” (Friedman and Bernstein 2015).
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Such aspirations are partially imagined, but they can be empirically tracked through
longitudinal purchasing behavior: do customer purchases change as customers age?
Aspiration is the easiest to measure when a company owns retail channels in multiple
tiers. Gap, for example, owns Banana Republic in the bridge segment, Gap and Athleta in
mid-tier, and Old Navy in value.
Placing Zara and Macy’s together in the bridge segment aroused the most debate
among the key informants whom I asked for feedback. Some feel that fast fashion (at
Zara) is necessarily a mid-tier or value strategy, although this ignores the risks of luxury
design and signals like prices and visual merchandising.244 In my opinion it is rather
Macy’s which most troubles the segmentation model. Macy’s is imprinted with a century
of consolidation in family-owned department stores across America (see Stinchcombe
1965/1986). It deliberately tries to reach across market segments: “They want to hit topto-bottom,” according to Emily. On the higher end,
The strategy internally is you want to offer something for that higher-end
customer in the markets where it matters [i.e., competitive markets]. So anywhere
that there’s flagship locations, you know [Herald Square in] New York, you’ll see
they have, um, they have product that’s high-end, designer, that’s within the
store… The [customer] can still shop within the retail foot space.
Indeed, Macy’s Herald Square rents floor space to high-end luxury brands like Gucci and
Burberry. The same cannot be said of the Macy’s in my hometown of Madison,
Wisconsin. Entwistle (2009:146) similarly notes edgier allocations to the Oxford Street
flagship store of Selfridges in London compared to the semi-peripheral Manchester or
Birmingham. In both high-level strategy and lower-level allocations, then, retailers may
deliberate ignore niche segmentation models and favor a generalist approach instead.
All the participants I questioned agreed that Gap is the prototypical mid-tier or
specialty store, offering quality basics: “the plain shirts, the stripes, they’ve got some
plaid over there,” says a bored blogger. It is especially respected by the Indian
participants I interviewed, sometimes seen as a premium or aspirational brand. Like
Levi’s, Gap has a more prestigious reputation in India than it does in the US. The reverse
is true for Nike and adidas. Such variation is to be expected from new exposure to
international markets (Lantz 2016:163-95). Although academic debates typically sideline
consumption, most participants in my study believe that brand reputations will stabilize
with the steady march of globalized marketing (cf. Klein 2002a, Levitt 1983, Ritzer
2003). Although American and European brands dominate global retail, Indian
participants point to Japanese brands like Uniqlo and Muji as serious competitors to Gap.
Returning to the concept of aspiration, Emily believes that mid-tier brands,
[Are] providing what is, like, a good brand experience to certain type a customer,
but [the customers] not trying to keep themselves moving up that ladder… Maybe
you know of other brands in like Middle America, they’re like, ‘I’ve made it, I got
good stuff, like, this is the best I’m going to have.’”
“Middle America” or “Nebraska” signal contentedness in fashion (Mears 2011b:158),
There is conceptual confusion about “fast fashion” in academia that does not extend to
the retail world and should be dispelled. I discuss fast fashion as a product management
strategy in Chapter 5.
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connected as they are to an “honest” agricultural/manufacturing lifestyle in which “social
climbers” are disliked (Broughton 2015, Lamont 1992:26-27).
In addition to bridge segment competition, a mid-tier retailer that straddles the
value segment faces additional competition from the lower end. Although this is a
vulnerable strategic position (Porter 1980:41-44), retailers can compensate with
sophisticated allocation strategies, investments in technology and logistics, and a
variation of location or “access-based positioning” (Abernathy et al. 1999, Alcácer 2006,
Porter 1996). Macy’s, for example, is a “straddler” that also seeks to compete on the
lower end, especially through the Macy’s Backstage store format. As Emily explains, “in
a lot of stores it is in the same physical retail space. But then there are freestanding
locations in the markets where it makes sense, where there are a lot of TJ Maxx,
Marshall’s, Ross” nearby. Sales executives may decide that “we want this customer—like
the low value [customer]—so we’re going to make sure [Backstage] goes to the markets
where they see a higher penetration of that behavior, for like more clearance shoppers.”
JCPenney is also well-known among industry experts for its experiments and eventual
dependence on discounting (see for example Gereffi 1999:46, as well as more recent
CEO dramas). At the same time, Macy’s, JCPenney, and Kohl’s are increasingly
embracing fast fashion (learning from the more profitable Zara and H&M). According to
Rosemary, value brand H&M sells to a “younger customer. Honestly,” she says, “I think
they buy throwaway clothes, a lot of these girls…” To Rosemary and other participants
whom I shopped with, H&M represents one-season, throwaway garments. In the words
of two bloggers on shop-a-longs, “Price isn’t that big a deal… Their clothes designs are
ok, but their quality isn’t all that great. If I just need a pair of khaki pants that I know I’ll
be like doing whatever [short-term thing] in, I’ll go to H&M… I can never have enough
pants!”
Target is at the upper end of value segment, successfully increasing their prestige
with designer collaborations in recent years (e.g., Lilly Pulitzer, Missoni, Phillip Lim).
Similar “big buyers” in the value and discount segments, including Kmart in discount,
were the first movers in offshoring a large proportion of apparel production in the 1970s
(Gereffi 1999:61). At the lower end, Kmart had an initial cost advantage against Sears but
later suffered against the more differentiated and fashionable Walmart (Porter 1985:23),
which straddles the value and discount segments.245 Today Walmart and Target are the
two largest importers in the US (Braden 2017). Walmart alone accounts for 11.2% of
goods imports from China (Scott 2015) and supplied a full 25% of the US apparel market
in the early 2000s (Rivoli 2005:149).
The discount segment emphasizes utility rather than luxury, aspiration, or
quality/specialty basics. Discounts, of course, are relative. Saks, Nordstrom’s, and
Macy’s, for example, all operate independent discount store formats. TJ Maxx, on the
other hand, specializes in a double-edged motion of buying excess inventory from other
retailers and discounting it. In recent years (as in the early 1990s before the expansion of
specialty retail), TJ Maxx and Burlington have seen dramatic gains in market share
against mid-tier and value retailers. They operate with lower overheads by avoiding
245

Primark, headquartered in Dublin, is now using a similar strategy to compete against
Walmart.
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product development, accepting smaller profit margins, hiring fewer staff, and assigning
less attention to visual merchandising.
Secondary and tertiary segments could be split depending on research purposes.
Rivoli (2005:175-210), for example, describes the travel of a t-shirt from the Salvation
Army—the US almost 40% global market share of used clothing exports—to East Africa,
where it is again sorted according to the principles of a status market and re-sold. Other
studies, especially by anthropologists, explore second-hand retail in post-Soviet countries
(Gerasimova and Chuikina 2009, Pachenkov 2011) or other locations (Palmer and Clark
2005). Such discussions by definition exclude production, focusing instead on allocation,
retail, and consumption (see for example Yükseker 2007 on illegal distribution). Apart
from any particular segment, finally, is the increasingly popular strategy of private labels.
Private Labels
Private labels are probably most familiar to consumers as supermarket or
pharmacy “off brands,” “store brands,” or “house brands”; these are the underpriced
competitors to Cheerio’s, Kleenex, and Band-Aids. Private labeling is essentially a
retailing innovation which allows retailers to compete directly with featured brands by
providing a moderately more accessible collection, often but not always focusing on
basic items (e.g., dress shirts). Visible in every segment except the very top and bottom, it
is profitable because it cuts out the middleman (Gereffi 1999:46). It also provides an
exclusive offering to department store customers. Private labels name are sometimes
linked to retailers directly (e.g., Saks Fifth Avenue Men’s Collection), other times
indirectly (I. N. C. International Concepts for Macy’s), and other times not at all (Arizona
at JCPenney). Private labels for major fashion retailers reportedly generate 10-30% of
sales (Edwards 2015).246 They are as yet a very small percentage for Amazon, which
owns eight private labels, but product offerings are expanding.247 The growth of private
labels will be an important area for future researchers to watch. As buying agencies and
suppliers enter retailing for themselves (Edwards 2015), they can build on existing
production experience (“linkages”) to attack existing industry leaders (see Porter 1985,
especially pp. 513-536). Some of the suppliers I studied are developing private labels,
although aggressiveness varies.
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In the more scientific beauty and cosmetic product offerings, the vice president of a
private label firm claims that “80 percent of the products that you see in department
stores we’ve created for brands” (McIntyre 2017).
247
Of the top 500 items in all major men’s and women’s product categories, Amazon
items account for an estimated 0.1%. Nike is the leader with about 2% of listings
(Coresight Research 2018b).
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